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Civilwar 11th MS Regiment
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11th MS Regiment At Gettysburg
THE ELEVENTH MISSISSIPPI REGIMENT AT GETTYSBURG.
By BAXTER McFARLAND, Aberdeen, Mississippi.

  Soldiers of the 11th Mississippi Regiment have known for over fifty years that
the official reports (contained only in Medical Returns) of its losses in the
battle of Gettysburg on July 3, 1863, are inaccurate and incomplete. As there
given, the casualties were 32 killed and 170 wounded.

  The purpose of this article is to record more fully and in detail the losses
sustained by each company of the regiment in that world famous battle, and to
give more general publicity to facts shown by the official reports of commanding
officers in the battle, published in the War Rebellion Records, principally in
Serial Nos. 43 and 44, which are of much importance to the truth of history
relating to the Eleventh and other commands that day on the "left".

  When it left home in April, 1861, I was a member of Company H of the regiment,
and was with it as First Sergeant, and Lieutenant until about the first of June,
1863, when I was promoted and transferred to the Army of Tennessee, and was
therefore not with the 11th regiment at Gettysburg, but I knew its members-many
were college mates-and have kept more or less in touch with most of the
survivors since the war closed. Company losses have often been talked over with
survivors of the companies, the fate of individuals discussed-in many cases
repeatedly, not only with survivors but with members of their families.
Survivors of each company, except A and B, have carefully and fully gone over
their company losses, man by man; have exhaustively examined every source of
information and secured every scrap of evidence bearing upon its losses in that
battle, the results of which have been available to me. I have corresponded with
many survivors of the companies; have had access to company rolls, lists,
histories, memorials and much data; have thoroughly searched every source of
information, carefully weighing it all, and am quite sure that the casualties
herein given are practically correct-if anything are under, rather than over the
real losses.

  The Eleventh Mississippi Regiment was in Davis' brigade, Heth's division, A.
P. Hill's corps, but was left at Cashtown, Penn., to guard the division wagon
trains and did not rejoin the brigade until the night of the 2nd of July. The
losses here given were therefore all sustained in the battle of July 3rd.

  The charge on Cemetery Ridge was made by Pickett's and Heth's divisions,
aligned in front with supports. Pickett's division of three brigades was formed
with Kemper's on the right, Garnett's on the left, in front, and Armistead's in
support; Wilcox's and Perry's brigades being ordered to move on his right rear.
Heth's division, Brig. Gen. Pettigrew commanding, on Pickett's left, was formed
in the following order: Archer's brigade, Col. B. D. Fry commanding, on the
right, and Brockenbrough's brigade on the left of the division; Pettigrew's
brigade, Col. Marshall commanding, in the right center, and Davis' brigade in
the left center. Heth's division was supported by Scales' and Lane's brigades,
Maj. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble commanding, on its right rear.

  Davis' brigade was formed in the following order; the 55th North Carolina on
the right, and the 11th Mississippi on the left, with the 2nd and 42nd
Mississippi regiments in the center.

  The line of advance was not parallel with the enemy's line, which receded
toward its rear, forming an angle; furthermore, there was a bend to the west in
Seminary Ridge behind which the troops were placed for protection before the
advance, and when the column moved up to the crest of the Ridge and began the
assault, Pettigrew's division, especially its left, and its supports, had much
further to march under fire to reach the enemy's works in its front than did the
division upon the right and its support, but in compliance with orders they
"spread their steps", (as Gen. Longstreet states in "From Manassas to
Appomattox", pages 389 and 393) moving rapidly, and soon gained correct
alignment with Pickett's division, but still having further to go than had that
division on account of the angle in the enemy's line. The bend to the left in
the line first above mentioned gave rise, doubtless, to the error that
Pettigrew's division, or part of it, "supported" Pickett's division in the
charge, the left of Pettigrew's division bending back as if in echelon, in
conforming to the lines of the Ridge.

  Pettigrew's division when ordered forward ascended to the wooded crest of
Seminary Ridge and began the advance over the open plain, its supports following
upon its right rear. Gen. Davis states, Rebellion War Records, Serial No. 44,
pages 650 and 651, that when about three-quarters of a mile from the enemy it
came upon a post and rail fence, its left then being "perpendicular to the
(left) front" of Howard's 11th (Federal) corps,- Maj. T. W. Osborn commanding
batteries of Howard's Corps, Serial No. 43, p. 745,-when the left of the
division received a diagonal fire from at least 32 guns of these batteries
massed upon Cemetery Hill, but clambering rapidly over the fence, quickly
restoring the somewhat disordered alignment, it had advanced but a short
distance further when all the batteries of the enemy upon the front and right
opened upon the assaulting column with 75 or 80 more guns, and after this
converging artillery fire from front and both flanks, the division moved
steadily on, passing over several other post and plank fences, past the
Emmettsburg road, at or near which the left brigade of Pettigrew's division was
broken and driven back, leaving Davis' brigade, especially the 11th Mississippi
regiment on its left, to bear alone the storm of death dealing missiles from
Osborne's 32 or more guns, and a deadly flanking musketry fire from the left,
besides that from the front and right of all arms, until it reached the wall.

