Statewide County IN Archives History - Books .....Chapter V Chickamauga Campaign 1893 ************************************************ Copyright. All rights reserved. http://www.rootsweb.com/~usgenweb/copyright.htm http://www.rootsweb.com/~usgenweb/in/infiles.htm ************************************************ File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by: Joy Fisher sdgenweb@yahoo.com February 14, 2007, 1:24 am Book Title: History Of The 82nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry CHAPTER V. CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN. On the 16th day of August 1863, the Eighty-second Indiana, in connection with the Army of the Cumberland, broke camp near Winchester, Tennessee, on the campaign for Chattanooga, Tennessee. Shortly after we broke camp the severest thunder storms I ever witnessed broke on us. The clouds rolling on the ground, the most terriffic [sic] peals of thunder with such vivid flashes of lightning in every direction. This lasted for about one hour. Colonel Hunter, fearing the injury of his men by lightning, caused them to fix bayonets, refuse their guns, stick the bayonets in the ground and remove some distance from their arms and await the action of the storm. The storm was so severe it was next to impossible to move the Army. A general halt was ordered. After the storm passed over the sun came out in all its beauty, and we commenced to march. We moved on the Pelham road, via Dechard, encamping for the night about four miles from Dechard-On the 17th we again broke camp for the forward move, but were unable to proceed very far on account of the Fourth Division of the Fourteenth Corps obstructing the road. We encamped for the night. On the 18th we ascended the Cumberland Mountains, and encamped near "University Place." On the 19th we commenced the descent toward "Sweden's Cove." Arriving at the head of the cove, we encamped for the night. We remained in camp until the morning of the 22d, when we again marched to Battle Creek on the Tennessee River. The enemy's pickets were on the opposite side of the river, but disappeared on our arrival. The Eighty-second Indiana and Fourth Kentucky were sent to Bridgeport to build a bridge across the Tennessee River. After completing the bridge we returned to Battle Creek on the 31st, when we crossed the river. Our division had to make the crossing on temporary rafts, hastily constructed for the occasion, made from such material as we could find. We had to partly unload our wagons, which made our progress very slow and tedious. We completed the crossing on the evening of the 2d day of September. On the 3d we marched to Graham's Station, encamping for the night. We remained in camp most of the 4th, awaiting the division supply train to reach us from Bridgeport, as it was impossible to move without rations for the men and teams. On the evening of the 4th, the train having reached us, we proceeded through Hog Jaw Valley to Raccoon Mountain, ascending the mountain by Gordon's Mines, encamping for the night. On the 5th by 2 o'clock A. M. the whole division with artillery and trains were on top of the mountain. The ascent of the mountain .at this point was very steep and exceedingly dangerous, yet we had exceedingly good luck, losing only two wagons. The infantry were of the greatest assistance; by their untiring energy and faithfulness, the safety of the artillery and trains is accounted for. We remained in camp on the mountain until the morning of the 7th, when we advanced to Trenton. Remaining in camp at Trenton until the 10th, we then advanced to Easley's. On the 11th, at daybreak, the Eighty-second, with the balance of the division, moved without baggage, with orders to cross Lookout Mountain without delay to support General Negley's division, which was in a very dangerous position in McLemore's Cove When we arrived at the foot of the mountain we found it impossible to proceed further on account of the road being in posession [sic] of General Reynolds baggage train and other troops. In the evening at 6 o'clock we received orders to move and reach McLemore's Cove by daylight of the 12th. We were unable to move until 12:30 A. M. the 13th. We commenced the ascent of the mountain and succeeded in getting one brigade up by daylight; the other two brigades followed and succeeded in getting into the cove by 11 A. M , with, however, only one battery. On the evening of the 13th our whole division, and one brigade of General Baird's division, made a reconnaissance meeting with no resistance except cavalry scouts. We advanced two miles beyond Davis cross roads. We remained in camp on the 14th awaiting the developments of General McCook's movements with the Twentieth Corps. On the 15th my brigade advanced to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee's Mill and went into camp. We remained in position the 16th. On the 17th we moved and covered four fords, between Gower's Ford and Pond Spring. On the 18th our whole corps moved to the left along Chickamauga Creek to Craw-fish Spring. During the evening we received orders to move on a cross road leading by the Widow Glenn's house, to the Chattanooga and LaFayette road. We marched all night and reached Kelley's Farm about daylight on the morning of the 19th. Our night march was extremely tiring, the roads being narrow and packed with troops. Only for the fences along a part of our journey, it would have been extremely dark. The men fired the fences wherever they came to them, making it light and warm. While the four divisions of the Fourteenth Corps moved on different roads at times, the aim was to keep them in supporting distance of each other. General Negley, being in the advance, reached McLemore's Cove and found the enemy making every preparation to destroy his command, together with his train. General Baird arrived to his assistance, and by good generalship on their part and extreme bad generalship on the part of the enemy, they saved their commands and trains. This movement on General Negley would have proved a success had it been pushed with vigor. But Negley's boldness of advancing led the enemy to believe there was a large force advancing, and caused them to defer the attack until the whole of the Fourteenth Corps was in position, then they deemed it unsafe to make the attack. Crittenden's Corps being out of supporting distance by the rest of the army, Bragg ordered an attack made on him. While Crittenden was not aware of the danger of his command, he made movements of his troops as though he was able to compete with anything in his front. Again the lack of generalship on the part of the Confederates saved Crittenden's troops from defeat. By the 7th of September the movements of the army had placed it along the western base of Lookout Mountain, about six miles from Chattanooga to Valley Head, thirty-six miles distant. In order to threaten the enemy's line of communication it was necessary to pass through the gaps of Lookout Mountain south of Chattanooga. General Rosecrans received information that Bragg was evacuating Chattanooga, and ordered McCook, with the Twentieth Corps, to move rapidly on Alpine and Summerville, Georgia, to intercept his retreat and attack him on flank. Bragg estimated