Statewide County IN Archives History - Books .....Chapter X Through The Carolinas 1893
************************************************
Copyright.  All rights reserved.
http://www.rootsweb.com/~usgenweb/copyright.htm
http://www.rootsweb.com/~usgenweb/in/infiles.htm
************************************************

File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by:
Joy Fisher sdgenweb@yahoo.com February 14, 2007, 10:14 pm

Book Title: History Of The 82nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry

CHAPTER X.
THROUGH THE CAROLINAS.

  Soon after reaching the sea, General Sherman was ordered to move his army by
sea to assist in taking Richmond, Va. He wrote General Grant his preference for
an overland route through the Carolinas and come up in the rear of Richmond. On
the 27th day of January, 1865, Grant gave orders for Sherman to move his army
northward through the Carolinas as soon as possible. By this movement it was
intended to keep the fragments of the rebel army in the south and west from
concentrating in heavy forces. Troops from the Nineteenth Corps were sent to
garrison Savannah to allow General Sherman his army unbroken to make the
campaign, and should Lee evacuate Richmond and fall back, to allow him force
enough to wipe them out. It would have been one of the pleasures of Sherman's
army to have met Lee's troops and shown them what it was to meet an army that
didn't know what defeat was. Accordingly, orders for a forward movement were
issued for the 15th of January. Heavy rains had swollen the rivers and flooded
the country to such an extent that a part of the army failed to cross into South
Carolina until the 5th of February. General Howard, with the Seventeenth Corps,
crossed from Beauford's Island, flanking the enemy at Gordon's Corner and
pursuing him to Pocotaligo, and took possession of a fort at that point. This
movement was intended as a feint on Charleston, to deceive the enemy as to the
movement on Columbia, S. C, and Goldsboro, N. C. A pontoon bridge was thrown at
Savannah, and the Union causeway repaired for the left wing's advance. The flood
having destroyed the bridge and submerged the causeway, the left wing was
compelled to move up the river some forty miles to Sister's Ferry to effect a
crossing. A part of the Twentieth Corps crossed at Purrysburg, and formed
communication with General Howard at Poeotaligo. The Fourteenth and a part of
the Fifteenth, being relieved from Garrison duty at Savannah by Gower's Division
of the Nineteenth Corps, left Savannah on the 26th, moved up to Sister's Ferry
and crossed on the 5th. Gen. John A. Logan, with the Fifteenth Corps, joined
General Howard at Pocotaligo.

