Statewide County CA Archives History - Books .....American Invasion 1891
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Book Title: Memorial And Biographical History Of Northern California

AMERICAN INVASION.

  In historic events like that of the taking of Sonoma and the hoisting of the
bear flag, we naturally expect to find some continuity of antecedent causes
leading up to the occurrence. But that great event stands out, in bold relief, a
conspicuous exception to the rule. Like Topsy, who averred "I was not born'd—I
jes growed up," the Bear Flag party seemed to be laboring under equal perplexity
as to their origin and ultimate destiny. The happy outcome of their venture can
be compressed into the single sentence, "All is well that ends well." Search and
sift history as we may there can be found no authentic connection between the
little band of adventurers and any responsible United States authority. There
has been a great deal said and written upon the subject that inclines the casual
reader of history to believe that the taking of Sonoma was but the first act in
a well matured plan which was to ultimate in placing California under the stars
and stripes of the United States; but we find nothing to warrant such
conclusion. The majority of the Bear Flag party were frontiersmen with more
nerve than education, and to believe them capable of carrying out to a
successful conclusion the secret orders of the United Slates Government
authorities, and never after disclosing the same, would be too great a tax upon
even extreme credulity. It is true that General Fremont had been in California
for some time, ostensibly at the head of a scientific expedition, but with a
force at his back ample to render secure his travels while here, but till now it
has never been revealed that he was clothed by the government that he
represented with any powers of a revolutionary diameter. While his attitude had
been defiant of California authority and his hoisting of the American flag on
Gabilan Peak, almost in sight of the California capital, a bold affront to
Castro, California's military chieftain, yet there is no evidence, as yet, that
his acts were other than the effervescence of an individual disposed to magnify
the importance of his mission. The effects of Fremont's acts were two-fold. The
Californians believing him to be acting under instructions from his government,
naturally believed that he was here for the purpose of fomenting a revolutionary
spirit among foreigners resident here, and they were more disposed than ever to
enforce the laws prohibitory of indiscriminate immigration. The American
settlers finding themselves more and more the objects of suspicion by the
California authorities, naturally took it for granted that as Fremont had been
the instrument of inciting the authorities to a more rigid enforcement against
them of existing immigration laws, he knew what he was about, and would stand by
them if trouble came.

  Aside from the fact that all knew that war was imminent between the United
States and Mexico, California was rent and torn by internal discord. The
Territorial government had ever been, at best, a weak one, but during the past
decade it had gone from bad to worse, until chaos seemed to brood over the
Territory from Sonoma to San Diego. The government was divided; one part being
administered from Los Angeles and the other from Monterey, and each wing in open
revolt against the authority of the other. In the very teeth of a threatened
danger from without, Governor Pio Pico at Los Angeles and General Castro at
Monterey were seemingly only intent on each other's overthrow. The action of
Fremont, already referred to, in flaunting the stars and stripes upon Gabilan
Peak seems to have brought General Castro to something like a correct
appreciation of the fact that there was great need of unification and effort
among California authorities. This he tried to impress upon Pico in the south,
but the suspicious governor saw fit to construe the efforts of Castro to get the
military upon a defensive basis, into a menace to himself; and the people of the
entire South seemed to be in entire accord with him on the subject. In truth,
the people of the lower and upper portion of the Territory seem to have been as
completely estranged and soured against each other as if their origin had been
from distinct races. Hence, was witnessed the pitiful endeavor of Pio Pico to
gather together a force sufficient to proceed to Monterey for the purpose of
subjugating Castro, at the very time the latter was equally intent upon
gathering a force to meet what he conceived to be a great danger on the northern
frontier. To California, the early mouths of 1846 seems to have been a dark
period to all fruitful of junto meetings and dark-room cabals, when all were
suspicious of each other, and it seemed politic for no man to let his right hand
know what his left hand was doing.

  "While this condition of doubt and uncertainty was unmistakably true as
related to the Californians, it was only less true, in a modified degree, as
related to the Americans then resident here. While they were united in heart and
sentiment, they were completely out at sea without chart or compass, in the face
of a brewing storm. If Fremont's action in Monterey County had encouraged them
to believe that he had authority to raise the standard of revolution in
California, that belief must have received a chill when he, a few weeks later,
with his sixty men started northward to Oregon, with the avowed purpose of
returning East by that route. That this was not a strategic movement on his part
is evidenced by letters he wrote at the time both to his wife and his
father-in-law, Hon. Thomas H. Benton.

