Logan County IL Archives Court.....Adams, V County Of Logan 1849
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Source: Reports Of Cases Illinois
Written: 1849

Lucien B. Adams et al. v. The County of Logan.

Agreed case from Logan.

1. County seat—legislative power to remove. A conveyance of land to a county, 
in consideration of the location of a county seat at a particular place, does 
not deprive the legislature of the right to remove the same, whenever the 
public good shall require a change. Nor does such conveyance, if 
unconditional, give the donors of property a right of action for damages 
sustained, in consequence of such removal.

2. Conveyance—reservation must be express. Even had the donors of property 
made an express agreement that the land should revert, in case of the removal 
of the county seat, it would not avail them, unless it had been expressed on 
the face of the deed, or in a separate instrument. Such an agreement can not 
rest in parol.(1)

At the August term, 1849, of the Logan circuit court, the plaintiffs filed 
their declaration in assumpsit, containing two general counts: one for money 
lent and advanced, and paid out and expended, and the other for money had and 
received by defendant, for the use of plaintiffs. To this declaration, the 
defendant filed the plea of the general issue, to which there was a joinder. A 
judgment was entered pro forma for the defendant, by Davis, judge, in the 
circuit court, upon the agreed case, which is in substance as follows: that in 
consequence of the act of the general assembly, entitled "an act to establish 
the counties of Menard, Logan and Dane," approved February 15th, 1839, S. M. 
Tinsley, one of the plaintiffs, proposed, upon the condition that the county 
seat for Logan county should be at Postville, to erect a framed building, upon 
certain specified lots, which he would give to the county for a court house, 
and other county purposes. M. L. Knapp, another of the plaintiffs, proposed to 
give two blocks of ground, upon the same condition. That the commissioners 
named in the said act, made said location temporarily at Postville. That 
Tinsley built the house as he proposed, and that Knapp conveyed the blocks of 
ground as he proposed. That afterwards the general assembly passed "an act to 
locate permanently the seat of justice of Logan county," approved February 
17th, 1841; upon which the proprietors of Postville, in view of the provisions 
of the last named act, which required a donation of $3,000, on the permanent 
location of the seat of justice at Postville, proposed, first, that they be 
allowed the amount already paid for building the court house, and for the 
several lots by them previously given to the county, the sum of $3,000. In 
addition to which they gave three additional lots; and in lieu of one of the 
blocks given to the county, the plaintiffs gave their notes for $600, if the 
same should be reconvened to them.

This proposition was accepted by the county commissioners by an order entered 
upon their records. That on the same day deeds of conveyance were executed by 
the proprietors (the present plaintiffs) of the lots given to the county, with 
court house, etc., but these contained no conditions or reservations differing 
from ordinary deeds in fee simple. That by a subsequent act of the general 
assemblv, authorizing a vote of the people for that object, the seat of 
justice for Logan county was removed from Postville to Mount Pulaski. That 
afterwards, said lots and court house were sold by the county for three 
hundred dollars, and the money was received by the county. That the 
plaintiffs, after the seat of justice was fixed at Postville, and before its 
removal, had sold a large portion of their real estate in the town, but still 
were the owners of a large amount; and that if the supreme court should be of 
opinion that the plaintiffs, or any of them, in any character which they or 
any of them have, are entitled to recover on the pleading and proofs, a 
judgment is to be rendered according to the rights of the parties, it being 
the intention that the case should not go off on any collateral question.

The error assigned is, that the circuit court erred in giving judgment for the 
defendant.

S. T. Logan, and Stuart & Edwards, for plaintiffs.

Lincoln & Herndon, for defendant: The plaintiffs in error in this case, made 
these donations with a knowledge that the county seat was not permanently 
located at Postville; and having this knowledge, if the county seat was 
removed, they have no cause to complain. They made these donations with the 
hope that it would advance their individual interests. Laws of 1838 and 1839, 
p. 106, section 8: Laws of 1846, page 31. This last act was passed at the 
special request of plaintiffs in error, and the county of Logan did not ask 
for it nor participate in its passage. The original gift was immoral — against 
public morals and founded in corruption. It was to make officers do their 
duty. 1 Breese, 103; 2d Part ibid, 10; Story on Contracts, sections 569-70; 
ibid, 571-72. Their remedy is against others, and not against the county.   8 
Johnson, 385; 9 ibid, 73.

C. Emebson, on same side: The conveyance to the county vested the property in 
the county. Revised Laws, 132. The building the court house was a voluntary 
act, and a donation, and can not give the plaintiffs any cause of action. 5 
Blackford, 182. The court house, when built, became a part of the realty, and 
went with the land. The removal of the county seat did not divest the [*339] 
*county of its property, or give any cause of action to the plaintiffs, 
against the county. A permanent location of a county seat is no undertaking 
that it shall remain where located perpetually, or for any definite length of 
time. See the various acts locating county seats. 1 Blackford, 285. The 
location and removal of the county seat of Logan county, was the act of the 
legislature, and not the act of the county. County commissioners have no power 
to consent that county seats shall not be removed. County seats are located, 
and their locations changed, for the public good. 4 Blackford, 208.