  The whole army was now ready for the campaign. The enemy was making every
attempt to organize a force to meet our advancing columns, but were at a loss as
to the intended movements of the army. Beauregard and Hardee were at Charleston,
and Bragg in North Carolina. North Carolina being open to attack on the east
coast, General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps and other troops,
threatened Charlotte, N. C. General Sherman made disposition of his command,
threatening Charleston, Augusta and Columbia. The enemy was at a loss to discern
his intentions. His front, right or left wings all bore upon objects of great
importance; but what was his aim remained a mystery to them until his movements
were completed. Had they known his intentions, he could have changed his plan
and moved on with great injury to them and with no detriment to himself. The
Fourteenth Corps, forming the extreme left flank, made a feint on Augusta, Ga.,
passing through the town of Barnwell. The right wing, with General Sherman in
person, moved to the Salkahatchie, touching the river at Beauford and River's
bridges, flanking Charleston. The enemy was very weak in force, and General
Howard had but little trouble in forcing a crossing, the enemy retreating to
Branchville. These movements caused great alarm through the country. General
Sherman's objective was yet a great mystery, but his strategy was far beyond
their comprehension. Columbia was left almost unprotected. The Fifteenth Corps
moved on the Orangeburg road; the Seventeenth by Holman's, crossing the Edisto
River, then by direct road to Columbia; the left wing by Barnwell and Lexington,
and destroyed the Charleston & Augusta Railroad for several miles. The evening
of the 12th of February my division struck the railroad at Johnson's turnout,
about twenty-five miles from Augusta. General Hunter, being in command of our
brigade, ordered Captain Whedon and myself to make search for water (we being on
his staff), it being very scarce, and, if found, report to the commanders of the
regiments of his brigade, so as to relieve the men from the labor of hunting it
up, the men being tired, having marched all day, and were ordered to tear up
railroad after night. The Captain and I went in obedience to orders. We divided
forces, he taking the right and me the left, to scour the country back to a road
some three-quarters of a mile, there to meet and report success. After riding a
short time, hearing a noise in the rear, I looked around and saw the Captain
with eighteen other horsemen dressed in blue coming in my rear. I took them to
be Kilpatrick's men (he being on our flank), but soon discovered they "wasn't
that kind of cats." The outside appearance was all right,. but the inside was
all wrong (not being as used to these appearances then as I have since). I
found, to my horror, that Captain Whedon was a prisoner, and, having promised
his wife to follow him through thick and thin, and die with him if necessary, I
concluded to go along and look after his welfare, and thus became a prisoner
with him. We traveled some thirty miles that night to flank our army and get to
their camp. Before going in to report, they halted us in a dark hollow, built a
fire and traded with us until from outward appearances we looked like tolerably
onery Johnnies. When they called for Cap's watch I had to laugh, not from joy at
Cap's loss, but to see how he took the demand. The watch was a present to him,
and he thought so much of it no money could have bought it. He took the watch
from his pocket and commenced looking at it, his breath coming very hard.
Finally he broke forth, saying: "I will tell you what I can do, Sergeant; I can
whip any d—n son of a b— in your command whether I keep this watch." The banter
wasn't accepted, but the watch was. We were finally turned over to the provost
guards, our quarters being in a field alongside of a burning log. Lieutenant
Oliver, of Kilpatrick's staff, with two Orderlies, were lying asleep. They had
the appearance of Johnnies, as they, too, had been trading with the rebels. We
asked the guards who they were. On being informed, we concluded to see how they
felt. The Lieutenant having a jacket on, and being a robust young man, displayed
a fine set of hips. Cap walked up and gave him a friendly slap with his hand,
representing a blister powder. The Lieutenant was up in a flash looking Cap
square in the face, exclaiming: "What do you mean, you d—n rebel son of a b—?"
Cap commenced laughing, and replied: "Fresh fish." The Lieutenant extended his
hand and gave him a good friendly shake. We had a good chat. In the morning we
started for Augusta, arriving there after night, and were placed in a stockade.
Next day Cap found the Lieutenant in charge, who was a member of the I. O. O.
F., and the brother took him and myself out to get a drink. For this favor the
Lieutenant was relieved from duty and sent to his command, and Cap, Lieutenants
Oliver, Ohara and myself were sent to the fourth story of the Augusta jail,
where we remained for eleven days and nights. Getting hold of a city paper we
noticed the agreement between the commissioners of exchange (Ould and Mulford),
as to treatment of prisoners. They were not to be kept in any confinement except
regular military prisons. Getting some writing material we addressed the General
(Fry) in cammand [sic] of the post, calling his attention to the order, and
requested him to see it complied with. He ordered us to Andersonville. But being
posted on the angle of the square, I struck the Lieutenant in whose charge we
were placed, and he answered me satisfactory. He said his orders were for
Andersonville, but thought he could have us stopped at Macon, as the keeper of
the prison there was a man of the square also. We were placed in the hospital at
Macon (although none of us were sick) and remained there one month. Then we had
the pleasure of boarding at the Hotel de Andersonville better than two weeks.
General Wilson's Cavalry reminded the rebs that they were looking after our
interests, and we were run out for Macon. Wilson having cut off the retreat, in
that direction, we were taken back through Andersonville to Albany. From there