Rosecrans' force at seventy thousand and Burnside's at twenty-five thousand men, and fearing a conjunction of the two armies in his rear, fell back from Chattanooga to prevent being cooped up in there and his base of supplies destroyed. He was expecting reinforcements from Virginia, Mississippi, and Buckner's troops from near Knoxville, Tennessee, and calculated to catch Rosecrans' command in detail and destroy them. He placed his army between Lee's and Gordon's Mills and LaFayette. He soon seen his rapid retreat from Chattanooga misled Rosecrans, and attempted to get in his flank and rear, thus dividing the flanks of his army thirty-six miles, and placing them in such a position that to combine them they had to make a detour, increasing the distance to near fifty miles over a rough country. General Rosecrans discovered Bragg had received re-enforcements, and more were coming, and his only hopes of preventing total defeat was the speedy concentration of his army. At midnight of the 13th General McCook received orders to move to General Thomas' support. He moved with all haste, and on the 17th be had his command in McLemore's Cove, in supporting distance of the Fourteenth Corps. During this time General Crittenden kept up appearances of an advance, keeping in supporting distance of the Fourteenth Corps. Now that the army was in supporting shape, how was it to be put into position to hold Chattanooga? The force of rebels already present outnumbered our forces several thousand, and some ten or fifteen thousand being near at hand. Their base of supplies being with them, while ours was fifty miles in the rear, with rough country to contend with. Had the rebel army been in charge of a general the utter defeat of the Union army could have hardly escaped execution. Bragg was showing great activity on his left to cover the massing of his right. The re-enforcements coming from Virginia, passing through Dalton, revealed his intention. The night of the 17th Bragg laid his plan of attack. His army comprised five corps, Hood's, Walker's, Buckner's, Polk's and Hill's. Hood was to cross the Chickamauga at Reed's Bridge, and sweep up toward Lee and Gordon's Mills to reach Rosecrans' flank and rear, Walker to cross Alexander's Bridge and join Hood, and Buckner was to cross at Ledford's Ford, and press on Wood's position in front of Polk's Corps, while the latter was to demonstrate on the line of direct approach, and if not met by too much resistance to cross and attack any force he might meet. Hill's duty was to cover the left flank of the army, and in event of the movement of the Union Army to Wood's position, he was to attack its left flank. Had these orders been executed as intended they would have been on Rosecrans' left and rear, and gained possession of all the roads east of the Chickamauga Valley. Rosecrans was not prepared to defeat it. From causes unknown he was detained, giving Rosecrans time to form his command between Bragg and Chattanooga. On the night of the 18th Bragg was not ready for action, but was better prepared than Rosecrans, as his movements were on shorter lines. Rosecrans was compelled to make a night march on the 18th, which put five divisions in front of the enemy, with others in motion. General Thomas ordered Brannon's division to make a demonstration toward the Chickamauga to capture a brigade of the enemy on the west side. This movement opened up the battle of the 19th, and disturbed Bragg's plans of attack and led him to believe it was an attack to turn his-right flank. Soon the battle became fierce, lasting-through the day, inflicting heavy loss on both armies. It appears that while the two armies had been in close proximity for days there was no general engagement. At request of General Morton C. Hunter, I have permitted him to give the history of the battle of Chickamauga, as far as the Eighty-second was concerned, he being its Colonel in command during the two days' battle. BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. THE PART TAKEN BY THE EIGHTY-SECOND INDIANA-ADDRESS DELIVERED BY GENERAL MORTON C. HUNTER AT COLUMBUS, IND, OCTOBER 7, 1887. Fellow-Comrades, Ladies and Gentlemen: On the morning of the 19th of September, 1863, about 8 o'clock, Brannon's Division, to which the Eighty-second Indiana belonged, opened the battle of Chickamauga. We had marched all the night previous, as also had the Confederate Army, each intent on getting to Chattanooga first; but the roads came together near Chickamauga River, about twelve miles from Chattanooga. The river lay between the two armies, but most of the enemy had crossed, and the two armies met face to face. Brannon's Division was in the advance. It was reported to Thomas that a brigade of the enemy had been intercepted by Dan McCook's cavalry force and cut off from its main command, by the burning of a bridge where they had attempted to cross the Chickamauga River, and Brannon's Division was sent to capture it. He made the following disposition of his division; General Crockston's Brigade moved on the right and General Vandaver's Brigade on the left, and our brigade, commanded by Colonel Connell, with the Fourth Michigan Battery moved in the center. There were but three regiments in our brigade during the whole fight, to wit: The Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio and the Eighty-second Indiana, the Thirty-eighth Ohio having been sent to guard the train to Chattanooga. We had not gone far until Vandaver's Brigade encountered a division of the enemy, said to be commanded by General Walker, and Crockston's Brigade encountered Forrest's Cavalry and drove it back till it became engaged with infantry. The enemy that we had thus attacked greatly outnumbered Brannon's forces; he sent to Thomas for reinforcements but could get none. Our brigade was soon divided. The Seventeenth Ohio was sent to Van Devene and the Thirty-first Ohio was sent to the right to the support of General Crockston's Brigade and the Eighty-second Indiana with the Fourth Michigan Battery were left to the support of General Vandaver's Brigade. We had gone but a short distance till we were halted on the brow of a hill, where we could distinctly see the fighting. Vandaver's Brigade was hard pressed, but the regular brigade which belonged to General Baird's had given away and was coming back, and the enemy after them. Captain Church, of the Fourth Michigan Battery, had six guns which he was ordered to put in position, each of which he double-shotted. The Eighty-second Indiana was placed on the right of the battery to support it, and the men were ordered to lie down so that they would not be seen by the enemy, and were ordered not to fire till the regular brigade had passed over them. They lay down but a few moments until the regular brigade had passed and the enemy came up, pressing them with all their might. When within fifty yards of us, the battery and the Eighty-second Indiana opened fire and gave them a volley. Then I ordered the Eighty-second Indiana to their feet and followed up the firing as rapidly as possible, and the battery did the same, which was so sudden and so deadly that it gave them a check; in an instant, almost, they were on the retreat. When the regular brigade passed over us they halted