  In advancing, the assaulting column, as its ranks rapidly thinned, steadily
closed, Pettigrew to the right upon Pickett, the division of direction, the
latter to the left, as the line constantly shortened, to preserve the relative
alignment as to the indicated point of attack-the "copse of wood" near the salient.

  The retiring of the left brigade of the division and the rapid contraction of
the lines enabled the enemy to concentrate the whole of his fire, front and
flanks, in ever increasing volume upon the oncoming Confederate column as it
boldly advanced until it became appallingly destructive, and only a few of the
heroes in gray passed through it unscathed to the stone wall. To fill out the
line when Brockenbrough was driven back, Lane's and Lowrance's brigades, under
orders from Gen. Longstreet to Gen. Trimble, moved obliquely from the rear to
the left front until the right of Lowrances's brigade "touched the wall", but
because of the diagonal direction followed its left and Lane's brigade did not
reach the wall. But Gen. Lane states that his brigade was within a few yards of
it when they fell back. Lowrance's report. Serial No. 44, pp. 656 and 657; Gen.
Lane's report lb., pp. 671 and 672.

  Gen. Lane states that "Lowrance's brigade and my own took position on the left
of the troops still contesting the ground"; and that, suffering from a heavy
artillery fire from his right and an enfilading infantry fire on his left, he
withdrew his brigade, "the troops on my right having already done so". Maj.
Engelhard states, page 659, that the division (Trimble's) moved rapidly up,
connecting with troops on the right still fighting, and that the division moved
in an oblique direction, as does Lowrance, pp. 671, 672.

  When within musket range of the wall, Gen. Hayes commanding Federal division,
states, Serial No. 43, p. 453, that his men "in four lines rose up behind our
wall" and poured terrible volleys into the thinned ranks, which was returned by
Davis' brigade as it steadily pressed on, firing as it went, then charging with
a yell the few undaunted survivors impetuously rushed through the "hell of fire"
of all arms to and near the wall, continuing the battle there at close quarters
for a short time in front of Smyth's, Bull's and part of Carroll's brigades.

  Col. F. M. Green and Maj. R. O. Reynolds, the only field officers present,
were wounded. All the captains, save one, who is said to have been wounded, and
nearly all the lieutenants and non-comhiissioned officers present were killed,
wounded or captured ; the brave colorbearer, Billy O'Brien, was killed near the
wall, and the colors were planted upon it by private Joseph G. Marable. later
Lieutenant in Co. H, and both were captured. Capt. W. T. Magruder (brother of
Maj. Gen. Magruder), A. A. G. of the brigade, was killed on the wall; Capt.
Thomas C. Holliday (who succeeded Capt. Magruder as A. A. Gen. of the brigade
and was killed May 6th, 1864, at the Wilderness) of the brigade staff was
wounded, and it has been stated that another member of the staff was wounded.
Capt. Magruder was killed upon the wall near the Bryan barn whilst cheering the
men over the wall. After a short and bloody struggle to carry the works, the few
gallant survivors, realizing the utter hopelessness of the unequal conflict,
were ordered to retreat, and made their way back under a deadly fire to the
position from which the charge began, where the very few officers were busily
engaged in restoring order and the surgeons in sending to hospitals the wounded
(many of whom escaped to the rear) in anticipation of an attack by the enemy,
until the night of the 4th, when the army began a retrograde movement and for
many weary days there was no time or opportunity to ascertain the losses. The
hasty company lists forwarded to become the basis of the routine casualty
returns of the Medical Department were, under the circumstances and conditions
surrounding the regiments of the brigades, admittedly inaccurate and incomplete,
but were allowed to stand, imperfect as they were, and were soon lost sight of
in the pressure of other great events.

  Some of the other commands, however, rectified this in official brigade or
regimental reports of the campaign, in which the losses shown were invariably
much greater than those found in the Medical returns, and of course are accepted
as the real casualties of those commands instead of the Medical returns, the
inaccuracy of which they conclusively prove. The unfortunate absence of the
usual official statements of casualties and the overwhelming evidence of the
inaccuracy of the Medical returns, has impelled a resort in part to other
evidence, that of participants, verbal and written, which is original testimony
of the highest nature, to give the Eleventh Mississippi regiment What it is
justly entitled to and richly deserves, a correct statement of its losses in one
of the great battles of the world to hand down to posterity along with those
passed down by other gallant participants, albeit in a different form.