we took it on foot to Thomasville, sixty miles, thence by rail to Lake City,
Florida, where we remained several days. General Sam Jones (Confederate) called
on us, giving us the news of President Lincoln's assassination and the surrender
of General Lee's army, and said the bottom of the Confederacy had dropped out.
The pleasant news of the war being over made but little feeling in the hearts of
the soldiers when they heard of the death of our noble-hearted President,
Abraham Lincoln. The morning of the 28th of April we were put aboard the cars
and run down to Baldwin, within twenty miles of Jacksonville, where our forces
held possession. As bad off as the men were the most of them footed it through
by night. We were received in grand style by our forces. Although only absent
from the sight of our flag, the "Star Spangled Banner," two months and sixteen
days, I thought it the prettiest thing I ever saw. We had one man in our squad
that was captured at the first battle of Bull Run. From some cause he had been
missed in the different exchanges, and had served in nearly every prison the
rebels had. The last squad that was ever in Andersonville, I was one of the
number—thirty-five hundred. Of this number there were but thirteen officers. The
officers remained only a few days and went to Hilton Head to get transportation
toward home; we remained at Hilton Head about one week. During our stay there we
took a trip to Charleston to take a look at Forts Sumpter and Moultrie, and
spent a day in the city seeing the grand effect of our artillery practice on the
place. We could find but one fault with the work, i. e., we would have been glad
to have stood on the bank and looked down in a bottomless chasm, with the
knowledge that there laid buried the hot-bed of high treason. On our return to
Hilton Head we took vessel for Annapolis, Maryland, making a safe but not
over-pleasant trip, remained there four days, starting for my home, arriving
safely. If the history of my prison life interests the reader as little as it
did me while undergoing it, they will be as glad to finish its perusal as I was
to finish my term of prison life. Not being with the grand old regiment on the
balance of its journey to the close of the war, I am indebted to my brother,
Gen. Morton C. Hunter, and the official records for the history of its marchings
and actions to its return to Indianapolis and muster out. After making a strong
demonstration against Augusta, General Slocum marched his command to the Saluda
River above Columbia, forming a connection with General Howard. The movement of
our army had caused the evacuation of Charleston, South Carolina, and drove
General Cheatham, with the remnant of Hood's army, north of our prospective line
of march. By the same strategy, General Sherman proposed to reach Goldsboro.
This movement was of greater danger than his former ones. The garrisons of
Augusta, Charleston and Columbia could be united with Western and Atlantic coast
forces, making it dangerous to divide his forces as heretofore. Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston having again taken command of the rebel forces, made it more dangerous,
as it was conceded he was the best General in the Confederate cause. General
Sherman, knowing his abilities, was prepared to meet him, and knowing the lay of
the country did not furnish the natural advantages that General Johnston had on
his Atlanta campaign, and feeling that the demoralized condition of the troops
with which he had to contend, he had no fears of carrying out his plans.
Johnston's army was inferior to General Sherman's in every particular; it lacked
in numbers, and being composed* of fragments badly demoralized from the effect
of late engagements, and knowing they were to meet the army which had driven
them from their natural strong positions from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and a part
of them feeling that they had been badly whipped by a part of the army only,
which they contended with on the Atlanta campaign. Johnston knew he had to
contend with the man that maneuvered the army and took Atlanta, left but little
hope of ever stopping the grand army on its forward movement. His only hope was
to strike unsupported columns and defeat our army in detail. Genera] Sherman was
well aware that this was his only hope, and guarded against giving such
opportunities. The Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, under General Slocum, made a
movement threatening Charlotte, North Carolina, to create the impression he
would strike that point on his way to Virginia, while his real object was
Goldsboro, crossing the Saluda River at Mount Zion Church on the 17th and Broad
River, at Freshley's Mills, on the 19th, arriving at Winsboro on the 21st,
destroying many miles of railroad on either side of Alton. On the 20th the right
wing, with General Sherman, left Columbia moving to Winsboro destroying the
railroad between the two points. A great portion of Columbia was destroyed by
fire, by whose order remains a matter of controversy. Here the wings again
separated, the left wing moving northward a short distance, turned eastward,
crossing the Catawba River, advancing to Sneedsboro. The cavalry on its left
moved toward Charlotte, thence to Sneedsboro. The right wing advanced to Cheraw,
entering it on March 2d. The enemy made a weak resistance. The forces from the
West under Cheatham were directed to Charlotte, with the impression it was the
objective point, the two wings crossing the Peedee River at Sneedsboro and
Cheraw. On the 9th of March General Hampton surprised one of Kilpatrick's
brigades and gained advantage over his entire command, Kilpatrick making his
escape on foot. The enemy stopped to plunder his camps, giving him time to rally
his troops and retake his camps and hold the enemy at bay. On the 11th the
Fourteenth and Seventeenth Corps met at Fayetteville and skirmished with
Hampton's Cavalry. Hardee withdrew across Cape Fear River, burning the bridge.
It was expected that Hardee would make a stand here, but he abandoned the place
without resistance, leaving large quantities of public property, among which was