and gave us their support, and we immediately cleared the enemy from our front. Vandaver's Brigade, the Eighty-second Indiana, and Fourth Michigan Battery, were then sent to the right, to the support of Crockston's Brigade, which was hard pressed. When the enemy saw the re-enforcements coming, they, supposing that they were much larger than they were, gave way and left us masters of the Held. By this time lighting had become general and we could hear it distinctly for some distance to our right; but that ended the lighting of our division on the first day. The officers and men of the division acted gallantly and were in good spirits, feeling that they had defeated the enemy in their front, though the losses were heavy on both sides. We stayed on the field guarding our front till near sundown, when General Baird took our place and General Brannon received orders to march to another position, which was some two miles to the right. We arrived there about dark and camped in an open field, in which there was a straw stack. It was a very chilly evening; the men were without blankets, having left them where they had prepared to enter the battle in the morning, the ground of which was now occupied by the enemy. That night a very heavy frost fell, and being near the enemy we could not build fires, in consequence of which the men suffered very much during the night, but the boys stood it without a murmur. About 3 o'clock in the morning we marched out a short distance, the frost cracking under our feet like a young snow, and took position in the new line of battle as formed; the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio occupied the first line and the Eighty-second Indiana the second line, about sixty yards in the rear. The main army which formed the line of battle was divided into three parts, the right, the left and the center. The right was commanded by General McCook, and was composed of three divisions, to wit: Jeff. C. Davis', Sheridan's and Johnston's divisions. The left was commanded by General Crittenden and was composed of three divisions, to wit: Van Cleve's, Palmer's and Wood's divisions. The center was commanded by General Thomas, and had four divisions, to wit: Baird's, Negley's, Reynold's and Brannon's divisions, with General Granger's Division in reserve. The line of battle as formed was imperfect in this, to wit: The right was not closed up against the center, but left a gap of a quarter of a mile or more between Thomas' and McCook's commands. Had McCook been closed up against Thomas' command, our line could never have been broken. Now the Eighty-second Indiana was in Brannon's Division, which was on the extreme right of Thomas' command, where this open gap appeared, which made it more difficult to defend. That was the position of the army on the second day's battle. [The line of battle given here.] That morning the sky was clear, and when the sun arose it looked as red as blood through the fog, and was an omen to many as to what the day would be. The light commenced on the left about 9 o'clock in the morning and grew more furious each moment thereafter. Many supposed the attack on our left was a mere feint to draw our forces from the right to oppose it, while the enemy massed his troops in front of our line where this gap of a quarter of a mile or more appeared. Be that as it may, the enemy finding themselves unable to break the line on the left, suddenly commenced an attack in our front. About fifteen minutes before the fighting commenced in our front, General Wood moved a brigade of his to the left and in line with us, but Rosecrans sent to him an order to close to the left and support Reynolds, as the fighting at that time had reached .Reynolds, but Wood did not know how to obey the order unless he moved out of line and to the rear of Reynolds, as Brannon was in line between him and Reynolds. Woods' brigade stayed there but a few moments when it moved out of line, and went to the left in rear of Reynolds. It had been gone but a short time when the enemy commenced a heavy attack on us. The Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio had made a breastwork of rails in their front. When the enemy made the attack it was so furious and angry that the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio, resisting with all their power, soon gave way, and came back to the rear and passed over us. I had the Eighty-second Indiana lying down. The enemy were pressing the Seventeenth and Thirty-first with all their power, when I ordered the Eighty-second to fire, and to raise and charge them, which they did. The fire proved so deadly, and the shock was so great and unexpected to the enemy that they gave way, and we pressed them until we regained the breastworks from which the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio had been driven. In going this short distance of sixty yards I lost ninety-two men, killed and wounded. On looking to my left I saw the whole line had given way as far as I could see. I expected that the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio, when they had passed over my regiment, and saw that I had gone to the front, would reorganize and come to our support. When I reached the breastworks from which they had been driven I looked around, and not a single man in the Union army, outside of the Eighty-second Indiana, was to be seen. My regiment was left alone, and had to take care of itself. I did not go any further than the breastworks, seeing I had no support, and ceased firing, when the enemy, about five minutes later, saw there was no force following them, reorganized and came back. When I saw them coming on our right and in front of us I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, of my regiment, to throw back the right of the Eighty-second so that the enemy could not surround us. He did so, and then I ordered the regiment to fall back and wheel and fire about every fifty yards, which kept the enemy in check. While we were falling back, Captain McCallister, of Company K, a brave officer, was killed, and our flag-staff was shattered to pieces and the flag was disconnected from the staff, when Colonel Davis seized the flag and carried it with him. We fell back about half a mile or more to the top of a hill. While going up the hill we met stragglers by the hundreds coming from Jeff. C. Davis' command, saying that they were flanked. I looked around and could see no one in command. I tried to take command of them, and did stop quite a number of the men from going to the rear, and put them on the left of the Eighty-second Indiana, as the Eighty-second was an organized body. When we reached the top of the hill I determined to go no farther, and ordered the men to throw up a breast-work of rails, a fence being there. While superintending the breast-works, Captain Roop, of my command, came to me and said Colonel Davis wished to see me. He was to my right. I immediately started and met him, and he then told me he had ordered the men of the Eighty-second to put anything in their front they could find. I told him that was right, that I could see no place of safety and I proposed to fight it out there. While I had gone to see Colonel Davis, quite a number I had stopped left, and the