  The Medical returns show the killed and wounded of each command in the
battles, July 1-3, consolidated, and not each days casualties separately. When
comparing casualties it must be borne in mind that the losses there given of the
Eleventh are those suffered July 3rd., only one day, as it was not in the
battles of July 1st and 2nd, having joined the brigade July 2nd, as previously
stated. Gen. Davis did not give the losses of his brigade in his report, nor are
there any official reports containing them known to the writer, except the
Medical returns.

  The fire, within easy range, of Maj. Osborne's 32 or more guns, was an
exceedingly trying as well as a terribly destructive ordeal to which
comparatively little consideration has been given in the many things said and
numerous articles written concerning that immortal charge. In the controversies
growing out of the battle all the difficulties and dangers encountered and the
losses sustained in the charge by the gallant right division often and
eloquently have been recounted, but the left division, much of it, has not been
so fortunate; neither its heroic conduct nor its appalling losses have received
the public recognition which long ago should have been accorded and willingly
would have been extended, had full and truthful information been given, which
unfortunately has not been done. This is especially true of the three
Mississippi regiments in Davis' brigade, but the terrible losses of the Eleventh
afford irrefutable proof of valor and heroism at least equal to that of any of
the gallant commands in the famous charge. The unflinching courage and noble
conduct displayed by that fine old regiment in the long advance that hot day
under devastating fire converging from front and both flanks, over an open plain
for more than a mile, could not have been surpassed by any troops in the world
under like desperate conditions.

  Osborne's guns appear to have been directed almost exclusively upon the two
left brigades of Pettigrew until Brockenbrough was broken and driven back,
thereafter upon Davis' brigade until it had almost reached the wall. He had at
least 26 splendid guns of his own, besides the First New Hampshire artillery, 6
guns, Capt. Frederick M. Edgell, Serial No. 43, pp. 892 and 893, who fired
diagonally upon Pettigrew's left from Cemetery Hill. Osborne states, Serial No.
43, p. 746 on page 750, that all the force of his artillery was used upon
Pettigrew's division, wholly regardless of the firing Confederate guns.

  In his report, on page 666, Gen. Lane says: "As soon as Pettigrew's command
gave back, Lowrance's brigade and my own", etc., which includes Pettigrew's
entire division. In this that gallant General was mistaken,-only Brockenbrough's
brigade had then given back, the others moved on.

  As stated, Lane and Lowrance, under Gen. Trimble, were supporting Pettigrew's
division, directed to march upon its right rear and presumably did so,
preserving proper distance, and if any part of the leading division in their
immediate front had given back it was the duty of the support to have gone at
once to its assistance. These three front brigades, as shown by the reports of
their respective commanders, advanced rapidly and steadily to the works of the
enemy, but were so reduced and weakened by the concentrated, converging fire of
all arms that they were wholly unable to take the strong well manned works, and
the few survivors retired to avoid destruction or capture. The only brigade that
"gave back" before reaching the wall was Brockenbrough's on the extreme left,
because of which Trimble's division passed diagonally to the left front to take
its place. The two supporting brigades were some distance behind Pettigrew's
division-Gen. Trimble has stated 150 yards-when their movement to the front to
take the place of the broken left brigade began, and the distance was still
greater because of the oblique or diagonal course they had to pursue.

  Meantime, the division in their front was quickly advancing and soon rushed to
the wall, where it remained fighting a short time before retiring, and by the
time Trimble's division had obliqued past the left of Pettigrew's three brigades
in its front and Lane had fired upon the enemy in his immediate front,
"repeatedly driving the cannoneers from their guns, breaking the lines of
infantry formed upon the crest and had advanced to within a few yards of the
stone wall", doubtless there were no Confederate troops on his right, as stated
by him on page 666; Col. Lowrance, on Lane's right, states that when his right
had "touched" the wall, his line then in oblique direction, there were no other
Confederate forces anywhere to be seen; pp. 671, 672. Lane did not reach the
wall, but was within a few yards of it, he states, when he "fell back," and only
Lowrance's right "touched" it before he retired. The flag of the 34th North
Carolina, Lowrance's brigade, was captured by the 8th Ohio on the extreme left.

  Gen. Hancock states, Serial No. 43, p. 366, that he "had to break the (his)
line to attack the enemy in flank on^my right, where the enemy was most
persistent after the front attack was repelled", and Maj. Engelhard, a staff
officer, who wrote the report of Gen. Pender's-later Trimble's-division, states,
Serial No. 44, p. 659, on p. 660, that the two left regiments of Lane's brigade
"advanced some minutes after the whole line had given way", which two statements
appear to sustain and explain the opinions of Gen. Lane, Col. Lowrance, Serial
No. 44, p. 671, 672, and Maj. Engelhard, p. 660, that the Confederate troops
upon their right had then withdrawn.

