Woodford County IL Archives Court.....Woodward, V Seely 1849
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Source: Reports Of Cases Illinois
Written: 1849

Luther Woodward and George Cowell v. William Seely and Charles C. Elliot.

Appeal from Woodford.

Equity — will not quiet rights not ascertained at law. A bill of peace, where 
the parties are not numerous, will not be sustained to prevent multiplicity of 
actions at law, before the rights of the parties have been settled in a court 
of law.(1)

2. Same — remedy at law. A party can not come into a court of equity to 
enforce his rights, when he has a full and complete remedy at law.(2)

3. A mere license, whether by deed or parol, is always revocable at the will 
of the licensor, unless coupled with an interest and executed, then it is 
irrevocable.(3)

4. A license coupled with an interest in land, must be in writing. A license 
perpetually to overflow the land of a party granting such license, would 
create an iuterest in the land, and, therefore, the license can not be granted 
by parol.(4)

5. A court of equity will not enforce a parol license to overflow the lands of 
the licensor, even in favor of a party who, instead of procuring a license by 
deed, has acted in good faith upon the parol license, and made valuable 
improvements upon his own land, which will become worthless if the license is 
revoked.

This is a bill in chancery, alleging that some time in the spring of the year 
1835, Luther Woodward, one of the complainants, in company with one Levi 
Woodward, came to La Salle county, and became acquainted with William Seely, 
one of the respondents. That Seely told Luther Woodward, that he, Seely, owned 
an hydraulic privilege on the Big Vermilion river, where he had erected a saw 
mill; said Seely also told Woodward, that there was another water privilege on 
the said stream, immediately below the one occupied by him, and recommended 
Woodward very urgently to purchase and improve the same, by the erection of a 
saw mill, or in some other way. That Woodward, listening to the advice and 
persuasion of Seely, went with him to examine the said water privilege, when 
said Seely pointed out the lowest west line of his, said Seely's land, on 
which he had erected his said saw mill, and pointed out and explained the 
nature and extent of the said water privilege, below the land of said Seely, 
and again urged and persuaded Woodward to purchase and improve said privilege, 
stating that it would be a great benefit to, and enhance the value of the land 
to the neighborhood. That Woodward, upon a careful examination of the 
premises, informed Seely, that he, Woodward, could not safely build a dam on 
the said water privilege, only at the place where Seely's dam stood, by reason 
of the loose state of the bottom of the river; and in order to erect his dam 
with perfect safety, it would be likely to flow the water back above the west 
line of said Seely's land, as there was little or no fall on the said lower 
water privilege, from the west line of said Seely's land, to the place where 
said Woodward's dam stood, at the time of the filing of the bill. Thereupon 
Seely told Woodward that there was a considerable fall on said Seely's land, 
between his said lower or west line, and his saw mill, and that if Woodward 
would purchase and improve the lower privilege so pointed out and recommended 
by Seely to Woodward, that Woodward might have and enjoy the right to flow 
back the water, provided he did not raise his dam so as to cause the water to 
flow up stream, so as to interrupt and hinder Seely in the use of his mill. 
Which offer and inducement Seely repeatedly made and urged upon Woodward, 
until, in consideration thereof, Woodward was induced and persuaded to 
purchase the lower water privilege, or the lands so recommended by Seely to 
Woodward, viz: the west half of the southeast quarter, and the east half of 
the south-west quarter of section eight, township thirty-two north, of range 
two, east of the third principal meridian; and thereupon proceeded to improve 
the same, as is set forth in the bill. That in the month of May, 1835, 
Woodward purchased the fee simple and title of Edward Fay, who was then the 
proprietor of the west half of the south-east quarter of said section eight, 
and took a release of said Pay's claim to the said east half of the south-west 
quarter of said section eight, and paid the said Fay therefor the sum of two 
hundred and five dollars. That Woodward, subsequently, about the month of 
July, 1835, purchased with and in the name of said Levi Woodward, of the 
government of the United States, the said last mentioned eighty acre lot, and 
paid therefor one hundred dollars. The complainant, Woodward, immediately 
after the purchase from Fay, and about the last of May, 1835, went to the 
state of Massachusetts, and commenced purchasing irons and other necessary 
materials for the purpose of erecting a saw mill on the premises, and 
improving the water privilege, in accordance with the permission of an 
understanding with said Seely, as above set forth; and in the autumn of the 