brunt of the fighting fell on the Eighty-second. We had been there but a few moments till the enemy pressed up and made an attack, which we repulsed. A short time afterwards they made a second attack, which was much more severe than the first, which we again repulsed. In a few moments they made a third attack with still greater severity, which we again repulsed, we having advantage of position. In the meantime the firing being heavy, it attracted the attention of General Thomas, who could not have been far distant, as he sent one of his staff officers, whose name I have forgotten, but "he rode a large black horse with white in his face." He asked me "What troops were fighting there? If the officer is living he will remember this. I told him it was the Eighty-second Indiana and some men I had stopped going to the rear and put in line. He asked me how long I supposed I could hold the hill. I told him as long as our ammunition would last, and I asked him if he knew where I could get a new supply. He made no reply, but rode away. In about fifteen minutes from that time fourteen men came up, carrying fourteen boxes of ammunition. Where they came from I do not know unless this staff officer had sent them. I immediately caused this ammunition to be distributed to the men. When we had time we still strengthened our works. We had been on the hill, I should judge at least one hour and a half, before I saw a living man, except General Walker, of the Thirty-first Ohio, who is a brave and gallant officer, and Captain Byers, adjutant of the Thirty-first Ohio, the enemy against us, and the men in the Eighty-second Indiana and those I had stopped and put in line. The first troops I saw were the Ninth Ohio. They came up and charged down the hill on the enemy. It soon got too hot for them and they came back and formed on our right and turned logs in their front. A few moments later we saw troops coming up and going into line on our right, until I supposed we had about three thousand men in line, with the order from Thomas "to hold the hill at all hazards" This hill proved to be the key to the battle field, for the enemy had to take it in order to get around Thomas. While Brannon was coming up with his troops and going into position, the enemy were massing their forces in our front. About 1 o'clock the enemy made the most determined and furious attack upon us that I ever saw or heard of-charging right up against our line, which we repulsed with great slaughter to them and with equal determination. They made charge after charge and the more we repulsed them, the more furious they became, until the roar of battle and the surge of the charge made the very earth tremble beneath us; everything was drowned by the rattle of musketry and the tumult of the onslaught. I judged from the way they fought us that they knew that they had three or four times the number of men we did, at least they kept up the lighting, never ceasing for scarcely a moment for nearly four hours. I did not know certainly what troops were opposing us, but understood it was Longstreet's command, which consisted of his corps and other troops that were placed under him. Sometime in the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, when the fighting in our front was heavy as it could be, General Steadman came up with a division and went to the right of Brannon, in a ravine, and entered the fight with us. The hill butted up against the ravine so that the enemy could not get farther to the right. No artillery was used on either side, at least I could hear none, but it was a fight with the deadly musket, wielded with all the skill and power of gallant soldiery. But we could not be dislodged from our position, and stayed there as though we were frozen to the hill. Steadman, as well as we, on the hill, held his ground and was never driven an inch. In our front everything was mowed smooth by bullets, and the dead lay thicker than I ever saw them on any other battle field. General Ward and Major Stinchcom of the Seventeenth Ohio came up with the last troops and acted nobly and gallantly. General Ward fell pierced with a minnie-ball and was carried from the field dangerously wounded. The fighting, after some four hours, subsided a little, but the enemy kept it up till dark; then everything quieted down. I supposed the enemy was defeated, or, at least, was satisfied that they could not whip us. We had shot away all the ammunition that we could get, and were determined to hold the hill with the bayonet, which had already been used by those who were out of ammunition. We had fought all day without food or water, when an order came [at least I was told so] that other troops would take our places, and that we should go down the hill, on the opposite side from the enemy, in the bottom and take supper. We moved by the left flank, which threw the Eighty-second Indiana in advance. We marched some distance, when we came to a road. One of Thomas' staff officers was there. General Brannon asked him if that was the road to Rossville; he said it was. Then General Brannon ordered me to take it and go there, which was the first intimation I had that we were going there to take a new position. You can imagine my feelings better than I can express them. I supposed the enemy was defeated, and instead of us taking a new position for defense we should be preparing to advance, for we had undoubtedly defeated the enemy in our front, and I supposed the rest of the army had done likewise. I could not see any of our forces but a small portion of them on our left, about a half a mile a way, and could not hear anything that was going on, for everything was drowned by the roar of musketry. But I soon learned the facts, and found that we had been holding the enemy in check until Thomas had gotten the rest of the army out of danger, and that we were now merely bringing up the rear. Besides, we were now marching away from our killed and wounded. I had two brothers in my regiment, and I did not know whether they were with us or not; my Lieutenant-Colonel had a son who I knew was wounded, but did not know where he was, besides all the killed and wounded, leaving them to fall into the hands of the enemy. I did not know our losses, but knew they must be heavy. When we made the charge in the bottom after 10 o'clock, after the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio had given way from the breastworks, I knew our loss must be terrible in killed and wounded, for when we came out of the charge our regiment did not look as large by half as when we entered the fight. I expected when night came to have our killed and wounded cared for, but now we could see after none. It was eight miles to Rossville, the night dark, and the surviving troops were tired, as they had fought all day without food or water, and yet had to travel this distance, leaving an enemy between us and those we loved so well. But enough of this, for the very thought of it unnerves me. Now what I claim for the Eighty-second Indiana is this, They are entitled to the credit of being the first troops on the hill, which proved to be the key to the battle-field, and held it against the enemy for at least one hour and a half, until Thomas could learn its importance and send up