  Under the anguish of the awful destruction inflicted upon the Eleventh by the
almost unparalleled combined fire as it came within musket range of the wall, it
hastened forward and perhaps came to and near the wall in advance of its
comrades upon the right. It is probably now impossible to ascertain precisely
when and how many movements took place, or whether they were synchronous, or
successive.

  The reports of Maj. Jones, commanding Pettigrew's brigade, Serial No. 44, p.
642, Lt. Col. Shepard, Archer's brigade lb., p. 646, and Gen. Joseph R. Davis,
lb., p. 650, show conclusively that these three brigades of Pettigrew's division
advanced to the wall, a fact well known to the survivors who almost miraculously
did so. This fact is as well attested as any event of the war, but the evidence,
so far as the Eleventh is concerned, is not all set forth in official reports.

  But Gen. Davis positively states in his report that his command advanced
steadily, the alignment unbroken, except temporarily when passing over the
fences, then quickly restored, otherwise unchecked until it closed with the
enemy, and that it rushed to the wall. This of course does not apply to
Brockenbrough. Gen. Davis was in command of his own brigade from beginning to
end of the battle, better knew its movements than did officers of other
commands, and his statements, as between them are conclusive. He wrote the
report for the division because Gen. Pettigrew. after being in command of it
until the close of the battle, was killed a few days later at Falling Waters,
and it fell upon Gen. Davis to prepare it. Gen. Pettigrew was one of the ablest
and bravest of the brigadiers of the Confederate army, and led his division on
the 3rd up to the wall, where he was painfully wounded in the left hand by a
piece of shell, but refused to retire until the bloody conflict was over. His
death at Falling Waters was greatly deplored. Both he and Gen. Trimble
accompanied their divisions upon the field and directed their movements, the
latter also being badly wounded near the wall, suffering amputation of a leg,
and the staff of each were greatly exposed, some being killed or wounded.

  It is true that the left, all of it, including the supporting brigades, were
repulsed and "gave back", but Pettigrew's extreme left brigade was the only part
of the left, as an organization, that was repulsed and "gave back" before the
works of the enemy were reached, statements or implications from any quarter
whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding-statements and implications that as
surely include Lane's and Lowrance's brigades, under command of Maj. Gen. Isaac
R. Trimble, as they do all of Pettigrew's division. The report of Maj. Gen.
Howard commanding the 11th Federal Corps shows that when repulsed,
Brockenbrough's brigade scattered out to their left in his front, and in every
direction; in the smoke they doubtless thus had the appearance of a much larger
body than a brigade, especially from a distance, Serial No. 43, on page 374. It
had only 25 killed in the battles of the 1st and 3rd of July.

  Garnett's brigade, to the right of Pettigrew's division, when about 75 paces
from the wall was 50 or 60 yards in advance of Kemper on its right, the left of
the latter overlapping the former, and when about 20 paces from the wall
Garnett's brigade "recoiled". At that moment Kemper came up on the right,
Armistead in rear, and all three brigades rushed to the wall. Report of Maj.
Chas. S. Peyton, commanding Garnett's brigade, War Records, Serial No. 44, p.
385, on p. 386.

  It seems, therefore, that at the instant of impact Pickett's division was in
at least two lines throughout and to the extent that Kemper overlapped Garnett
it had three successive lines. whilst Pettigrew's, because of the movement of
its support to the left front line previously mentioned, at the critical moment
of contact had no support whatever. In this formation Pickett's division was a
formidable body, in striking contrast with the single line on his left, and
strong enough for a small part of it to pass over the works, through an interval
in the enemy's line abandoned at the approach of the charging column (Hancock's
report, Serial No. 43, p. 367, on p. 374) and fight for a few minutes, but the
speedy arrival of reinforcements quickly drove it back and off the field despite
its gallantry, leaving the heroic Armistead dead beyond the works, near
Cushing's guns.

  Webb's brigade on its front had only three regiments, the 106th Pennsylvania
having been sent to General Howard. Of these three the 69th and 71st
Pennsylvania, the latter perhaps on the right, were behind the works, the 72nd
Pennsylvania in reserve behind or near the crest. When Pickett neared the wall
the 71st Pennsylvania and perhaps others of the front line fled up the crest,
causing much confusion in Webb's command, in the midst of which Picketfs
division struck the works, some of it crossing through the vacated space. It
thus appears that the enemy force behind the works in Pickett's front as he
approached was in single line, was weaker than the force confronting Pettigrew's
division at the point of its attack, and that most of this force was retreating
in disorder, creating confusion in Webb's brigade at the moment Pickett's
division reached the works, where it halted and fought the enemy, excepting
those who passed through the interval, until broken and driven from the field
under a destructive fire.

