Madison County IL Archives Court.....Tufts, Vs. Rice 1819-31
************************************************
Copyright.  All rights reserved.
http://www.usgwarch.org/copyright.htm
http://www.usgwarch.org/il/ilfiles.htm
************************************************

File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by:
Deb Haines http://www.genrecords.net/emailregistry/vols/00003.html#0000719 June 4, 2008, 10:55 pm

Source: Reports Of Cases Illinois
Written: 1819-31

December Term 1822.


Samuel Tufts, Plaintiff in Error, v. Thomas K. Rice, Defendant in Error.

ERROR TO MADISON.

An action of assumpsit was commenced in 1822, upon a contract made in 1812, to 
which the statute of limitations was pleaded. This statute was passed in 1819, 
and is no bar to such action.

It seems, that if the five years had run under the territorial government, it 
might have been pleaded in bar.

Tufts brought his action of assumpsit, at the April term, 1822, of the Madison 
circuit court, against Rice, on a promissory note, for the payment of twenty-
five dollars, executed by Rice to Tufts, at Boston, and dated the tenth day of 
April, 1812. To this action, Rice pleaded the Statute of Limitations, that he 
did not undertake or promise, within five years next before the commencement 
of the suit. To this plea, there was a demurrer, and joinder, and judgment for 
the defendant on the demurrer. The plaintiff brought his writ of error, and 
assigned for error, besides the general error, that the court below gave 
judgment in favor of the said Rice, and against the said Tufts, on the 
demurrer of the said Tufts, to the plea of said Rice.

Starr, for plaintiff in error.

Smith, for defendant in error.

Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Reynolds. This was an action of 
assumpsit, for the non-performance of a contract. To the declaration, the 
defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. To this plea there was a 
demurrer, and the demurrer overruled by the court below.

To reverse that decision, this writ of error is prosecuted. The statute, 
limiting actions in cases like the present, was approved March 22d, 1819, 
[Laws of 1819, page 141,] and limits the time in which actions on the case 
upon promises shall be commenced, to five years. As that statute has not run 
five years, it can not operate as a bar to this action.

It is not necessary now to decide, whether if the five years had run under the 
territorial government, it would not have been a bar, and might have been 
pleaded. It will be time enough to settle that question, when brought before 
us; we can only say at present, that we incline to the affirmative of that 
question.

Let the judgment be reversed, the plaintiff recover his costs, and the cause 
remanded for new proceedings to be had, not inconsistent with this opinion. (1)

Judgment reversed.

------------------
(1) As a general rule, a statute is to operate in futuro only, and is not to 
be so construed as to affect past transactions. A retrospective effect will 
not be given it unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the 
legislature. If it is left doubtful what was the real design, the statute must 
be so construed as to have a prospective effect only. Jones adm. v. Bond, 
post. Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm., 221. Thompson v. Alexander, ll Ill., 55. 
Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 Ill., 227.

Additional Comments:
Reports of Cases at Common Law and in Chancery, Argued and Determined in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, From its First Organization in 1819, 
to the End of December Term, 1831. By Sidney Breese, Counsellor at Law. Second 
Edition, with Additional Notes, By Edwin Beecher. Chicago: Callaghan & 
Company, 1877.

File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/il/madison/court/tufts219gwl.txt

This file has been created by a form at http://www.genrecords.org/ilfiles/

File size: 3.8 Kb