reinforcements which held it and saved our army. Had the Eighty-second Indiana not gone on that hill the enemy would undoubtedly have destroyed our forces, for they would have gotten behind us and assaulted us in the front and rear. Rosecrans had left the army and gone in the direction of Chattanooga and given up, as also had the commanders of the right and left wings of the army, and the whole command fell on .Thomas' shoulders. Thomas could not have learned the importance of this position had not the Eighty-second Indiana taken and defended it until he had time to see and know the advantage it afforded; hence the order he sent, "to hold it at all hazards." The fighting we did on that hill to hold it, on the 20th day of September, 1863, is equal, if not superior, to that of any battle fought during the war. In this remark I include all the troops on the hill, and Steadman's in the ravine to our right. It is claimed that when Steadman came into the fight he saved our army by keeping the enemy from flanking Brannon. That may be true, but Brannon was of as much importance to Steadman as Steadman was to Brannon. If he kept the enemy from flanking Brannon on the right, Brannon kept the enemy from flanking Steadman on the left. One was just as important as the other. The truth is just as I have stated it, the honor of saving the army was due to all the troops that fought on the hill and in the ravine to our right- to one as much as the other, for it took the fighting of all to hold the position. In anything I have said I do not wish to be understood as detracting from the rest of the army, for I believe every regiment did its full duty, and is entitled to credit therefor. Some regiments had more fighting to do than others, because they occupied a position the enemy thought was more important for them to take than others, hence the hard fighting of the Eighty-second on the second day, for we occupied a position with other comrades the enemy desired to take, and massed their forces to take, and tried with all their power from 1 o'clock till dark to accomplish it, but utterly failed in their attempt. In the morning before the fight commenced, I ordered Major Slocum, of my regiment, to take thirty men and go out and form a picket line and guard the open gap to our right. He and his men who were not killed or wounded when the enemy made the attack, fell back on the hill about one hundred and fifty yards to our right and joined Brannon's forces and fought there bravely till dark and joined us at Rossville. When we got to Rossville we stayed there all the next day and next night, prepared and waiting for the enemy. The question is often asked by many, why was it that the enemy did not follow us up and attack us? The answer is this, they could not; they would have done it if they could, but their army was so badly hurt that it had but little fight left in it, so little that they would not attempt it. If they had it would have proved a failure, for we formed a line across the valley at Rossville that would have held it against any force they could have brought. We moved from Rossville to Chattanooga on Tuesday morning without interruption, except their cavalry made a little show of fight when we got to Chattanooga, hut took good care to keep out of range of our muskets. After we got to Chattanooga we fortified in twenty minutes, so that we could not have been gotten out of there with twice their force. Chattanooga was the objective point; we got there in good shape and held it. The battle of Chickamauga would have terminated very differently from what it did, had McCook on the second day's fight been closed up against Thomas, for then our line could never have been broken, but that fatal gap of a quarter-mile or more was left open where the enemy came in and flanked our army both ways, which was the fatal blunder. It was always a mystery to me, after our army was flanked how Thomas could hold together as he did till dark, and then draw off his forces without loss to Rossviile. That blunder, which Thomas was not responsible for, caused us a retreat to another position, but not a defeat. I had about three hundred muskets in line that day, and my loss, as I now remember it, was one hundred and thirty-seven killed and wounded; none of my men were taken prisoners except the wounded. When I wrote my account of the battle of Chickamauga, and delivered it to my regiment at a reunion held at Columbus, Indiana, in the fall of 1887, I then regarded it as true, though written twenty-four years after it occured, and written, too, from memory; for that battle was more indelibly fixed in my mind than all the battles I was ever in, for the reason that it was the most dangerous and critical in which I was ever engaged; and thought it would be borne out by my report made immediately after the battle, when published by authority of the United States, giving a history of the war. Since that time the reports have been published, and mine does not appear among them. It is reported "not found," though I know it was made, and forwarded in the regular channels of reports, as shown by my brigade commander's report, published in volume thirty of the "Chickamauga Campaign," on page 410. I find among said reports General Brannon's. He was my division commander. His report, published on page-400 of said book (Chickamauga Campaign) does, as I think, my command great injustice. On page 402 of said report he says: "Wood being taken while marching by the flank, broke and fled in confusion, and my line actually attacked from the rear, was obliged to swing back from the right, which it accomplished with wonderful regularity under such circumstances (with, however, the exception of a portion of the First Brigade, which, being much exposed, broke with considerable disorder.)" In that part of his report the thing I complain of is this: He does not say what part did its duty. In order that you may see how our division was placed, I will give the exact position. It was closed up against Reynolds. The Second Brigade was on the left, the First Brigade was on the right, with the Third Brigade in reserve. Wood's division having moved out of line of battle, left the right of my brigade exposed, as there was a gap open as far as I could see-being more than 250 yards. I never saw my division commander from the morning of the 20th until after night, when we moved off the hill. I don't know where he kept himself; but am sure he was not around where I was during the 20th. For I believe, under the circumstances, he should have been in the rear of my brigade, for it was the place of danger, for the reason that the Seventeenth Ohio and my regiment (Eighty second Indiana) formed the right flank of his division, where this gap appeared. General Longstreet was in front of us with his picked corps of the Eastern army, with his troops six lines deep, to march in said gap when the time came for him to advance, for we had no protection on the flank for the Seventeenth Ohio and the Eighty-second Indiana, except Major Slocumb, who was thrown out with thirty flankers to do the best he could where the enemy made their appearance. Before the attack was made by General Longstreet the Third Brigade, which was in reserve, was sent