  Thomas O. Larkin was the secret and confidential agent of the United States
Government in California and he certainly had no commission to do anything in
the direction of encouraging the raising of the standard of revolt in
California. Fremont's conduct seems to have been to him a complete enigma.
Larkin's instructions were to feel the pulse of Californians as well as
Americans in reference to peaceable annexation to the United States, and any
demonstration on the part of the Americans in the direction of violence and
force could but complicate and render more difficult his task. He had sagacity
enough to understand this, and seems to have directed all his energies in the
direction of a peaceable solution of the problem he was to assist in working
out. It must be borne in mind that Thomas O. Larkin had long been a resident
merchant in California and that his intimate connection and association with the
leading men of California, both natives and foreigners, peculiarly fitted him
for this labor of paving the way for peaceable annexation of California to the
United States. But that he was not taken into all the secret councils of the
nation is manifest from the instructions of Hon. George Bancroft, then the
Secretary of War under President Polk, under date of June 24,1845, nearly a year
before war was declared between the United States and Mexico. The Secretary's
instructions to Commodore Sloat were:

  "If yon ascertain that Mexico has declared war against the United States, you
will at once possess yourself of the port of San Francisco, and occupy such
other ports as your force may permit. Yon will be careful to preserve, if
possible, the most friendly relations with the inhabitants, and encourage them
to adopt a course of neutrality."

  On the 13th of May, 1846, war was declared. On that very day Secretary
Bancroft again instructed Commodore Sloat to carry out his first orders "with
energy and promptitude." Only two days later we find Secretary Bancroft writing
the following instructions to Commodore Sloat: "A connection between California
and Mexico is supposed scarcely to exist. You will, as opportunity offers,
conciliate the confidence of the people of California. You will conduct yourself
in such a manner as will render your occupation of the country a benefit," etc.
In a dispatch dated June 8th, 1846, the American Secretary comes out a little
plainer. He says: "If California separates herself from our enemy, the central
Government of Mexico, and establishes a government of its own under the auspices
of the American flag, you will take such measures as will best promote the
attachment of the people of California to the United States. You will bear in
mind that this country desires to find in California a friend; to be connected
with it by near ties; to hold possession of it," etc. On July 12 he speaks still
plainer: "The object of the United States has reference to ultimate peace, and
if at that peace the basis of the 'uti possidetis' shall be adopted, the
Government expects to be in possession of California."

  While the instructions to Larkin seem to have been of an entirely [sic]
pacific and diplomatic character, it is quite evident that the authorities at
Washington did not intend to allow the formalities of red tape to stand in the
way of the acquisition of California.

  There were two men on the northern frontier, both occupying commanding
positions, and each destined to fill a conspicuous place in the history of those
stirring times. One was General M. G. Vallejo, and the other Captain John A.
Sutter. At this time, when California was nearing her final struggle with
manifest destiny, it is important to know just how and where they stood. Much
has been said and written on the subject, so much that it has become confusing
and difficult to always determine where history ends and fiction begins. Vallejo
and Slitter both were officers of the California government and as such owed
good faith and allegiance to their country. We find nothing to warrant the
conclusion that either proved recreant to their trust.

  Vallejo evidently had a very strong premonition that California had reached
the beginning of the end. So believing, he evidently had little heart or concern
about the personal quarrels of Pico, Castro and other factions would-be leaders
of California. When called into council on the alarming condition of the times,
he was free to express his opinions, and so far as reliable evidence goes, it
was always to the effect that if it came to the worst and a change of government
had to be made, it was to the United States that California could look for the
strongest arm of protection and speedy development of her latent resources.
While those were his sentiments expressed in council with his countrymen, he in
no wise seems to have abandoned hope that California might yet be safely steered
through her dangers. This is evidenced by two circumstances. Governor Pico
addressed a letter to Vallejo, probably in April, in which he chided him
somewhat sharply for his apparent adhesion to Castro, the every act of whom Pico
seemed to regard as dangerous usurpation of military power, the ultimate aim of
which was the overthrow of the civil government. Vallejo's reply to Pico was
both temperate and patriotic. He did not hesitate to admonish Pico that he was
allowing his jealousy to befog his better judgment—that Castro was making an
effort to properly face a real danger, and he warned Pico that the time had come
when unity of action was imperative if California would continue to exist in her
present form. He pointed out to the Governor the folly of expecting a general in
the face of a threatened danger, to wait for the transmission of orders such a
long distance as intervened between Los Angeles and Monterey. These wise and
temperate counsels of Vallejo seem to have been wasted upon Pico, for he appears
to have gone forward in his endeavor to marshal a sufficient force to march to
Monterey and overthrow Castro. The second circumstance which shows that Vallejo
had not yet lost all hope is the fact that early in June Castro visited Sonoma
on his mission of gathering war supplies, and secured a large number of horses.
Of these horses more will be said a little further on. Of what occurred between
Vallejo and Castro at that time there seems to be little of record. Intelligent
reflection draws two conclusions somewhat difficult to harmonize. That a matter
of 170 horses was furnished by Vallejo to Castro would clearly indicate that the
former was willing to contribute liberally toward the common defense, for Castro
lacked the power, if he had the will, to exact from Vallejo forced
contributions. The next question to harmonize with a cheerful desire of Vallejo
to heartily second Castro's seeming patriotic efforts is, why was it that Sonoma
with an armament of nine cannons of various caliber, and at least two hundred
muskets, was not brought into requisition in a time of such great peril? It was
to the east and north that Castro was looking for lurking danger, and if that
General and Vallejo were working together in perfect accord, it seems little
short of amazing that Sonoma was left to repose in sleepy security without a
cannon shotted or a musket in hand or sentinel to signal the alarm of an
approaching foe.