  Had Pickett's division been strung out in single regimental line as was the
left, it is questionable whether it would have driven the line in its front from
the works-even whether it would have reached the wall. Maj. Chas S. Peyton,
commanding Garnett's brigade, states, Serial No. 44, p. 386, that when within 20
paces of the works, then being well in advance, Garnett's brigade
"recoiled"-this was about the time Gen. Garnett fell-, but just in time to
arrest its rearward movement and probably avert disaster, Kemper, his left
overlapping the right of the "recoiling" brigade, rushed up on its right and
Armistead in its rear, sweeping on, enfolding Garnett in their forward movement
with courage regained, and the gallant body in that formation pressed towards
the breastworks, so impressing the defenders behind it with its heroic bearing
and combined strength that when it had dashed on to within a short distance of
the works most of the enemy abandoned the line and fled up the crest, (Gen.
Hancock's report, Serial No. 43, p. 374) and when the three brigades reached the
works, some of them-Gen. Webb says, Serial No. 43, p. 428, over 100-passed over
the vacated rail breastworks and fought inside, the others fighting outside, but
unable to withstand the overwhelming reinforcements they were quickly driven out
and from the works, not, however, until 42 of their number lay dead and many
wounded and captured inside the works. The survivors retired under a destructive
fire of all arms, just as did the left when it was repulsed at the stone wall
and fell back.

  The writer has been unable to find any report of Kemper's brigade, but the
reports of Federal officers in the brigades to Webb's left, and Gen. Hancock,
Serial No. 43, p. 367 on page 374, state that the right of Pickett's division,
presumably Kemper's brigade, attacked and was driven from their fronts, flanking
to its left until finally it closed with the enemy as previously stated, which
was on Webb's front. Hall's report, Serial No. 43, p. 435, on page 439; Harrow's
report, lb., p. 419; and reports of commanding officers of their regiments in
the same volume. Hall, to the left of Webb, had the 7th Michigan. 59th New York
Battalion (four companies) and the 20th Mass. on his front line, and the 19th
Mass. and the 42nd N. Y., the latter on the right, in reserve some distance in
rear up the crest, the 20th Ma«s. perhaps on the right of the front line next to
Webb's left, and when Pickett's division struck the works in Webb's front the
20th Mass., 48nd N. Y., the 19th Mass. and part of the 7th Mich. 1 eft their
lines in Hall's position and moved rapidly to Webb's relief, as did Harrow's
regiments, showing that all of Pickett's division finally closed with the enemy
upon Webb's front.

  Gen. Harrow, in his report states that the front of Webb and Hall was 500
yards long, Serial No. 43, p. 419, and if Webb's front was half, it was, say,
250 yards long-barely sufficient for Pickett's division, in three brigade lines.
Fry's (Archer's) brigade, of Pettigrew's division, in front of Smyth's brigade,
Hay's division, was next to Pickett on his left. This seems to make it certain,
as previously indicated, that Pickett was at least partly in three lines close
together, when he struck the works. If true, as stated by the officers of those
commands, that Kemper was driven from their fronts, both Garnett and Kemper, as
Gen. Longstreet said of the left, also "staggered" and "wavered", and but for
the massed formation at the critical moment, might not have reached the works,
and had the three brigades been in single line in front all might have met the
same fate, judging by what happened, according to accounts, to two of them.

  From the reports it is evident that it was Kemper's purpose to close with the
enemy on Webb's left, but he was driven away by the troops in his front,
although they were not so strong as those in front of Pettigrew, as has been
shown, and none of whom abandoned their positions, leaving a vacant interval for
art easy passage into their lines, the confusion attending which would have
greatly contributed to a momentary success also by the left.

  Hon. James M. Griffin of Co. H, when nearing the wall, firing as he advanced
with his company, had just fired and rammed home a cartridge when the gallant
colorbearer of the regiment, Billy O'Brien, fell dead at his feet, and Griffin
stooped to pick up the flag, but Jo. Smith of the same company seized it first
and raised it; Griffin made a few steps forward and while in the act of capping
his gun was severely wounded in the foot by a fragment of shell from a gun on
Cemetery Hill, and Jo. Smith fell wounded about the same time, when William P.
Marion of the same company picked up the flag and had gone on a step or two,
when he was killed, then Joseph G. Marable of the same company raised the colors
and planted them on the wall, falling against it as he did so, stunned, but not
much injured, and presently he and the flag were captured; he afterwards escaped
from prison with W. D. Reid, 1st Sergt. of Co. H, wounded within ten feet of the
wall and captured, they having many adventures and "hair breadth 'scapes" before
getting back to the regiment. Griffin whilst lying wounded on the field saw
through the smoke Pickett's division on his right as it charged, just as lie
fell, the ground where he fell being the highest. He was taken with two others
of Co. H in an enemy ambulance to a hospital of Gen. Hayes (Federal) division,
where they found Col. Hugh R. Miller commanding the 42nd Mississippi regiment
mortally wounded, and his son; Col. Miller died a few days later. Griffin's foot
was amputated, and the arm of one of his companions, Robt. B. Marion, wounded
near the wall, was amputated. He states that many of the regiment were killed
and wounded near the place where he fell, and that along there and to the wall
perhaps was the most fatal part of the line of advance, as do many others.

