Noxubee County MsArchives Military Records.....The Noxubee Squadron Of The First MS Cavalry, Part 3 Civilwar 1st MS Cavalry, CSA ************************************************ Copyright. All rights reserved. http://usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm http://usgwarchives.net/ms/msfiles.htm ************************************************ File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by: Joy Fisher sdgenweb@yahoo.com April 24, 2007, 12:03 am The Noxubee Squadron Of The First MS Cavalry, Part 3 THROUGH ALABAMA. We left Columbus, full of hope and confidence, and passed through Tuscaloosa, Montevallo, Talladega, and Anniston, on our way to Rome, Ga. The pellucid streams, the charming valleys, and the encircling mountains, as well as the hospitable citizens of towns and country, all contributed to our comfort and happiness. This region had not yet been ravaged by hostile bands nor traversed by many Confederates. We naturally gave way to feelings of joy and gladness while we could, for well we knew that erelong we should experience a rude contrast to these pacific and delightful scenes. On May 15th, we arrived at Rome. General Jackson being away, Armstrong commanded the division, Pinson our brigade, and Montgomery our regiment. Early next morning, Ross's brigade encountered a strong force of Federal cavalry, and Montgomery with the First Mississippi was sent to support Ross. After a short and sharp skirmish, the enemy became satisfied and retired, having met much stouter resistance than had been expected. ADAIRSVILLE. We then rode all night and joined Johnston's army at Adairsville by daylight on the 17th, and immediately went into action on Wheeler's right. Here let me say in passing that from that day till the fall of Jonesboro on September 1st, we were so constantly engaged in skirmishing, scouting, and picketing, that it would be too tedious to go into minute details, and I shall undertake simply to tell something of the more important engagements in which we took part. General Jackson was kept too busy to find time to write reports and left no record of the operations of his command from May 6th to May 31st, nor from July 14th to October 9th, 1864. As stated above, we were sent to Wheeler's aid, when he was doing his utmost to hold the enemy in check. The Federals, however, brought forward heavy reinforcements and drove Wheeler and Armstrong back. Then, Hardee's corps was ordered out to resist the enemy's advance and Armstrong's brigade was ordered to support Hardee. In Johnston's Narrative, it is simply stated that Jackson's cavalry had joined his army and that with Hardee's corps they had checked the advance of Sherman. In fact, we fought in line with Hardee's corps for more than three hours and did not yield an inch of terrain; and our brigade lost 31. Being in the woods, we were somewhat protected, for we did not scruple to utilize every available tree, log, or stump as a shelter from bullets. The Twenty-eighth lost more heavily than the First Mississippi, because it was the first of our regiments to get into the fight and was somewhat more exposed than the First. We made a most favorable impression on our infantry in line behind us, and they cheered us lustily as we were ordered to the rear. After dark, our army fell back, and we again marched all night to get into proper position on the left flank of the army to cover the retreat. Every old trooper of Armstrong's brigade now living will remember that night. It was the second night we passed in the saddle with a busy day intervening. As short halts occurred at long intervals, the men would throw themselves on the ground to snatch a few minutes of sleep; but a great majority of us had learned to sleep in the saddle, and thus we fared better than our faithful horses. CASSVILLE. On the morning of the 18th, we reached Cassville. Our brigade was ordered out immediately to repel hostile cavalry advancing rapidly and but four miles away on the Fairmount road. In a lively skirmish for some hours, we inflicted some loss on the enemy and drove them from the field. We were then, to our gratification, ordered to go into camp behind the infantry. We needed both rest and food. Gladly we unsaddled our horses and fed them bountifully, and then we drew rations for ourselves. Next day, May 19th, we had but little to do, though there was firing along the whole front all day, as the enemy continued to press the rear-guard. Late in the afternoon, a ringing battle-order from General Johnston was read in every regiment, awakening the greatest enthusiasm in every breast. The position assigned to Armstrong's brigade was on the extreme left of the army, adjoining Polk's corps. So thither we marched and bivouacked there about 9 o'clock that night. To our great surprise on awakening in the morning, our army had fallen back. Wheeler on the east and Jackson on the west screened the movements of the infantry. NEW HOPE CHURCH. On the 28th, our brigade was ordered to occupy some trenches on the left of Bates' division. In our immediate front, the trees and undergrowth were thick and effectually hid from our view the Federal works not more than two hundred yards away. General Armstrong had orders from General Bates at a given signal to charge the hostile entrenchments, supposed by General Bates to be held by a mere line of skirmishers. We were under the impression that Bates would advance synchronously with us. Late in the afternoon the signal gun was fired, and with a wild yell we leaped from the trenches and rushed forward, the First Mississippi being next to Bates' men. We drove the enemy from his works and captured a battery. Bates' men failed to move forward; and, in consequence, the enemy rallied, and enfiladed us, thus compelling us to withdraw and to abandon the captured battery and leave our dead and some wounded on the field. With others under the immediate eye of Lieutenant Foote, Willis Hunter had been desperately wounded, and Jack White and J. G. Deupree were ordered to carry him back to our field hospital. To do this was one of the most trying experiences we had during the war, for the Federals returning to their works concentrated rifle and cannon fire upon us as soon as our line began to withdraw. Missiles of death coming from behind are far more frightful than when coming from the front, and every moment we felt that we would be struck down, but somehow we carried our burden through and committed dear Willis to the hospital. He was another of the famous Hunter group to give his life to the cause, for he died within a few days. He and I had been schoolmates at Howard College, where he was universally esteemed. I recall the name of another member of our Squadron killed here, that of Ed Crawford, also a gallant soldier, a member of Company F. The total loss in our brigade was 171, almost equally distributed among our regiments. We lost many excellent officers and none better than Captains Herrin and Turner of the First Mississippi, who fell within the enemy's entrenchments. Had Bates' division advanced with us, we might have held the Federal works and brought off many prisoners. Our charge was made down one hill and up another, the opposing battery being on the crest of the hill and directly in front of our regimental centre. Behind the battery were strong earthworks filled with soldiers, thus rendering it impossible for us to hold what we had gained, when the right of our regiment, by Bates' men not coming forward, was thus exposed to enfilading fire by those Federals immediately fronting Bates. But when we reoccupied our own trenches, we hoped the Federals would then assail us, as we thought "turn about would be fair play", and we were sanguine that we could give them a hotter reception than they had given us. But they were content to shell us from a distance more or less continuously during the night. The prisoners we captured were amazed to find, as they said, "the Confederate infantry wearing spurs", mistaking us for the "web-footed", because we had assailed them so furiously. On June 2d, Sherman withdrew from our immediate front and extended his lines still further around Johnston's right wing. While Sherman and Johnston were playing their game of strategy for many weeks and thousands of good men were shedding their blood, our cavalry were engaged more or less every day in skirmishes with detachments of the enemy, but with slight losses as compared with those we believed we had inflicted on our foe. The Federal cavalry, as estimated by General Johnston, numbered more .than 15,000, greatly exceeding the combined cavalry of Wheeler and Jackson; and they were far better equipped. So we were kept exceedingly busy, watching their maneuvers and thwarting their plans. LOST MOUNTAIN. On June 5th, our regiment was on top of Lost Mountain, whence we had a grand view of Sherman's vast army encircling Johnston's and gradually outflanking it on one wing or the other, thus forcing it to yield one position after another in order to maintain communication with Atlanta. Some of our companies had quite a skirmish near the base of the mountain with a detachment of Federal infantry to-day, who were evidently searching for Johnston's left wing, that they might find some way to get in his rear. As we held the higher ground, we readily drove the Federals within their own lines. DEATH OF GENERAL POLK. Early on the morning of June 14th, Generals Johnston, Hardee, and Polk, rode to the top of Pine Mountain to inspect the position of Bates' division. The captain of a Federal battery six hundred yards in front observed the distinguished group and opened fire upon them. The third shot struck General Polk and passed through his chest from left to right, killing him instantly. This sudden death of the eminent Christian and fearless soldier, who had distinguished himself in every battle fought by the army of Tennessee, produced the deepest sorrow among all the troops, and more especially in his own corps, to which we practically belonged. General Polk had been a classmate of President Davis at West Point and they were devoted personal friends. Had General Polk lived a few weeks longer, he might have prevailed upon President Davis not to remove Johnston from the command of this army, and thus the fall of the Confederacy might have been indefinitely postponed. IN REAR OF SHERMAN. In the last days of June, General Armstrong was ordered to select a detachment from his brigade, consisting of twenty-five men from each company, and cut the railroad between Etowah and Alatoona. Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomery was in command of the men from our regiment, who had been selected because our horses were in the best condition. We took with us five days' cooked rations. The strictest secrecy was observed lest any inkling of the expedition or its purpose might reach the enemy; for it was a matter of great importance that we should get into the rear of Sherman's army without being discovered. Moving west for some miles and then turning north, we eluded the hostile outposts and got too far ahead of them to be overtaken, if we should be discovered and pursued, before we could strike the railroad. Whether we could ever get back was altogether another question, which we would have time enough to consider when the emergency came. We passed directly across our old battlefield at New Hope Church, and to our astonishment every tree was dead, evidently having been killed by the countless scores of bullets from the rifles of Federals and Confederates, striking the trees from near the ground to ten and twenty feet above. Many trees had been entirely cut down by minie balls and cannon shot, even trees more, than three feet in circumference. Passing on rapidly, we reached the railroad somewhat north of Alatoona, dispersed a force of cavalry and infantry, and captured more than forty prisoners, without incurring any loss whatever. Having fewer than 900 men and no artillery, Armstrong found Alatoona too strongly garrisoned and fortified to be successfully assailed. He, therefore, destroyed the railroad so far as possible, and with his prisoners moved west ten miles and bivouacked for the night. We found abundant forage for the horses in the wheatfields. Next morning, Armstrong lingered here, hoping he might find an opportunity to capture a wagon train or a cavalry detachment; but none came in sight during the day. Late in the afternoon, after giving Montgomery orders to remain here twenty-four hours longer, Armstrong with the detachments from his other regiments and with the prisoners set out towards Lost Mountain, going first west and then south, somewhat in the same way he had come. Montgomery, apprehensive that he might be discovered, concealed his troops as much as possible in a thicket, passed the night quietly with pickets out on all roads; but spent the next day more or less in dread of encountering a superior force, supposing, of course, that cavalry would be sent in pursuit of us. However, the appointed hour came, and just before night we were all exceedingly glad to start on our return to Lost Mountain. We moved off rapidly, in order to put ten miles or more between us and possible pursuers. We spent the latter portion of the night in thick woods, but daylight found us again in the saddle, going rapidly and diverging but little from the route we had come. At noon we halted in a deep valley to feed and rest our horses. It was raining hard, but that made no difference, for we had long since grown accustomed to getting wet, as it had rained on us during the last forty-five days, day or night without exception. We reached camp just before night, fed our horses, and drew rations for ourselves. Horses and men then enjoyed a night of solid and undisturbed repose. ON THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. Next morning we learned that Sherman was still extending his right wing, and by the 2d of July General Johnston reported that Sherman's right was nearer Atlanta than our left, thus threatening the railroad bridge and Turner's ferry. But on July 1st a division of Georgia State troops had come to support Jackson's cavalry, which opposed the Federal advance on our extreme left. .On July 4th, General Smith withdrew his Georgians within their intrenchments and thus necessitated our yielding some ground. We had been constantly engaged since the 1st of July, incurring some losses, as we fought outside the entrenchments. After crossing the Chattahoochee on July 5th, we were kept busy guarding the river for twenty miles below Atlanta. General Johnston's Narrative says: "On July 14th, a division of of [sic] Federal cavalry crossed the river by Moore's bridge near Newnan, but was driven back by Armstrong's brigade, which had been sent by General Jackson to meet it". Newnan is forty miles southwest from Atlanta on the railroad leading to West Point, Ga. The enemy's cavalry intended to cut this important artery of communication with one of our sources of supply. But we made a forced march and intercepted the Federals before they reached the railroad, and with but one brigade we drove back their division, with considerable loss to them and little to us. We then destroyed Moore's bridge and awaited orders. The morning of July 19th dawned. O fateful day! and never to be forgotten! Just as we began moving out in obedience to orders to intercept this same cavalry division, Colonel Pinson informed us of Johnston's removal from the command of the Army of Tennessee and the substitution of Hood in his place. We were greatly surprised and deeply grieved. We could scarcely believe it possible. We marched rapidly to head off the Federals who were on a raid to West Point, and we rode hard all day and all night, and the melancholy gloom that overshadowed officers and men can never be told. We believed that the hopes of the Confederacy rested largely on Johnston, for we knew well with what alacrity he had always been obeyed, the absolute confidence the army had reposed in him, the matchless skill with which he had thus far outwitted Sherman, and the great losses he had inflicted on the Federals at comparatively small cost to the Confederates; and we felt sure that Johnston would have administered a crushing blow when Sherman's army was divided in crossing Peach Tree Creek. It was the universal conviction of the army that Joseph E. Johnston was one of our greatest commanders, ranking with Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee, and that his removal was equal to the loss of one half of the army. Even to this day, the theme is too sad to dwell upon, and I turn from it and resume the thread of my story. IN CAMP ON BATTLEFIELD. Our all day and all night ride ended at La Grange. The enemy had turned back without reaching West Point, so soon as he learned that we were in position to cut off his retreat, in case he advanced further. After a few days, we were ordered back to Atlanta and arrived there on July 24th, after the memorable battle of the 22d. I will not say what impression Hood made on us and on the army; but he was in authority and we must obey without question. Colonel Pinson reported to Hood in person, and our regiment was ordered to pass through Atlanta and go into camp on the battlefield of July 22d. The scene was horrible; decomposing horses were lying scattered in all directions; the dead of both armies had been buried in shallow graves, barely covered with earth; legs, arms, and heads might be seen protruding; and the green flies were so multitudinous, that it was well-nigh impossible to prepare food or to eat it. But the position was important and must be held. The hostile infantry had been withdrawn from our immediate front in order to continue the extension of their right wing. We had, however, minor engagements with bodies of cavalry and easily repelled their attacks. We fought with them for the corn in a field lying between us and them, and we got our full share of the corn. We were here because temporarily all of Wheeler's cavalry were employed elsewhere. Early on the 28th, however, we were relieved from this disagreeable place and ordered to join our brigade on the Lick Skillet road northwest of Atlanta on the extreme left of our army. BATTLE OF THE 28TH. Our regiment was sent to relieve a Georgia regiment at the edge of a skirt of woods, which bordered an open field two hundred yards wide along our front. As our pickets took intervals and began to cross this field, they were suddenly fired upon, and the woods beyond the field were full of "blue-coats" advancing in line of battle. We could not yield without resistance, for we must give warning to the brigade. A brief, sharp skirmish resulted, in which J. J. Hunter, of Company F, was sure he killed one Federal; and it was clear that we were facing not less than a brigade and possibly a division. But we retired slowly through the woods, firing from every stump and tree and prostrate log into the ranks of the enemy. As we were steady veterans, good shots, with good guns, we must have done considerable execution. The caution displayed in their advance attested somewhat the accuracy of our marksmanship. We halted on the crest of the next hill, protecting ourselves more or less behind houses and fences. As the enemy came on in close array, they suffered heavily, while our loss was comparatively light. Seeing, however, that we could not stop their persistent advance, Colonel Pinson ordered us to withdraw to the next hill and mount our horses. But as we gained the summit of the hill, we heard a noise in the woods back of our horses and were overjoyed to meet a brigade from S. D. Lee's corps on the double quick hastening to our support. It goes without saying, the advance of the Federals was instantly checked. Thus was brought on the battle of the 28th of July, and this was our part in it. Both sides brought up reinforcements, each extending its battle-line eastward. Lee's whole corps and A. P. Stewart's came into action, and the battle raged till night, according to Hood without material advantage to either belligerent. Each failed to dislodge the other. Losses were heavy, perhaps not less than from 4,000 to 5,000 to either the Federals or the Confederates. Meanwhile, Jackson with his two other brigades and Wheeler's cavalry under Wheeler and Iverson had been pursuing the Federal commands of Stoneman and McCook. On the 29th, a telegram from Wheeler stated: "We have just completed the killing, capturing, and breaking up of the entire raiding party under General McCook, capturing 950 unwounded prisoners, two pieces of artillery, and 1200 horses and equipments." On the same day, a dispatch from Iverson said: "General Stoneman, after being routed yesterday, surrendered 500 of his men; the rest are scattered and fleeing towards Eatonton; and many have already been killed and captured." Armstrong's brigade regretted not being permitted to participate in these brilliant achievements, though just as profitably employed in guarding the left flank of Hood's army. DEFEAT OF KILPATRICK. After the battle of the 28th, Atlanta was regularly besieged and this lasted a month. Wheeler was sent north to interrupt Sherman's communications. Sherman, taking advantage of Wheeler's absence, made yet another attempt to cut the Macon railroad by sending for this purpose a strong detachment of cavalry under General Kilpatrick, who passed rapidly around our left. General Jackson with two brigades pursued, and Pinson's regiment and most of Armstrong's brigade followed shortly afterwards. Kilpatrick had crossed the railroad at Jonesborough, burned the depot, and torn up several miles of track, before he was overtaken by Jackson. General Ross had thrown his brigade across Kilpatrick's path while our brigade under Armstrong was pressing him in the rear. As the Texans were between Kilpatrick and safety by flight, he withdrew the force fighting us, formed his troops into column by companies and charged through Ross' thin line that had been stretched out to cover Kilpatrick's front. The heroic Texans, firing first in the faces of the advancing Federals and then at their backs after they had passed on, inflicted heavy losses on them. Likewise, the men of King's battery, right in the road of Kilpatrick's charging column, fired into it one or two rounds as it came on; then, dodging under their guns till the last company of Kilpatrick's column had passed, they rose, wheeled their guns around, and again fired into the retreating column. Afterwards, Armstrong followed rapidly on the heels of Kilpatrick and brought him to bay. Pinson was ordered to dismount his regiment and begin the attack. This he did promptly and furiously. We routed Kilpatrick's rear-guard and drove it pell-mell a mile or more, though for awhile they put up a stout resistance. Here, our loss was about fifty, killed and wounded, and we killed, wounded, and captured many more than fifty. At length, on a high ridge the Federals made another stand, but before we could assail them, or Armstrong could bring up the regiments already mounted, the Federals remounted and fled precipitately. The Federal dead and wounded were left on the field and many unwounded were also captured. Kilpatrick's sole aim now was to escape. This he did. I regret I cannot give the names of our killed and wounded, other than of two of the bravest of the Noxubee Squadron, Tommy Staunton and Hall Haynes, both members of Company F. In charging through the Texans in line of battle, the Federals had little time or thought for anything else than flight; but as they reached the Texan horseholders and horses, they stampeded these horses and carried off as prisoners a few of the horse-holders, all of whom, however, succeeded in getting away and coming back to Ross during the night. Most of Kilpatrick's artillery horses and pack-mules were killed, and his cannon and rich supplies of