to General Baird for his assistance. General Croxton, commander of the Second Brigade, was closed up against Reynolds. Then came the Thirty-first Ohio of our brigade, supported by the Fourteenth Ohio, one of Croxton's Brigade, then the Fourth Michigan Battery, then the Seventeenth Ohio, supported by my regiment, the Eighty-second Indiana, about sixty yards in the rear. Now, had Brannon been there, and I believe he should, then he could have seen what the First Brigade did instead of guessing at it as he did. He would have learned the perils that the First Brigade was in when the enemy appeared and fired upon us. Their coming was so furious and determined-like a cyclone-that the Thirty first and Seventeenth Ohio, who were occupying the first line, after exchanging a few shots with them, gave way and came back over us. After the Seventeenth had passed and the rebels had crossed our line of breast-works, I had the Eighty-second lying down with bayonets fixed, when I ordered them to fire and rise and charge them, which they did with a will. Their fire was so deadly, and so unexpected was the charge, that the rebels who had crossed the breast-works gave way, and we pressed them until we regained them and drove the rebels from our front. In that charge my regiment numbered only about 200; lost 90 in killed and wounded of as brave men as ever shouldered a musket. When I got to the breast-works, and had driven the enemy back, I looked around to see what support I had, and, to my surprise, I could not see a single soldier to my left except the Eighty-second Indiana. They were all gone as far as I could see, and I was left alone out in the field to take care of myself. Had any regiment come to my support I should not have left, but fought it out there. In this charge many of the rebels were killed and wounded, among whom was General Hood, wounded, one of the bravest generals in the rebel army, and I believe the Eighty-second Indiana did it, for they were the only ones engaged in this charge. I never saw men fight braver and more determined than my men did. General Brannon and the Second Brigade had all given back; at least I could not see anything of them. Being left alone and without any prospect of support, and the rebels coming on my right and left, I had Colonel Davis to throw back my right, to keep from being surrounded. I ordered my men to give back and wheel and fire every fifty yards, to keep the enemy in check. I moved straight to the rear, moving neither to the right nor the left, and kept ahead as fast as we could walk. That we made this charge, I refer you to Colonel Connell's report, my brigade commander, page 411 of "Chickamauga Battlefield," where he says: "Under my observation come the heroic conduct: of Colonel Hunter, Eighty-second Indiana, Colonel Ward of the Seventeenth Ohio, and Colonel Lister of the Thirty-first Ohio. The former, charged with his brave command through our fleeing troops, and retook, and for a moment held our breastworks, when wholly unprotected on right flank or rear." Could more be expected of my gallant command than that? For it made one of the bravest charges against superior numbers, and against troops that were the flower of the rebel army, that was made during the war. And my division commander should have recognized my brave command in his report, instead of saying: "With the exception of a portion of the first brigade being much exposed, broke with considerable disorder." I will venture the assertion that my command left the breast-works after General Brannon had fallen back. While we were retreating four rebel regiments followed us up and kept firing at us. At one time Captain McAllaster was killed, and the flag staff shattered, and the flag fell to the ground, when Colonel Davis picked it up, and carried it to the top of the hill. The men for a moment were excited, but I spoke to them and soon quieted them down. By this time our regiment was tolerably long, and scattered out, when I was informed that General Brannon rode up with two orderlies, but I did not see them, and ordered my brother, Adjutant Hunter, to form at a fence about five hundred yards in our front (we were then going to the rear) when Adjutant Hunter and some forty men moved up faster than the regiment to the fence on the hillside. When the adjutant got there, General Negley ordered him to move to the rear, for if he stayed there two minutes he would be captured. The adjutant insisted on waiting until I would come up with the rest of the regiment, but Negley insisted that we would be captured before we got there. The Adjutant and his men went up the hill with him and joined the Eighty-fourth Illinois and started for the rear. When I got to the fence and started up the hill, I saw stragglers from Jeff. C. Davis' command, and tried to stop them, and did stop a few and put them on the left of the Eighty-second Indiana. When I got to the top of the hill I saw in an instant, from the lay of the ground, that it was the place to fight, and determined to do so as long as my ammunition would last, for I never could consent to going down the opposite side of the hill, giving the enemy the advantage of being above us. I instantly deployed my regiment along the brow of the hill and told them to throw logs, rocks, stumps, rails or any other thing in their front that they could get for their protection. The enemy, in about fifteen minutes, came up and attacked us and we repulsed them. We repulsed them for three different times. Then they seemed to leave us alone for a time. The first man I saw on the hill was one of General Thomas' staff. He came up and asked me who was fighting on the hill; I told him the Eighty-second Indiana and a few men I had stopped and put into line. He asked me how long I could hold the hill. I told him I thought I could hold it as long as my ammunition would last, and asked him if he knew where there was any more, to which he made no reply, but rode away. In a few minutes fourteen men came up carrying fourteen boxes of ammunition, and I immediately had it distributed among the men. Where it came from, I know not, unless this staff officer sent it. The next men I saw were Colonel Walker and Adjutant Byers of the Thirty-first Ohio. In a few moments more I saw the Ninth Ohio (Colonel Kammerling's regiment) coming up from our left and rear, who charged down the hill. I told them before they charged that they had better stop on the top of the hill and throw logs in their front and let the rebels charge them. But Colonel Kammerling insisted on going and I told him to go. The regiment stayed about five minutes and then came back. Colonel Kammerling, when he came back, remarked that the rebels were too d-d thick down there. Then he formed his command on my right and turned logs in their front. As evidence of what I say is true, I herewith submit the statements of Captain Henry S. Byers, of the Thirty-first Ohio, and Colonel Gustav Kammerling and members of the Ninth Ohio. "BLOOMINGTON, IND., January, 1893. "I, Henry S. Byers, late Adjutant Thirty-first Ohio Veteran Infantry, take pleasure in making this statement in honor to Gen. Morton C. Hunter, and his regiment, Eighty-second Indiana. That on the 20th day of September, 1863, between the