Martin County NcArchives Court.....Slade's Administrators, Cherry V. 1819
************************************************
Copyright.  All rights reserved.
http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm
http://www.usgwarchives.net/nc/ncfiles.htm
************************************************

File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by:
Deb Haines http://www.genrecords.net/emailregistry/vols/00003.html#0000719 January 25, 2009, 7:49 pm

Source: Nc Reports
Written: 1819

Cherry v. Slade's Administrators

From Martin

May Term 1819

The Court will award a venire facias de novo, where the jury, in a special 
verdict, find the evidence and not facts.

The rules which have been established by the decisions of the Courts, for 
settling questions relative to the boundary of lands, have grown out of the 
peculiar situation and circumstances of the country: and have been moulded to 
meet the exigencies of men, and the demands of justice. These rules are:

1. That whenever a natural boundary is called for in a patent or deed, the 
line is to terminate at it, however wide of the course called for, it may be; 
or however short or beyond the distance specified.

2. Whenever it can be proved that there was a line actually run by the 
Surveyor, was marked and a corner made, the, party claiming under the patent 
or deed, shall hold accordingly, notwithstanding a mistaken description of the 
land in the patent or deed.

3. When the lines or courses of an adjoining tract are called for in a deed or 
patent, the lines shall be extended to them, without regard to distance: 
Provided those lines and courses be sufficiently established, and no other 
departure be permitted from the words of the patent, or deed, than such as 
necessity enforces, or a true construction renders necessary.

4. Where there are no natural boundaries called for, no marked trees or 
corners to be found, nor the places where they once stood ascertained and 
identified by evidence; or where no lines or courses of an adjacent tract are 
called for; in all such cases, we are of necessity confined to the courses and 
distances described in the patent or deed: for however fallacious such guides 
may be, there are none other left for the location.

In this case the jury found a special verdict, so much of which as relates to 
the point which was sent up for the opinion of this Court, was as follows:

"Hislop's patent calls for Whitehurst's corner, described in the plat of 
survey as A, and thence along Ward's line 80 poles." Ward's line is from C to 
D. "Thence south on his line 320 poles to the back swamp." The line from C to 
D is south 30 degrees west; and is on the back swamp, and is the corner of 
Ward's patent, which covers the land to the east of the line from C to D. If 
the poles from Whitehurst's corner at A be run east, the course and distance 
will lead to B: and the south course called for in the patent from the 
termination of this line, will lead to D. If the east course called for in the 
patent, from Whitehurst's corner at A be continued, it will lead to F and not 
touch Ward's line. If the Court be of opinion that the line from Whitehurst's 
corner at A, should be continued east 80 poles, and thence to Wards' line in 
the course nearest the description in the patent; or that it should run 
directly to Ward's line along the course nearest to that called for in the 
patent, the Jury find for the plaintiff, and assess his damages to $345. But 
if the Court be of opinion that the line from Whitehurst's corner at A, should 
run east 80 poles, and thence south, though not on or with Ward's line, the 
jury find for the Defendant. It does not appear that Ward had any lands, 
except those covered by the patent referred to in this case.
 
Taylor, Chief-Justice: The land claimed by the Plaintiff under Hislop's 
patent, is described by the letters A, B, C, D, and E. "Beginning at 
Whitehurst's corner at the letter A; thence east along Ward's line 80 poles, 
thence south to his line 320 poles to the back swamp." If the lines first 
called for, be extended according to the course and distance in the patent, 
they would run from A to B, and thence to D, and leave out the land claimed by 
the Plaintiff; but in so running, they would not be on or with Ward's line; 
they would depart from the boundaries called for in the patent, for the sake 
of preserving the course and distance. If the course of the first line, viz, 
east, be pursued, it will lead to F, and will not strike Ward's line, which is 
intersected by running a course south 50 degrees east, at the letter C: and 
the question is, whether after running the first line 80 poles, east, it shall 
diverge in the course nearest to that called for, for the purpose of meeting 
Ward's line, and "of running on it" 320 poles to the back swamp, although the 
course of Ward's line is south 30 degrees west, instead of south, as in the 
patent.