  Of Captain John A. Sutter little in this connection need be said. Being a
citizen by naturalization, his position was different from that of Vallejo. It
is true he was holding position under the California government, but his
attachment to the country of his adoption never seems to have outweighed his own
personal objects and aims in business. But even he is not chargeable with having
been guilty of gross perfidy to the land that had given him wealth and honor.
This is evidenced by the two-fold fact that he took pains to warn the government
at Monterey that a man named Gillespie, who had been at Monterey and was then
following Fremont north, was a secret emissary of the United States. At the same
time, and with possibly a less patriotic motive, he again called the attention
of the California government to the importance of strengthening itself in the
Sacramento Valley, and for that purpose offered to sell his establishments at
New Helvetia. This, on his part, was business, simon pure, and should not be
allowed to counterbalance too much of the good deeds and kind offices of that
historic pioneer to the weary travel-worn American immigrants, so many of whom
enjoyed his benefactions. Sutter was a man of pretty good common sense and was
not blind to the fact that California was liable to be in an eruptive state at
any moment; and, like Mieawber, was "just waiting for something to turn up."

   It was now in early May of 1846, and General Fremont, with his sixty
explorers, was well on his way northward, having pitched camp on the shores of
Klamath Lake. General Castro, doubtless elated at having achieved a bloodless
victory in taking the abandoned fort of Fremont on Gabilan Peak, was now seeking
new fields of glory. Pio Pico was yet in the south intent upon marshaling a
sufficient force to warrant him in visiting the northern end of the Territory of
which he was governor. Consul Larkin was inditing confidential epistles to all
such as to whom he thought could be entrusted the secret and work of peaceable
annexation of California to the United States. General M. G. Vallejo was in
quiet repose at Sonoma, apparently having converted his sword into a plowshare,
his spear into a pruning hook, and his martial field-glasses into a medium
through which to watch his herds and flocks upon a thousand hills. Captain John
A. Sutter was looking after his fields of waving grain at Hawk Farm, doubtless
anticipating a paying harvest, for the incoming immigration expected from over
the mountains was variously estimated at from'l,000 to 5,000 souls. The hills
and valleys of this genial clime were doubtless clad in verdure and flowers; and
yet the very air was oppressive with the forecast of revolution and sanguinary
strife.

  A new Richmond, with closed visor, had now appeared upon the field. He
answered to the plain name of Archibald H. Gillespie, and had reached Monterey
the 17th of April. Larkin had already received a letter from James Buchanan, the
then Secretary of State, informing him that, "Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie,
of the marine corps, will immediately proceed to Monterey, and will probably
reach you before this dispatch. He is a gentleman in whom the President reposes
entire confidence. He has seen these instructions, and will co-operate as a
confidential agent with you in carrying them into execution." Gillespie was a
month behind time in reaching Monterey in consequence of unavoidable delays in
Mexico. That his dispatches to Larkin were of a very important and secret
character is evidenced by the fact that lest they might fall into Mexican hands,
Gillespie had memorized them and then destroyed the paper upon which they were
written. On reaching Monterey he was plain Mr. Gillespie, an American merchant,
traveling for the benefit of his health. He was also the bearer of a letter of
introduction from Hon. Thomas H. Benton to his son-in-law, General Fremont, as
well as a package of private letters from the same distinguished statesman to
the "Pathfinder." After lingering a little at Monterey, doubtless to give color
to his assumed character, Lieutenant Gillespie one night embarked for New
Helvetia, and arriving there at once began to arrange for an escort to accompany
him on the trail of Fremont. It was then, as already stated, that Captain Sutter
conveyed to the authorities at Monterey his suspicion that Gillespie was a
secret emissary of the United States Government. Lieutenant Gillespie made all
haste northward. Historian Bancroft gives the following graphic account of this
journey and the tragic occurrences attending it:

