Statewide County IN Archives History - Books .....Chapter IV Tullahoma Campaign 1893
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Book Title: History Of The 82nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry

CHAPTER IV.
TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

  Having been laying around camp doing picket duty, drilling, guarding forage
trains, building works of defense, standing to arms of mornings two hours or
more before daylight, etc., for more than five months, the army was becoming
impatient waiting for a forward movement. Finally, -on the 23d day of June,
1863, the order for a forward move reached the men composing the Third Division
of the Fourteenth Army Corps, of which the Eighty-second Indiana formed a part.
Bragg's army was holding a strong fortified position north of Duck River,
extending from Shelbyville to Wartrace, his cavalry holding McMinnville on the
right, Spring Hill and Columbia on the left, with detachments at Guys, Hoovers,
Liberty and Bellbuckle Gaps. Thomas', McCook's and Crittenden's Corps were
concentrated on the rebel's right, with Granger's Corps and most of our cavalry
making a feint on the rebel left. The enemy's position was a strong one for
defense, and extremely favorable for a retreat. The hills in his front being
very rough, the depressions being the only place for roads, Rosecrans' aim being
to turn Bragg's right and force him to give battle on ground of his own
selection, or if he retreated it would be over a disadvantageous line. The
movement from Triune was to lead the enemy to believe he intended a direct
attack on their front at Shelbyville. Our cavalry struck the enemy's cavalry and
drove it back on the infantry, skirmishing heavily at Eaglesville, Rover and
Unionville. Our cavalry and infantry demonstrated on the enemy's left, and went
as far as Woodbury to induce the enemy to believe it was merely a feint to
divert their attention from a direct attack on Shelbyville. By direction of
Major General Granger, commanding reserve corps, our division advanced from
Triune at 9 A. M., on Tuesday, June 23, 1863, by the Nolinsville pike, to within
one mile of Harpeth River, thence across to the Manchester piker by way of
Winslow's Camp Ground, arriving at Salem at 6 p. M., and encamped for the night.
At 7 A. M., Wednesday, June 24, we advanced from Salem to Christiana, and
relieved General Sheridan's Division, of the Twentieth Army Corps, and. remained
at Christiana until relieved in turn by General Baird's Division of the reserve
corps, when we advanced two miles in the direction of Millersburg, encamped for
the night on Ross farm at Henry's Creek. At Christiana the enemy kept up a brisk
skirmish with our advance, bringing up a six-pounder gun to bear on us, without
doing any harm. On Thursday, June 25, we were relieved from duty with the
reserve corps and ordered to report to General Thomas. We, however, remained at
Ross farm, at the request of General McCook, in command on our left, until 11 A.
M., when we moved forward to Hoover's Mill and encamped for the night. During
the 24th and 25th it rained incessantly, rendering the roads over which we were
frequently obliged to travel exceedingly difficult for the passage of artillery
and wagons, and not exceedingly good for the army of footmen. We, however, got
through, train and all, in very good shape. On Friday, June 26, we reported to
Major General Rousseau, agreeable to orders, and with his division effected the
passage of Hoover's Gap, and encamped for the night on the south side of Scott's
branch of Garrison Creek. I copy from General Brannan's report: "Colonel, I have
the honor to report in accordance with instructions from Corps Headquarters. I
reported at 8 A. M., Tuesday, June 26, 1863, to Major-General Rousseau on the
Manchester pike. By his direction I moved my division to the right of the pike,
with a view to turn the flank of the rebel position on the heights north of
Garrison Creek. Having succeeded in forming line under a pretty brisk fire of
musketry, I advanced the First Brigade, Col. M. B. Walker commanding, on the
right, while the Second, Brigadier-General J. B. Steadman, and the Third, Col.
F. Vanderveer, supported the advance of the First Division on the center and
left. After a determined but ineffectual resistance on the part of the rebels we
gained the first position on the commanding heights south of Garrison Creek.
Having established batteries on the position lately taken from the enemy, the
Second Brigade of my division, supported by a portion of the First Divison, was
thrown forward, and again succeeded in dislodging the enemy from their position.
The enemy then attempted to enfilade us from the high ground on our right, but
in this were effectually prevented by the gallant and determined manner in which
they were attacked and driven back by Colonel Walker's Brigade. The conduct of
the troops was everything that could be wished. In accordance with orders from
General Rousseau I encamped on Scott's branch of Garrison Creek." The
Eighty-second Indiana, under command of Colonel Morton C. Hunter, supported by
the Seventeenth Ohio, charged the battery in our front, and drove it and the
regiment in support from the hill on which they had taken position, in great
confusion. Although the Eighty-second was in the advance the Seventeenth Ohio
lost the most men in this charge, the enemy overshooting us and the Seventeenth
getting the effect of the greater part of the leaden hail. The charge was made
through an open field covered with weeds higher than the men's heads. The rain
poured in torrents all the time. On Saturday, June 27, we advanced to Manchester
via Fairfield (striking the Manchester pike at Powell's farm); encamped there
for the night. On the 28th of June, 12 M., left Manchester and proceeded to
Crumpton's Creek and encamped for the night. The beating of drums could be heard
in our front, and cars running at Tullahoma. Our advance skirmished with the
enemy's pickets until after nightfall. On June 29 a part of our division
advanced and met with much resistance from the enemy. Having no support on the
right our division halted. Two regiments were thrown to the front on the
Winchester road as a protection, but were withdrawn on the arrival of General
Reynold's Division at Bobo's cross-roads. On July 1 our division was pushed
forward vigorously to feel the enemy, advancing on the main road to Tullahoma to
within one mile of the town. Finding the works evacuated we pushed on lively,
entering the town close on the retreat of the enemy. The rebel works were
extensive and well constructed, effectually covering the road on which we
advanced. The enemy must have left in great haste, as we found three large guns
and considerable stores, which had been fired by the enemy and was still burning.