same year, Woodward employed two men and sent them to the said premises, with 
the said materials, at an expense of several hundred dollars; that these men, 
on arriving at the premises, commenced getting out timber and other materials, 
for the purpose of improving said mill privilege, in accordance with the 
permission granted by Seely. That Woodward returned to the premises with his 
family, and, in person, went on with the improvements already oommenced. That 
in the spring of 1837 he commenced constructing his dam, and digging a race, 
to convey water to his mill, finished his dam, partly finished his mill-race, 
and mill. That all were completed and ready for operation some time in July 
following, at an expense of $5,000. That the dam is about five hundred feet 
long and three feet high, which is situated near half a mile above the mill, 
and about thirty rods below the west line of Seely's land. That although the 
dam of Woodward and Cowell raises a head of water of about three feet, on the 
land of said Seely, to wit, in the bed of the river, yet it does not flow the 
water back, so as to interrupt him in the use and enjoyment of his said saw 
mill. That some time in the summer of 1835, Levi Woodward released and 
conveyed to Luther Woodward, complainant, whatever interest said Levi had in 
the premises, and about the same time, complainant, Woodward, sold to James S. 
Bullock, Joseph Bullock and Maxey O. Bullock, one undivided fourth part of the 
said premises, and in July, 1839, all of said Bullocks, for a valuable 
consideration, roconveyed to complainant, Woodward, all their interest in said 
premises. That some time in the spring or summer of 1837, Woodward conveyed to 
Cowell, his co-complainant in this bill, an undivided eighth part of said 
premises, and also to one Floyd C. Knapp, for a good consideration, another 
undivided eighth of the premises, which was reconveyed afterwards by Knapp to 
Woodward. That when Woodward returned to La Salle county, in the fall of 1836, 
he found one Charles C. Elliot, one of the defendants, in joint possession 
with Seely, of Seely's premises, and that he conversed and advised frequently 
with Elliot, as to the construction of said dam, and explained his intentions 
in relation thereto. That some time in the fall of the same year, and while 
Elliot was in the immediate neighborhood, Woodward built a wall of stone, 
about eight feet long and three feet wide, and to the full height to which the 
complainants' dam stood, and where it is now erected, and gave out and 
promulgated in the neighborhood, and also to Seely and Elliot, that the said 
wall was to show the location and height of Woodward's then intended dam. That 
when Elliot became interested with Seely in the premises of Seely, he was 
fully advised and well aware of the existence, nature and extent of the 
license given by Seely to Woodward, and that he, Elliot, took his interest, 
subject to the license, and that Woodward and Elliot conversed frequently 
about the license, whereby Elliot was informed by Woodward of the existence, 
nature and extent of said license, and that Woodward was about building said 
dam in pursuance of said license, and that said dam, when erected, would flow 
the water back on to the land so occupied by Seely and Elliot, as high as the 
same might be done without injury to, or impeding of the operation of the mill 
of Seely and Elliot. That Elliot saw the works of Woodward daily as they 
progressed, from 1836 until about August, 1837, without intimating in any way, 
that he objected to the execution of the license, although it was notorious 
that Seely had given Woodward permission to flow the water up the stream as 
hereinbefore stated, and that without such permission, the dam would be 
entirely useless. That since the completion of the dam and mill, etc., on or 
about the 19th December, 1840, Elliot commenced an action at law in trespass 
against complainants, and the Bullocks and Knapp, complaining of the 
construction of said dam, whereby the water is made to flow back up said 
stream, and on the lands of Elliot, and thereby drowned out the water 
privilege of Elliot. That on the 26th December, 1840, and on several days 
subsequent thereto, the said Seely and Elliot commenced divers actions of 
trespass against complainants for the same cause. That Seely and Elliot 
refused to dismiss these several suits, but threatened, not only to prosecute 
them to judgment, but also to bring others, so long as Woodward and Cowell 
should continue to keep up their mill-dam.

The bill prayed for an answer to the bill, an injunction against proceedings 
at law, and for general relief. An injunction was allowed.

Seely answered separately, denying generally the allegations of the bill; 
admitted having had some conversations with the Woodwards about mill 
privileges on the Vermilion river, but denies having given permission to erect 
a dam, etc., as charged in the bill. Alleges that water flows back to the 
injury of his mill. Admits he brought the suits, and insists that he has the 
right so to do. Cowell makes much the same answer to the bill.

