Madison County IL Archives Court.....Buckmaster, V Ryder 1850
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Source: Records Of Cases Illinois
Written: 1850

Nathaniel Buckmaster, appellant, v. Simeon Ryder, appellee.

Appeal from Madison.

Upon a bill to quiet title, if a decree is rendered which is binding upon a 
party, his assignee, who has notice of the decree, is bound by it, if the 
court had authority to adjudicate. Such a decree, though erroneous, cannot be 
questioned collaterally. (a)

A decree is conclusie on the parties while it remains in force, its errors can 
only be inquired into and corrected by a direct proceeding for that purpose.

A party assigning a judgment, is not estopped from asserting title to land 
against a purchaser under the judgment, where the lien of such judgment is 
divested by decree, especially if there was no express or implied covenant, 
that the judgment was a subsisting lien.

This is a suit in chancery, wherein the said Simeon Ryder is complainant, who 
filed his bill against Buckmaster and others, to foreclose a mortgage assigned 
to him by the State Bank of Illinois; in which bill he alleges, that one 
Sigerson & Harrison, in August, 1840, being indebted to the bank $4,196, made 
four notes to secure that sum, payable in two, three, four and five years from 
date, and gave the mortgage sued on, to the bank to secure these notes; that 
Sigerson & Harrison embraced in said mortgage, a lot in Middletown, and a lot 
in block 1, in Alton, of which property they pretended to be seized and 
possessed; that in 1847, the State Bank assigned to Ryder said mortgage, and 
the three promissory notes first mentioned in the mortgage, excepting the lot 
in Middletown, from the effect of said assignment, which had been released by 
the bank; that the said Buckmaster claims to have some title in the mortgaged 
premises, through a sale made to him on a judgment in favor of Ryder & Frost, 
against one John A. Halderman and Job Lawrence, obtained against them the 
seventeenth of January, 1838, in the municipal court of the city of Alton, and 
assigned by them to the said Buckmaster. The bill, however, charges the fact 
to be, that in a chancery suit, by Sigerson & Harrison against Ryder & Frost, 
and others, to confirm the title of Sigerson & Harrison to the lot in block 1, 
in which suit, the judgment, under which Buckmaster bought the property, came 
in question, it being charged in said bill upon which said suit was brought, 
that Ryder & Frost were judgment creditors of John A. Halderman, upon a 
judgment obtained by them in January, 1838, in the municipal court of the city 
of Alton, against the said Halderman & Lawrence, for $279.08, besides costs; 
and it being averred in said bill, that Sigerson & Harrison were entitled to 
hold said lot, in block 1, as the legal and equitable owners thereof; and the 
prayer of said bill being, that the title to said lot in block 1, should be 
confirmed and established in Sigerson & Harrison, it was decreed at the 
September term of the Madison Circuit Court, 1841, that they were entitled to 
hold the same, free of all liens and encumbrances, of any of the defendants, 
and that the defendant should be barred of all claim upon the same, as will 
appear from a copy of the decree, etc. That the judgment was assigned to 
Buckmaster after the lien thereof was barred; that Buckmaster is preventing 
the tenants from paying Ryder rent, on the pretense that his claim, under the 
judgment, is better than the mortgage claim; and that he, Ryder, is entitled 
to a priority of lien over said judgment, by force of his assigned mortgage, 
praying, that he may have his money, due on the notes, in a strict 
foreclosure, and that the master in chancery may make a deed to complainant, 
etc. On the pleadings, and on the proofs which were in the cause, decree was 
entered at the March term, 1850, of the Madison Circuit Court, Underwood, 
Judge, presiding, which decrees, that defendants pay to S. Ryder $3,839.34, 
within ninety days from the date of the decree, with interest; that in default 
to pay, the defendants be barred, etc.; and, that all interest which 
Buckmaster has in the premises, by virtue of his sale on the execution, issued 
upon the judgment, assigned to him and Greathouse, by Ryder & Frost, and all 
certificates of purchase, and deed or deeds made to Buckmaster, by virtue of 
said sale, be cancelled and set aside, and for nothing esteemed, and that 
Buckmaster, and all persons claiming under him, be perpetually enjoined from 
proceeding under said judgment, to enforce any sale or lien against the said 
mortgaged premises; and, that the property, in case of non-payment of the 
money found due, shall be sold, etc., and deed made by the commissioner to the 
purchaser, etc.; and that the cross bill of the said Buckmaster be dismissed 
at his cost, etc. From which decree Buckmaster appeals, etc.