The decisions which have taken place in this State on questions of boundary, 
have grown out of the peculiar situation and circumstances of the country, and 
have, beyond the memory of any person now alive, been moulded to meet the 
exigencies of men and demands of justice, where the mode of appropriating an 
almost uninhabitable forest, had involved land titles in extreme confusion and 
uncertainty. In many cases, surveys were no otherwise made than upon paper; 
and in many others, when an actual survey was made, the purchasers from the 
Lords Proprietors were, in danger of losing their lands by an inaccurate 
description of them, the omission of whole lines, and the mistake of courses. 
Land appropriated by a general description of courses and distances, without 
natural boundaries or marked lines, cannot be identified after the lapse of a 
considerable interval of time. If a beginning tree only were marked, the 
property continually revolves around it, and never can be ascertained for no 
person can pronounce what course must now be run in order to ascertain a line, 
said to be run in a certain direction an hundred years ago, from the 
uncertainty in the variation of the compass, and from carelessness or the want 
of skill in measurement. It is easy to conceive, therefore, how utterly 
impossible it would have been to render anything like justice to claimants 
under old patents, if the lands described in them were to be allotted only 
according to the courses and distances, to the neglect of natural boundaries, 
marked lines, and the well established lines and corners of adjoining tracts. 
Hence, certain rules have been laid down and repeatedly sanctioned by 
adjudications, which, in their application, have been found effectual for the 
just determination of almost every case that has arisen, and which have been 
considered for so great in length of time as part of the law of the country, 
that they ought not to he abrogated by any power short of that of the 
Legislature. These rules are,

1. That whenever a natural boundary is called for in a patent or deed, the 
line is to determine at it, however wide of the course called for it may be, 
or however short or beyond the distance specified. The course and distance may 
be incorrect, from any one of the numerous causes likely to generate error on 
such a subject; but a natural boundary is fixed and permanent, and its being 
called for in the deed or patent, marks beyond controversy, the intention of 
the party to select that land from the unappropriated mass. In confirmation of 
this rule, many cases have been decided, only a few of which have been 
reported; but as some of them are fully up to the rule, and have been 
uniformly acquiesced in, it may be useful to bring forward the principal 
features of them.

In Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N. C. 237, Gee's patent began on the mouth of a 
dividing run, thence north, thence east, thence south to a white oak, thence 
along the river to the beginning. This white oak stood half a mile from the 
river, and if the line were run thence to the beginning, a large part of the 
land described in the Plaintiff's grant would be left out of Gee's patent. It 
was decided that the river must be considered the boundary of Gees' patent.

In Pollock v. Harris, 2 N. C. 252, a swamp, a pocosin and a marsh, are 
severally called for in the patent, as the termination of lines, which if run 
according to the courses and distances did not extend to them. The natural 
boundaries were held by the Court to be the proper terminations of the lines. 
To these cases may be added Witherspoon v. Blanks, Id. 496; Harramond v. 
McGlaughon. 1 N. C., 90, and Swaine v. Bell, 3 N. C., 179.

2. Whenever it can be proved that there was a line actually run by the 
surveyor, was marked and a corner made, the party claiming under the patent or 
deed, shall hold accordingly, notwithstanding a mistaken description of the 
land in the patent or deed.

I understand the first decision of Bradford v. Hill. 2 N. C. 22, to be an 
authority for this rule; for although the Court directed the Jury to find 
according to the courses and distances called for in the deed, it was in the 
absence of proofs tending to establish the old marked line leading from 
Pollock's to Bryant's corner. The boundaries in the patent were, "beginning on 
Fishing Creek, thence east 320 poles to Pollock's corner, thence north the 
same number of poles to Bryant's, thence along Bryant's lines west 320 poles 
to the Creek." — Bryant's corner being four degrees to the east of north from 
Pollock's corner, the line from Pollock's corner intersected Bryant's line 
considerably to the west of Bryant's corner. It was proved that there was an 
old marked line leading from Pollock's to Bryant's corner, but that in running 
by the compass north 54 degrees cast, which was the general course of that 
line, it would be sometimes on the other side and sometimes on the other of 
that run by the compass, whence it was taken by the Jury to have been run by 
some person after the survey. The triangle formed by the said north line, part 
of Bryant's line and a line from Pollock's corner to Bryant's corner, included 
the land in dispute. It was decided by the Court that the courses and 
distances in the deed must be adhered to, because the line from Pollock's to 
Bryant's corner, was not proved to have been run by the surveyor; but that in 
cases of evident mistake by the surveyor, parol evidence was admissible, 
though it ought to be admitted with caution.