food and forage were abandoned. As night had fallen, and further pursuit was useless, Colonel Pinson ordered us back into camp. That night, every man of us had genuine coffee in abundance and all the good edibles heart could wish; and our horses had corn, oats, and hay,-all they could devour. IN SHERMAN'S FRONT. Next day, we received orders to hasten back to the left of Hood's army, for Sherman had begun his flank movement in earnest, because, as he says in his book, his cavalry either could not or would not disable a railroad; and, therefore, he had resolved to throw his infantry on the railroad in rear of Hood. As Sherman extended his left, Armstrong was always found in his front to obstruct his advance. One day we held a rocky ridge facing west with an open view for at least a mile across a cultivated field; and along a road on the opposite ridge we watched for a long while thousands and thousands of infantry march South. We had no artillery and the range was too great for effective use of our carbines. The Federals, however, not relishing our constant firing into their moving column, deployed not less than a brigade and slowly drove back the First Mississippi. Late in the day, the head of Sherman's column crossed the railroad near Fairburn; during the day we had captured a few prisoners from three different corps, indicating that at least three-fourths of Sherman's army were engaged in this movement. We had kept General Hood fully advised of the progress of events, and at last he was convinced, as we had been for many days, that Sherman was moving with his whole army, that his purpose was to destroy the Macon railroad, and that the fate of Atlanta depended on the possibility of defeating Sherman. Our infantry and artillery then in the neighborhood of Atlanta had been reduced to about 35,000 men. Wheeler with 4,500 men was doing valuable service in the region around Chattanooga, but service useless in the present emergency. Jackson with two of his brigades was busy elsewhere, and only Armstrong's brigade of about 1,500 men was in Sherman's immediate front. After crossing the West Point railroad, Sherman's progress was slow. The country was open and Armstrong availed himself of every desirable position at which he could offer even temporary resistance and retard somewhat the march of Sherman's immense column. On the 30th of August, we crossed the Flint River not many miles from Jonesboro, whither Hood had dispatched the brigades of Lewis and Reynolds to reinforce Armstrong. We halted on the south bank of the Flint and for awhile offered stout resistance. But the enemy crossed above and below us about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and this compelled us to withdraw. Our next stand was on a ridge at right angles to the road. We had a broad open field in front and woods behind us. We piled up rails as a fortification and sent our horses to the rear under the hill. First a heavy line of skirmishers advanced against us. Waiting till they were well within range, we fired a volley and they retreated rapidly over the hill, leaving their dead and wounded behind them. But soon appeared two solid lines of infantry, and at least one battery of artillery opened fire upon us. The first shots went wild above our heads; but, soon getting the range, they fired with greater precision of aim, causing our rails to fly in all directions, and rendering our position more dangerous than in the open. I distinctly remember that one member of our Noxubee Cavalry, a new recruit and a noted street "bully" at home that would fight even a wild-cat in a fisticuff encounter, at this moment threw down his gun, turned his back to the foe, and fled as fast as his legs could carry him. We never saw him again. I do not care to reproduce his name, as some respectable descendant might grieve over his cowardice. We were ordered to get in front of our rail-piles; but this position was tenable only a short time, since the Federal line extended far beyond ours on each flank and enabled them to enfilade us. JONESBORO. When we reached Jonesboro, we found Lewis' brigade in the trenches. We dismounted and joined them. Reynolds' brigade had not yet come. Early the next morning, the enemy massed heavy forces, used long-range artillery, and drove us out. Hardee's corps coming a little too late assaulted the works of the enemy in vain, losing about 1,400 in killed and wounded. Lee's corps arrived still later. Had these two corps been twelve hours earlier, the result at Jonesboro would have been different. Hood then assembled his whole army at Lovejoy and Sherman took possession of Atlanta. PALMETTO. After the removal of the Federal prisoners from Andersonville, the destruction of railroads radiating from Atlanta, the strengthening of the fortifications of Macon, Augusta, and Columbus, the recall of Wheeler's cavalry from Tennessee, and the transfer of all army supplies to the West Point railroad, Hood on the 18th of September began to extend his left towards the Chattahoochee, which his advance reached on the 19th. He formed his line of battle on the 20th, his right east of the railroad and his left resting near the river, with headquarters at Palmetto. On the 28th, Jackson's cavalry advanced, a detachment being sent to operate against the railroad between Marietta and the Chattahoochee. The First Mississippi captured a long and well loaded train of cars with its guard complete. Kilpatrick's cavalry was north of the Chattahoochee and Girard's had gone in the direction of Rome. ALATOONA. At Alatoona, large supplies were stored, guarded by a brigade of infantry well entrenched, which General French's division had been ordered to capture. A squadron from Pinson's First Mississippi under Capt. Tobe Taylor accompanied French and served as eyes and ears for him. We tore up considerable stretches of the railroad; but when Sherman's army on its march north came too close and threatened to cut off our communication with Hood, General French, having captured only a portion of the Federal works and destroyed them, despite his several desperate assaults, retreated westward and rejoined Hood. DALTON. On October 10th, our cavalry was dispatched to hold in check the Federals at Rome; and on the 11th Hood's army marched towards Resaca and Dalton, and on the 13th captured the latter place with more than 1,000 prisoners. Wheeler's cavalry was resisting and retarding Sherman's march north. Hood had planned to give battle, but his corps-commanders advised him that it would be unwise with less than 35,000 effectives to risk an engagement with 65,000 veterans, flushed with recent victory. Hood next conceived the idea of moving into Tennessee. Beauregard, commanding the Department, assented but directed Hood to leave Wheeler's cavalry to protect Georgia from state-wide depredation by Sherman's army. Then, as Sherman turned south, Hood moved north and on Nov. 13th established headquarters at Florence. DEATH OF CAPTAIN KING. A few days previously, Captain King of the Noxubee Cavalry, who had long entertained a presentiment that he would be killed, while riding at the head of his company and leading the advance of Armstrong's brigade, was struck centrally in the forehead by a minie-ball and instantly killed, to the utter amazement of all. Na one was apprehensive of danger, not an enemy was in sight, and no firing was heard in any direction. We were ascending a hill but could not yet see over it. Evidently, the ball had been fired by a Federal sharpshooter from a long-range gun and was on its descending trajectory when it struck Captain King. King's presentiment like that of Bealle previously mentioned in this narrative was thus realized. His death was deeply lamented, for he was universally popular. First Lieutenant T. J. Deupree from this time till the end of the war commanded the Noxubee Cavalry. After mounting the hill and advancing more than a mile, we discovered the enemy's line, and a brief but sharp skirmish followed, in which among the first to fall was Lieutenant Henley of the Noxubee Troopers. Thus in less than an hour our Squadron lost two of the best officers we ever had. DEFEAT OF COON. On Nov. 18th, General N. B. Forrest, in obedience to orders from General Beauregard, reported to General Hood. Then Jackson's division, that is, the brigades of Ross and Armstrong, were added to Forrest's command. Now in command of all the cavalry of Hood's army, numbering about 5,000 effectives, Forrest moved out from Florence in advance of the infantry and went into camp on Shoal Creek. Thence, Buford's and Jackson's divisions were ordered to advance northward over the military road. Next day, Nov. 19th, a foraging detachment from Buford's division, while gathering corn, came suddenly into contact with a Federal brigade of cavalry under Colonel Datus Coon of Hatch's division, which charged the Kentuckians so vigorously and unexpectedly, that they fled and abandoned two wagons belonging to Buford's headquarters. Fortunately, Armstrong's brigade was also gathering corn from a field not far away. Upon hearing the firing, Armstrong promptly led his Mississippians at a gallop to the scene and fell furiously on the right and rear of the Federals; while Buford's men, quickly rallying after recovering from their surprise, again faced their pursuers. The Federals were thus caught between the Mississippians and the Kentuckians and were roughly handled. They were routed and driven precipitately and in great disorder from the field, leaving many prisoners and the recaptured wagons in our hands. CAVALRY COMPLIMENTED Meanwhile, Forrest with his remaining division under Chalmers had set out on his march towards Nashville, going through Kelly's Forge, and reaching Henryville on the 23d. On the 22d, Buford and Jackson, coming into Lawrenceburg, again encountered a portion of Wilson's cavalry, which after slight resistance retreated towards Pulaski. That our cavalry made itself severely felt is gracefully acknowledged by Colonel Henry Stone, U. S. A., on the staff of General George H. Thomas, who says in his report: "The Confederate army began its northward march from Florence Nov. 19th, in weather of great severity. It rained and snowed and hailed and froze. Forrest had come up with 6,000 cavalry and led the advance with indomitable energy. Hatch and Cox made such resistance as they could; but on the 22d the head of Hood's column was at Lawrenceburg, sixteen miles west of Pulaski". As the scope of my narrative is designed to give in the main only the operations in which the Noxubee Squadron of the First Mississippi took part, I regretfully forbear to recount the brilliant action of Rucker's brigade, Chalmer's division, under Forrest's own eye at Henryville. DEFEAT OF HATCH. Jackson and Buford continued the pursuit towards Pulaski on separate roads, and at night on the 23d Jackson learned that the enemy were rapidly evacuating this portion of Tennessee. Next day, therefore, he moved more directly north and at Campbellsville found in his front more than a division of cavalry under Hatch. Promptly making his dispositions to attack, Jackson threw forward a part of Ross's brigade, while Armstrong's brigade made a wide detour and fell with fury upon Hatch's right and rear, and at the same time Young's battery from a favorable ridge opened with telling effect. In a few moments, too, Bu-ford's guns were heard a mile or more away. He had also come up against the enemy on his line of pursuit. Thus, Kentuckians, Mississippians, and Texans were all thrown with a common aim against Hatch. Our fierce attack was, indeed, irresistible, and the enemy was speedily routed. Buford on his part of the field charged and captured more than 100 unwounded prisoners; and Jackson's brigades, pressing their advantage, captured still more, with horses and equipments, four stands of colors, and sixty-five fat beeves. BETWEEN COLUMBIA AND FRANKLIN. Next day, Buford and Jackson joined Forrest