Proofs were taken upon the bill and answer, but as the opinion of the court 
does not depend upon the proofs, it is unnecessary to furnish an abstract of 
them.

A change of venue was had in the suit, and it came on to be heard upon bill, 
answers, replications, depositions and exhibits, before Treat, judge, at 
Woodford county, at the April term, 1847, of the circuit court, when a decree 
was pronounced, dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill. An appeal 
was prayed by the complainant, Woodward, and allowed.

S. T. Logan, for appellant.

O. Peters, for appellees, presented and supported his argument as follows: A 
court of chancery has no jurisdiction of this case, the complainants having a 
complete remedy at law. If the license set up in the bill is a good license, 
it may be pleaded, and is a complete bar of the suits at law. 1 Chitty's Pl., 
528, 544. A trial at law of this issue, would determine the rights of the 
parties. Plumleigh v. Dawson, 1 Gilman E., 544. Where the remedy is thus 
complete, courts of equity will not interfere. Jerome v. Ross, 7 John. Ch. 
Rep., 331 and 337. By the bill it appears that the complainants have not 
established any right at law; and until this is done, a court of equity will 
not interfere; unless, perhaps, where parties are so numerous that a full 
remedy can not be had at law. Fonblanque's Equity, 28; Eldridge v. Hill, 2 
John. Ch., 281, also, 375 to 379; Livingston v. Livingston, 6 John. Ch. Rep., 
499; 2 Story's Equity, p. 174, et seq.

The proof does not show such license as is claimed by the bill. Title can not 
be proved by rumor or reputation. Nor is rumor sufficient to charge a 
purchaser with notice. 2d Sug. on Vend., 315 to 320; 1 Story's Equity, sec. 
400; Jolland v. Stainbridge, 3 Ves., 478. At common law, one can not flow 
water back upon the land of another. Angel on Watercourses, 94; 9 Mass. E., 
306 and 316; 2 Gilm., E. 298; Plumleigh v. Dawson, 1 Gilm. R., 550; *23 Eng. 
C. [*162] L. R., 76; 27 vol. of same work, 11, as to priority. The license 
being by parol, as shown by bill and proofs, was not a good license, and was 
void, or at least voidable by the statute of frauds.

The bill terms this a license; it is more properly an easement, for it is 
claimed as a permanent interest in, or right to encumber the defendants' land. 
Rev'd Stat., p. 258, sec. 1; 1 Chitty's G. Prac, 292, 337, 338, 339, 340, 635; 
Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. K., 533; Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. E., 390; Right 
to flow must be secured by deed. Miller v. Auburn and Syracuse E. E. Co., 6 
Hill's Rep., 61; 3 Kent's Com., 451, 452 and 453, and also notes to the 
title "Rights by License;" 1 Sug. on Vend., pa. 91 to 98, and note; Heaton v. 
Ferris, 1 John. Rep., 145; Phillips v. Thompson, 1 John. Ch. Rep., 131; 11 
Metcalf's Rep., 251, Stevens v. Stevens.

If there was a license, it was revoked before the commencement of the suits at 
law. Woodward was forbidden to proceed with his dam, and this was a good 
revocation. Ex parte Coburn, 1 Cowen, 568; Fentiman v. Smith, 4 East Rep., 
107; Hawkins v. Shippam, 11 Eng. Com. Law E., 207; Tillotson v. Preston, 7 
John. E., 288; Cook v. Stearns, and Mumford v. Smith, before cited.

A license is personal and is not assignable. Emerson v. Fish et al., 6 
Greenleaf's Reps., 205. The bill alleges that license was given to Luther 
Woodward; the proof is, that it was to others as well as to him; at least, 
others entered into the enjoyment of the supposed permission or license. This 
was, of itself, a revocation or rejection of the license, or an assignment of 
a part of it; and either would destroy it. So, too, a sale by Seely to Elliot 
was a revocation of the license; clearly so if he purchased without notice, as 
it is shown he did.

If there was such a license as is claimed by the bill, Woodward exceeded it, 
and flowed higher than he pretended he was authorized to do. He makes no claim 
of any right to flow, so as to interfere with the saw mill of defendants.