  This officer, of whose arrival I will have more to say presently, had reached
Sutter's April 28th, and Lassen's the 1st of May. From that point, with only
five companions, Lassen, Neal, Sigler, Stepp and a negro servant named Ben, he
started May 2, on Fremont's trail. On the 7th two men were sent in advance, and
the others encamped at the outlet of Klamath Lake, unable to ford the river, and
having nothing to eat for forty hours. On the morning of the 9th a party of
Indians made their appearance, who, with great apparent kindness, gave the
travelers a fresh salmon for food, and ferried them over the water in canoes.
After a day's journey of some thirty miles, Gillespie met Fremont at sunset, at
a stream named from the events of that night, Ambuscade Creek. The sixteen tired
travelers retired early after the two parties were united on May 9th, and were
soon sleeping soundly—Fremont sitting up later than the rest to read his
dispatches and letters from home. The Indians were deemed friendly, and no watch
was kept. Just before midnight the camp was attacked by savages, Basil
Lajeunesse and a Delaware were killed as they slept, by blows from axes. The
sound of these blows aroused Carson and Owens, who gave the alarm; when the
Indians fled, after killing with their arrows a Delaware named Crane, and
leaving dead a chief of their number, who proved to be the very man from whom
Gillespie had that morning been furnished with food and aid further south. Next
morning they started northward to join the main body, burying the bodies of
their slain comrades on the way. The whole party started on the 11th down the
eastern side of the lake, wreaking terrible vengeance on the innocent natives
along the route, if we may credit the statement of Kit Carson, who played a
leading part in the butcheries. They reached Lassen's rancho on their return the
24th, and a few days later moved their camp down to the Buttes.

  This awakens the reflection that the greatest of human events are subject to
the modifying influence of currents and cross-currents; for had the Indians who
made that midnight attack been successful in their evident design to massacre
all in that unguarded camp, it is more than probable that the Bear Flag
revolution would never have formed a chapter of California history. Mr. Bancroft
expresses the opinion that Gillespie's meeting with Fremont had nothing to do
with the latter's return northward—that "the Captain had nearly determined, on
account of the difficulty of crossing the mountains into Oregon on account of
the snow," to retrace his steps. We dissent from this view of the subject. If
Gillespie was only the bearer of instructions to Fremont couched in the same
language of diplomacy as that used by Secretary Buchanan in imparting to Larkin
the duties devolved upon him by the President, then the continued presence of
Fremont could have served no good end. In truth, his continued presence would be
detrimental to the very object Larkin was expected to achieve. Gillespie must
have had full knowledge of what Fremont had done at Gabilan Peak, and as he was
the duly accredited secret agent of the United States government it is but
reasonable to suppose that he would have at least some advisory influence with
Fremont. Then, again, Fremont and Larkin were occupying entirely different
positions, and it is quite probable that while the latter was expected only to
use the weapons of diplomacy, the former may have been accorded discretionary
power, if circumstances seemed to warrant, to use more weighty arguments. But
outside of all this it must be remembered that Gillespie had placed in Fremont's
hands letters from Hon. Thomas H. Benton. The latter was just as near to the
war-making power as was James Buchanan, and he was under no trammel to measure
his words with red tape. While he was not in a position to give Fremont either
instructions or orders, it is fair to presume that he would intimate to the
husband of his favorite daughter the true condition of affairs and impress upon
him the importance of holding himself in readiness to improve any opportunites,
such as were liable to suddenly arise, for preferment and position. To believe
that Fremont had any serious intention of leaving California just at a time when
he must have known that right here and then he was upon the very eve of the
fruition of Benton's most ardent expectation, would be to impute to him a lack
of regard for name and fame singularly at variance with reputed character of
either himself or Mr. Benton.

  But we now put behind us matters speculative and enter upon the domain of
thrilling facts. During Fremont's absence north there were all kinds of wild
rumors afloat, and they lost nothing as they passed from mouth to mouth.
Castro's war preparations had been magnified into an expressed purpose on his
part to drive the American settlers out of the country. It was rumored and so
believed, that the Indians of the Sacramento Valley were being incited to an
uprising, and that as soon as the grain fields were far enough advanced to be
combustible, the torch would be applied. Captain Sutter seems to have given
credence to these stories, for he was on an active Indian campaign against some
of the lawless tribes. Fremont had moved camp from the Buttes to Bear River,
near where Nicholas now stands. It was but natural that his camp should become
the head centre, around which the hopes and expectations of his
fellow-countrymen should cluster. The settlers knew that Gillespie was acting
upon some authority of the United States government, and his swift haste
northward after Fremont, and the latter's equally speedy return, had to them a
significance that they were close to exciting times. There is nothing of record
to show that General Fremont either counseled action, or quiet, on the part of
American settlers. He seems to have been a passive listener to the recital of
their plans and grievances, but somehow, the most unlettered of those
frontiersmen, gathered from his very silence, assent that he would stand between
them and harm. The people were ripe for revolution and the favored chance to
strike the first blow opportunely came.