  A comparison of the killed and wounded of the Eleventh Mississippi with those
of the regiments in Pickett's division, as given in the Medical returns
previously mentioned, Serial No. 44, pp. 329, 330, 333, shows that the killed
and wounded of the Eleventh exceeded in numbers the killed and wounded of any
one of the 15 regiments in Pickett's division. The 11th Miss. lost, killed, 32;
wounded, 170. The 38th Va. lost, killed, 26; wounded, 147; and the 57th Va.
lost, killed, 26; wounded, 95, the two last in Armistead's brigade; the 24th
Va., in Kemper's brigade, lost, killed, 17; wounded, 111; these were by far the
greatest losses in killed and wounded in any of Pickett's regiments, those in
the remaining 12 regiments are much less. The aggregate killed and wounded in
Garnett's 5 regiments, omitting staff, etc., is 324; the aggregate 11th Miss, is
202; aggregate Kemper's 5 regiments, staff omitted, 462; aggregate Armistead's 5
regiments, staff omitted, 574; aggregate Pickett's 15 regiments, staff omitted,
1360; average to regiment, 90 2/3.

  Placing Pickett's force at 4900, the percentage of casualties was 27 2/3,
exclusive of field and staff, and the average casualties of the 15 regiments was
slightly less than 91 to the regiment; while the casualties of the 11th Miss.
(202), was 58 per cent. The casualties of the 11th Miss. (202), were nearly % as
many as the entire 5 regiments of Garnett, (324) ; were over half as many as the
5th regiment of Kemper, (462) ; were over 1/g as many as the 5 regiments of
Armistead, (574); and were over 1/7 as many as the casualties in Pickett's
entire division, (1360). The losses of the 11th Miss, and Pickett were all
sustained on July 3rd.

  Lane's brigade, 5 regiments, on the 1st and 3rd, two days, same returns, lost,
killed, 41; wounded, 348; total, 389; Lowrance's brigade, 5 regiments, on the
1st and 3rd, two days, lost, killed, 102; wounded, 322; total, 424. Davis'
brigade lost, 2nd Miss., killed, 49; wounded, 183; 42nd Miss., killed, 60 ;
wounded, 205; and 55th N. C, killed, 39; wounded, 159; on the 1st and 3rd, two
days, including the 11th, killed, 32, wounded. 170, total, 202, in 1 day;
aggregate, 2310.

  The 2nd and 42nd Miss, and the 55th N. C, of Davis' brigade, had been in the
battle of July 1st and had suffered heavily in killed and wounded, and the 2nd
Miss, lost its left wing, under the gallant Major (later Lt. Col.) John A.
Blair, in a railroad cut, where they were surrounded and compelled to surrender
seven officers and 225 men, according to the report of Col. Dawes, of the 6th
Wisconsin, in command of the enemy troops; Serial No. 43, p. 275, on page 276.
It has been stated that the 2nd Miss., because of that and other heavy losses in
the battle of the 1st, had only 60 men in the battle of the 3rd; Archer's
brigade, on the 1st, lost Gen. Archer and many men captured, besides many killed
and wounded, and was very much reduced when it went into battle on the 3rd. This
is true of Pettigrew's brigade, under Marshall, the 26th N. C. having lost over
half on the 1st, Lane's and Scales' brigades also suffered heavily on the 1st;
Pickett and the 11th Miss, alone were fresh.

  The Medical returns are used for the foregoing comparisons of casualties upon
the supposition that it is about equally defective as to each regiment, in the
absence of general correct reports of the regimental casualties.

  As will be perceived, the corrected returns herein given of the losses of the
Eleventh Mississippi regiment greatly exceed those stated in the Medical
returns, and presumably corrected losses in other regiments would show
relatively the same ratio,-those of the 11th Miss, and Pickett's 15 regiments
having been sustained on July 3rd, one day, besides which Pickett lost 1500
captured unwounded.