  On July 2 ours and the Fourth Division joined at Spring Creek and followed the
enemy to the Winchester road crossing of Elk River. The bridge having been
burned by the rebels and the river not being fordable, the First, Third and
Fourth Divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were moved up the river to Jones' Ford,
one brigade being thrown across, the balance going into camp on the north side.
This being a deep ford it was with much difficulty the troops were crossed,
damaging much amunition, [sic] the water getting into the cartridge boxes. The
current was so swift the men could not stand up without some support. The first
attempt to form a crossing was to drive the ambulances into the stream as a
guard against the men being washed down and drowned. The first one that struck
the center of the river was turned over and both mules drowned; a second one
tried it with the same result. Then ropes were stretched across from bank to
bank and securely fastened, and the men kept hold on the rope with one hand as
they waded across. Several men were washed down and drowned. On the 4th of July
our division moved to Tates, on the Decherd, Winchester & McMinnville Road, and
halted at 2 p M. The guns needing cleaning, and it being the 4th, the officers
were ordered to have their regiments fire off their guns and clean them up.
Colonel Hunter was exceedingly anxious to have his regiment fire the finest
volley of any in the brigade. He marched his command out and fronted them, then
rode along the line giving orders as to the volley. Having everything
understood, he came to his position and gave the command, "Ready, aim,"—about
that time some one in Company B (I expect Balser Kirsch) fired his gun; then it
went pop, pop, bang, all along the line, every fellow fearing he would be
behind. I think the colonel was the maddest man in Tennessee, for awhile, and
putting the rowels to old Duke he rode into camp on a regular cavalry charge to
the rear. This was as good as I could ask. Not having any fears of his arresting
his boy brother, I twitted him all evening about what a fine volley his regiment
had gotten off. After getting him to laughing he appeared to enjoy it so well I
concluded to let him alone. On July 5 we moved near Winchester and went into
camp, where we remained until August 16,1863, when we started on the Chattanooga
campaign. During the nine days occupied in taking Tullahoma it rained every day
but one, yet the men, regardless of rank, did their work cheerfully, faithfully,
and with patriotism and zeal. Some commands did more fighting than others, their
losses being greater, yet I feel every man in the whole command is entitled to
as much praise as though he had fought the enemy from the time he started until
the point for which we started was captured. They all did just as ordered, and
if the enemy in their front didn't stand to fight, of course all they could do
was to follow up. There wasn't a case of any command failing to fight when the
enemy stood for battle; nor was there a case of failure to drive the enemy when
he did stand and show fight. While this was a short campaign, yet it was
brilliant, and bore its share of hardships, owing to the vast amount of rain. We
moved on an enemy equal in numbers and in a position of his own selection, the
position being naturally strong. The passes through the mountains being such
strong military positions of nature it took but few men of nerve to guard them
against a whole army, from the fact that but few could be brought to bear on the
point of entrance at one time. From all appearances nature or human skill, or
both combined, was unable to produce a place that the Army of the Cumberland
could be checked, when it had orders to go beyond and view the landscape. Our
division lost—enlisted men killed, 6; wounded, 62; captured, 1; officers
wounded, 1. Total, 70. Our brigade had enlisted men killed, 6; wounded, 41.
Total, 47. While our brigade lost near three-fourths of the whole division, it
don't go to prove we did our duty any better than the other brigades. I am
unable, in fact indisposed, to call forth the brave and noble deeds of the
Eighty-second Indiana on former occasions, and hold them up as superior to any
other regiment in the United States Army, in writing the history of their acts
on this campaign. As did the historian of the gallant Sixth, I claim they always
did their duty every time called on, and believe the Sixth did the same, and
know the members of the Sixth (outside of the historian) don't claim they put
down the rebellion. It is a conceded fact, recognized by all true soldiers, that
where "my regiment" and big "I" done everything, that the "I" part was generally
where the bullets were thickest, "back with the ammunition train." The return of
the Union Army to South Tennessee and North Alabama was as unexpected to the
people as its previous appearance the year before. The farmers had been induced
to repair their farms and put in crops, under the assurance of the rebel
authorities that there was no possible chance for the Union troops to ever give
them any more bother. They ascertained to a moral certainty that war was very
uncertain. When the brightest rays of prospective victory were apparently
breaking forth, the dark clouds of adversity were gathering in the North, and
swept on them and bursted in all their fury, bringing death and ruin to
everything in their front. Their crops were consumed by both armies. The
desolation wrought by the worn war path was most distressing, leaving the whole
country in a very dilapidated condition. The country surrounding Tullahoma is
low, wet, and extremely poor; a very unpromising country for farming when at its
best. Then of course its appearance must have been very deplorable after two
armies had maneuvered over it for days, during extreme rain fall, with
artillery, heavy trains and cavalry, saying nothing about the infantry columns
which worked up the roads and fields until they bore more the appearance of vats
for brick-yards than for farming purposes. But such is war. Our army was
enduring all this exposure, and helping to devastate the country, to save it for
the army of rebels who were striving so hard to destroy it. The people have
finally decided we were wrong in keeping the country undivided, and suppose the
next effort will meet with no opposition.


Additional Comments:
Extracted from:

HISTORY OF THE EIGHTY-SECOND
Indiana Volunteer Infantry,
ITS ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES.

WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE MEMBERS

BY
ALF. G. HUNTER,
Late Adjutant.

INDIANAPOLIS:
WH. B. BURFORD, PRINTER AND BINDER.
1893.


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