St. Clair County IL Archives Court.....Noble, Vs. People 1819-31
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Source: Reports Of Cases Illinois
Written: 1819-31

December Term, 1822.

William D. Noble, Plaintiff in Error, v. The People, Defendants in Error, on 
an indictment for Forgery.

ERROR TO ST. CLAIR.

An opinion formed, if not expressed, does not disqualify a juror.

A person whose name is forged, is a competent witness to prove the forgery, 
although upon conviction, he receives one-half of the fine imposed. His 
credibility is left to the jury. 

All persons who believe in the existence of a God and a future state, though 
they disbelieve in a punishment hereafter for crimes committed here, are 
competent witnesses.

Opinion of the Court by Justice, John Reynolds. William D. Noble was indicted 
for forgery, and found guilty in the St. Clair circuit court. To reverse that 
judgment, Noble prosecuted this writ of error, and assigned four errors, to 
wit:

1. A juror, Moses Short, formed an opinion but had not expressed it.

2. David Rankin, the person intended to be injured by the forgery, and the 
person who would in case of conviction, receive a moiety of the judgment, was 
admitted as a witness against said Noble.

3. On account of the religions principles of said Rankin, he not believing in 
the doctrine of receiving punishment after death for crimes done in this life, 
although he believed in the existence of a God and a future state.

4. The record of a civil suit was admitted in evidence, to show the amount 
that said Noble intended to defraud said Rankin of.

On the first point the law and constitution provide that all men shall be 
tried by an impartial jury; but as the mind of man is so organized, it is 
almost impossible for a jury to be perfectly impartial. Slight impressions 
will appear on the minds of any person who will at all think of any subject-—
this is unavoidable. These impressions will go on step by step on the mind, 
until they are confirmed into complete opinions. Yet the law can not draw any 
distinction between the most hasty impression, and a confirmed opinion; 
therefore all these grades of opinion must be treated alike, and ought not to 
disqualify the person from acting on the jury. It is quite different when 
these opinions are expressed-—every person wishes to appear to the world 
consistent--therefore there is a strong partiality for these opinions when 
expressed, so much so, that it disqualifies a person so situated from acting 
on a jury. This pride of opinion to act consistent, exists in every person, 
but as there was in this case no expression of this opinion. I think there is 
no error in this respect. (a) (1)

The second point presents a question important to the public, yet I think one 
of easy solution. From necessity and public policy, the person on whom the 
forgery was committed must be admitted to prove it, although our statute gives 
such person one-half of the judgment so recovered against the licensed. If 
this were not the law, forgeries would go unpunished. This is an exception to 
the general rule of an interested person being a witness. This interest must 
be left to his credit. If the witness be manifestly biased by his interest, 
the jury can detect him. With this view of the subject, I think Rankin was a 
competent witness; therefore in this there is no error. (b) (2)

The third error brings in discussion the religious principles of said Rankin. 
I conceive the law to be, that all persons who believe in the existance of a 
God and a future state, are on this account good witnesses. The witness 
believed in a God and a future state of existence, yet he did not believe in 
being punished hereafter for crimes done in this life; yet as he believed in 
the great essential matters as the law requires, he is considered a good 
witness. (c) (3)

On the fourth point I may barely remark, that the record appears to me to be 
the best evidence to prove the amount which the said Noble intended to defraud 
the said Rankin of. Therefore on all these matters I am of opinion the 
judgment of the court below ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

---------------------
(a) Jurors must be free from all exceptions. 2 Johns. Rep., 194. The proper  
question to be propounded to a juryman is, "Have you made up and delivered an 
opinion, that the prisoner is guilty or innocent of the charge laid in the 
indictment?" 1 Burr's Trial, 418.

(1) The law in relation to disqualification of jurors from having formed 
opinions is very fully discussed in the case of Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam., 77. 
Breese, Justice, who delivered the opinion of the court in that case, 
said: "If a juror has made up a decided opinion on the merits of the case, 
either from a personal knowledge of the facts, from the statements of 
witnesses, from the relations of the parties, or either of them, or from 
rumor, and that opinion is positive and not hypothetical, and such as will 
probably prevent him from giving an impartial verdict, the challenge should be 
allowed. If the opinion be merely of a light and transcient character, such as 
is usually formed by persons in every community upon hearing a current report, 
and which may be changed by the relation of the next person met with, and 
which does not show a conviction of the mind and a fixed conclusion thereon, 
or if it be hypothetical, the challenge ought not to be allowed; and to 
ascertain the state of the mind of a juror, a full examination, if deemed 
necessary may be allowed." The principles enunciated in this case have, over 
since, been adhered to by our court. Gardner v. The People, 3 Scam., 83. 
Sellers v. Same, id., 412. Vennum v. Harwood, 1 Gilm., 659. Baxter v. The 
People, 3 Gilm., 368. Neely v. The People, 131 Ill., 687. In Thompson v. The 
People, 24 Ill., 60, a person was called as a juror who, on being examined on 
oath as to his qualifications, said he had conversed with a witness in the 
case, and formed an opinion as far as he heard—that he believed what he heard, 
but that he had not formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
prisoner. It was held by the court that he was not incompetent.

(b) The English rule is, that a party whose signature is alleged to be forged 
can not be received to testify in support of an indictment for the forgery. 2 
Stark on Ev., 582. This rule is adhered to in Connecticut, Vermont and North 
Carolina. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New York, he is 
held to be competent. 4 Johns. Rep., 296.

(2) The present statute in relation to qualifications of witnesses in criminal 
trials is as follows: "The party or parties injured shall, in all cases, be 
competent witnesses, unless he, she or they shall be rendered incompetent by 
reason of his, her or their infamy or other legal incompetency other than that 
of interest. The credibility of all such witnesses shall be left to the jury 
as in other cases." Scates' Comp., page 377. Purple's Statutes, 361, Sec. 15.

(c) The proper question to be asked of a witness is, whether he believes in 
God, the obligation of an oath, and in a future state of rewards and 
punishments. 1 Stark. Ev., 82, note (r). The witness must believe that divine 
punishment will be the consequence of perjury. Ibid., 80.

(3) A person who has no religions belief, who does not acknowledge a Supreme 
Being, and who does not feel himself accountable to any moral punishment here 
or hereafter, but who acknowledges his amenability to the criminal law, if he 
foreswear himself, can not become a witness. Central Military Tract R. R. Co. 
v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill., 541. The unbelief of such a person is best 
established by the testimony of others; though he may be permitted, sworn or 
unsworn, to explain any change of belief, and leave the court to determine as 
to his competency. Id. The authorities on this question are stated fully in 
the opinion of Scates, C. J., in this case.

Additional Comments:
Reports of Cases at Common Law and in Chancery, Argued and Determined in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, From its First Organization in 1819, 
to the End of December Term, 1831. By Sidney Breese, Counsellor at Law. Second 
Edition, with Additional Notes, By Edwin Beecher. Chicago: Callaghan & 
Company, 1877.

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