Trumbull, J.* This bill was filed to restrain the defendants from prosecuting 
certain actions which they had commenced, and perpetually to enjoin them from 
instituting others, to recover damages for the overflow of their lands; the 
complainants alleging that said overflow was by the license and permission of 
the defendants and occasioned by the erection of a mill-dam upon their own 
land, which they had been at great expense in constructing. None of the 
actions at law had been disposed of, when the bill was filed, though several 
were then pending, and the defendants were continuing to commence them at 
intervals of every few days. [*Mr. justice Caton, having been of counsel, did 
not sit at the hearing of this cause.]

Can this bill be maintained? We think not. There is no instance in which a 
bill of peace, where the parties were not numerous, has been sustained, to 
prevent multiplicity of actions at law, before the rights of the parties have 
been settled in a court of law. The principle that a party can not come into 
equity to enforce his rights, when he has a full and complete remedy at law, 
is too familiar to require the citing of authorities to support it. The 
license in this case, if valid and effectual, constitutes a complete defence 
at law; and until that defence has been established, and the defendants 
continue afterwards to harass the complainants by vexatious suits, chancery 
has no jurisdiction in the matter. Eldridge v. Hill, 2 John. Ch., 281; West v. 
Mayor, etc., New Tory, 10 Paige, 539. But admitting that chancery has 
jurisdiction, and that the complainants have established by proof, the 
granting of a parol license to overflow the land of the defendants, as they 
insist — the evidence of which is by no means satisfactory — are they entitled 
to the relief sought? We are aware that there is some conflict in the 
authorities, as to the effect of a parol license to enter upon the lands of 
another; that a distinction has been drawn between an easement or privilege in 
land, and a license or authority to do something upon land, and that different 
courts have arrived at opposite conclusions, as to the necessity of a writing, 
to take cases out of the statute of frauds, while professing to found their 
decisions upon the same authorities. In this state the question is new, and we 
feel at liberty, in the conflict of authorities, to settle it upon principle, 
and what we believe to be the true interpretation of the statute, without 
attempting to examine and explain the numerous cases upon the subject of parol 
licenses, which have been so often reviewed and commented upon by the various 
courts, both of this country and England. 

What then is a license? Simply the permission to do something which, without 
such permission, would have been unlawful. It matters not whether granted by 
deed or by parol; as a mere license, it is always revocable at the will of the 
licensor, but when coupled, with an interest, and executed, it is irrevocable, 
and this constitutes the distinction between revocable and irrevocable 
licenses. In the books, this is illustrated by the case where a man authorized 
another to hunt in his park, and carry away the deer which he should kill. 
Here is a license to hunt, coupled with a grant or right to carry off the 
deer, and is, therefore, irrevocable when acted upon, and the deer killed, 
until they are carried away, if in a reasonable time; but a mere license to 
hunt in one's grounds, whether by deed or by parol, is revocable at any 
moment. When the license is coupled with an interest in land, or of such a 
character that the interest could not pass by parol, then a writing is 
essential to the creation of the interest, otherwise no interest passes. In 
this case, the license, while unrevoked, authorized the complainants so to 
erect their dam as to overflow the land of defendants, and released them from 
the damages, to which they would otherwise have made themselves liable in so 
doing, but did it give them the right to overflow the land of the defendants, 
and deprive them of their use perpetually and forever? If so, the license 
certainly carried with it an interest in the land, and if the grant of the 
interest was valid, the license became irrevocable. But can such an interest 
be granted by parol? To hold that it could, would, to use the language in 1 
Sugden on Vendors, 80, be "in the very teeth of the statute," which declares 
that every contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any 
interest in or concerning them, for a longer term than one year, shall be in 
writing. If one man can acquire by parol, the right so to use another's land 
as to render it useless to the owner, it will be but taking a short and easy 
step, and going very little further, to hold that he may acquire the title 
itself, by parol; for of what avail is it to a man to have the naked title to 
a piece of land, which he can not use, but which, in spite of him, another has 
the right to keep forever covered with water?