Caton, J. We are of opinion that this action can not be maintained. It is not, 
nor can it be denied, but that the legislature still retained complete control 
over the county seat of Logan county, notwithstanding all that had been done 
fixing it at Postville. Nor was there any covenant or agreement that the money 
should be repaid, or that the lands should revert, which had been donated to 
the county, by the proprietors of Postville, under the several acts of the 
legislature, to induce the location of the county seat at that place. When the 
money was paid and the land conveyed, the donors knew that the county seat 
might, when the good of the community should require it, be changed; and it 
must be presumed that they acted in view of such a contingency. Had they 
intended to guard against the consequences of such a removal they should have 
made an express agreement or reservation to that effect, in the deed. So far 
from that, they made an absolute conveyance, without any reservation whatever. 
Even had an express agreement been made at the time of the conveyance, that 
the land should revert, in case of the removal of the county seat, it could 
not be proved by parol, but should have been expressed on the face of the 
deed, or at least in a separate writing. But here we are asked, in the absence 
of a parol agreement, to infer one from the circumstances of the case. Had the 
deed upon its face contained a reservation, or had any specific purpose for 
which the land was conveyed been declared, from which a reservation might be 
implied, then we should have something upon which we could act, and we might, 
possibly, so far disregard the literal expressions of the conveyance, as to 
give effect to the spirit and intent of the transaction. Such was the case in 
Police Jury v. Reeves, 18 Martin's Louis. Rep., 221, where land was conveyed 
on condition that the public buildings of the parish should be erected 
thereon; and it was held to revert by the subsequent removal of the seat of 
justice of the parish, by the legislature. But in this case, there was no such 
purpose declared. The case of Armstrong v. The Board of Commissioners, 4 
Blackford, 208, is a stronger case than the one before us. There, the 
commissioners appointed by an act of the legislature, to relocate the county 
seat of Dearborn county, in pursuance of the authority vested in them, 
accepted the proposition of certain parties, who proposed to furnish money to 
build a court house, in consideration that "they, the said commissioners under 
the said act, would make the said town of Lawrenceburgh for ever, the 
permanent seat of justice of said county." The location was accordingly made, 
and the money advanced; and yet it was held that the legislature, by 
subsequently removing the county seat, violated no legal lights of the 
parties, for which they could obtain redress.

It is undoubtedly true, that the donors made this donation to the county, in 
order to secure the location of the county seat at Postville, with the 
expectation of being more than reimbursed, in the enhanced value of their 
other property in the place; and it is equally beyond doubt, that all the 
property in the place, as well theirs, as that of others, may have more or 
less deteriorated in value, by the removal of the seat of justice. But it 
appears that while the county seat remained at Postville, they sold to 
individuals a large portion of their real estate in and about that place; and 
in that way they have, undoubtedly in part, if not entirely, been reimbursed, 
for the bonus which they gave the county. Should we allow them now to recover 
of the county, they would be twice reimbursed. Those who have bought property 
of them, or even of others, at the enhanced prices occasioned by the location 
of the county seat, have as much cause to complain as they have. Those to whom 
they have sold, have no means of recovering from them any portion of the 
amount which might be recovered from the county; and yet, if there is any 
equity in any portion of this claim, such purchasers have an equal right to a 
rateable proportion of what the county should be obliged to pay. If the county 
has received money, which ex equo et bono the county ought not to retain, how 
shall we determine to whom it equitably belongs. The court that should 
undertake to determine this, would find itself inextricably involved in a 
labyrinth of inquiries.

But the plaintiffs have no legal right to claim damages for the loss which 
they have sustained, by this legitimate exercise of power by the legislature 
and the people. With equal propriety might one who has purchased canal lands, 
in view of the present location of the canal, claim to recover damages, in 
case the canal should be so changed as to diminish the value of his purchase. 
Such a claim would hardly be thought of.

In this case, the very fact that the donors gave an absolute and unconditional 
deed, shows that they expected to take their chance for retaining the county 
seat. Knowing, as they must have known, that the legislature had the right to 
change the seat of justice, whenever the public good should require it, they 
might have insisted in their contract that the title should revert, in case of 
a removal. But there is no such intimation, in any of their written proposals 
presented to the commissioners, during the negotiation. Had there been, 
perhaps Postville never would have been a county seat. The donation being 
unconditional, may have turned the scale in their favor. Be that as it may, we 
can not now make a new bargain for them, and impose a condition where there is 
none.

The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed, with costs.

Judgment affirmed.

---------------
(Followed — Harris v. Shaw, 13 Ill., 456. 
(1) An absolute conveyance in fee, as a gift to a county, of land for public 
buildings does not enable grantor to recover the land in case of the removal 
of the county seat, Harris v. Shaw, 13 Ill., 456.)


Additional Comments:
Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of 
Illinois, from November Term, 1849, to June Term, 1850, Both Inclusive. By 
Ebenezer Peck. Volume XI. Annotated by Henry Binmore, of the Chicago Bar. 
CHICAGO: CALLAGHAN & CO. 1886.

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