Wm. Martin, for appellant.

The assignee of a mortgage takes the title which the mortgagee has in the 
mortgage; and is affected by all equities in favor of third persons. 2 Paige 
C. R., 206.

Sigerson & Harrison mortgaged property to the State Bank, which they bought on 
a junior judgment against Halderman. Therefore, the mortgage, to the bank 
passed to them no better title to the property mortgaged, than Sigerson & 
Harrison had at the date of the mortgage in August, 1840: 4 Porter, 321-29. 
When the bank mortgage was made, Ryder & Frost's judgment was the oldest lien 
on the mortgaged property. This lien was a matter of record. Hence, all 
persons dealing with the property, affected by the lien, were bound to take 
notice thereof, and especially the State Bank, who took the mortgage. The 
bank, also, had notice of Buckmaster's claim.

When the State Bank took the mortgage, they obtained all the title for which 
they bargained; and they took all the title which Sigerson & Harrison had to 
the property. In the absence of fraud, then, or misrepresentation, neither 
Sigerson & Harrison, nor the State Bank, can apply to chancery, to deprive 
third persons of older and paramount legal liens which by law have been fixed 
upon the mortgaged property.

The decree set up in this case to defeat Buckmaster's title, was rendered 
thirteen months after the property was mortgaged to the State Bank, and on a 
bill filed eight months after the date of said mortgage. The bank under whom 
Ryder claims, was not a party to said bill, or to the decree; the bank neither 
authorized the filing of the bill, nor do they claim any thing under the 
decree: hence the bank is neither a party to the decree, nor are they privy to 
the decree, the bank not claiming title through Sigerson & Harrison after the 
rendition of this decree.

To affect Buckmaster, the bill must have been filed by the State Bank, or by 
some one for their benefit, wherein such facts must appear as will show a 
superior equity in the State Bank over the legal lien of the oldest judgment. 
To override Ryder & Frost's judgment, the bank must show that she contracted 
with Sigerson & Harrison for a better title than she obtained by the mortgage; 
and that Ryder & Frost, or those claiming under them, induced the bank to make 
such contract.

This decree in favor of Sigerson & Harrison, cannot be set up by Ryder, to 
defeat Buckmaster, because Ryder does not claim through them, but as assignee 
of the State Bank.

Ryder, having taken the consideration from Buckmaster & Greathouse, for the 
assigned judgment, under which he, Buckmaster, purchased, will commit a fraud 
on Buckmaster by defeating his sale on the oldest judgment. This a court of 
equity will not permit.

The sale by Buckmaster, overreaches the mortgaged title of the State Bank, and 
the bank failing to redeem from Buckmaster's sale within twelve months from 
its date, lost all their title to the land under their mortgage. To have given 
the bank the legal title, they should have paid off the oldest judgment and 
tacked the sum paid to their mortgage: See 2 Cowen, 125; 11 Ills., 445.

This bill, setting up a decree to bar Buckmaster, must show by averment that 
the lien of the Ryder & Frost judgment was put in issue in the case of 
Sigerson & Harrison against Halderman. This not appearing, the decree should 
not have an influence with the court in deciding the rights of these parties: 
See Mitford's Chancery Pleading, pp. 237-8;  Story's Equity Pleading, sec. 
791; 2 Madd. Ch., 313-4.

To conclude parties by a decree, it must be in a suit directly between them or 
their privies, and upon the subject matter directly involved in the 
controversy. The controversy here is to foreclose a mortgage by an assignee, 
wherein he does not so connect himself or the mortgagee, etc., with the decree 
as to authorize the court to consider it.

To make a decree conclusive, it must appear that chancery had jurisdiction. 
This is done by averment. If there be no such averment the decree is a 
nullity: See Story's Eq. Pl., secs. 10, 12; also secs. 257, 290; Andrews v. 
Fenton, 1 Arkansas, 186; Baraitt v. Oliver, 7 Gill & Johnson, 193, 208; 4 
Scam., 333; 4 Gilman, 354.

Where judicial proceedings are brought collaterally in question, the authority 
of the court whose proceedings are plead to conclude a party, may be inquired 
into; they may also be inquired into when relied upon by a party claiming the 
benefit of such proceedings. See 1 Peters' U. S. R., 329, 340, 341.

A decree cannot be used in a suit in favor of new parties, unless the same 
decree could have been used against the new parties had it been adverse: See 2 
Peters' Digest, 539, sec. 51; Pain's Cir. Court Rep., 196; 2 Stark. on Ev., 
196, title Mutuality.

