Adams County MsArchives Court.....Jones, Isaac June 1818
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Source: Reports Of Cases Adjudged In The Supreme Court Of Mississippi, June Term, 1818
Written: June 1818

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI vs. ISAAC JONES.


In the state of Mississippi, murder may be committed by the killing a slave, 
as well as by the killing a freeman.

In some respects, slaves may be considered as chattels, but in other respects 
they are regarded as men.

The ancient law of Rome, giving power over the life of the slave, never 
extended here.

Slavery exists not by force of the law of nature or of nations, but by virtue 
only of the positive provisions of the law, to these the master must look for 
all his rights, and they do not confer the power of taking the life of the 
slave.

The term "reasonable creature" in the definition of murder, means a human 
being, and embraces an idiot, lunatic, or unborn child, and slave.

The term "king's peace" in the same definition, means the place where the 
crime was committed, and embraces persons attainted, outlawed, or even alien 
enemies not engaged in battle.


OPINION OF THE COURT-BY THE HON. J. G. CLARKE.

The question in this case arising on motion in arrest of judgment, transferred 
on doubts from Adams superior court, is, whether in this state, murder can be 
committed on a slave. Because individuals may have been deprived of many of 
their rights by society, it does not follow, that they have been deprived of 
all their rights.

In some respects, slaves may be considered as chattels, but in others, they 
are regarded as men. The law views them as capable of committing crimes. This 
can only be upon the principle, that they are men and rational beings. The 
Roman law has been much relied on by the counsel of the defendant. That law 
was confined to the Roman empire, giving the power of life and death over 
captives in war, as slaves, but it no more extended here, than the similar 
power given to parents over the lives of their children. Much stress has also 
been laid by the defendant’s counsel, on the case cited from Taylor’s reports, 
decided in North Carolina, yet in that case, two judges against one, were of 
opinion, that killing a slave was murder. Judge Hall, who delivered the 
dissenting opinion in the above case, based his conclusions, as we conceive, 
upon erroneous principles, by considering the laws of Rome applicable here. 
His inference, also, that a person cannot be condemned capitally, because, he 
may be liable in a civil action, is not sustained by reason or authority, but 
appears to us to be in direct opposition to both. At a very early period in 
Virginia, the power of life over slaves was given by statute, but Tucker 
observes, that as soon as these statutes were repealed, it was at once 
considered by their courts, that the killing a slave might be murder. 
Commonwealth vs. Dolly Chapman, indictment for maliciously stabbing a slave 
under a statute. It has been determined in Virginia, that slaves are persons. 
In the constitution of the United States, slaves are expressly designated 
as "persons." In this state, the Legislature have considered slaves as 
reasonable end accountable beings and it would be a stigma upon the character 
of the state, and a reproach to the administration of justice, if the life of 
a slave could be taken with impunity, or if he could be murdered in cold 
blood, without subjecting the offender to the highest penalty known to the 
criminal jurisprudence of the country. Has the slave no rights, because he is 
deprived of his freedom. He is still a human being, and possesses all those 
rights, of which he is not deprived by the positive provisions of the law, but 
in vain shall we look for any law passed by the enlightened and philanthropic 
legislature of this state, giving even to the master, much less to a stranger, 
power over the life of a slave. Such a statute would be worthy the age of 
Draco or Caligula, and would be condemed by the unanimous voice of the people 
of this state, where, even cruelty to slaves, much less the taking away of a 
life, meets with universal reprobation. By the provisions of our law, a slave 
may commit murder, and be punished with death; why then is it not murder to 
kill a slave? can a mere chattel commit murder, and be subjected to 
punishment? Villains, in England, were more degraded than our slaves. It is 
true, that formerly, the murder of a villain was not punished with death, but 
neither was the murder of a freeman then so punished. The only difference 
between a freeman and the slave, was in the magnitude of the fine. In England, 
killing a villain was as much murder, as killing a lord. Yet villains were 
then the most abject slaves, and could be bought and sold as chattels, but 
because slaves can be bought and sold, it does not follow that they can be 
deprived of life. The right of the master exists not by force of the law of 
nature or of nations, but by virtue only of the positive law of the state, and 
although that gives to the master the right to command the services of the 
slave, requiring the master to feed and clothe the slave from infancy till 
death, yet it gives the master no right to take the life of the slave, and if 
the offence be not murder, it is not a crime, and subjects the offender to no 
punishment. The taking away the life of a reasonable creature, under the 
king’s peace, with malice aforethought, express or implied, is murder at 
Common law. Is not the slave a reasonable creature, is he not a human being, 
and the meaning of this phrase reasonable creature is a human being, for the 
killing a lunitic, an idiot or even a child unborn, is murder, as much as the 
killing a philosopher, and has not the slave as much reason as a lunitic, an 
idiot, or an unborn child? All are in the kings peace, except alien enemies, 
flagrante bello. A distinction once existed in England, between the killing a 
Dane and a Saxon, but even in Coke’s time, the killing any rational being was 
murder. Jews were then regarded in a light more odious than the most abject 
slave, yet to kill them was murder. So to kill one attainted, or an outlawed 
felon, or even an alien enemy, except in battle, might be murder. The 
term, "king’s peace" means the place where the crime is committed, the actual 
venue, and not a particular class of human beings.

At one petiod of the Roman history, a history written in the blood of 
vanquished nations, slaves were regarded as captives, whose lives had been 
spared in battle, and the savage conqueror might take away the life of the 
captive, and therefore he might take away the life of the slave. But the civil 
law of Rome extirpated this barberous privilege, and rendered the killing a 
slave a capital offence.

When the northern barbarians overran Southern Europe, they had no laws but 
those of conquerers, and conquered, victors, and captives, yet even by this 
savage people, no distinction was recognized between the killing in cold 
blood, a slave or a freeman. And shall this court, in the nineteenth century, 
establish a principle, too sanguinary for the code even of the Goths and 
Vandals, and extend to the whole community, the right to murder slaves with 
impunity?

The motion to arrest the judgment must be overruled.

The defendant was sentenced to be hung on the 27th July 1821.


Source: Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Mississippi, June 
Term, 1818, By R. J. Walker, Reporter of the State. Natchez: Printed at the 
Courier and Journal Office, 1834; pages 80-83.

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