The same case under the name of Bustin v. Christie, 1 N. C. 160, came on for 
trial before Judge Moore, when the only additional fact proved was, that some 
ancient deeds were bounded by the old marked line from Pollock's to Bryant's 
corner. The Judge directed the Jury to establish that line, if they believed 
that to be the one intended.

In Eaton v. Person, 1 N. C. 23, the deed called for a course and distance, 
which carried the second line through the body of the land, leaving out a 
triangular piece, included in the second and third lines really run; but the 
second and third lines really run, as well as the corners, were marked and 
proved, by persons present at the survey for the patentee; upon which evidence 
the claimant under the patentee recovered.

In Person v. Roundtree, 2 N. C. 378, the latter entered a tract of land, lying 
in Granville county, upon Shocco Creek, which was run out, "beginning at a 
tree on the bank of Shocco Creek, running south a certain number of poles to a 
corner, thence north a certain number of poles to a corner on the creek, 
thence up the creek to the beginning." By a mistake, either in the surveyor or 
secretary who filled up the grant, the courses were reversed, placing the land 
on the opposite side of the creek to that on which it was really surveyed, so 
that the grant did not cover any of the land surveyed. Roundtree settled on 
the land surveyed, which was afterwards entered by a person, who obtained a 
deed from Lord Granville, and brought an ejectment against Roundtree, who 
proved the lines of the survey and a possession under his grant. The Court 
decided that Roundtree was entitled to the land intended to be granted, and 
which was surveyed: and that he should not be prejudiced by the mistake of the 
surveyor or secretary.

It was decided by Judge Haywood, in — v. Realty, 2 N. C. 370, that if a course 
and distance be called for, and there be a marked line and corner, variant 
from the course, which is proved to be the line made by the surveyor as a 
boundary, that marked line shall be preserved.

In Standen v. Bains, 2 N. C. 238, the Plaintiff claimed under Askill, who 
patented a tract of land in 1740, extending, as he alleged, to a line 
distinguished in the plat by the name of the dotted line. The courses and 
distances expressed in the patent, extended not so far, but only to a line 
distinguished in the plat as the black line. The Defendant entered this 
intermediate tract in the, year 1781, and took possession; whereupon the 
Plaintiff brought suit. The Court permitted evidence to be given, that the 
dotted line, which was a marked one, had, for a long time, since the year 
1740, been reputed the line of Askill's tract. The patent called for a gum 
standing in Roberts' line; this gum was found at the termination of the dotted 
line. It next called for two lines of Roberts' tract; the dotted line was upon 
these two lines. It called for Hoskins' corner; the dotted line went to that 
corner; and there was nothing in favor of the black line, but course and 
distance. But there was no witness who could prove positively that the dotted 
line was the line of Askill's tract.

In Blount v. Benbury, 3 N. C. 353, Judge Hall says there have been many 
decisions in this country which warrant a departure from the line described in 
the deed or patent, to follow a marked line, which the Jury have good reason 
to believe was the true one.

The circumstances of that case, of which I have a fuller note than any 
published, afford a striking confirmation of the rule. The question arose on 
the title of a piece of land, which lay between two parallel lines, A, B and 
C, D. The latter line was contended for by the Defendant as the line of J. 
Blount's patent; in which case, the Defendant was not in the possession of the 
Plaintiff's land; but if the line A B was the line of J. Blount's patent, the 
Defendant was in possession. The patent under which the Defendant claimed, 
called for Beasley's line and Blount's line at E, south 85 degrees east, as 
one of the boundaries. The person under whom the Defendant claimed, in his 
deed dated in 1785, called for Blount's line, and at the same time, marked as 
such, the line, from C to D. The principal question was, whether the line thus 
marked should be the boundary of the deed, or whether Blount's, wherever that 
should be ascertained to he, should be so considered. It is to be remembered, 
that the line from A to B was an old marked line. It was decided by the Court 
that Blount's line, wherever it was, should be the boundary; that although the 
patent calls for Beasley's line and Blount's line south 85 degrees east for 
one boundary; still the jury might consider Beasley's line the boundary as far 
as it went, and then the line A B which was 51 poles to the north of it; and 
that line was consequently established.