near Columbia. This was Nov. 24th. Columbia was held by the Fourth and Twenty-third corps under General Schofield and by Wilson's cavalry, with heavy lines of skirmishers in rifle-pits encircling the town. General Forrest immediately invested the place and held his position till the 27th, when Hood's infantry arrived and the Federals began the evacuation of Columbia by crossing to the north side of Duck River. On the 28th, the main portion of our cavalry succeeded in effecting a crossing. Forrest's celerity and boldness in leading Hood's invasion was now giving to General Thomas at Nashville grave concern for the safety of Schofield's army. After crossing Duck River we promptly drove back all hostile cavalry on the roads leading to Spring Hill and Franklin. Before midnight, Forrest with Chalmers' division was eight miles beyond Columbia on the Spring Hill road, greatly disappointed to learn that Buford was slow to cross Duck River by reason of the stubborn resistance he had met and that he could not join him earlier than 8 o'clock on the morning of the 29th. Jackson's division had been directed to move on the Lewisburg pike towards Franklin. Erelong Armstrong's brigade, being in the lead, sent back word to Forrest that the enemy had been found in force and waited for instructions. Forrest ordered Armstrong to hold the enemy and not press them too closely till he could with Chalmers' division gain their flank and rear. Forrest then moved rapidly towards Spring Hill with Chalmers' division and within two miles of the village encountered Union pickets. By this time Buford had come up and in conjunction with Chalmers advanced against the enemy, who being well fortified held their position heroically. Strong barricades had been erected and Coon's brigade of Hatch's division had reinforced the Federals. By his usual flanking process, however, Forrest at length dislodged them; and then we were ordered to press them with vigor, which Armstrong was always glad to do. About this time, Colonel Wilson of the NINETEENTH Tennessee was thrice wounded while leading his mounted regiment in a desperate charge across an open field; but he refused to leave his regiment. The fight speedily became general, and word came from Hood to hold the position at all hazards, and that the head of the infantry column was only two miles away. Chalmers' division moved upon the enemy's right. A charge was ordered. Thus the enemy, driven from his rifle-pits, fled towards Spring Hill. Jackson's division was ordered to ride at a gallop to Thompson's Station, to hold it, and thus cut off Schofield's retreat. In obedience to this order, we reached the railroad by 11 o'clock that night, and found the advance of Stanley's division of Schofield's army passing north. We assailed them promptly, took possession of the road and held it firmly, despite their fierce attacks, till daylight. But the odds against us grew constantly as Schofield's army retreating from Columbia swelled the number of our assailants, till with overwhelming forces they drove us from their front. All this time, while we were doing our utmost to hold the pike, Hood with Cheatham's corps was within easy striking distance; and, if he had thrown Cheatham's veterans boldly and with vigor upon the Federals, they would have inevitably been routed and captured. This would have assured the complete success of Hood's campaign into Tennessee. But failure to make the most of this great opportunity gave rise to a bitter controversy between Hood and Cheatham; and in this connection, I am sure, my readers will be glad to see the following letter from Governor Isham G. Harris: "Memphis, Tenn., May 20th, 1877. "Governor JAMES D. PORTER, Nashville Tennessee. My dear Sir:- General Hood on the march to Franklin spoke to me in the presence of Major Mason of the failure of General Cheatham to make the night attack at Spring Hill, and censured him in severe terms for disobedience of orders. Soon after this, being alone with Major Mason, the latter remarked to me that General Cheatham was not to blame about the matter, that he did not send him the order. I asked him if he had communicated that fact to General Hood. He answered that he had not. I replied that it was due General Cheatham that this explanation should be made. Thereupon, Major Mason joined General Hood and gave him the information. Afterwards, General Hood said to me that he had done injustice to General Cheatham, and requested me so to inform him, that he held him blameless for the failure at Spring Hill; and on the day following the battle of Franklin I was informed by General Hood that he had addressed a note to General Cheatham saying that he did not censure him with the failure to attack. "Very respectfully, (signed) ISHAM G. HARRIS." FRANKLIN. On the next day, the 30th, Forrest with his entire force pressed the enemy closely, until they reached Winstead's Hill, where they were strongly posted and offered stouter resistance. When Hood's infantry came up, the Federals withdrew within the fortifications of Franklin. Hood then directed Forrest to take charge of the cavalry during the impending battle; and, if the assault was successful, to capture all who attempted to escape. I shall not undertake to describe this bloody battle. Though our army failed to carry all the breastworks, they made lodgments in many places and held on firmly till the enemy late at night withdrew and fled to Nashville. WILSON'S CROSS-ROADS AND BLOCK-HOUSES. Crossing the Harpeth and moving along the Wilson pike, Forrest struck the enemy in force at Wilson's Cross-roads. Morton's battery was ordered to the front and opened fire. Buford's division charged, driving the enemy and capturing many prisoners. Without further resistance, some of our cavalry pursued the fugitives several miles towards Nashville. As the infantry had come up, next morning the cavalry began to operate against block-houses and detached garrisons, and to obstruct navigation on the Cumberland River. Buford's division captured several important stockades on the 3d and 4th of December. On the 5th, Jackson's division captured a redoubt near LaVergne with its garrison, two pieces of artillery, many wagons, and a great quantity of munitions and supplies of food and forage. MURFREESBOROUGH. When Bates' division had come to cooperate with Forrest against Milroy's forces at Murfreesborough, the cavalry were ordered to picket the pikes leading from Murfreesborough to Nashville and Lebanon, while the division of Chalmers was operating successfully along the Cumberland. On the 6th, Forrest made a reconnaisance in force of the enemy's works at Murfreesborough by advancing in line of battle Bates' division, two additional brigades of infantry under Sears and Palmer, and Jackson's cavalry. Skirmishing continued for some hours, and the Federals withdrew into the intrenchments. Forrest ordered the infantry to remain in line, while with Pinson's regiment he rode forward to make a careful inspection of the fortress. This he did very leisurely, as it seemed to us who escorted him around, exposed to the fire of sharp-shooters more or less all the time. He satisfied himself that the position was too strong to justify direct assault, but hoped to hold Milroy there till the battle of Nashville was fought. On the morning of the 7th, however, Milroy's forces moved out of Murfreesborough and advanced with great gallantry, halting now and then to discharge a volley at our infantry in line of battle. When they had come within three-hundred yards of Bates' division, those veterans who had faced far greater odds and held their ground unflinchingly on many a battlefield, became panic-stricken and from some inexplicable cause broke into wild disorder. Forrest, in his report says: "The enemy moved boldly forward, driving in my pickets, when the infantry with the exception of Smith's brigade, from some cause I cannot explain, made a shameful retreat, losing two pieces of artillery. I seized the colors of the retreating troops and endeavored to rally them, but they would not be moved by any entreaty or appeal to their patriotism. Major General Bate did the same thing, but was as unsuccessful as I. I hurriedly sent Major Strange of my Staff to Brigadier General Armstrong and to Brigadier-General Ross of Jackson's division, with orders to say to them that everything depended on the cavalry. They proved themselves equal to the emergency by charging on the enemy, thereby checking his further advance". As stated in Wyeth's Life of Forrest, Mr. W. A. Galloway of Atlanta, Ga., at that time an artillerist in Young's battery, says: "I was an eye-witness to an interesting incident in this battle of Murfreesboro. During the stampede, Forrest rode among the infantry, ordering the men to rally and doing all in his power to stop their retreat. As he rode up and down the line, shouting 'Rally, men, for God's sake, rally!' the panic-stricken soldiers paid no attention to him. Rushing to a color-bearer who was running for dear life, Forrest ordered him to halt. Failing to have his command obeyed, he drew his pistol and shot the retreating soldier down. Forrest dismounted, seized the colors, remounted, and rode in front of the soldiers, waved the colors, and finally succeeded in rallying them to their duty." The charge made by Armstrong and Ross had checked the Federals, and they retired immediately within their works. In camp that night, the men of our company indulged in chess, checkers, cards, and other amusements, necessary to relieve the anxieties of the day. As is well known, chess is emphatically a game of war; and our company contained more than a dozen devotees of Caissa. Among them was our first Captain, H. W. Foote; then, T. J. Deupree, who as First Lieutenant had been in command of the company since the death of Captain King near Florence, was an excellent player; also, Lieutenant S. B. Day, James Rives, Alec McCaskill, Frank Adams, and J. G. Deupree were more or less expert amateurs. There were others, whose names I cannot now recall. By a seeming coincidence, Lieutenant Deupree that night was ordered to appear before a board of officers, presided over by Captain Porter of Memphis, for examination with a view to his promotion. The Lieutenant rode several miles on the pike towards Nashville to face this board. On arrival at headquarters, he was at once challenged to a game of Chess by Captain Porter, who said: "Beat me and I shall add another bar to your collar, Sir." The reader will bear in mind that a First-Lieutenant wore two bars and a Captain three. There was no dodging. Porter opened the game with "Pawn to Queen 4", and proceeded speedily and skillfully to marshal his forces. The Lieutenant replied with "P to King 3", and having much at stake concentrated his mind on the game and likewise proceeded to develop his forces to the best advantage. The game was long and hotly contested. At length, by a judicious sacrifice of a rook, the Lieutenant overreached the Captain and effected mate in a style that would have done credit to a Morphy or a Capablanca. There was no need of further examination. Courage and coolness in action had been tested in actual battle many times, and intellectual power was proved in this game of war. Captain Porter and his board unanimously recommended Deupree's promotion, and thus the Lieutenant became Captain. In this connection, it may be added that he was a favorite of Colonel Pinson's, who when in command of the brigade always appointed T. J. Deupree to a staff position. HOOD'S REAR-GUARD. While Buford picketed the Cumberland towards the Hermitage and some infantry destroyed the railroad from LaVergne to Murfreesboro, Jackson's cavalry operated south of Murfreesboro and by a brilliant dash captured a train of nineteen cars and the Sixty-first Illinois Infantry. The train loaded heavily with military supplies was burned and the prisoners were sent to the rear. Receiving a message from Hood that