Hancock County IL Archives History .....A. T. & S. F. RR. Accident 1922
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT
WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY AT EAST FORT MADISON,
ILL, ON MAY 29, 1922

JULY 18, 1922

TO THE COMMISSION

On May 29, 1922, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway at East Fort Madison, Ill, which
resulted in the death of 2 employees and the injury of 48 passengers and 3
employees. The investigation of this accident was conducted in conjunction with
representatives of the Commerce Commission of Illinois

LOCATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION

Thus accident occurred on that part of the Illinois Division extending between
Chillicothe, Ill, and Shopton, Iowa, a distance of 104 5 mules. In the vicinity
of the point of accident, with the exception of about 6,000 feet of single track
over the Mississippi River between East Fort Madison, Ill, and Fort Madison,
Iowa, this is a double-track line, over which trains are operated by time-table,
train orders, and a manual block-signal system.

Train movements over the single-track section are controlled by interlocking
signals operated from two mechanical interlocking towers, one at East Fort
Madison and one at the draw of the bridge. These towers are connected by an
electric en curt so that a movement can not be made over the single-track
section in either direction until one operator has communicated with the other
and had the other throw a knife switch, permitting the first operator to clear
the signals, and when this has been done the other operator can not change the
route or permit an opposing train to proceed until the movement for which the
signal has been cleared has been completed, the levers in his tower having been
locked in normal position.

Diagram

Diagram showing relative location of tracks and signals in vicinity of point of
accident

ACCIDENT AT EAST FORT MADISON, ILL

The accident occurred about 15 feet west of the frog of the switch leading from
single to double track at the eastern end of the budge The movements of
westbound trains approaching this point are governed by a one-aim,
lower-quadrant, two-position distant signal, displaying yellow or green for
caution and proceed, respectively, a two-aim route signal of the lower-quadrant,
two-position type, the top arm governing main-line movements and displaying red
or green for stop and proceed, respectively, a one-arm, lower-quadrant,
two-position home signal displaying red or green for stop and proceed,
respectively, and a train-order board, these signals being located 6,844, 4,009,
787, and 313 feet, respectively, east of the point of accident. The eastbound
home and distant signals are located approximately 200 and 2,500 feet,
respectively, west of the point of accident.

Approaching from the east the track is tangent for several miles and the grade
nearly level. Approaching from the west there is a curve of 3 degrees 30’
leading to the left, this curve being about 2,500 feet in length, followed by
about 200 feet of tangent to the point of accident, the grade is from 0 365 to 0
596 percent descending for a distance of about 2,600 feet, followed by about
1,170 feet of level track. The weather was clear at the time of the accident,
which occurred at 4.07 a. m.

DESCRIPTION

Eastbound passenger train fourth No. 2 consisted of 1 club car, 1 dining car,
and 5 Pullman sleeping cars, hauled by engine 531, and was in charge of
Conductor Dunn and Engineman Wallace. It left Shopton at 3.54 a. m., 44 minutes
late, crossed the budge, and had reached the switch leading from single to
double track when it collided nearly head-on with train No 1, while traveling at
a speed estimated to have been 18 or 20 miles an hour

Westbound passenger train No. 1 consisted of 1 baggage car, 1 smoking car, 1
chair car, 3 tourist sleeping cars, and 8 Pullman sleeping cars, hauled by
engine 3403, and was in charge of Conductor Wells and Engineman Eaton. It left
Dallas City, 6 2 miles from East Fort Madison and the last open office, at 4.00
a.m., 3 minutes late, and collided with train fourth No. 2 at East Fort Madison
while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 30 miles an hour.