In Johnson v. House, 3 N. C. 301, Person surveyed the land for the patentee, 
under whom House claimed, and extended the line in question 160 poles, and 
marked and cornered it, as also the next line; but upon calculation, he found 
he had included 712 acres, instead of 640, and he cut off the land in question 
by drawing from 80 poles instead of 160. But he returned a plat to the 
Secretary's office, mentioning the corner red oak, marked at the end of 160 
poles, and the corner white oak, marked at the end of the next line drawn from 
thence. The plat having been returned with those corners, although mentioned 
to stand at the distance of 80 poles instead of 160, they were taken, 
notwithstanding the distance mentioned in the plat, to the true corners. The 
corner marked at the end of 80 poles, was a white oak instead of a red oak, 
called for in the patent.

These cases, and many others which have occurred since, sufficiently prove the 
existence of the rule, which, if it had not been adhered to, would, in every 
case cited, have deprived the true owner of part, or the whole of his land.

3. Where the lines or corners of an adjoining tract are called for in a deed 
or patent, the lines shall be extended to them, without regard to distance, 
provided those lines and corners be sufficiently established, and that, no 
other departure be permitted from the words of the patent or deed, than such 
as necessity enforces, or a true construction renders necessary.

This rule is founded upon the same reasons with the preceding ones, the design 
of all being to ascertain the location originally made; and calling for a well 
known line of another tract, denotes the intention of the party, with equal 
strength, to calling for a natural boundary, so long as that line can he 
proved.

In Miller v. White, 3 N. C. 160, the Plaintiff claimed under a patent to 
Nathan Bryan, beginning at a corner tree, thence south 80 degrees east 40 
poles, to Walter Lane's line. There was no actual survey; the 40 polls were 
completed before arriving at Lane's line. The second line was with Lane's line 
to his corner, a certain course and distance; but that distance would not 
reach the corner. Supposing the line to be drawn from the point of 
intersection of the first line with Lane's line, if the first line extended to 
Lane's line, and if the second line went with Lane's to his corner, then the 
land claimed by the Plaintiff was within Bryant's grant. If the first line 
stopped at the end of 40 poles, the land in question was not included. Judge 
Johnson was of opinion that the line should extend to Lane's line.

In Smith v. Murphy, 1 N. C. 223, the Defendant produced in evidence two deeds: 
the third course of the latter deed called for 42 poles to a corner standing 
on the other tract. Forty-two poles were completed before arriving at the 
first tract. If the last line of the second tract should be drawn from the 
point where the 42 poles were completed, the land which the Plaintiff had 
obtained a grant for, was not within any of the Defendant's deeds: but if the 
line be extended beyond the 42 poles to an intersection with the lines of the 
other tract, then the land claimed by the Plaintiff was covered by the 
Defendant's second deed. It was held by the Court that the line should be 
extended to that of the other tract.

4. Where there are no natural boundaries called for, no marked trees or 
corners to be found, nor the places where they once stood can be ascertained 
and identified by evidence, or where no lines or corners of an adjacent tract 
are called for, in all such cases, we are, of necessity, confined to the 
courses and distances described in the patent or deed: for, however fallacious 
such guides may be, there are none others left for the location.

A case recently decided, Bradberry v. Hooks, 4 N. C. 443, may seem, upon a 
hasty glance, to limit the application of the third rule, and in some degree 
to shake its authority; but an accurate attention to the circumstances of that 
case, will show that the decision and rule accord with each other. The words 
of the Plaintiff's patent were, "Beginning at a pine in or near his own line, 
and runs south 240 poles to a stake in William Hooks' line, thence with or 
near his line, north 73 degrees east 400 poles to a stake, thence north 305 
poles to a pine, thence to the beginning." Hooks had three lines in the 
direction of the first line of the Plaintiff's patent, the two first of which 
formed an acute angle, and the corner of a patent which was ten years older 
than the Plaintiff's: the third line of Hooks' formed one side of a patent 
which was seven years younger than the plaintiff's. The question in the case 
was, whether Hooks's line which first presented itself as one side of the 
angle, that which formed the other side of the angle, or the still more 
distant line of the new patent, should form the terminus ad quem of the 
Plaintiff's patent. The claim of the last line was rejected without 
hesitation, because, being made several years after the Plaintiff's location, 
it could not have been called for in the survey, although there was evidence 
of Plaintiff's declaration that the patent was not surveyed 'till after the 
grant issued. The court decided in favor of the first line, as the 
establishment of that formed the least departure from the words of the patent, 
and as the course from that line was north 73 degrees east, as called for in 
the Plaintiff's patent; and would also run with or near Hooks' line, which 
would not be the case, if the first line of the Plaintiff's patent were 
extended to Hooks' second or third line. Upon this case it is to be observed, 
that; it is an express authority to shew that where the line of another tract 
is called for, the line calling for it shall be extended thither, and in the 
terms of the rule, with no greater departure from the words of the patent than 
is necessary to satisfy them. The words of the plaintiff's patent were 
satisfied by stopping at the first line, and would have been departed from, if 
the line had been extended to the second. It was also a part of the case, that 
no actual survey of the Plaintiff's land had been made till after the patent 
issued.