  As has already been stated, General Castros' visit to General Vallejo in the
first week of June resulted in his securing 170 horses. Having achieved this
much toward placing himself upon a stable war footing, Castro returned by boat
to Yerba Buena, entrusting the horses to the care and management of his private
secretary, Francisco Arce, Lieutenant Jose Maria Alviso and an escort of eight
men, for safe conduct to Santa Clara. Leaving Sonoma with the band of horses,
they reached what is now Knight's Landing, on the Sacramento River, where a
crossing was effected, and on June 8th they reached Sutter's Fort. It is alleged
that Arce told some one on his route that the horses were for Castro, and to be
used in driving the American settlers out; but this was probably idle rumor. But
whether true or not, it served to intensify the excitement, which was now at
about white heat. On the afternoon of June 9th, eleven or twelve Americans
started on the trail of Arce and Alviso and their band of horses. These men are
said to have started from the neighborhood of Fremont's camp, and a man named
Hensley is the authority that they were sent by Fremont; but this lacks the
evidence that should back a historic fact. In passing New Helvetia, this company
was increased by two new recruits. Ezekiel Merritt commanded the expedition. 
Of its members, Semple, Henry L. Ford and Granville P. Swift, afterward for long
years a resident of Sonoma County, are the only names known with certainty.
Crossing the American River late in the evening, they made their first stop at
the rancho of Allen Montgomery, who not only furnished them a supper, but he,
with another man, accompanied them to lend a hand at striking this first blow of
revolution. Arce and Alviso had stopped for the night at the rancho of Murphy,
using his corral for their horses. Merritt and his men camped within three miles
of the place, and at early dawn, on the morning of the ever-memorable 10th of
June, 1846, swooped down upon the unsuspecting Arce and Alviso, and in a trice
had them and their men disarmed. That Merritt and his men were not heartless
desperadoes is apparent from the fact that they allowed the vanquished to retain
each a horse, and recognized Alviso's claim to a few more as private property;
after which their arms were restored to them and they were made the bearers of a
message to Castro, that if he wanted his horses he could come after them. Arce
also reported to Castro that the insurgents had declared their purpose to take
Sonoma. This declaration of their intent was a subject of official announcement
at Monterey two days before Sonoma was captured, which proves that Arce and
Alviso had not falsely reported the utterance of Merritt and his followers. The
revolutionists, with their band of horses, were back to the neighborhood of
Fremont's camp within forty-eight hours after they set out on their mission.
While there seems to have been no preconcerted action on the part of the
American settlers in this high-handed act, they all seemed to have assented to
the fact that the bridges had been burned behind them, and all they had to do
now was to "fight it out on that line if it took them all summer."

  It was the 11th of June that Merritt and his followers returned with Castro's
horses. They seem to have acted on the principle of "making hay while the sun
shines," for on that afternoon the company was increased to twenty men, still
led by Ezekiel Merritt, who took their departure in the direction of Sonoma.
That night they readied Gordon's, on Cache Creek, where they halted for
refreshments, and then made a night inarch to Napa Valley, which they reached on
the forenoon of June 12th. In Napa Valley they remained two days, evidently for
the purpose of strengthening their force, which they did by the enrollment of
twelve or thirteen additional men. The force now numbered either thirty-two or
thirty-three, who, so far as is now ascertainable, responded to the following
names: Ezekiel Merritt, William B. Ide, John Grigsby, Robert Semple, H. L. Ford,
William Todd, William Fallon, William Knight, William Hargrave, Sam Kelsey, G.
P. Swift, Sam Gibson, W. W. Scott, Benjamin Dewell, Thomas Cowie, William B.
Elliott, Thomas Knight, Horace Sanders, Henry Booker, Dav. Hudson, John Sears,
and most of the following: J. H. Kelly, C. C. Griffith, Harvey Porterfield, John
Scott, Ira Stebbins, Marion Wise, Ferguson, Peter Storm, Pat. McChristian,
Bartlett Vines, Fowler, John Gibbs, Andrew Kelsey and Benjamin Kelsey. It was
about midnight of Saturday, the 13th of June, that this motley crowd of
frontiersmen took to saddle and proceeded across the hills intervening between
Napa Valley and the Pueblo of Sonoma. Just at break of day they reached that
fortified stronghold of Northern California, and neither baying of watch-dog nor
cackling of goose aroused the sleeping Sonomans to a sense of impending danger.
Every reader will expect to hear, in detail, exactly what transpired on that
memorable occasion. Bancroft has in his possession many of the original
documents connected with that event, or authenticated copies. He is certainly in
a position to give as near the absolute facts in connection therewith as will
ever be attainable, as very many of the participants in the capture of Sonoma
are now dead. We have had from General Vallejo's own lips a statement of the
individual part he played in the event, and it is substantially the same as
recited by Mr. Bancroft. Believing that historian Bancroft gives a true and
reliable version of the whole occurrence, we incorporate it here. It is as follows:

  At daylight Vallejo was aroused by a noise, and on looking out saw that his
house was surrounded by armed men. This state of things was sufficiently
alarming in itself, and all the more so by reason of the uncouth and even
ferocious aspect of the strangers. Says Semple: Almost the whole party was
dressed in leather hunting-shirts, many of them very greasy; taking the whole
party together, they were about as rough a looking set of men as one could well
imagine. It is not to be wondered at that any one would feel some dread in
falling into their hands. And Vallejo himself declares that there was by no
means such a uniformity of dress as a greasy hunting-shirt for each man would
imply. Vallejo's wile was even more alarmed than her husband, whom she begged to
escape by a hack door, but who, deeming such a course undignified as well as
impracticable, hastily dressed, ordered the front door opened, and met the
intruders as they entered his sala, demanding who was their chief and what their
business. Not much progress in explanation was made at first, though it soon
became apparent that the Colonel, while he was to consider himself a prisoner,
was not in danger of any personal violence. Lieutenant-Colonel Prudon and
Captain Salvador Vallejo entered the room a few minutes later, attracted by the
noise, or possibly were arrested at their houses and brought there; at any rate,
they were put under arrest like the Colonel. Jacob P. Leese was sent for to
serve as interpreter, after which mutual explanations progressed more favorably.

  Early in the ensuing negotiations between prisoners and filibusters, it became
apparent that the latter had neither acknowledged leader nor regular plan of
operations beyond the seizure of government property and of the officers. Some
were acting, as in the capture of Arce's horses, merely with a view to obtain
arms, animals, and hostage—to bring about hostilities, and at the same time to
deprive the foe of his resources; others believed themselves to have undertaken
a revolution, in which the steps to be immediately taken were a formal
declaration of independence and the election of officers, Merritt being regarded
rather as a guide than captain. All seemed to agree, however, that they were
acting under Fremont's orders, and this to the prisoners was the most assuring
feature in the case. Vallejo had for some time favored the annexation of
California to the United States. He had expected and often predicted a movement
to that end. There is no foundation for the suspicion that the taking of Sonoma
and his own capture were planned by himself, in collusion with the filibuster
chiefs, with a view to evade responsibility; yet it is certain that he had
little, if any, objection to an enforced arrest by officers of the United States
as a means of escaping from the delicacy of his position as a Mexican officer.
Accordingly, being assured that the insurgents were acting under Fremont, he
submitted to arrest, gave up keys to public property, and entered upon
negotiations with a view to obtain guarantees of protection for non-combatants.

  The guarantees sought were then drawn up in writing and signed by the
respective parties. The originals of those documents are in my possession, and
are given in a note.

  The following are the documents referred to by Mr. Bancroft:

                              SONOMA, June 14, 1846.

  Be it known by these presents, that, having been surprised by a numerous armed
force which took me prisoner, with the chief and officers belonging to the
garrison of this place that the said force took possession of, having found it
absolutely defenseless, myself as well as the undersigned officers pledge our
word of honor that, being under the guarantees of prisoners of war, we will not
take up arms for or against the said armed forces, from which we have received
the present intimation, and a signed writing which guarantees our lives,
families, and property, and those of all the residents of this jurisdiction, so
long as we make no opposition.

                              M. G. VALLEJO,
                              VICTOR PRUDON,
                              SALVADOR VALLEJO.

  We, the undersigned, have resolved to establish a government upon republican
principles, in connection with others of our fellow-citizens, and having taken
up arms to support it, we have taken three Mexican officers as prisoners,
General M. G. Vallejo, Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Prudon, and Captain D. Salvador
Vallejo, having formed and published to the world no regular plan of government,
feel it our duty to say it is not our intention to take or injure any person who
is not found in opposition to the cause, nor will we take or destroy the
property of private individuals further than is necessary for our support.

                                             EZEKIEL MERRITT,
                                             R. SEMPLE,
                                             WILLIAM FALLON,
                                             SAMUEL KELSEY.