Engine 3403 came to rest on its right side, while engine 531 was also derailed
to the right and came to rest inclined at an angle of about 45 degrees, both
engines were quite badly damaged. The first car of each train was also derailed,
and half of the left side of the baggage car of train No. 1 was torn away. The
employees killed were the engineman of train No. 1, and the fireman of train
fourth No. 2.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

At 4.00 a. m., Budge Engineer Schneider, on duty at the draw-bridge interlocking
tower, notified the dispatcher train fourth No. 2 was approaching from the west,
and inquired if he should allow it to proceed over the budge before train No. 1
crossed, and on receiving an affirmative reply the operator in the interlocking
tower at East Fort Madison threw the knife switch at that point which permitted
Bridge Engineer Schnerder to clear the eastbound signals for train fourth No. 2.
On account of being on the outside of the curve when approaching the end of the
single-track section, Engineman Wallace was unable to see the signal
indications, but he said he was told by the fireman they were Clear, and he was
working steam and increasing the speed when the accident occurred.

Train No. 1 had been reported as passing Dallas City just as the dispatcher had
told time bridge engineer to allow train fourth No. 2 to cross the bridge, at
which time the double-track switch at East Fort Madison had been lined for the
movement of train fourth No. 2, and all westbound signals were set against train
No. 1 as it approached. When Operator Bertchi, on duty at East Fort Madison,
realized that train No. 1 was not going to stop it was too late for him to stop
the train by hand signals. He did not see any fire flying from the wheels.

Fireman Van Loo stated that when distant signals were set against his train it
was Engineman Eaton’s custom to shut off steam at the distant signal and reduce
speed, but on thus occasion he did not shut off steam at the distant signal,
although he sounded the station whistle, the station board is located 272 feet
west of the distant signal. The fireman had been working on the fire approaching
East Fort Madison, and on getting on his seat box when the engine was about
opposite the route signal, the indication of which he did not notice, he saw
that the home signal and the train-order board were displaying stop indications.
His train was then traveling at a high rate of speed, and he said he called the
indication of the signals to Engineman Eaton as soon as he saw them, at which
time the engineman had started to apply the air brakes, and he said the
engineman acknowledged his call with a wave of his hand, as was his custom, and
then made a service application of the air brakes. Soon afterwards he again
directed the engineman’s attention to the stop signals, but the engineman paid
no attention to him and continued to look ahead. The engineman then reached for
the throttle with his heft hand and for the sand valve with the other,
apparently to see that the throttle was closed and the sand valve open, and then
made another service application of the air brakes. Shortly afterwards Fireman
Van Loo saw the reflection of a headlight on an elevator in the vicinity of the
switch, and called to the engineman to apply the air brakes in emergency, saying
that his train was not going to stop, at which time the engineman sounded one
blast on the whistle, calling for brakes. Fireman Van Loo started to get off on
the left side, and then decided it would be safer to get off on the engineman’s
side and got back in the cab and crossed over on the right side of the engine,
at the same time again calling to the engineman to apply the air brakes and
jump. At this time the engineman was standing in a crouching position, with his
hand on the brake valve, and reached for the reverse gear, but he did not know
whether or not the engineman succeeded in reversing the engine. At the time he
crossed over from the left to the right side before Jumping, Fireman Van Loo
could hear the air blowing from the brake valve, but so far as he knew the
engineman had not applied the air brakes in emergency. Fireman Van Loo did not
think the first application of the brakes decreased the speed, and said that
after that time he was not paying much attention to whether or not the Speed was
reduced. He further stated that he did not take charge of the engine himself
because the engineman had his hand on the brake valve and seemed to be conscious
of what was going on, and also because there were only a few seconds in which to
act, and he was busy trying to get off himself.

Conductor Wells, of train No. 1, who was riding in the forward end of the second
car, Said his first knowledge of anything wrong was when he noticed the
train-order board in the stop position, and at the same time the engineman
sounded the whistle signal for brakes and the conductor felt the brakes being
applied. Neither he nor Flagman Casey noticed any application of the air brakes
until probably a few seconds before the collision occurred. On getting off
immediately after the accident, the conductor saw the eastbound train-order
board displaying a clear indication and the westbound train-order board
displaying a stop indication, while the flagman said all signals were set
against his train.

General Foreman Cullom found the brake valve of engine 3403 in the emergency
position and the reverse gear two or three notches hack of center. The
driving-wheel brake shoes were burned blue. He examined the track for a distance
of several hundred feet but did not find any evidence of sand having been used.