a general engagement was in progress in front of Nashville with instructions to hold his command in readiness to participate, Forrest on the 18th withdrew to Wilkinson's Cross-Roads. Here he received tidings of Hood's disastrous defeat. He was ordered to fall back towards Duck River, concentrate the cavalry, and be prepared to fall in the rear of our retreating army. Chalmers' division, joined by Buford's at Franklin, in conjunction with S. D. Lee's corps, now in the rear, fought heroically during the 17th and 18th to hold back the pursuing enemy, who made every possible effort to rout the retreating column. Though he had been seriously wounded on the 17th, Lee would not relinquish his command till the safety of his corps was assured. He was then succeeded by Major-General Stephenson. After reaching Duck River, where he had purposed to spend the winter, Hood decided that the heavy losses incurred at Franklin and Nashville had so reduced his strength that he must cross the Tennessee as soon as possible. Forrest agreed to protect the rear and to check the relentless pursuit made by Wilson's cavalry and Thomas' infantry, if in addition to his cavalry, now not more than 3,000 effectives, he could have under his orders 4,000 select infantry under General E. C. Walthall. Just here, I shall quote from the report of General Thomas the following pertinent paragraph: "Forrest with his cavalry and such other detachments, as had been sent off from his main army, joined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear-guard, numbering about 4,000 infantry and all his available cavalry. With the exception of this rearguard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and bare-footed men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause, so as to put an end to their sufferings. The rear-guard, however, was undaunted and firm and did its work bravely to the end." In this connection, I also quote the following from Wyeth's Life of Forrest: "Of the infantry which volunteered its service to cover the Confederate retreat, fully three hundred were without shoes, and their feet were so badly cut by the ice and the rocks that they could with difficulty hobble along on foot. The brave fellows, however, had not lost heart,-but were willing to fight to the death, if needed. They wrapped pieces of blanket around their raw and bleeding feet, tied them up with thongs, and trudged .painfully along, staining the snow and slush as they went, until Forrest ordered some wagons to be emptied of their contents in order to furnish transportation to these unconquerable men. Whenever it became necessary to fight off the Union advance, they left their wagons, took their places in line, and did effective service. When the uncomplaining sacrifices which these heroic patriots made becomes fully known, historians and poets will transmit to posterity the thrilling story of the immortal rearguard of Hood's army under Forrest and Walthall." RICHLAND CREEK. At Richland Creek south of Columbia, Forrest made a stand. Six pieces of artillery were favorably placed on the main pike, supported by the cavalry. What impression was made on General Wilson, after coming up and viewing the position, may be gathered from the following extract from his report: "The pursuit was resumed on the 24th. Hood's reorganized rear-guard 118 Mississippi Historical Society. under the redoubtable Forrest was soon encountered by the cavalry advance-guard; and Forrest was a leader not to be attacked by a handful of men, however bold. The few remaining teams and the rabble of Hood's army had been hurried on towards the Tennessee, marching to Pulaski by turnpike and thence to Bainbridge by the dirt roads of the country. Hood's rear-guard had thus a clear road, and when hard pressed could fall back rapidly. The country to the right and the left of the pike was open and broken, heavily timbered and almost impassable, while the turnpike itself, threading the valleys, depressions, and gorges, offered many advantageous positions for defense; hence with a few men offering determined opposition, the pursuing force could be made to halt and develop a front almost anywhere, and its progress in consequence was at many times comparatively slow." Wilson would not attack but waited for Thomas' infantry to come to his aid, and then with his cavalry he began a flanking movement to gain our rear. Forrest withdrew in order to meet this maneuver, leaving Armstrong's and Ross' brigades to make obstinate resistance against any attack that might be made upon them. This they did and retired only when about to be overwhelmed. ANTHONY'S HILL. Forrest's next stand was at Anthony's Hill, seven miles south of Pulaski, forty-two miles from Bainbridge, where Hood's army was to cross the Tennessee. At this time, as General Thomas Jordan says in his "Campaigns of General Forrest", the enemy were coming on in vast numbers. General Wilson had already passed Pulaski with 10,000 cavalry, and Thomas had reached that point with a larger force of infantry; and both were pressing forward in eager pursuit. To prevent the annihilation of Hood's army, a desperate effort must be made to delay the enemy as long as possible. Fortunately, the ground was favorable. The approach to Anthony's Hill for two miles was through a defile formed by two steep high ridges, which united at their common southern extremity to form Anthony's Hill, whose ascent was steep. Both these ridges and Anthony's Hill in which they united, were heavily wooded. In the language of General Jordan, "Morton's battery was established on the immediate summit of the Hill so as to sweep the hollow below as well as the road running through it. Along the crest of the hill and around on the ridge were Featherston's and Palmer's brigades of Walthall's division, reinforced by 400 of Ross' Texans and a like number of Armstrong's Mississippians, dismounted. The rest of Jackson's division were disposed as cavalry on either flank, with Reynold's and Field's brigades of infantry held in reserve. The infantry had further strengthened their position by breastworks of rails and logs, and skirmishers were posted in line under cover on the hillside. At the same time, Chalmers was halted a mile and a half to the rightward, on the road along which he was moving, in order to guard that flank from being turned. So broken and deeply timbered was this region that the concealment of the Confederates was complete. About 1 o'clock the Confederate cavalry withdrew slowly into the mouth of the glen and the Federal cavalry pursued closely. To the Federals the place began to look so dangerous that their commander thought it requisite to dismount several of his regiments before ascending the hill. These he pushed forward with a piece of artillery. The Confederates, meanwhile, had ridden rapidly through the hollow, up and over the hill, as if they had been left unsupported, and the enemy was permitted to ascend within fifty paces of our skirmishers without hindrance. Then Morton broke the grim silence with cannister, while the skirmishers enveloped the enemy with a hot galling fire from front and flank, followed soon by a still heavier fire from the main line of Confederate infantry. The enemy, thoroughly surprised and returning but a feeble and scattering fire, gave way to disorder, when the Confederates sprang forward with a yell and charged down the hill upon them, rushing through the horses of the dismounted men and halting but once to deliver another volley. Thus the enemy were driven in great confusion out of the defile. Then Forrest recalled his men from their hot pursuit so as to avoid becoming entangled with the Federal infantry, which by this time was near at hand. The enemy left behind 158 killed and wounded, 59 unwounded prisoners, 300 cavalry horses fully equipped, as many overcoats, one 12-pounder Napoleon, with its team of eight horses intact. The Conferedate loss did not exceed 15 killed and 40 wounded." Among our wounded at Anthony's Hill was George W. Alford of the Deupree Mess of the Noxubee cavalry. No truer or braver man ever faced the foe in battle. As usual he was with the foremost in pursuit of the fleeing Federals, when a bullet pierced his chest. So serious was his condition, he could not be transported rearward even in an ambulance. His young friend and messmate, T. S. Brooks, volunteered to remain and care for him, though knowing that this would result in his capture and imprisonment, after we retreated. Brooks was at this time only a lad under eighteen years of age, though a veteran by reason of two years of service with us. By tender, faithful, and affectionate nursing, Alford slowly and gradually began to recover. But long before he could be moved without pain, or serious risk to life, the Federals sent Alford and Brooks to a Northern prison, where they remained till the war ended. Afterwards, for many years, Alford was a useful citizen and christian in the Deerbrook neighborhood of Noxubee county; and at this writing, Brooks is living with a married daughter on our Gulf coast, esteemed by all who know him as an honest man and a devout follower of the lowly Nazarene. Pertinent to the fight at Anthony's Hill, I quote the following from the report of Wilson to the commander of the Fourth Army Corps: "We are now four miles from Pulaski on the Lamb's Ferry road, and have met with a slight check. If you bring up your infantry, we may get some prisoners; and, I think, then I shall be able to drive Forrest off. Just before sundown on Christmas-Eve, Forrest in a fit of desperation made a stand on a heavily wooded ridge at the head of a ravine, and by a rapid and savage counter-thrust drove back Harrison's brigade, captured one gun, which he succeeded in carrying away as the sole trophy of his desperate attack." SUGAR CREEK. The day was now drawing to a close and heavy columns of Federal cavalry by making wide detours had begun to menace seriously our flanks. All the advantages of this position had been exhausted; and, after sending ahead all prisoners and captured munitions, Forrest retired in good order. The roads were wretched. Horses had to be driven or ridden through slush and mud from two to three feet deep. Infantry marched, many of them barefooted, through ice-cold streams waist-deep, while rain and sleet beat upon them from above. However, by 1 o'clock that night we reached Sugar Creek, a clear stream with pebbly bottom. Here both men and horses were glad to halt and to have the mud and mire washed from their feet and legs. Being now thoroughly wet, we built fires and rested till daylight. When the first streaks of dawn flushed the eastern sky, we strengthened our position by a lay-out of rails and logs, and then quietly awaited the approach of the enemy. A thick fog concealed our breastworks. As the Federals advanced, our pickets with little resistance fell back slowly, till they had drawn their pursuers within musket-range of the unseen Confederate line. Having then joined us, our pickets fired a volley into the unsuspecting Federals and threw them into more or less confusion, and they began a rapid and disorderly retreat. A charge by Ross' cavalry and two infantry regiments completed the rout of the enemy. Strong bodies of infantry and cavalry were met marching rapidly to rally and reinforce the fugitives, when our men withdrew to Sugar Creek and remained in line of battle for more than two hours. As the enemy failed to appear, we retreated towards the Tennessee. General Forrest in his report says "The enemy made no further attacks between Sugar Creek and the Tennessee River, which stream I crossed on December the 27th." TWENTY DAYS' FURLOUGH. Forrest proceeded to Corinth with all the cavalry, except Armstrong's and Roddy's brigades, that were to protect Hood's rear till the army passed westward of Cherokee Station. All the cavalry but Ross' brigade were then allowed to disperse to their homes to get remounts, winter-clothing, and