It may also be thought that the second rule and the cases which support it, 
are broken in upon by the late decisions in Herring v. Wiggs, 4 N. C. 474; but 
such an inference is not authorized by the very peculiar circumstances of that 
case. Michael Herring was the owner of a patent covering the whole land in 
dispute; and in 1778, conveyed to Keetley, under whom the Defendant 
claimed, "beginning at a pine tree of Jacob Herrings and George Graham's land 
and running with George Graham's line, and the same course continued to a 
corner, including 100 acres of land, running a north course to the patent 
line." Twenty-seven years afterwards, Michael Herring conveyed to his son the 
Plaintiff, by deed, which after describing several lines, called for "Richard 
Keetley's corner, a pine, thence with Rutley's line south 98 poles to a pine, 
standing by the side of Graddy Herring's fence." The Plaintiff proposed to 
prove by parol evidence that a marked line from L to K was the true line of 
the Keetley deed; and he did prove that at the lime of the conveyance to him 
(the Plaintiff) Michael Herring and himself actualy ran to K, and thence to L, 
where there had stood the pine by Graddy Herring's fence; and that Keetley had 
sent his son to shew this line. The Court were of the opinion, that no parol 
evidence was admissible to show a line in contradiction to the deed, which 
would give less than 100 acres; that as Keetley's corner was admitted to be at 
U, a line running thence could not alter the location, which was fixed by a 
prior deed from Michael Herring, to which, permanency was affixed by 
registration; that as to the line in question, the deed did not purport to be 
bounded by a tree or stake, but was to be run in such a way as to include 
quantity. It was, therefore, a boundary, which could not be mistaken, altered, 
or changed by memory or reputation, but would always speak in the same tone of 
decisive notoriety. With respect to the circumstances of the land's being run 
off before Michael Herring executed the deed to the plaintiff, of the conduct 
of Keetley in recognizing the line K L as the true one, they were held not to 
affect Keetley's right, or to change that which was originally made the 
dividing line by the deed from Herring to Keetley.

This case does not affect the general rule; because the question in it was not 
where Keetley's line was originally fixed, but whether, when the survey was 
made and the lines established so as to include 100 acres, the posterior 
circumstances should have the effect, of changing the line, so as to include a 
less quantity.

The right of the case before us depends upon the application of the third 
rule. The patent calls for Whitehurst's corner, which is ascertained to be at 
the letter A, and this is sufficient authority for running the course and 
distance of the next line from it, notwithstanding the unaccountable insertion 
of the words "along Ward's line." After running out the 80 poles, the words 
are "thence south on Ward's line 320 poles to the Back Swamp." Here we are 
presented with a choice of difficulties. If we run according to the course, we 
reach the Back Swamp, but we do not run on Ward's line. On the other hand, if 
we continue the first line in an eastern course beyond the 80 poles, Ward's 
line will never be touched. It is, therefore, less a question of constitution 
respecting the patent than of fact to be ascertained upon evidence to the 
jury, whether the line described as Ward's was the line originally called for, 
and according to which the land was located; and if Ward's line be established 
by proof, whether the second line in Hislop's patent was run from B to C, or 
from B to D. I am of opinion these facts ought to be enquired into by the 
Jury; for which purpose there must be a new trial.