All the evidence is to the effect that engine 3403 was in good working order and
that the an brakes had worked properly at all times, no difficulty having been
experienced in stopping the train at various points en route. The air brakes had
been thoroughly inspected before departing from Chicago, while a running test
had been made before leaving Chillicothe, 100 9 miles from East Fort Madison.
Stops were made at Edelstein and Galesburg, 92 9 and 53 5 miles, respectively,
from East Fort Madison. The speed was also materially reduced in accordance with
municipal regulations while passing through Stronghurst, 22 1 miles from East
Fort Madison. It was also stated by employees who handled the undamaged
equipment after the accident that the air brakes were in good working order. The
investigation also failed to bring out anything to indicate that Engineman Eaton
had not been in good physical condition up to the time the train approached the
point of accident.

CONCLUSIONS

This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Eaton of train No. 1,
properly to observe signal indications.

While there is no evidence to indicate whether or not Engineman Eaton saw the
indication of the distant signal, the statements of Fireman Van Loo indicate
that he saw the home signal and the train-order board in the stop position, but
for some unknown reason he took no effective measures toward bringing his train
to a stop. His actions in this particular suggest that in some way he may have
been so incapacitated as to be unable to take proper steps. Under circumstances
of this character, the conduct of the fireman is governed by rule 494 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Operating Department, which rule reads as follows.

“They must watch the engineman, and in case he should fail to promptly obey
signals, see that he is not disabled. If the engineman becomes suddenly disabled
or can not be kept awake, stop the train and report to the conductor".

When Fireman Van Loo first directed the engineman’s attention to the signal
indications there was still time for the engineman to have stopped the train,
but in view of the fact that the engineman seemed to be alert, acknowledged the
indication of the signals to the fireman, and had his hand on the brake valve
apparently making an application of the brakes, the fireman said he had no
reason to suppose it would be necessary for him to take charge of the engine,
and when he finally realized that there was danger of an accident he was engaged
in preparing to jump.

The circumstances surrounding this accident raised a question as to the
condition of the air-brake system, but aside from the apparent physical
inability of the engineman to operate the brakes, and the one blast of time
whistle sounded by him just before the accident occurred, there is nothing to
support this theory, while there is abundant evidence of a positive character
that the brakes were in good condition.

This accident again forcibly directs attention to the necessity for automatic
train-stop or train-control devices which will intervene to stop a train in case
an engineman, for any reason, neglects or fails properly to control it when
approaching a point of danger. In this case adequate signals were provided, the
distant, home, and train-order signals were all displayed against train No. 1,
and the fireman, who was fully alive to the situation, called a warning to the
engineman, which was apparently understood and acknowledged. But due possibly to
sudden or momentary mental lapse or physical incapacity or other unexplained
reason, the engineman failed to control or stop his train, and it proceeded
unchecked until it collided with the opposing passenger train. Under these
conditions, it was merely extreme good fortune that there was not a greater
number of fatalities. The failure of an experienced engineman, in charge of an
important passenger train, properly to control his train and to stop before
passing a danger point is a matter of grave concern, particularly as in this
case, when there were apparently no circumstances of an extenuating character
but the operating conditions were such as are commonly and frequently
encountered in railroad service. Had a suitable tram-control device been in use
at this point this accident would undoubtedly have been prevented and the
introduction and use of such devices is necessary to guard against the
occurrence of similar accidents in the future.

The employees involved were experienced men. The crew of train No. 1 had been on
duty a little more than 6 hours, after 24 hours or more off duty. The crew of
train No. 2 had been on duty less than an hour, after 9 hours or more of duty.

Respectfully submitted,

W. P. BORLAND,

Chief, Bureau of Safety.

WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. ***

Note -- Delay in issuing this report was occasioned by a delay of approximately
one month on the part of the railroad company in furnishing a copy of the
evidence taken in this investigation after it had been transcribed

Additional Comments:
See postcard of damaged locomotive No. 531 at

http://www.usgwarchives.net/il/hancock/postcards/531.jpg

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