recruits. The Texans were too far from home and the Mississippi River was too well guarded by gun-boats. The Noxubee Squadron of Pinson's regiment were furloughed for twenty days. It goes without saying, we had the time of our lives. All the delights of home were experienced. I cannot describe them as they deserve to be portrayed, and shall not undertake to do so. But I hazard naught when I claim that Lieutenant S. B. Day, Alec McCaskill, and J. G. Deupree were at least somewhat more fortunate than the others. We were challenged one afternoon by three beautiful and amiable and expert Chess amateurs, Misses Duck Foote, daughter of our first Captain, Judge H. W. Foote, Pattie Lyle, afterwards famous as Mrs. Pattie Lyle Collins of the Dead Letter Office in Washington, and Fannie Lucas, afterwards Mrs. Featherstone of Brooksville, to play a consultation game of Chess that evening at the hospitable home of Judge Foote. In the exuberance of joy, we accepted, knowing full well the great pleasure in store for us. When we arrived, we found all preparations had been made. Two tables and sets of Chess-men had been arranged, one in each of the double parlors. Around one table sat the three queens of grace and beauty while at the other the cavalrymen took their places. Judge Foote, himself a good player also, was chosen referee by unanimous vote; for though we knew his innate gallantry would incline him to give the benefit of any doubt to the ladies, we felt sure his rare judicial temperament would make him a just arbiter of any disputed point that might arise in the progress of the game. By drawing, the ladies won the Whites and the initial move. They moved Pawn to King 4. We replied the same. Shortly after we had passed the mid-game, the cavalrymen by skillful maneuvering outwitted the opposing team and were preparing to give the coup de grace. Each side had a passed Pawn on the seventh rank. It was the Black's turn to play. After some consultation, the cavalrymen decided they would advance the passed Pawn to the eighth rank, claim a Knight, and thus at the same time check the white King and menace the white Queen. But, foreseeing this impending disaster, the ladies executed a novel strategy to prevent it. By the tintinnabulation of a tiny bell, they summoned a maid-servant bearing a waiter, which contained seven foaming glasses of egg-nog, better far, from a soldier's view-point, than the nectar of Olympian Jupiter. The ladies sipped gently, while the soldiers drained their glasses. While there is no positive proof that these last glasses were extra-strong, it is certain that an instantaneous thrill sped along the nerves of the cavalrymen, obfuscated their reasoning faculties, and kindled their imaginations. Caring naught for hazard or peril, they shoved the passed Pawn, and, forgetting their decision to claim a Knight, they called for a Queen, which did not check, as the Knight would have done. This was fatal. The ladies then quietly pushed forward their passed Pawn and very properly claimed a Queen, which checked our King and after a few moves effected a mate. Thus ended the game and an evening of delight. How sad it is now to reflect that I am the only survivor of that most felicitous evening's entertainment! CLASH WITH UPTON. I need not undertake to give a full and detailed account of Wilson's invasion of Alabama, with perhaps the largest and in all respects the best armed body of cavalry ever assembled on the continent of America. To those interested, I advise the reading of Wyeth's Life of Forrest. After the expiration of furloughs, Armstrong's brigade all assembled near West Point, Miss., just as Armstrong had pledged General Dick Taylor they would do; and, on March 25th with King's battery, were put in motion towards Selma, Ala. The cavalry had been regrouped somewhat, so that Jackson commanded a division of Tennesseeans and Texans, while Armstrong was put in the division of Chalmers. Forrest temporarily enlarged his own escort by adding to it two-hundred men with the best horses selected from the several regiments of Armstrong's brigade. With them was Captain T. J. Deupree of the Noxubee Cavalry. By hard riding accompanied by this enlarged escort, on the afternoon of the 31st Forrest was moving along the road leading from Centreville to Montevallo, while Crossland's three-hundred Kentuck-ians and Dan Adams' Alabama Militia and Roddy's small division were driven before Upton's and Long's troops under Wilson. Forrest at length came in behind these Federals into the road on which the Alabamians and Kentuckians were retreating and the Federals were pursuing. What occurred I shall now tell in the language of Dr. Wyeth: "Having approached within less than one-hundred yards of the Federals, who were in considerable confusion after having lost their formation in their hot pursuit of the fleeing Confederates, Forrest boldly, at the head of his staff and his enlarged escort, ordered the men to draw their six-shooters and in column of fours charged directly into the road, riding along with the Federal cavalry. This sudden and altogether unexpected attack, its boldness, and the severe work of the repeating pistols in the hands of those picked men, threw the Federals into still greater confusion, and drove them in a stampede from the scene. Having captured a number of prisoners, Forrest learned that Wilson's main command had passed down the road and was between him and Selma. With this information, he left the road and after a detour of eight or ten miles rapidly, passed around the Federal column, and reached his command about 10 o'clock that night near Randolph and directly in the path of the approaching enemy. UNWELCOME TIDINGS FROM CHALMERS. "As the divisions of Upton and Long advanced towards Selma early on the morning of April 1st, they encountered small detachments of Confederates and drove them back with slight effort until they reached a point several miles north of Plantersville, known as Ebenezer Church. Here Forrest was greatly chagrined to receive a message from Chalmers informing him he had met with such obstacles in his route that he could not reach Plantersville in time to unite with him on that day. Forrest was furious with rage on reading this dispatch. He then sent an urgent dispatch to his lieutenant that Wilson was pressing down upon him with great vigor and overwhelming forces, and that he would accept no excuse for his not uniting with him at Plantersville or between that place and Selma, before he should be driven into the works of that city. Forrest insisted that Chalmers had not moved with the alacrity and swiftness which the emergency demanded, and which had characterized him on all other occasions. Chalmers, with Starke's brigade, was marching eastward by one route, while Armstrong commanding the other brigade of the division was some five miles further north travelling by a parallel road. The messenger from Forrest to Chalmers passed through Armstrong's command, and Armstrong read the dispatch and forwarded it immediately to Chalmers, informing him that under the circumstances he would not wait to receive orders but would march to Forrest on his own responsibility and urged the division commander also to press on towards Plantersville to the rescue of their chief. He added that he could then hear firing in that direction and that he would rapidly march towards it. Armstrong, who had the soldierly habit of always arriving in time, swept forward with great rapidity and reached Forrest just at dark on the night of April 1st. BOGLER'S CREEK. "Realizing the desperate situation of his command at this juncture and the necessity for holding the advance of the Federals in check until Chalmers could reach Plantersville and be in supporting distance, Forrest had selected a naturally strong position at the crossing of Bogler's Creek, had thrown up lay-outs of rails and logs, and had placed the small force and artillery at his command in the best possible position for defense. Here Roddy's division, Crossland's brigade, and Dan Adams' militia were thrown into line of battle. Forrest with his enlarged escort, including the two-hundred men selected from Armstrong's brigade, took position immediately with the artillery commanding the road coming from the north. To his left, Crossland's three-hundred Kentuckians were posted, while on the extreme right a detachment of State troops under Dan Adams was placed. The entire Confederate force on the field did not exceed 2,000 men. To assail this force, General Wilson had on the ground and in action Upton's division, 3,900 strong, Long's division of 5,127, and two full batteries of artillery. SIX-SHOOTERS AGAINST SABRES. "At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the Federals appeared with Long's division in front. As soon as the skirmishers opened fire, Long reinforced his advance-guard. . . . Pushing these forward, Wilson and Long ordered a rash sabre-charge by four companies of the Seventeenth Indiana Cavalry. As soon as Forrest saw these gallant troopers riding down upon him with their sabres in air, he placed himself in line with his augmented escort and Crossland's Kentuckians. He ordered the men to reserve their rifle-fire until the enemy had come within one-hundred yards of their position, then to fire a volley, then to draw their revolvers, and with one in each hand to ride among and along with their assailants and use these weapons at close quarters. As the Federals came near, the horse of one trooper in their front plattoon became unmanageable, ran far ahead of the line, bolted through the Confederates, and struck the wheel of a gun with such momentum as to knock the wheel from its spindle, dismount the gun, kill the horse, and throw the brave rider to the ground, where he was instantly killed by being knocked in the head with a gun-stick by one of the artillerists. As the main body of the charging column swept into the Confederate line, Forest and his enlarged escort and two companies of Kentuckians under Captain H. A. Tyler rode in among them, and the desperate encounter which occurred may be more easily imagined than described in words. It was, indeed, one of the most terrific hand-to-hand conflicts which occurred between cavalry soldiers during the war. It was a test between the sabre in the hands of as brave a lot of men as ever rode horses and the six-shooter in the hands of experts that were just as desperately brave and daring. Forrest himself was most viciously assaulted. His conspicuous presence made him the object of direct attack by a brave young officer, Captain Taylor of the Seventeenth Indiana Cavalry, and five or six other Union troopers, who were killed in their attempt to slay the Confederate General. In this fierce onslaught, the Federals lost twelve killed and forty wounded. ... On the Confederate side, General Forrest and Captain Boone of his escort and about a dozen troopers were wounded, but none of them fatally". I regret my inability to give the names of the wounded troopers from the First Mississippi Cavalry in Forrest's enlarged escort. Meantime, Upton's division, led by Alexander's brigade, advanced upon the flank, practically in rear of the Confederates, striking the militia. Without offering the slightest resistance, these fled in disorder, compelling the entire Confederate line to be withdrawn. AT SELMA. When General Forrest reported on April 2d to General Dick Taylor, Departmental Commander in Selma, he evidently made a strong impression, for General Taylor said in an official communication: "General Forrest had fought as if the world depended on his arm. He appeared, both horse and rider covered with blood, and announced the enemy at his heels, and said I must move at once to escape capture. I felt anxious for him, but he said he was unhurt and would cut his way through, as most of his men had done, whom he had ordered to meet him west of the Cahawba. My engine started towards Meridian