hours of 12 M. and 1 P.M. I saw General Hunter and the Eighty-second Indiana in position on the left of the hill, known as Snodgrass Hill (and the key-point to the field), they being the first troops to take position. Some time after I saw the Ninth Ohio, Colonel Kimmerling, come up and take position on the right of the Eighty-second Indiana. Afterward other troops took position, and held the ridge until dark. "HENRY S. BYERS." "TELL CITY, IND., February 7, 1893. " I take pleasure in making the following statement of facts that took place on the 20th of September, 1863, at what was known as the 'Battle of Chickamauga," viz.: About 1 o'clock p. M., Sept. 20, 1863, I moved my regiment (the Ninth Ohio) on to what is known as 'Snodgrass Hill,' and found Col. Morton C. Hunter with the Eighty-second Indiana Regiment, and formed on his right along the brow of the hill, and there was no other troops on the hill at the time I arrived there but the Eighty-second Indiana. We held our positions until after night, and then moved off under orders. "GUSTAV KIMMERLING, " Late Col. 9th O. V. I." "We, the undersigned, members of the Ninth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, being present at the time mentioned above, take great pleasure in fully indorsing the statements of our brave Colonel, knowing them to be true: Name. Rank. Co. Regiment. Christ. Haffner, Private, "I." Ninth O. V. I. C. W. H. Luebbert, Private, "D." Ninth O. V. I. Fred. Bertsch, 1st Lieut. "B." Ninth O. V. I. Geo. A. Schneidey, 1st Sergt. "C" Ninth O. V. I. Gerhard Ferber, Corporal, "F." Ninth O. V. I. John Schmutt, Private, "I." Ninth O. V. I. Wihjalm Stagge, Private, "D." Ninth O. V. I. Fredrick Freever, Private, "B." Ninth O. V. I. Joseph Scherer, Private, "B." Ninth O. V. I. Adam Klingel, Private, "A." Ninth O. V. I. Carl Haller, Private, "F." Ninth O. V. I. Herman Howind, Private, "G." Ninth O. V. I. F. Bedecker, Private, Louis Mark, Sergeant, "A." Ninth O. V. I. Chas. Bemimger, Private, "E." Ninth O. V. I. Joseph Deitsch, Private, "H." Ninth O. V. I. John Loge, Private, "A." Ninth O. V. I. George Rimpler, Private, "E." Ninth O. V. I. H. Gunklack, Private, "A." Ninth O. V. I. F. Wendel, Private, "A." Ninth O. V. I. Wm. Leipnitz, Private, "G." Ninth O. V. I. Peter Miller, Private, "C." Ninth O. V. I. A. Voegmann, Private, "K." Ninth O. V. I. Chas. Nulsen, Corporal, "C." Ninth O. V. I. Bernard Sentro, Corporal, "H." Ninth O. V. I. A. Bachlet, Private, "A." Ninth O. V. I. Deitrick Dorst, Private, "E." Ninth O. V. I. Adam Fath, Private, "E." Ninth O. V. I. John Heine, Private, "I." Ninth O. V. I. George Maier, Private, "B." Ninth O. V. I. Chas. Schuly, Sergeant, "B." Ninth O. V. I. Igwers Hoch, Private, "I." Ninth O. V. I. Jacob Setter, Private, "K." Ninth O. V. I. John Boecual, Private, "I." Ninth O. V. I. In about fifteen minutes other regiments came up, which I said in my speech were Brannon's troops. I then did not know, but supposed they were. But since I have read the reports of the various officers in volume 30 of the battle of Chickamauga, I can't find any of them that say that they were sent or brought by General Brannon on that hill, except one regiment sent by General Negley after the fight commenced. I suppose they came up of their own accord (at least, they were not sent or brought by General Brannon), because they were brave officers and men, and knew that they had to fight or surrender, and that being a good place to fight, formed on the right of the Ninth Ohio, along said ridge, and made the line about 400 yards long from left to right, where the heaviest battle was fought during the war. No body blames General Brannon for taking command of the troops, for he was the ranking officer, and it was his duty to do it. What I blame him for is this: After the battle was fought, and it was successful, he claimed all the credit of selecting the position. From his report you would come to the conclusion that he had selected that hill as the key to the battle-field, and he had made every preparation to defend it; when the truth is that my regiment, the Eighty-second Indiana, had been on that hill for more than an hour before he came on it, and had repulsed three charges of the Rebels made upon it, and yet he does not give my command any credit for doing a single thing, when it is entitled to the credit of holding that hill against the enemy until re-enforcements came up and assisted in holding the enemy at bay. Had my regiment not gone on that hill the enemy would have been on top of it an hour before General Brannon came there, and would have crushed our army and taken us as prisoners of war. I hold that the fight on the hill was purely accidental, for when I came upon that hill I did not know where to go. But being pressed by the rebels, the top seemed like the place to fight. Without giving it a moment's thought, I immediately deployed my men along the brow and froze to it. I claim that all the officers and men, without exception, are entitled to the credit of holding it; but no man or set of men is entitled to the credit of selecting it. That was purely accidental; but when Brannon came the line of battle was fixed by my regiment and the Ninth Ohio. There was nothing left for troops to do except to form on the right of the Ninth Ohio along the brow of the hill. There was no other place for them to go, if they wanted to defend the hill. For Brannon to say that he selected the place for them to go is simply preposterous. My regiment took its position upon the top of that hill on the left in line of battle before twelve o'clock of that day (Sept. 20,1863) and maintained it by as hard fighting as was ever done by man. I never saw any one during the day with a star on his shoulder, save one, I think he had, though I am not certain, whom I did not know at the time nor for a long time afterwards, and that was General John Beatty, of Ohio, who came in with some troops on the left of my regiment. He spoke of others as well as myself, during the heaviest charge that I ever saw made. He spoke as follows, on page 370, Chickamauga Campaign: "* * * Of Colonel Hunter, of the Eighty-second Indiana, * * * as men who deserve the gratitude of the Nation, for an exhibition on this occasion of determined courage, which I believe unsurpassed in the history of the Rebellion." After dark, about eight o'clock, General Brannon came to me, the first time that I saw him since early that morning, and told me that we would go off the hill. We moved by the left flank, which threw me in advance, and we marched down the hill and thence to Rossville. I feel that I have done my duty as a soldier, and am now in declining years and care nothing for honors, unless due me. Knowing the cause for which I fought was successful, I would not bother myself to ask for justice to myself; but knowing the soldiering qualities of my brave command, I can not think of keeping quiet until I see them given the honor so justly due them. I never gave them an order but what was cheerfuly executed, no difference how dangerous. It was so general I am unable to point out a single instance of failure. Brave boys. I cheerfully make this statement so justly due you. [Colonel Davis and myself were the only field officers in command