Maryland Archives Court Records.....Grant vs. Naylor, 1808 ************************************************ Copyright. All rights reserved. http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm http://www.usgwarchives.net/md/mdfiles.htm ************************************************ File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by: Allie Griffith-Nelson alinel@sbcglobal.net Image can be viewed at: http://www.rootsweb.com/~archcrtc/US/Supreme/volii/toc.html Supreme Court Reverses Maryland Circuit Court Decision February Term 1808 Grant v. Naylor4 Cranch's Reports, 224 to 236 A letter of credit addressed by mistake to John and Joseph Naylor, and delivered to John and Jeremiah Naylor, will not support an action by John and Jeremiah for goods furnished by them to the bearer, upon the faith of the letter of credit. It is not a written contract between the plaintiffs and defendants; and parol proof cannot be admitted to make it such. It is not a case of ambiguity, or of fraud, or of mistake on the part of the plaintiffs. [see note at the end of the case] The best judges in England have been of opinion, that relaxing the construction of the statute of frauds, ought not to be extended further than it has already been carried out; and this court entirely concurs in that opinion. [see note at the end of the case] ERROR to the circuit court for the district of Maryland. John and Jeremiah Naylor instituted a suit in the circuit court for the recovery of two thousand one hundred and sixty-eight pounds sterling, being the amount of goods furnished to Alexander Grant , the son of the defendant, Daniel Grant: which goods they charged that they had so furnished on the guarantee of the defendant, Daniel Grant. In support of their claim they presented and read in evidence a letter addressed by the defendant "To Messrs. John and Joseph Naylor and Company," as follows: "Baltimore, 6th April, 1795 " Gentlemen, By the recommendation of Mr. Travis, I take the liberty to address to you by my son Alexander, who visits England with a view of establishing connexions in the commercial line there in the different manufactories and others. He is concerned with Mr. John Hackett, of this place, under the firm of Hackett and Grant. For their plan, I refer to themselves. Have therefore only to add, that I will guaranty their engagements, should you think it necessary, for any transaction they may have with your house." The defendant prayed the court to instruct the jury, that the plaintiff's were not entitled to recover. This instruction the court refused; and the court instructed the jury that the evidence was sufficient in the law to support the plaintiff's suit. The defendant tendered a bill of exceptions, and brought this writ of error. The cause was argued by Martin, for the plaintiff in error, and by Ingersoll, for the defendants. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court. In this case three points are made by the plaintiff in error on the letter which constitutes the basis of this action. He contends, 1. That this letter being a collateral undertaking, and being addressed to John and Joseph Naylor and Co., the plaintiffs below cannot be admitted to prove by parol testimony that it was intended for and is an assumpsit to John and Jeremiah Naylor. 2. That the undertaking was conditional and required notices to be given to the writer of the extent and nature of his liability. 3. That it is confined to the shipments made during the year in which it was written. On the first objection the court has felt considerable difficulty. That the letter was really designed for John and Jeremiah Naylor cannot be doubted; but the principles which require that a promise to pay the debt of another shall be in writing, and which will not permit a written contract to be explained by parol testimony, originate in a general and a wise policy, which this court cannot relax so far as to except from its operation cases within the principles. Already have so many cases been taken out of the statute of frauds, which seem to be within its letter, that it may well be doubted whether the exceptions do not let in many of the mischiefs against which the rule was intended to guard. The best judges in England have been of opinion that this relaxing construction of the statute ought not to be extended further that it has already been carried, and this court entirely concurs in that opinion. On examining the cases which have been cited at the bar, it does not appear to the court that they authorized the explanation of the contract which is attempted in this case. This is not a case of ambiguity. It is not an ambiguity patent, for the face of the letter can excite no doubt. It is not a latent ambiguity, for there are not two firms of the name of John and Joseph Naylor and Co., to either of which this letter might have been delivered. It is not a case of fraud. And if it was, a court of chancery would probably be the tribunal which would, if any, could afford redress. If it be a case of mistake, it is a mistake of the writer only, not of him by whom the goods were advanced, and who claims the benefit of the promise. Without reviewing all the cases which have been urged from the bar, it may be said with confidence that no one of them is a precedent for this. A letter addressed, by mistake it is admitted, to one house, is delivered to another. It contains no application or promise to the company to which it is delivered, but contains an application and a promise to a different company not existing at that place. The company to which it is delivered are not imposed upon with respect to the address, but knowing that the letter was not directed to them, they trust the bearer who came to make contracts on his own account. In such a case, the letter itself is not a written contract between Daniel Grant, the writer, and John and Jeremiah Naylor, the persons to whom it was delivered. To admit parol proof to make it such a contract, is going further than the courts have ever gone, where the writing is itself the contract, not evidence of a contract, and where no pre-existing obligation bound the party to enter into it. It being the opinion of the majority of the court that John and Jeremiah Naylor could not maintain their action on this letter, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other points which were made at the bar. It is the opinion of this court that the circuit erred in directing the jury that the evidence given by the plaintiffs in that court was proper and sufficient to support the issue on their part. The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, to be reversed, and the cause sent back for further trial. Judgment reversed. Source: Condensed Reports of Cases in The Supreme Court of the United States Containing the Whole Series of the Decisions of the Court from its Organization to the Commencement of Peter's Reports at January Term, 1827 with Copious Notes of Parallel Cases in the Supreme and Circuit Courts of the United States. Edited by Richard Peters, Counselor at Law and Reporter of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. II of six Volumes. Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co No. 253 Market Street.1841.