A right of way, it is said, can not be granted by parol, but must be founded 
upon a deed, or writing, or presumption which presupposes one, and it is 
difficult to conceive how the right to pass over the land of another should 
constitute an interest in it, incapable of being granted by parol, while the 
right to cover it with water constitutes no such interest. In our judgment, a 
license perpetually to overflow the land of the defendants would create an 
interest in it, and, therefore, could not be granted by parol; consequently, 
the license in this case carried with it no interest, and was revocable at the 
will of the party granting it. The defendants have chosen to revoke it, and 
thereupon the complainants became liable for any subsequent overflow of the 
land. It makes no difference that the complainants may have acted upon the 
parol license, and erected valuable buildings, which will become worthless in 
case the license is revoked: before acting so imprudently, they should have 
acquired permission by deed to overflow the land of the defendants. Nor can 
the complainants call upon a court of equity to enforce the license, upon the 
ground that they have made valuable improvements, and expended their money, 
relying in good faith upon it. It is not like the case of a parol purchase of 
land, where the purchaser contracts to pay the value of the land, enters into 
possession, and makes valuable improvements, when a court of equity will 
compel the vendor, who has received the purchase money, to make a title to the 
land; and courts have sometimes regretted that the statute shonld so far have 
been departed from, as to allow parol contracts for the sale of lands, even 
under such circumstances, to be enforced. To enforce the license in this case, 
where nothing was ever paid or agreed to be paid the defendants, for the 
privilege of flowing their land, and where no improvements have been made 
upon, or possession taken of it, except by covering it with water, would be a 
still farther departure from the statute, by extending a doctrine, originally 
of doubtful propriety, and which, if it were a new question, would now perhaps 
be settled otherwise. A reference to a few modern decisions, analogous in 
principle, is all that is deemed necessary in support of the views we have 
expressed. The case of Wood v. Leadbetter, decided in the court of exchequer 
in 1845, and reported in 13 Meeson & Welsby's Rep., 837, is the most recent 
English decision upon this subject that has come to our notice. In that case, 
the plaintiff had purchased a ticket of the proprietor of the Doncaster race 
course, for which he paid a guinea, and which was understood to entitle him to 
come into the stand and enclosure surrounding it, and remain there every day 
during the races. While in the enclosure, he was requested by the defendant to 
leave, and upon his refusing to comply, the defendant by the direction of the 
proprietor of the race course, turned him out, and for so doing the plaintiff 
brought suit. The court, after reviewing most of the cases upon the subject of 
parol licenses which had been decided in England, came to the conclusion, that 
a right to come and remain for a certain time upon the land of another, could 
be granted only by deed; and that a parol license to do so, though money be 
paid for it, is revocable at any time, and without paying back the money. 
Consequently, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover, though he had 
in nowise misbehaved, and that his having paid a valuable consideration for 
going on the stand, made no difference. The cases of Fentiman v. Smith, 4 
East, 107; Rex v. Horndon on the Hill, 4 M. & Sel., 565; Hewlins v. Shipman, 5 
B. & C., 222; Bryan v. Whistler, 8 B. & C. 288, and Wallis v. Harrison, 4 M. & 
W., 538, are referred to as sustaining the decision in the case of Woody. 
Leadbetter. In Gale & Whatley's Law of Easements, 29, the result of all the 
decided cases is stated to be, "that a man may, in some cases, by parol 
license, relinquish a right which he has acquired in addition to the ordinary 
rights of property, and thus restore his own and his neighbor's property to 
their original and natural condition; but he can not by such means impose any 
burden upon land in derogation of such ordinary rights of property; as for 
instance, a parol license will be valid for building a wall in front of his 
ancient windows, while a similar permission to turn a spout on his land, from 
a neighboring house, will be invalid and revocable." Tested by the law as here 
stated, the license in this case was clearly invalid, as it did impose a 
burden upon the land of the defendants, in derogation of what ordinarily 
belonged to it, and there can be no difference in principle, whether water is 
turned upon the land of another by means of a spout or a mill-dam. In the 
United States there are numerous cases to the same effect. Cook v. Stearns, 11 
Mass., 533; Stephens v. Stephens, 11 Met., 251; Thompson v. Gregory, 4 John., 
81; Miller v. Auburn and Syracuse R. R. Go., 6 Hill, 61; Mumford v. Whitney, 
15 Wend., 381. The cases of M'Killisy, M'Ilhaney, 4 Watts, 317, and Woodbury 
v. Parshby, 7 N. H., 237, and upon which plaintiff's counsel principally 
relies, are admitted to lay down a doctrine in conflict with the views we have 
expressed; but those cases are entitled to the less weight as they were both 
decided upon the authority of cases which have either been expressly 
overruled, or else do not sustain the conclusions they were cited to 
establish. Especially is this so as to the cases of Webb v. Paternoster, 
Palmer, 71; Wood v. Lake, Sayer, 3; and Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunton, 374; all 
of which are overruled, or shown to be without authority, by the decision in 
the recent case of Wood v. Leadbetter.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

-------------------
Cited — Simpkins v. Rogers, 15 Ill., 397; Morris v. Thomas, 17 Ill., 112; 
Tanner v. Valentine, 75 Ill., 624; Patterson v. Sweet, 3 Bradw., 550. 