of the regiment during that bloody encounter on Snodgrass Hill. Colonel Davis is now dead and gone. He was as brave an officer as ever lived, and is entitled to as much credit as I am in that struggle.] The regiment reached Rossville about 10 o'clock the night of the 20th, and took position in rear of Reynolds' Division, near the Dry Valley Road. The army remained in position guarding Rossville Gap and roads leading to Chattanooga until 10 o'clock p. M. of the 21st. "Brannon's Division was posted at 6 p. M. on the road about half way between Rossville and Chattanooga to cover the movement. The troops were withdrawn in a quiet, orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, and by 7 A. M. on the 22d were in their position in front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to them previous to their arrival." I make this statement from General Thomas' report to show that our division was the rear guard covering this movement, having heard many soldiers claiming that their division was the one who performed that duty. In one hour after reaching Chattanooga the army had succeeded in throwing up breastworks that defied the assault of the enemy, and in a few days the defense of Chattanooga would have defied all the rebels that were contending for the establishment of the Southern Confederacy. General Roseerans was soon removed from command and the greatest General of them all placed in command, i. e., George H. Thomas, better known by his soldiers as "old Pap Thomas." Report of the killed, wounded and missing of the Eighty-second Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, in the fight of Chickamauga, Georgia, the 19th and 20th of September, 1863. STAFF. Missing, Surgeon William H. Lemon. Wounded, Adjutant Alf. G. Hunter, in forehead, slight. NON COMMISSIONED STAFF. Wounded, Sergeant-Major Henry I. Davis, since died. Missing, Hospital Steward, Robert H. Campbell. COMPANY "A." Killed, Private James A. Sipe. Wounded, Private Enoch Robinson, right arm. Wounded, Private William C. Eldridge, leg, slightly. Wounded, Private Eastman Wine, forehead. Wounded, Private Andrew H. Blackford, left arm. Missing, Sergeant Thadeus O. Swindler. Missing, Corporal James I. Hollenback. Missing, Private Wesley L. Blackford. Missing, Private Joseph Hutchinson. Missing, Private William R. Hartwell. Missing, Private Harman K. Whitsell. Missing, Private Francis M. Nicely. Missing, Private Jacob Stites. COMPANY "B." Killed, Private William Baty. Killed, Private John Fink. Killed, Private George A. Hopple. Killed, Private George S. Garrell. Wounded, Corporal John M. Larabee, breast, slightly. Wounded, Private John W. Lafevers, left thigh, since died. Wounded, Private William H. Gorrell, shoulder, since died. Wounded, Private Lucian Allison, thigh, slightly. Wounded, Private Harvey Crockett, thigh, slightly. Wounded, Private Frederick Mauler, breast, slightly. Wounded, Private William E. Meek, left shoulder. Missing, Captain Samuel A. Spencer. Missing, Corporal James M. Gasaway. Missing, Private David M. Hall. COMPANY "C." Killed, First Sergeant William F. McCaskey. Killed, Corporal Albert Park. Wounded, Captain William C. Stineback, hands slightly. Wounded, Private Hensley H. Kirk, thigh. Wounded, Private Joseph Neff, left arm. Wounded, Private Morgan Jordon, left hand. Wounded, Private William Means, wrist. Wounded, Private Oliver H. Kinnear, both hips. Wounded, Private James F. McFall, left arm. Wounded, Private Robert H. Logan, thigh and ankle. Wounded, Private George L. Wilson, thigh and hand. Missing, Corporal Simon D. Strang. Missing, Private William B. Clark. COMPANY "D." Missing, Private Oddy Satterthwait, hospital nurse. COMPANY "E." Killed, Corporal John Kirts. Killed, Private Joseph C. Stearns. Killed, Private Thomas Crayton. Killed, Private William Pauley. Killed, Private James I. Taylor. Wounded, First Lieutenant Lathan C. Almond, leg, slightly. Wounded, Sergeant Fredrick Brower, leg, slightly. Wounded, Sergeant Theodore Alley,leg, slightly. Wounded, Sergeant Henry Wise, leg and shoulder, severely. . Wounded, Corporal Joseph Hunter, leg. Wounded, Private Gideon Underwood, leg, slightly. Wounded, Private William Black, leg, slightly. Wounded, Private Jay Day, breast. Wounded, Private William Ford, thigh and shoulder; severe. Wounded, Private George W. Riley, arm. Wounded, Private James T. Orrell, neck. Wounded, Private Abram Coryell, shoulder. Missing, Private Thomas Luallen. COMPANY "F." Killed, Corporal James Russell. Killed, Private James R. Dearman. Wounded, Sergeant John P. Harrell, leg slightly. Wounded, Corporal Alva P. Hart, shoulder; severe. Wounded, Private Clark McDermott, since died. Wounded, Private William F. Sears, breast severely. Wounded, Private Joseph Letts, thigh broken. Wounded, Private Alvis Moore, nesh wound in side. Wounded, Private James A. Sanders, head slightly. Missing, Private James M. Burris. Missing, Private George Jund. Missing, Private Emanuel Whisenand. Missing, Private David A. Foster. COMPANY "G." Killed, Private John Wolf. Wounded, Sergeant James K. Chamberlain, leg broken. Wounded, Sergeant John Barber, head slightly. Wounded, Private Charles L. Danner, right arm. Wounded, Private Martin Traster, leg severely. Missing, Private Samuel Gordon. COMPANY "H." Killed, Private Martin Ault. Killed, Private Nathan Ayers. Wounded, Private Isaac Collins, left breast. Wounded, Private Hiram Souders, left side. Wounded, Corporal Joseph A. Mellvain, right thigh; severely. Wounded, Private William Pranklin, knee slightly. Wounded, Private William C. Lathrop, mouth slightly. Wounded, Private Thos. I. Kirk, hand slightly. Missing, First Lieutenant Jackson Woods, died in Macon prison. Killed, Sergeant George W. Coffland. COMPANY "I." Killed, Private David Stogdell. Wounded, Second Lieutenant Charles N. Hunter, in leg, slight. Wounded, Sergeant Andrew Raper, thigh. Wounded, Corporal Henry Ison, head. Wounded, Private Simon I. Waldridge, head. Wounded, Private Nicholas B. Maner, leg and arm. Wounded, Private Emanuel B. Brown, arm. Wounded, Private Andrew R. Freeman, leg. Wounded, Private Barton I. Ham, breast slightly. Wounded, Private Robert F. Livingston. COMPANY "K." Killed, Captain Harrison McAllister. Killed, Private John E. Hughes. Killed, Sergeant George J. Warren. Wounded, Corporal Samuel M. Chaille, left thigh. Wounded, Private Thomas H. Hyatt, right leg. Wounded, Private David L. Jackson, right arm. Wounded, Private John Johnson, right arm. Wounded, Private Daniel L. Glenn, right arm. Wounded, Private William J. McDermott, thigh. Wounded, Private Levi Redman, back slightly. Missing, Sergeant Allison A. Rust. Missing, Private William Thompson. Total Number—Killed, 19; wounded, 67; missing, 29. Aggregate, 115. Additional Comments: Extracted from: HISTORY OF THE EIGHTY-SECOND Indiana Volunteer Infantry, ITS ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES. WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE MEMBERS BY ALF. G. HUNTER, Late Adjutant. INDIANAPOLIS: WH. B. BURFORD, PRINTER AND BINDER. 1893. File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/in/statewide/history/1893/historyo/chapterv455gms.txt This file has been created by a form at http://www.genrecords.org/infiles/ File size: 58.3 Kb