  This comparison, or aught here written, is not intended to disparage in the
least degree any command in the charge, but to give the truth as the writer sees
it, that justice may be done the Eleventh and others engaged in the battle on
the left. The Eleventh was made up in large measure from the choicest spirits in
the State,-intelligent, honorable and brave, and was a tried and trained body
that had won fame upon many bloody fields before Gettysburg. It was the equal in
intelligence and soldierly qualities of any regiment in the charge, come from
where it might. In the last moments of that desperate battle, when being shot to
pieces as few regiments have ever been desolated by enemy fire, the gallant
fellows had the fine courage to risk escaping rather than surrender, when to
escape meant subjection for a mile to a deadly fire from a triumphant enemy and
looked like almost certain death, only 41 being captured unwounded, and 40
escaping unhurt out of 350 entering the battle.

  Gen. Longstreet states in his report, Serial No. 44, page 357, on page 360,
that "about the same moment" (that Pickett reached the enemy's lines and a few
passed through an abandoned interval) "the troops that had before hesitated,
broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the
enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking".

  As Pickett's brigades were about the same time driven in disorder from the
enemy's lines and retired under fire perhaps as destructive as that to which the
left was exposed when retiring, the statement that many more fell in retiring
than while attacking was as applicable to Pickett's retreating troops as to
those upon the left, but the stricture was expressly limited to the latter.

  In his report Gen. Longstreet comments upon the "hesitating," "wavering"
columns of Gen. Pettigrew and Gen. Trimble, but makes no reference whatever to
the "recoil" of Garnett, or the "repulse" of Kemper from the front of Hall's
brigade upon Webb's left. The language "the troops that had before hesitated,
broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the
enemy's fire retiring than while they were advancing ", giving "the enemy time
to throw his entire force upon Pickett" etc., seems to suggest that the retreat
of all Pettigrew's and Trimble's troops was inexcusable, an unsoldierly
desertion of comrades in the charge, unnecessarily leaving them to the mercy of
the foe, which, as time passes, is shown to be more and more harsh and unjust as
it appears that when the wall was reached these troops were practically
exterminated whilst heroically struggling to accomplish a most desperate
undertaking, and that despite their great fortitude and courage and without
fault on their part the thin single line then remaining was utterly unable to
carry the works held by a gallant enemy in superior numbers, and that,
therefore, the only alternatives were to fight uselessly until annihilated, to
surrender, or to try to escape, the few survivors bravely choosing the latter as
the noblest and most soldierly course, but they had too much sense to sacrifice
their only chance by a Quixotic affectation of withdrawing slowly and in perfect
order under the tempest of deadly shot and shell poured into them as they left
the field, but rallied calmly on the line in rear where the charge began.

  Gen. Longstreet was an educated, trained and experienced soldier, a very able
commander, whose distinguished services to the "Lost Cause" are and always will
be cherished by all who were attached to that cause. But Gen. Longstreet was
only a man, and as such was fallible. He was much disturbed by Gen. Lee's
rejection of his cherished plan to attack on the enemy's right, and was
manifestly distrustful of the attack as made. It is plain that his sympathies
and concern in that battle were centered about his own troops, and he was
entirely capable of taking care of himself and his own. The left belonged to
another corps.

  Had Gen. Longstreet been present at the wall when the gallant troops on the
left closed with the enemy he doubtless would have ordered a retreat, as their
utter destruction in front of the wall could have been of no advantage to the
country, but a great and irremedial loss to the army then greatly in need of
tried soldiers, the supply of which was rapidly becoming exhausted, and the
cause then seemed far from being won or lost.

  These troops were no more supporting Pickett's division than the latter was
supporting them, and nothing in their relations upon that bloody field warranted
implications of subordination in any respect of one to the other. The "left",
except one brigade, retired from the field only when all, and much more, had
been suffered and done that could have been expected of the bravest and best
soldiers in the world and when to remain longer was to court instant destruction
or capture, neither of which would have been the part of patriotic citizens, or
trained soldiers. They had the courage to take the chance of falling under fire
in retreat to fight again for the cause they loved, and some passed through and
fought on many a field afterwards. The 11th, and all of Davis' brigade who
survived continued to the end.

  It appears from official reports and from statements of survivors that the
smoke from gun fire enveloped the field, obscuring the movements of troops,
which doubtless caused much misapprehension otherwise inexplainable, and led to
many mistakes as to movements and identities of different commands. Lines became
so shortened and thin as they neared the wall as to be nearly or wholly
undiscernible and indistinguishable in the smoke, even near by, and much more so
at a distance.

  Company casualties were as follows:-Company C went into the battle with an
aggregate of 29; killed, 9; wounded, 12-including Capt. Geo. W. Shannon, 1st
Lieut. Wm. Peel (captured and died in prison), 2nd Lieut. Geo. M. Lusher
(captured) and 3rd Lieut. Geo. F. Cole; captured unwounded, 4; total 25; escaped
unwounded, 4.

  Company D-aggregate in battle, 55 ; killed, 15 ; wounded, 26; captured
unwounded, 5; total, 46; escaped unwounded, 9.