  Mr. Bancroft, continuing, says:

  It was naturally to be expected, under the circumstances, that the arrested
officers would be released on parole. Such was evidently the view taken on both
sides at first. Ford says there were some who favored such a course. Leese, who
had the best opportunities for understanding the matter, and who gives a more
detailed account than any other writer, tells us that such a decision was
reached; and finally, the documents which I have presented, Nos. 1 and 2, being
to all intents and purposes regular parole papers, leave no doubt upon the
subject. But now difficulties arose, respecting some phase of which there is
contradictory testimony.

  Thus far only a few of the insurgent leaders had entered, or at least remained
in, the house; and the negotiations had in reality been conducted by Semple and
Leese very much in their own way. Ide testifies that Merritt, Semple and Wm.
Knight, the latter accompanying the expedition merely as an interpreter, were
the first to enter the house, while the rest waited outside; that presently,
hearing nothing, they became impatient, determined to choose a captain, and
elected John Grigsby, who thereupon went in; and after waiting what appeared an
age, the men again lost patience and called upon the writer, Ide, to go and
investigate the causes of delay. Now the discrepancies in testimony begin. Ide
describes the state of things which met his view as follows: "The General's
generous spirits gave proof of his usual hospitality, as the richest wines and
brandies sparkled in the glasses, and those who had thus unceremoniously met
soon became merry companions; more especially the merry visitors. There sat Dr.
S., just modifying along string of articles of capitulation. There sat Merritt,
his head fallen; there sat Knight, no longer able to interpret; and there sat
the new-made captain, as mute as the seat he sat upon. The bottles had well-nigh
vanquished the captors!" Leese also states that the brandy was a potent factor
in that morning's event; but according to his version, it was on the company
outside that its influence was exerted, rendering them noisy and unmanageable,
though an effort had been made by his advice to put the liquor out of reach. I
do not, however, deem it at all likely that the leaders drank more than it was
customary to drink in a Californian's parlor, or more than they could carry; but
that some of the rough characters in the company became intoxicated we may well
believe.

  At any rate, disagreement ensued; the men refused entirely to ratify the
capitulation made by the former leaders, insisting that the prisoners must be
sent to the Sacramento; some of them were inclined to be insubordinate and eager
for plunder; while the lawless spirits were restrained from committing outrages
by the eloquence of Semple and the voice of the majority; yet the leaders could
not agree. Captain Grigsby declined to retain the leadership that had been
conferred upon him. So William B Ide was chosen in his stead, and the
revolutionists immediately took possession of all public property, as well as of
such horses and other private property as they needed, at the same time locking
up all citizens that could be found. It would seem that the second of the
documents I have presented was torn, and the third drawn up and signed at an
early stage of the disagreements, after it became apparent that it might be best
to send the prisoners to the Sacramento, the signatures showing that it could
not have been later. Vallejo, though not encouraged at seeing that the leaders
were not permitted by their followers to keep their promises, was not very much
displeased at being sent to New Helvetia. He was assured that the insurgents
were acting by Fremont's orders; his own views were known to be favorable to the
schemes of the United States; and he had no reason to doubt that on meeting
Fremont he and his companions would at once be released on parole.

  Before the departure of the prisoners and their escort a formal meeting of the
revolutionists was held. That Semple, secretary, made a speech counselling
united action and moderation in the treatment of the natives, and that William
B. Ide was chosen captain, is all that is known of this meeting, except what we
may learn from Ide's narrative. The leaders differed in their ideas, not only
respecting the disposition to be made of the prisoners, but about the chief
object of the movement. Evidently there had been no definitely arranged plan of
operations. Fremont had succeeded in bringing about a state of open hostility
without committing himself. Some of the men regarded their movement as merely
intended to provoke Castro to make an attack on Fremont; or at least they
dreaded the responsibility of engaging in a regular revolution, especially when
it was learned that no one could produce any definite promise from Fremont in
black and white to support such a movement. Others were in favor of an immediate
declaration of independence. That such differences of opinion did exist as Ide
states, is in itself by no means improbable; and it is confirmed to some extent
by the fact that Grigsby did resign his leadership, and by the somewhat strange
circumstance that three such prominent men as Grigsby, Merrill and Semple should
have left Sonoma to accompany the prisoners. Ide writes that when Grigsby heard
that no positive orders from Fremont could be produced, his fears of doing wrong
overcame his patriotism, and he interrupted the speaker by saying: "Gentlemen, I
have been deceived; I cannot go with you; I resign and back out of the scrape. I
can take my family to the mountains as cheap as any of you;" —and Dr. S. at that
moment led him into the house. Disorder and confusion prevailed. One swore he
would not stay and guard the prisoners; another swore we would all have our
throats cut; another called for fresh horses; and all were on the move, every
man for himself, when the speaker [Ide] resumed his efforts, raising his voice
louder and more loud, as the men receded from the place, saying: "We need no
horses; saddle no horse for me; I can go to the Spaniards and make freemen of
them. I will lay my bones here before I will take upon myself the ignominy of
commencing an honorable work and then flee like cowards, like thieves, when no
enemy is in sight. In vain will you say you had honorable motives. Who will
believe it? Flee this day and the longest life cannot wear out your disgrace!
Choose ye this day what you will be! We are robbers or we must be conquerors!"
and the speaker in despair turned his back on his receding companions. With new
hope they rallied around the desponding speaker, made him their commander, their
chief; and his next words commanded the taking of the fort. Subsequently the
three leaders of the party of the primitive plan of "neutral conquest" left us
alone in our glory.