an immense arsenal. Here General Sherman received notice of the fall of
Wilmington. He sent orders to Generals Schofield and Terry to move on Goldsboro.
The march through South Carolina left a track fifty miles-wide that bore
evidence that the army felt it was doing it justice for its initiative in
bringing on the war. It surely met with nothing but justice, unless one house
was left unburned by the gallant army as it advanced through a worse place than
the "black hole of Calcutta." As many important places had been lost to the
rebel cause without much show of resistance, it had left their army none the
less in troops. General Johnston having concentrated his army and received
several thousand from the west, made arrangements to meet General Sherman
between Goldsboro and Fayetteville. While his-army did not contain as many men
as General Sherman's, yet he had sufficient to meet, with some show of
resistance, either wing or smaller quantity. Their cavalry was greatly superior
to ours in numbers. Their infantry and artillery were-formidable enough to cause
General Sherman to-move his army with precaution as to support in case of
attack. In a letter to General Schofield, of March 12th, he said that "General
Johnston might concentrate at Raleigh forty or fifty thousand men;" but said, "I
can whip that number with my present force. With yours and Terry's added, we can
go wherever we can live." Sherman's movements from Fayetteville gave evidence of
his former strategy. He moved four divisions of infantry and his cavalry toward
Raleigh, following with four more divisions from the left wing, sending the
trains with the remaining four divisions farther to the east. The cavalry
advanced on the direct Averysboro road, making a feint on Raleigh, striking the
railroad at Smithfield. Two divisions of the left wing moved with their trains
to Fashion Station on the Wilmington & Goldsboro Railroad, General Sherman
accompanying the left wing. On account of heavy rains the roads were compelled
to be corduroyed in order to pass the artillery. On the 15th General Kilpatrick
skirmished the rear guard of Hardee, capturing some prisoners. On the 16th
General Slocum advanced his command to near Averysboro, finding General Hardee
intrenched on a narrow strip of swamp land between Cape Fear and South Rivers,
guarding the Bentonville and Goldsboro roads leading to Raleigh. This was the
first resistance worthy of note north of Savannah, and intended to give General
Johnston time to prepare for stronger opposition farther north. The idea was
that he would make a stand and give battle at either Raleigh, Smithfield or
Goldsboro. Let this be as it would, Sherman required the dislodgement of Hardee.
General Slocum was ordered to attack. He advanced the Twentieth Corps and
developed the enemy's position. Owing to the softness of the ground it was very
difficult to move an army, especially artillery. Direct attack was quite
perilous. One brigade was thrown on the left of the rebel line, routing a
brigade from their works, who fell back to a stronger position. General Davis,
with two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps, joined the advancing line. The whole
line now advanced, pushing the enemy into their works. The attack was so
determined that Hardee took advantage of the dark night and retreated. Our loss
was eighty killed and four hundred and eighty wounded. The Eighty-second did her
part in this gallant attack. The enemy left one hundred and seventy-eight
killed, one hundred and seventy-five captured, and three pieces of artillery.
Their wounded being removed the number was not known. Hardee retreated toward
Smithfield; General Slocum crossed South River and advanced on the Goldsboro
road;. General Sherman continued with the left wing. On the night of the 18th
encamped within twenty miles of Goldsboro. The right wing reached Lee's Store,
placing the two wings in supporting distance, in case of an emergency. General
Sherman had been expecting an attack on his left flank, but had now made up his
mind that the enemy had fallen back to Smithfield. The two columns were ordered
to move upon Goldsboro, General Howard, with the right wing, to move on road by
Falling Creek Church, and General Slocnm, with the left wing, on the main road.
Carlin's Division of the Fourteenth Corps, in advance of the left flank, started
on the road to Goldsboro, when they soon met a division of rebel cavalry. From
their strong resistance it was judged they had support, or had gained some of
their old-time Confederate courage. Carlin's orders being to press the enemy, he
engaged them heavily. The heavy roar of artillery soon gave notice that the
battle was on. General Johnston was expecting to crush the Fourteenth Corps,
which was a big undertaking. As the resistance became more stubborn, more troops
were brought into action. Two divisions now being in line, they were ordered to
press the enemy and develop their position and strength. A deserter coming in,
who formerly belonged to the Union army, gave General Slocum the intelligence
that Johnston's whole army was massed in his front. This statement being
supported by developments, General Slocum prepared for defense. He made
disposition of his forces and sent a message to General Sherman, notifying him
that he had met Johnston's whole army in full force. He ordered General Williams
to throw his train to the rights gather his forces and hasten to the support of
General Davis. General Hardee's retreat from Averysboro led to the belief that
the road to Goldsboro was clear. He changed his direction and made a detour and
joined the rest of the Confederate forces near Bentonville. From appearances
Johnston's success was assured. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were in
his front, two more divisions were a few miles away, and the right wing,
intended for their support, was far to the right in rapid motion for Goldsboro.
The idea was to defeat these four divisions in detail and destroy the trains;
then they would have some chance of contending against the balance of the army,
or maneuver to catch them in detail. The plan failed, for the reason that the