  Company E-aggregate in battle, 37; killed 15; wounded, 20; captured unwounded,
1; total, 36; escaped unwounded, 1. Capt. Halbert and Lieuts. Mimms and Goolsby
were killed, and Lieut. W. H. Belton was severely wounded and discharged.

  Company F-aggregate in battle, 34; killed, 9; wounded, 17; captured unwounded,
4; total, 30; escaped unwounded, 4; Capt. Thos. J. Stokes was wounded close to
the wall and captured, Lieut. Featherston was killed, and Lieuts. Chas. Brooks
and Woods were captured.

  Company G, Skirmishers-aggregate in battle, 24; killed, 4; wounded, 8;
captured unwounded, 10; total, 22; escaped unwounded, 2. Capt. Nelms was
wounded, and Lieut. Osborne killed, the only officers present.

  Company H-aggregate in battle, 37; killed, 12; wounded, 16; captured
unwounded, 5; total, 33; escaped unwounded, 4. Capt. J. H. Moore and Lieut. T.
W. Hill were killed, and Lieut. R. A. McDowell was captured inside the
works,-all the company officers present. Private Joseph G. Marable, after
planting the regimental flag upon the wall, was captured.

  Company I-aggregate in battle, 45; killed, 14; wounded, 25; captured
unwounded, 3; total, 42; escaped unwounded, 3. Capt. Baker Word was wounded,
Lieut. W. P. Snowden was wounded near the wall and captured, and Lieut. Wm. H.
Clopton was wounded and captured.

  Company K-aggregate in battle, 39; killed, 9; wounded, 20; captured unwounded,
3; total, 32; escaped unwounded, 7; Capt. Geo. W. Bird was killed while cheering
his men over the wall, and Lieuts. John T. Stanford and A. G. Drake were
wounded,- all the officers present.

  Company A (University Greys) and Company B (Coahoma Invincibles) the former
the right, the latter the left company of the regiment, have furnished least
data; but it appears from information obtained that the two had an aggregate in
battle of 50; that of these there were killed, 16; wounded, 22; captured
unwounded, 6; total, 44; escaped unwounded, 6. Lieut. Wm. A. Raines, Company A,
was killed; Lieut. A. J. Baker, same Company, was wounded 20 feet to the left of
the "Bryan barn", within 10 feet of the wall, and was captured; Lieut. John V.
Moore, the only other commissioned officer of the company present, escaped. This
company was composed of students at the University who came from all parts of
the State, a few from other States. Lieut. David Nunn of Company B was killed,
and it is believed Capt. Geo. K. Morton, same company, was badly wounded, and
that both are included in the casualties of that company.

  The ten companies had in battle an aggregate of 350; killed, 103; wounded,
166; captured unwounded, 41; total company casualties, 310; escaped unwounded,
40; besides field officers. The mortally wounded are included with the killed.
Some supposed at the time to be missing and since ascertained to have been
killed or mortally wounded, are likewise included with the killed; others
supposed to be missing and since ascertained to have been wounded and captured,
are included with the wounded. Commissioned officers, whether named or not, are
included in the casualties under the proper head.

  All these casualties, except two killed and perhaps a few wounded during the
cannonading that preceded the charge, were sustained in less than two
hours-amounting to about 89 per cent. of the company aggregate present upon the
battle field.

  The author wishes to express his appreciation of the kindly assistance
rendered in furnishing data for the preparation of this article by the survivors
of the Eleventh, and to acknowledge the valuable aid derived from the admirable
contribution by Hon. William A. Love, "Mississippi at Gettysburg", to the
Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Vol. IX, page 25.

  The official reports, Confederate and Federal, of commanding officers in the
battle of July 3rd, and others, have been thoroughly examined and carefully
considered, and this article, except as it relates to Company losses and
personal incidents, is based upon them. Much else that has been spoken and
written concerning the charge at Gettysburg also has been critically studied;
but many speakers and writers have gone far afield and a very large part of
their contributions, whilst characterized by excellence of literary form, have
little or no basis of historical truth,-no small part of it being fiction, pure
and simple.

  Discrepancies and conflicts in the reports, where they exist, have been dealt
with as ever they are when found,-by balancing relative weight and probability,
which the writer has faithfully endeavored to do, aided perhaps by long judicial
experience in dealing with and disposing of such testimony.


Additional Comments:
Volunteer transcription

Extracted from: 

pages 549-568

PUBLICATIONS OF THE
MISSISSIPPI HISTORICAL SOCIETY

EDITED BY
DUNBAR ROWLAND, LL. D.
Secretary

CENTENARY SERIES VOLUME II


JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
PRINTED FOR THE SOCIETY
1918

DEMOCRAT PRINTING COMPANY MADISON, WISCONSIN


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