Tyrrell County NcArchives Court.....Truett, V. Chaplin 1826
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Deb Haines http://www.genrecords.net/emailregistry/vols/00003.html#0000719 February 8, 2009, 8:06 pm

Source: Nc Court Reports, Vol 11, 1826
Written: 1826

December Term 1825

Truett v. Chaplin.

From Tyrrel.

Where a law suit is pending between two parties relative to the title of a 
vessel, and they enter into a parol agreement to settle all law suits and 
matters in controversy between them; and afterwards the plaintiff in the law 
suit, instead of dismissing it, takes a judgment by default, and is thereupon 
sued on his breach of the contract of settlement; in such suit either party 
may introduce parol evidence to show how his rights, as to the vessel, stood 
at the time of making the contract of settlement, because by so doing it would 
more satisfactorily appear whether those rights were taken into consideration 
in making the settlement.

The compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation for an agreement.

Chaplin, the defendant in this action, had brought an action of trover in 
Currituck County Court, against Truett, the present plaintiff, to recover 
damages for the conversion of a certain vessel called the Farmer's Daughter; 
both parties claiming to have title to the vessel.

Chaplin had also stayed Truett, by injunction, from carrying away the vessel.

During the pendency of these suits, and before Truett had pleaded to the 
action of trover, or answered the bill of injunction, Chaplin and Truett came 
to a parol agreement to settle all law suits and matters in controversy 
between them. Truett, in compliance with his part of the agreement, delivered 
to Chaplin his obligation for $75, and his written promise, with security 
thereto, to deliver to Chaplin 100 gallons of molasses on a certain day; and 
(179) Chaplin, in consideration thereof, agreed to dismiss his suits within 
ten days and pay his own costs; and in further performance of the agreement, 
Chaplin gave to Truett a receipt for six dollars in full of all demands and 
law-suits which he, Chaplin, had against him, Truett.

After this agreement between the parties, Chaplin, without the knowledge or 
consent of Truett, took a judgment by default in the action of trover, 
afterwards executed a writ of inquiry, and obtained final judgment for $2 240, 
issued his execution, caused it to be levied on the Farmer's Daughter, then in 
Truett's possession, sold her under the execution, and became himself the 
purchaser at the price of $750, and took the vessel and carried her away.

For Chaplin's breach of contract, Truett brought this action in Tyrrel County 
Court, whence it was carried by appeal to the Superior Court, and tried before 
Daniel, Judge.

Truett, on the trial, proved by the only three witnesses who knew any thing of 
the contract, the terms of it as in substance above stated; and farther, that 
Chaplin, when he made it, was not intoxicated but sober; that it was made 
between the hours of eleven and three of the 21st day of June, 1822. He proved 
also, by the person who wrote the receipt for $6 before mentioned, the signing 
of it by Chaplin, though the witness did not see the money paid.

The defendant, in his defence, alleged, that he expected to prove that Truett, 
at a sale made by the wreck master in Carteret county about two years before 
this contract, purchased the Farmer's Daughter for Chaplin, the former owner, 
and afterwards held her claiming her as his own. This evidence was objected 
to, but the Court received it. And much contradictory evidence was given of 
the declarations aud conversations of the parties, tending to show that, at 
the time of the contract, the title to the Farmer's Daughter was in the one or 
the other.

Chaplin contended, also, that the two notes (180) which Truett had given him 
as above mentioned, were for the freight of the vessel from North Carolina to 
Bermuda.

The Court charged the jury, that if the defendant agreed to dismiss his suits 
in Currituck and did not do it, the plaintiff was entitled to recover; and if 
they should be satisfied that Truett had purchased the vessel at a wreck sale, 
or had title to the vessel, then they should give damages to the amount of her 
value; but if they were of opinion that the vessel belonged to the defendant, 
and the sums mentioned in the two notes were the price of the freight of the 
vessel to Bermuda, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover but nominal 
damages for the breach of the contract, as no other property was levied on, or 
other injury shown. The Court further charged, that if the vessel was the 
property of the defendant the agreement to dismiss the suits in Currituck, on 
a settlement of all transactions between them, did not divest the defendant of 
his property in the vessel; but that the defendant would be permitted to set 
up his title whenever he could fairly get the possession. All the plaintiff 
could claim would be damages for a breach of contract.

Verdict for defendant, new trial refused, judgment and appeal.

Gaston, for appellant. 
L. Martin, for appellee.

Hall, Judge.—There are two objections made in this case to the opinion of the 
Court. The first relates to testimony offered by the defendant; the second to 
the charge given to the jury. With respect to the first, I think it is not 
sustainable. The contract by which it was alleged the parties had settled 
their disputes, were not committed to writing, and there could be no objection 
to either party's showing how their rights stood at the time when such 
contract was entered into, because by doing so, it would more satisfactorily 
appear whether those rights were (181) taken into consideration and included 
in it. If they were included in the contract, such evidence would not and 
ought not to have any tendency to invalidate it; if they were not, the 
contract, as to them, was a nullity, and the evidence was properly allowed.

The other objection is, that the jury was told "that if the vessel was the 
property of the defendant, the agreement to dismiss the suits in Currituck, on 
a settlement of all transactions between them, did not divest the defendant of 
his property in the vessel, but that the defendant would be permitted to set 
up his title whenever he could fairly get the possession."

This objection I think sustainable, because if the right of the vessel was an 
item in the settlement of all transactions between them, that right vested in 
the person to whom the settlement gave it; and was divested out of the other 
party in case he had a right to it before that time.

If an agreement is entered into upon a supposition of a doubtful right, it is 
binding. The compromise of a doubtful right is binding. (1 P. Wms., 727; 1 
Atk., 10; 2 Bl. 448.) If either party should be imposed upon by the fraudulent 
conduct of the other, the case would be otherwise; such agreement might be set 
aside for fraud. But as that is not the case here, I think the rule for a new 
trial should be made absolute.

And of this opinion was the rest of the Court.

Judgment reversed.

Additional Comments:
North Carolina Reports, Volume 11
Cases Argued and Determined in the SUPREME COURT of NORTH CAROLINA.
For December Term 1825 and June Term 1826 
by Francis L Hawks (Vol. IV)
Annotated by Walter Clark
Richmond: James E Goode Printing Company, Printers
1897

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