and barely escaped." By the departure of General Taylor, the chief command devolved upon Forrest, who began at once to make dispositions for defense, hopeless as it seemed, as three of his largest brigades were absent and beyond his control. Armstrong's brigade, about 1,400 strong, was stationed on the left and west, with the men deployed at intervals of 12 or 15 feet, in order to cover all the ground assigned to the brigade. On the right of Armstrong was Dan Adams with his State Militia, also deployed at like intervals, and to the right of the militia were Roddy's men, in the same extended development. Altogether, Forrest had about 3,000 men in works that had been designed and constructed for 20,000. Lieutenant Tom Stevens and a dozen men from the Noxubee Squadron were detailed as scouts to go out and ascertain the number of Federals approaching on the Plantersville road. Shelt Skinner and J. G. Deupree were posted in a thicket only a few feet east of the road with instructions to count the fours as the column of Federals rapidly passed along the road. This they did quietly and unobserved by the Federals for some time. At length, however, flankers discovered Skinner and Deupree and charged upon them. Quickly mounting and finding it impossible to get into the Selma road ahead of the Federal column, Skinner and Deupree rode east at a gallop through field and forest with a number of pursuing Federals chasing and firing at them till after sunset. Lieutenant Stevens and others of our squad were likewise cut off from Selma. Meantime, General Wilson had come within sight of Selma and made observations that induced him to attack. Confident of success and appreciating the prize now almost within his grasp, he approached with special care to avoid needless loss. An extensive wood in front of Armstrong's position was favorable for this purpose. Though not provided with suitable ammunition, having only solid shot, the Confederate artillery opened about 5:30 p. m. upon the Federals as they were forming for assault. Undaunted, the Federals moved steadily and handsomely forward to their work. They were all well armed with Spenser rifles, repeaters, and breech-loaders, and from their massive lines three-deep they poured out an incessant stream of leaden hail, to which the return-fire of the attenuated Confederate line was as that of a skirmish to the mighty uproar of a great battle at its climax. Long in person led the desperate charge of his gallant division against Armstrong's position. With well-attested courage and stubbornness, Armstrong's men held their ground. Meanwhile, the militia began to yield and gradually abandoned the breastworks, leaving a wide gap between Armstrong and Roddy, and thus exposing Armstrong's right. Roddy was thereupon ordered to move by his left flank westward and close this gap; but, before he could do it, the enemy had rushed the deserted line and interposed great numbers between Armstrong and Roddy, thus effectively cutting them asunder. Turning westward, the on-rushing Federals poured an enfilading fire upon Armstrong, who had repulsed three attacks upon his front and inflicted heavy loss upon his immediate assailants. Now, however, under fire from flank and rear as well as front, Armstrong withdrew and his brigade necessarily suffered greatly. The last to leave their position were the First Mississippi Cavalry under Pinson. They stoutly stood until the enemy were completely in their rear, so that the Colonel, the Lieutenant-Colonel, and most of the intrepid officers and men were captured. Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomery in his "Reminiscences" says: "Our regiment occupied the works to the left, extending from the road to a deep and narrow ravine which crossed the works and ran for a little way in front of the works on our extreme left. Near the road was a special fort, in which a few hundred men might find shelter, with embrasures for guns. Here two guns were placed. Ballentine's regiment was in the works on the right of the road. . . . About half-way to the extreme left of the First Mississippi, resting on the ravine, there were high earthworks projecting at 'right angles from the breastworks some thirty feet or more. This was designed, perhaps, to prevent an enfilading fire, if the enemy should gain possession of our works on either side of this salient. Here I had tied my horse, a very fine one and but recently purchased. I walked then up to the fort; Colonel Pinson and I agreed that if an assault was made, he would take charge of the right and I of the left of the regiment, since the regiment had been stretched into a long line. Forrest, Armstrong, Pinson, and I were in the fort with some other officers. Occasionally a cannon shot was fired at the ridge which hid the enemy from our view. They then brought up a gun and returned our fire. I doubt not, Forrest was cursing Chalmers for not coming up or else praying that he would come speedily. The sun was nearly down. A long dark line of men appeared on the brow of the ridge, moving slowly forward for a while, but soon charging and cheering and rushing onward. I hastened to my place in line and was just in time to caution the men not to fire till I gave the word, for the enemy were yet too far for our fire to be effective. "Rapidly approaching behind the dismounted Federals, could be seen on the ridge a strong column of mounted men, awaiting a favorable moment to charge. I could no longer restrain my men; they would begin firing too soon. But, as the enemy came nearer, I could plainly see the effects of our fire, though it did not appreciably check the progress of our assailants. Because of the salient, I could not see what was going on towards our right; but in my immediate front the enemy had reached the ravine and were crowding into it to protect themselves from our galling fire. Many of them were within less than twenty feet of our breastworks. Stepping up on the banquette at the base of the parapet, I fired my Tranter five times into the struggling mass and had begun reloading, when I heard wild cheering to the right. With me were four companies, including Montgomery's and the Noxubee Squadron; and, knowing we had effectively repulsed the enemy in our immediate front and that two companies could now hold our line, I ordered two companies to follow me to the right. As I came round the salient, I saw Forrest, Armstrong, and their staffs, and other mounted men, with one or two caissons, going at headlong speed towards the city. . . . I knew that all was lost. The right* of the regiment was even then rapidly retreating, Pinson with them calling 'Half at every step. There was no time for me to speak to the Colonel. Unhitching my horse and calling to the men to follow, I fell back towards the ravine in our rear, but my horse fell dead before we reached it. I could see the Federals pouring over the works to the right not a hundred yards away and their mounted column fast approaching. As we reached the ravine, the enemy were firing upon us. Realizing the impossibility of getting away, I gave my last order during the war, which was for the men to throw down their arms. In a moment a crowd of blue-coats had gathered around us. I suppose I had fifty men with me under Captain Cravens. Captain Montgomery had gotten across the ravine and was one of the few men of the regiment to escape death or wound or capture. I at once recognized a Federal sergeant from his chevrons. He demanded my pistol. I handed it to him. He then asked for my pocket-book. I took it out, saying it contained a locket with my wife's portrait which I would like to keep. He said that would be all right; and as I opened my pocket-book, he saw Confederate money and said if that was the only sort of money I had that I might keep it. This was the unkindest cut of all. I put the purse back into my pocket. He looked up and told me to give him my hat. It was brand new and had been smuggled through Memphis, and my wife had looped it up on one side and embroidered a star on it. I prized it highly and hated to part with it. But the sergeant had lost his in the charge and would take no denial. I then gave it to him with as good a grace as possible. All this was done in less time than it takes to tell it. . . . As we were marching back towards our fort, a straggler of the Federal army stepped up to me and with an oath threatened to shoot me; but the brave sergeant threw up the gun and cursed him as a cowardly scoundrel, who had shirked the fight and now wished to murder prisoners. . . . The sun was down and as a Major on General Wilson's staff rode up, I introduced myself and related what had just happened. He at once called the sergeant and gave him stringent orders to protect the prisoners. . . . Then as dusk came on, Colonel Pinson, Major Simmons, Captains Taylor, Lester, Deupree, and other officers of the regiment were brought in; and the fort would not hold us all. In fact, the First Mississippi had fought its last battle; and almost to a man, we had been killed, wounded, or captured. ... I have never seen General Wilson's report. Neither Forrest nor Armstrong ever made a report. "They guarded us in the fort through the long and dreary night, and next morning dawned upon as woe-begone a lot of cavalry as was ever seen during the war. Tired, hungry, sleepy, and dirty, we must have been a hard-looking set, if we looked at all as we felt. . . . In the course of the morning, Colonel Pinson, myself, and Captain Tobe Taylor requested permission to go over the field and see our dead and wounded. This was promptly granted. A guard went with us. From the works as far back as some of our men had gone when trying to escape, fully a half-mile, we found dead and wounded, though some of the wounded had been carried to a hospital under the care of our surgeons. "As we went over the ground, we found that the pockets of the dead had been turned wrong-side-out. One brave fellow, whom I knew well, who had gotten further than any other of the dead, had his pockets also turned inside-out, and by his side lay his bible. He had been noted for his piety as well as for his courage, and his influence for good was marked. He belonged to Captain Lester's company, was a good man in every way and a brave soldier, and has gone to his reward. . . . Our guard took us to our hospital, which had been hastily prepared. Here we found among others our Adjutant Johnston, and we were shocked when Dr. Montgomery told us his hours were numbered. We said all we could to cheer him and bade him an affectionate and final adieu. He died that night. Many others of our. regiment and brigade were there, and we saw them all; some lived, and some died; but I cannot now recall their names. Altogether, about one hundred in our regiment were killed and wounded, and about as many in Ballentine's. We were then escorted back to our prison in the fort. While we were walking over the field, a Federal took a fancy to Colonel Pinson's hat, but our guards proved to be kind-hearted and brave and protected Colonel Pinson." I have heard Captain T. J. Deupree tell how he and Lieutenants Day and Foote emptied their navy-sixes right into the faces of the Federal assailants on their part of the line, and how our Noxubee men stood firmly and repulsed several assaults and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. He also told how the Federal cavalry, after rushing through the gap left by the fleeing militia, had turned westward and come up directly in the rear of the Noxubee Squadron and fired into their backs before they left the breastworks. He said that he and Day and Foote and others fell flat on their faces and feigned death to protect themselves from the frenzied Federals till a commissioned officer came, to whom they might surrender. Though but a few minutes, it seemed an age and a fearful one at that. At length, however, a Major came along, and they were saved. The Major received their