  I find no reason to doubt that this version, though somewhat highly colored,
is in substance accurate; that Merrill, having captured horses and prisoners,
was content to rest on his laurels; that Grigsby was timid about assuming the
responsibility of declaring independence without a positive assurance of
Fremont's co-operation; that Sample, while in favor of independence, preferred
that Sacramento should be the centre of operations, unless —what Vallejo and
Leese also favored—Fremont could be induced to establish his headquarters at
Sonoma; or finally, that Ide and his associate influenced the majority to
complete their revolutionary work and take no backward steps. I think, however,
that Ide and all the rest counted confidently on Fremont's support; and that
Semple and Grigsby were by no means regarded as abandoning the cause when they
left Sonoma.

  It was about 11 A. M., on June 14lh, when the three prisoners, accompanied by
Leese as interpreter at their request and that of the captors—not himself a
prisoner as has been generally stated—and guarded by Grigsby, Semple, Merrill,
Hargrave, Knight and four or five others, started on horses from Vallejo's herds
for the Sacramento. It will be most convenient to follow them before proceeding
to narrate later developments at Sonoma. Before starting, and on the way,
Vallejo was often questioned by Californians as to the situation of affairs; but
could only counsel them to remain quiet, announcing that he would probably
return within four or five days. His idea was that Fremont, after releasing him
and his companions on parole, might be induced to establish his headquarters at
Sonoma, an idea shared by Semple, Grigsby and Leese. Relations between captives
and captors were altogether friendly, except in the case of some hostile feeling
among a few individuals against Don Salvador.

  They encamped that night at Vaca's rancho. No special pains were taken to
guard the prisoners, who, with Leese, slept on a pile of straw near the camp.
Vallejo had desired to travel all night; but the men declined to do so, having
had no sleep the night before. Before dawn on the morning of the 15th, a
Californian succeeded in reaching the captives, and informed Vallejo that a
company of his countrymen had been organized to effect his rescue, and only
awaited his orders. The Colonel refused to permit such an attempt to be made,
both because he had no reason to fear any unpleasant results from his enforced
visit to the Sacramento, and because he feared retaliation at Sonoma in case an
attempt to escape should bring harm to any of the guards. On the 15th the party
reached Hardy's place on the Sacramento. Here Merrill left the others, intending
to visit Fremont's camp and return next morning, but as he did not come back
Leese, with one companion, started in the forenoon of the 16th, also in quest of
Fremont. Arriving at Allgeier's place, they learned that the Captain had moved
his camp to the American River; and starting for that point, they rejoined their
companions before arrival. Here Grigsby presented an order from Fremont for
Leese's arrest, for which, so far as known, no explanation was given.

  Late in the afternoon they reached the camp, and the prisoners were brought
into the presence of Fremont. That officer's reception of them was very
different from what had been anticipated. His words and manner were reserved and
mysterious. He denied when Vallejo demanded for what offenses and by what
authority he had caused their arrest, that he was in any way responsible for
what had been done; declared that they were prisoners of the people, who had
been driven to revolt for self-protection; refused to accept their paroles, and
sent them that same night, under a guard composed in part if not wholly of his
own men—Kit Carson and Merritt being sent in advance—to be locked up at Sutter's
Fort.


Additional Comments:
Extracted from

Memorial and Biographical History of Northern California.

Illustrated, Containing a History of this Important Section of the Pacific Coast
from the Earliest Period of its Occupancy to the Present Time, together with
Glimpses of its Prospective Future; Full-Page Steel Portraits of its most
Eminent Men, and Biographical Mention of many of its Pioneers and also of
Prominent Citizens of To-day.

"A people that takes no pride in the noble achievements of remote ancestors will
never achieve anything worthy to be remembered with pride by remote
descendents." – Macauley.

CHICAGO
THE LEWIS PUBLISHING COMPANY
1891.


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