Davis & Edwards, for appellee:

Treat, C. J. In January, 1838, Simeon Ryder and Charles L. Frost recovered a 
judgment against John A. Halderman and Job Lawrence, in the municipal court of 
the city of Alton, for $279.08. In February, 1838, Krum, as executor of 
Emerson, obtained a judgment against Halderman in the Madison Circuit Court, 
for $533.48. In March, 1838, Halderman conveyed to John Sigerson, Wallace 
Sigerson and Enos H. Harrison, by deed of mortgage, a part of block one, and 
lot four in block twenty-four, in the city of Alton, to secure the payment of 
certain promissory notes previously made by Halderman & Lawrence. In April, 
1838, Fleming and others obtained a judgment against Halderman & Lawrence, in 
the municipal court of the city of Alton, for $1,236.10; and, at the same time 
and before the same court, Enos Litchfield obtained a judgment against 
Halderman & Lawrence for $469.39. In July, 1838, Ryder & Frost recovered 
another judgment against Halderman & Lawrence, before the same court, for 
$247.62. In October, 1838, Sigersons and Harrison recovered a judgment in the 
same court against Halderman for $4,624.98; and under an execution issued 
thereon, they became the purchasers of the mortgaged premises for $1,900, and 
received a sheriff's deed therefor in October, 1840. In August, 1840, 
Sigersons and Harrison conveyed to the State Bank of Illinois, by deed of 
mortgage, with covenants of warranty, that part of block one embraced in the 
mortgage from Halderman, and purchased at the sheriff's sale to secure the 
payment of $4,196 within five years.

In April, 1841, Sigersons and Harrison filed a bill in chancery in the Madison 
Circuit Court against Halderman, Ryder, Frost and the other judgment creditors 
of Halderman & Lawrence, in which after setting forth at large all the 
foregoing proceedings, but the mortgage to the State Bank of Illinois, they 
proceeded to state as follows: "Your orators under this state of facts, are 
informed and believe, that difficulties may arise in regard to the title of 
your orators to the said two pieces, parcels and lots of ground, so by your 
orators purchased at sheriff's sale aforesaid, which can only be remedied in a 
court of equity. Your orators, therefore, believing that they are entitled to 
the possession and ownership of said lots or parcels of ground, free and 
discharged of all liens, claims, or incumbrances, which the said John A. 
Halderman, or either of the said judgment creditors, may claim or pretend to 
set up, pray of your honor that the said John A. Halderman, Simeon Ryder, 
Charles L. Frost, Thomas Fleming, Charles McIntire, Jasper Corning, Sanderson 
Robert, Enos Litchfield, and John M. Krum, executor of William S. Emerson, 
deceased, may be required to make full, true and perfect answers to all and 
singular the charges above set forth, fully and particularly, according to the 
best of their knowledge, information and belief, as if the same were herein 
again repeated, and they interrogated thereto; and that the defendants above 
named, and all persons claiming and to claim the said described lots or 
parcels of ground in said mortgage mentioned and set forth, may be barred of 
and from all claims of, in and to the said premises, and every part and parcel 
thereof, with the appurtenances; and that your orator's title to the same may 
be confirmed." Process was served on the defendants, and, at the September 
term, 1841, the bill was taken for confessed, and a decree entered that the 
defendants be forever barred of all claim to the premises in controversy, and 
that the complainants' title thereto be fully confirmed and established.

In September, 1842, Ryder & Frost assigned the judgment first recovered 
against Halderman & Lawrence to Buckmaster and Greathouse; and, in November, 
1844, under an execution issued thereon, Buckmaster became the purchaser of 
that part of block are included in the mortgage to Sigersons and Harrison, for 
$550, and afterwards obtained a sheriff's deed therefor. In May, 1847, the 
State Bank of Illinois assigned and transferred to Simeon Ryder the notes and 
mortgage executed to it by Sigersons and Harrison. Ryder had actual notice of 
the sale to Buckmaster when he received the assignment of the mortgage; and 
Buckmaster was well aware of the decree rendered in favor of Sigersons and 
Harrison when he received the assignment of the judgment.