two first divisions to be annihilated were the Fourteenth Corps. To do that
corps up would require quite an army, as well as considerable time, which the
rebels found to be true on many occasions before. These two divisions held their
own and punished the rebels severely. Two divisions of the Twentieth Corps came
to their assistance, and through the failure of Bragg, Hardee, Lee and Cheatham
to man their troops, and the fighting qualities of these four divisions against
Johnston's whole army, the enemy had all they could do to maintain their own.
The other two divisions of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps marched to the
scene of action and took position for an attack. The right wing came up and
joined the right flank of the left. Generals Schofield and Terry arrived in
supporting distance. During the night Johnston crossed the Neuse River,
destroying the bridge and made a safe retreat, leaving his pickets to fall into
our hands; also his wounded. General Slocum's loss was nine officers and one
hundred and forty-five men killed, fifty-one officers and eight hundred and
sixteen men wounded. He captured three hundred and thirty-three, and buried one
hundred and sixty-seven of the enemy. General Howard's total loss was three
hundred and ninety-nine. The order for concentration at Goldsboro was carried
out. General Sherman went to meet General Grant to confer as to final
operations. Sherman made a new organization of the combined armies, General
Schofield to command the "Center." His old force (Fifteenth and Seventeenth
Corps) the right wing, retaining its designation, "Army of the Tennessee," and
the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps designated as the "Army of Georgia," as the
left wing. This left the Eighty- second a part of the First Brigade, Third
Division, Fourteenth Corps, Army of Georgia. The impression was that Lee and
Johnston's armies would unite; but let that be as it might. General Sherman was
to move against Johnston's command, and then move north and co-operate with
General Grant. Lee surrendered his army on April 9th, 1865. On the 10th
Sherman's armies moved toward Raleigh against the remaining Confederate army
east of the Mississippi River. Johnston knew full well he was unable to meet the
"Grand Old Army" marching against him, but to keep up appearances of fixing for
battle he fell back as Sherman advanced, his aim being to avoid an engagement
and procure as good terms as possible in the surrender of his army. General
Sherman was marching on the enemy to give the final blow. On the 14th he
received a note from Johnston which opened negotiations for the surrender of the
Confederate forces under his command, as well as all the Confederate forces
under arms. The Government disapproved of his actions. The truce ended on the
24th. Two days later there was a second conference, which resulted in the
surrender of all the forces of the Confederacy east of the Chattahoochee River.
General Sherman issued orders announcing the cessation of hostilities, and made
provisions for the relief of the people. Generals Howard and Slocum were
directed to move their armies through Richmond, Virginia, to Washington City.
The war was now virtually at an end. For six months before the fall came, no man
with common sense could for a moment believe there was more than a shadow of
hope of its success. The leaders fearing their necks would pay the debt of high
treason, sought the ignorance of the file to prolong their existance. Seeing the
end was near, had they been men of true courage, and had the interest of the
people at stake which they were claiming to represent, they would have
surrendered like men, and said, do with me as you deem just, but spare the poor
fellows we have led into wrong. This would have been honorable, and would have
saved many lives and millions of dollars worth of property. I may be wrong in my
views, but am conscientious in my belief, that no man who took the oath to
divide the United States and establish a Southern Confederacy, is worthy of
being trusted to assist in dictating laws to govern this "Grand old Government,"
handed down to us through the hands of that great and good man, George
Washington. The long boasted Southern cause collapsed with such suddenness as to
cause great wonder; but, upon examination, the last ditch was empty. Even
Jefferson Davis, its vaunted leader, disguised in crinoline and female skirts,
was stealthily endeavoring to escape the judgment of the conquerors, and he
thought to preserve the life which he had so often boasted should not survive
the fall of his (treasonable efforts) grand promises and lofty aspirations. His
cowardly heart was a fit symbol of the cause for which he and the leaders of the
South had committed treason to accomplish. His descent from power was sudden,
and should have shown to the deluded masses of poor whites that the men who
forced them in the battle's front were only brave so long as an army stood
between them and the advancing forces. The overthrow of the rebellion was caused
by a variety of causes; mal-administration being one of the greatest, lack of
soldiers being another. The need of soldiers not only failed by conscription,
but by desertion. Army supplies were secured by despotic restraint. The ruling
cause of the war by the South was insurrection, not true revolution.

Revolution is by the masses; insurrection by a few who presume to dictate. There
isn't a shadow of doubt but what the masses were against disrupting the
Government at the outset. Had a few paid the penalty of treason, all would have
been well to-day.


Additional Comments:
Extracted from:

HISTORY OF THE EIGHTY-SECOND
Indiana Volunteer Infantry,
ITS ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES.

WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE MEMBERS

BY
ALF. G. HUNTER,
Late Adjutant.

INDIANAPOLIS:
WH. B. BURFORD, PRINTER AND BINDER.
1893.


File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/in/statewide/history/1893/historyo/chapterx460gms.txt

This file has been created by a form at http://www.genrecords.org/infiles/

File size: 26.9 Kb