surrender and ordered the officers to the fort. It will be of interest just here to insert the following condensed statement from the Diary of Sergeant J. J. Hunter, of the Noxubee Troopers: When the First Mississippi fronted into line, before going into the breastworks at Selma, they counted off by fours; and I, being No. 4, was among those who had to hold horses. We carried the horses back two-hundred yards into a dense pine-thicket to hide them from the artillery. But the hostile artillerymen somehow discovered us and shelled us, killing many horses and wounding a few men. A fragment of shell grazed my shoulder and a passing shell blew my hat off and exploded within the belly of a horse not far behind me and made hash-meat of the horse. We held our position, however, till the Yankees began pouring over the breastworks. Then most of the horseholders stampeded to the rear, riding their own horses but turning loose the others. I with a few others walked back slowly, each leading four horses, obliquing so as to fall-in with General Armstrong, who was trying to rally his men. He ordered us to mount and to follow him. Just at this moment, a minie-ball passed through my right knee; and I violently clutched the bridles of my horses till I could recover from the shock, resting my weight entirely on my left leg. General Armstrong saw me and ordered some men to put me on my horse. I then fainted, leaning on my horse's neck and clinging to his mane, while a man on each side held me in the saddle, as we were all going at full speed. I next found myself lying on the ground beside the road about one-hundred yards from a railroad station-house and platform. About one-hundred yards behind me was the Yankee line firing at our men about the station as they crouched behind cotton-bales and the blocks of the platform. I was midway between the two firing lines and fully realized my danger. I pulled my wounded leg from under me and crawled about ten feet and got behind a bale of cotton, which protected me from the Yankee missiles; and a Confederate officer ordered our men to be careful not to shoot me. During a brief lull in the firing, two of Roddy's men came and carried me back to the station and laid me behind one of the platform blocks. When the Yankees resumed firing, I borrowed an Enfield and fired four rounds at them before they fled. I was then put on a pallet and left in the station. An Alabamian staid with me. The Yankees came and we surrendered. They carried off the un-wounded Alabamian. A rough old German asked me if we were not sufficiently whipped. I told him we would fight to the last to protect homes, fire-sides, women and children. He jerked out his pistol and said that the bullet should have gone through my head, rather than through my knee; and said he would put one there. I told him he might kill my body but could not terrify my soul. Just then some Westerners came up and presented their pistols to his face, denounced him as a coward, and ordered him at once to put his pistol in its holster, and leave the helpless prisoner. Those brave Westerners assured me I should not be hurt. At length, one of them looking me closely in the face asked if I was not Sergeant Hunter. I told him this was what was left of me. He grasped my hand and said: "Here is the man who once guarded me as a prisoner for several days and treated me as cleverly and kindly as I could wish. Comrades, join me now in returning his generous kindness". He introduced me and they all gave me the hand of comradeship and proffered to help me all they could. They told me all of our regiment had been captured at the breastworks and quite a number had been killed, much to their regret, as they considered the First Mississippi the best cavalry regiment in the Southern army, noted as a dare-devil body of men, who feared nothing whatever, as they had found out in many engagements but especially at Moscow, Tennessee, where the First Mississippi had run into their brigade of three regiments and so destroyed them, that afterwards the three regiments were consolidated into one and called the Second Iowa-Illinois. They said they were in the third line in the charge on our breastworks at Selma, that the two lines in front of them gave way, but they rushed on and got under cover of the breastworks and dared not go further, knowing the First Mississippi was in front of them. They waited till the First Mississippi had been attacked in the rear, and then did what they could to save their lives, capturing all the officers and many of the men. Before leaving me, they had me taken to a private house near by. Here I fell to the care of an old negro who had been left in charge when the family fled to escape the Yankees. I was put in the kitchen. When I got cold, the good negro made me a fire. I dropped off to sleep but was waked soon by bursting shells. I looked out and saw the town on fire and the station house, too, whence I had been brought. Cinders and sparks fell almost everywhere, thick and fast around the house I was in. I called the negro but he did not answer. I fell, at length, into a gentle sleep. I awoke next morning and the sun was shining brightly, and I spent the day reading quietly and all alone. At night I was sleeping when three of my Yankee friends woke me about 9 o'clock and told me they had an ambulance ready to take me to the Confederate hospital. They said they had been busy all day burying the dead and caring for the wounded. Their loss, they said, exceeded 800, and ours 300, exclusive of a large number of prisoners. At the hospital, the surgeons consulted as to the amputation of my leg, and but one opposed amputation. Then the chief surgeon came and after my pleading with him, consented to leave me my leg. It was washed and dressed, and I was placed on a bunk, so that my leg could hang over the side. It got well with a crook in it and it has that same crook yet. The Yankee surgeon sent me some nice food which I enjoyed amazingly, for I had eaten nothing during thirty-six hours. Father and mother came within the next few days and remained with me. I was well treated and recovered rapidly. I was soon on my crutches. So ended the war with me." Besides J. J. Hunter, who had here received his fifth wound since entering the service, Gus Fant and others were wounded in Company F; while Nat Barnett, James Brooks, John Fraser, Charley Gray, Dabney Gholson, William Perry, and Wiley Shaw were killed. The killed and wounded in Company F were fully 50% of those engaged in the battle. I regret I cannot give a list of the killed and wounded in Company G. But their casualties were comparatively few; and it will always be a mystery how and why the losses of Co. F so far exceeded those of Company G at Selma, when the two companies were interlaced, as it were, in the breastworks, each member of one company being sandwiched, so to speak, between two members of the other company. All other members of the Noxubee Squadron, except some horseholders, were captured, as were our dashing and intrepid Adjutant, Lawrence Yates and other regimental and company officers. Wyeth's Life of Forrest tells how he escaped and on his way out fought the Fourth U. S. Regulars, and by personal prowess put hors de combat his thirtieth armed enemy, and how Armstrong and his followers escaped. Our squad under Lieutenant Stevens, after being chased by the Federals till late, somehow next morning came together, and by capturing several distinct detachments of straggling and pilfering Federals soon had more than twice as many prisoners as there were men in our squad. We reported late at night to Colonel Matt Galloway at Marion, Ala. Here in a few days were concentrated Jackson's division and Chalmers' brigade. Not long afterwards, Forrest ordered all to Gainsville. General Wilson remained in Selma a week and then crossed the Alabama River, taking all unwounded prisoners with him, as he marched towards Montgomery. Hundreds escaped during the night-march, as only the officers were closely guarded. It is evident that Wilson intended to scatter the Confederates along the way; for on successive days he paroled many at long intervals. For example, he paroled W. G. White and Frank White, two brothers and both valiant and faithful soldiers, more than 100 miles apart. Then, after confirmation of Lee's and Johnston's surrender, Wilson paroled all the officers and the few Confederate privates still with him. Finally, all made their way to Gainsville. After the surrender of General Dick Taylor, Forrest on May 9th issued an address to his command, from which I quote the following paragraphs: "Soldiers,- By an agreement between Lieutenant-General Taylor and Major-General Canby, the troops of this Department have been surrendered. The terms are favorable and should be satisfactory to all. They manifest a spirit of magnanimity and liberality on the part of the Federal authorities, which should be met on our part by a faithful compliance with all the stipulations and conditions therein expressed. As your Commander, I sincerely hope that every officer and soldier of my command will cheerfully obey the orders given and carry out in good faith all the terms of the cartel. "Civil war, such as you have just passed through, naturally engenders feelings of animosity, hatred, and revenge. It is our duty to divest ourselves of such feelings, and to cultivate friendly feelings toward those with whom we have so long contended, and heretofore so widely and honestly differed. Neighborhood feuds, personal animosities, and private differences should be blotted out; and, when you return home, a manly, straight-forward course of conduct will gain the respect even of your enemies. Whatever may be your responsibilities, whether to government, to society, or to individuals, meet them like men. "In bidding you farewell, rest assured that you carry with you my best wishes for your future welfare and happiness. . . . Your courage and determination, as exhibited on many hard-fought fields, have elicited the respect and admiration of friend and foe. I now cheerfully and gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to you, the officers and men of my command, whose fidelity and unflinching bravery have been the greatest source of my success in arms. "I have never on the field of battle sent you where I was unwilling to go myself; nor would I now advise you to a course which I felt myself unwilling to pursue. You have been good soldiers; you can be good citizens. Obey the laws, preserve your honor, and the Government to which you have surrendered can afford to be, and will be magnanimous. "(signed) N. B. FORREST, Lieutenant-General." The utmost eagerness now prevailed to get home. General Dennis, a courteous gentleman, did all he could to accelerate the work of issuing paroles, and did it in a manner most acceptable to his late antagonists. By May 16th, 8,000 officers and men had been paroled and allowed to start home. To that extent, at least, "To them the blooming life is sweet; But not for all is there return". Alas! how sad it is to reflect that thousands of our dear comrades, as valiant and strong of soul as ever died on battlefield in defense of their birthright, after making bright records at Donelson, Murfreesboro, Thompson Station, Moscow, and in that dreadful winter retreat from Nashville, were in their graves on that day when Forrest's Cavalry ceased to exist! Additional Comments: Volunteer transcription Extracted from: pages 93-138 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI HISTORICAL SOCIETY EDITED BY DUNBAR ROWLAND, LL. D. Secretary CENTENARY SERIES VOLUME II JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI PRINTED FOR THE SOCIETY 1918 DEMOCRAT PRINTING COMPANY MADISON, WISCONSIN File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/ms/noxubee/military/civilwar/other/u1stmscav20gmt.txt This file has been created by a form at http://www.genrecords.org/msfiles/ File size: 95.5 Kb