In January, 1848, Ryder, as the assignee of the bank, filed this bill in 
chancery against Buckmaster and others, to foreclose the mortgage executed by 
Sigersons and Harrison. The foregoing state of facts appeared from the 
pleadings and proofs in the case. On the hearing, the court made a decree 
providing for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and directing, in case of 
default in the payment of the amount found to be due on the mortgage, that 
Buckmaster be enjoined from asserting any claim to the mortgaged premises, by 
virtue of the purchase under the assigned judgment. To reverse that decree, 
Buckmaster has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The correctness of the decision made by the court below must depend upon the 
effect to be given to the decree rendered in 1841, in the case of Sigersons 
and Harrison against Halderman and others. If that decree was binding on Ryder 
& Frost, who were then the owners of the judgment, it must be held to have the 
same effect against Buckmaster, who subsequently received an assignment of the 
judgment, with express notice of the decree. Under such circumstances, he 
could succeed to no greater rights than Ryder & Frost had as judgment 
creditors. If the decree operated to discharge the lien of the judgment on the 
premises now in controversy, the lien could not be revived by a transfer of 
the judgment to a party fully aware of the previous proceedings. The sole 
purpose of that suit was to quiet and confirm the title of Sigersons and 
Harrison to the premises in question. It was peculiarly a matter of equitable 
cognizance. All of the parties interested in the property, except the State 
Bank of Illinois, were made defendants. The object of the proceeding was 
clearly set forth in the bill. The complainants claimed to hold the premises, 
free from all liens of the other judgment creditors of Halderman. The validity 
of their liens, as against the complainants, was directly drawn in question by 
the allegations of the bill. The defendants were fully apprised of the grounds 
on which the complainants relied, and were distinctly called on to meet and 
controvert their exclusive claim to the property. They were regularly brought 
before the court, and an opportunity afforded them to set up and insist upon 
their rights. The court thus acquired full jurisdiction of the subject matter 
of the suit, and of the persons of the parties; and it proceeded to enter a 
decree affirming the title of the complainants to the premises. The decree was 
undoubtedly erroneous as to Ryder & Frost, and, in a direct proceeding for the 
purpose, might have been reversed. But it by no means follows that it can be 
declared invalid in this collateral proceeding. The only inquiry now is, had 
the court pronouncing the decree authority to adjudicate upon the rights of 
the parties in respect of the property; not whether its decision was in 
accordance with the principles of equity. If the court had such authority, and 
proceeded to exercise it, the decree, however inequitable or erroneous, must 
be held binding when drawn in question collaterally. This is an inflexible 
rule of the law, which has been repeatedly recognized by this court: 
Buckmaster v. Carlin, 3 Scammon, 104; Swiggart v. Harder, 4 ib., 364; Rigg v. 
Cook, 4 Gilman, 336; Young v. Lorrain, 11 Illinois, 624. 

There can be no doubt of the validity of the decree. It is conclusive on the 
parties, while it remains in force. Its errors can only be inquired into and 
corrected, in a direct proceeding instituted for the purpose. The complainants 
were entitled to the full benefit of the decree. The confirmation of their 
title inured to the benefit of the State Bank of Illinois, to which they had 
previously mortgaged the property with covenants of title. The proceeding was 
not adverse to the bank, but in furtherance of its interests. Although the 
bank was a proper party, yet the fact that it was not made one, did not defeat 
the jurisdiction of the court, nor prevent the decree from inuring to its 
benefit. From the rendition of the decree, the bank held the premises 
discharged of the liens of the judgment creditors. It transferred all of its 
interests to the complainant in the present suit. He thereby succeeded to all 
of the rights derived by Sigersons and Harrison by the purchase at the 
sheriff's sale, and by the decree establishing their title under that 
purchase, Buckmaster acquired no title by his purchase under the judgment, 
because the lien of the judgment, as respects this property, was previously 
divested by the decree. There is no force in the position, that Ryder is 
estopped by the assignment of the judgment from asserting title against a 
purchaser under it. He did not, either expressly or by implication, covenant 
that the judgment was a subsisting lien on this particular property. He simply 
transferred whatever interest he then had as a judgment creditor. The decree 
already exempted this property from the operation of the judgment, but, in all 
other respects, it left the judgment in full force against Halderman & 
Lawrence.
 
The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs.

Decree affirmed.

----------------------
(a) See Chestnut v. Marsh, ante 173, and note (a); Lane v. Bommelman, 17 Ill., 
95.

Additional Comments:
Reports of Cases Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois from 
November Term, 1850, to June Term, 1851, both inclusive by E. Peck, Counsellor 
at Law. Volume XII. Reprinted from the Original Edition, with Annotations by 
William Gordon McMillan of the Chicago Bar. Callaghan & Company, Chicago, Ill. 
1881.

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