Henderson, Judge: I think a venire facias de novo should be awarded, because 
the Jury, instead of finding the facts have only found the evidence. That the 
line C D is Ward's line or a line of a tract of land belonging to Ward, is 
matter of evidence. That it is the line of Ward called for in Hislop's patent, 
is a question of fact, for the Jury to find from the evidence: and this fact 
may depend upon a variety of circumstances, all proper for the consideration 
of a Jury. This error has become too common from confounding the evidence with 
the facts. A line, when once established to be the one called for, no matter 
by what evidence (if it be legal evidence,) whether it be artificial or 
natural, will certainly control course and distance, as the more certain 
description. A natural boundary, such as water course, is designated from 
other water courses by its name, or by its situation, or by some other mark. 
One of those means of identifying the water course cannot control all the 
rest, if those other means are more strong and certain. A name, for instance, 
is the most common means of designating it; and this in general is 
sufficiently certain: but it cannot control every other description; and when 
there are two descriptions incompatible with each other, that which is the 
most certain must prevail. Cases might be put, where it must he evident that 
the parties were mistaken in the name, and therefore the name must yield to 
some other description more consistent with the apparent intent of the 
parties. It is true, that in cases of water courses or other natural 
boundaries, and in some cases of artificial boundaries, which are of much 
notoriety, and have therefore obtained well known names, the other 
descriptions, must be very strong: but if they be sufficiently so, the name 
must give way, and be accounted for from the misapprehension or mistake of the 
parties. This doctrine was fully illustrated in the famous suit relative to 
the Cattail branch, between Bullock's heirs and Littlejohn, which was more 
than once in this Court, and finally decided on the Circuit, to the entire 
satisfaction of the bench and the bar. Hislop's patent begins "at A. 
Whitehurst's corner, thence along Ward's line east 80 poles, thence south on 
his line 320 poles, to the Back swamp." Ward's line mentioned in the case, is 
almost 240 poles from Whitehurst's corner, running in a southwestern 
direction, and would not be intersected by an east line from the beginning; 
and is the boundary of a tract of land of Ward's lying entirely east of that 
line. Of course, it cannot be the line of Ward called for from A to B, or the 
first course in the patent. It is therefore almost certain, that it is 
not "the Ward's line" called for in the record course of the patent, and 
therefore would not control the course and distance, which is from A to B, and 
from B to D, leaving out the triangle B, C, D. But this a question of fact, 
and the evidence should have been submitted to the Jury.

I presume the Chief Justice has correctly examined all the cases stated in his 
opinion; but I have not had an opportunity of looking into them; nor do I deem 
it necessary to do so, in order to illustrate my views of the points arising 
in this case — I am of opinion that there should be a new trial.

Hall, Judge: In this case I concur in the opinion delivered by Judge 
Henderson. I have not had time during the sitting of the Court to examine all 
the cases referred to in the opinion delivered by the Chief Justice, but I 
have no doubt, they are truly and ably set forth and commented upon. But I 
think it is unnecessary to take any further view of the case than that taken 
by Judge Henderson - I concur in the opinion that there should be a new trial. 
New trial granted.

Cited: Bank v. Hunter, 12 N. C. 122; Hurley v. Morgan, 18 N. C. 431; Carson v. 
Burnett, Ib., 559; Gause v. Perkins, 47 N. C. 226; Safret v. Hartman, 50 N. C. 
189; Long v. Long, 73 N. C. 321; Mizzell v. Simmons, 79 N. C. 193; Dickson v. 
Wilson, 82 N. C. 489; Baxter v. Wilson, 95 N. C. 143; Redmond v. Stepp, 100 N. 
C. 210; Buckner v. Anderson, 111 N. C. 575; Mortgage Co. v. Long, 113 N. C. 
125; Cox v. McGowan, 116 N. C. 133; Brown v. House, Ib. 870; Shaffer v. 
Gaynor, 117 N. C. 23; Brown v. House, 118 N. C. 876; Deaver v. Jones. 119 N. 
C. 599; Higdon v. Rice, Ib. 626; Bowen v. Gaylord, 122 N. 0. 820; Tucker v. 
Satterthwaite, 123 N. C. 530; s. c., 126 N. C. 959; McKenzie v. Houston. 130 
N. C. 572; Elliott v. Jefferson. 133 N. C. 212; Rowe v. Lumber Co, Ib. 436; 
Hill v. Dalton, 140 N. C. 13; Fincannon r. Sudderth, Ib. 250; Whitaker v. 
Cover, Ib. 284; Lance v. Rumbough, 150 N. C. 25; Land Co. v. Erwin, Ib., 43.


File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/nc/martin/court/sladesad786wl.txt

This file has been created by a form at http://www.poppet.org/ncfiles/

File size: 30.1 Kb