(1) Thus, riparian rights and infringements shall be established at law, 
before equity will interfere, Stolp v. Hoyt, 44 Ill., 219; contract creditors 
without judgment have no status in a court of equity, Horner v. Zimmerman, 45 
Ill., 14; M'Connell v. Dickson, 43 Ill., 99; parties to a contract must seek 
their remedy at law, Thomas v. Caldwell, 50 Ill., 138; Chi. & N. W. R'y Co. v. 
Nichols, 67 Ill., 464; Logan v. Lucas. 59 Ill., 237, Dewey v. Eckert, 62 Ill., 
218; Gregg v. Brower, 67 Ill., 526; so one who is out of possession of land 
can not try title in equity, but must resort to his action of ejectment, 
Burton v. Gleason, 56 Ill., 25, and to enforce a trust in bailee to sell, to 
pay the proceeds of sale, the party entitled must proceed at law, Taylor v. 
Turner, 87 Ill., 296. In like manner equity will seldom interfere in cases of 
nuisance and very seldom indeed, if ever, until a jury has found the existence 
of the nuisance, Dunning v. Aurora, 40 Ill., 481; Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill., 
81.

(2) Equity will not generally interfere where the party has his remedy at law, 
Greenup v. Brown, Breese, 193; Greenup v. Woodworth, Breese, 194; Elston v. 
Blanchard, 2 Scam., 420; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 2 Scam., 418; Andrews v. 
Sullivan, 2 Gilm., 327; State B'k v. Stanton, 2 Gilm., 352; Boss v. Buchanan, 
13 Ill., 55; Stow v. Robinson, 24 Ill., 534; M'Connell v. Dickson, 43 Ill., 
99; Wylder v. Crane, 53 Ill., 490; Sch. Direc. v. Miller, 54 Ill., 338; 
Hellman v. Schneider, 75 Ill., 422; Leopold v. Judson, 75 Ill., 536; Imp'l F. 
Ins. Co. v. Gunning, 81 Ill., 236; Clinton Co. v. Schuster, 82 Ill., 137; Long 
v. Barker, 85 Ill., 431; Barton v. De Wolf, 108 Ill., 195, and in a case of 
doubtful character the court will always remit the litigant to a court of law, 
Hacker v. Barton, 84 Ill., 313. By this, however, is intended that the remedy 
at law shall be adequate and complete. A remedy at law may exist and yet 
chancery will not refuse its aid where it is more effectual for the doing of 
complete justice, Morris v. Thomas, 17 Ill., 112; see Babcock v. M'Camant, 53 
Ill., 215; Burger v. Potter, 32 Ill., 66. Objection to the jurisdiction of 
chancery on the ground of the remedy at law existing must always be made in 
the trial court or it comes too late, Comstock v. Henneberry, 66 Ill., 212, 
and, it may be waived by answer, see Stout v. Cook, 41 Ill., 447; Dodge v. 
Wright, 48 Ill., 382; Hickey v. Forristal, 49 Ill., 255; Magee v. Magee, 51 
Ill., 500. As to when there is a defense at law, see More v. Bayley, Breese 
(ed. 1885), 60, and note 1.

(3) To the same purpose see Kimball v. Yates, 14 Ill., 464; Wiggins v. 
Chicago, 68 Ill., 372; Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill., 444; Kimball v. Custer, 
73 Ill., 389; Forbes v. Balenseifer, 74 Ill., 183.

(4) Followed in Tanner v. Volentine, 75 Ill., 624. So, license to work mines 
can only be granted by deed, Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73 Ill., 453.

Additional Comments:
Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of 
Illinois, from November Term, 1849, to June Term, 1850, Both Inclusive. By 
Ebenezer Peck. Volume XI. Annotated by Henry Binmore, of the Chicago Bar. 
CHICAGO: CALLAGHAN & CO. 1886.

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