Wilkes County NcArchives Court.....William Dula, Francis Browne V. 1819 ************************************************ Copyright. All rights reserved. http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm http://www.usgwarchives.net/nc/ncfiles.htm ************************************************ File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by: Deb Haines http://www.genrecords.net/emailregistry/vols/00003.html#0000719 February 5, 2009, 7:22 pm Source: Nc Reports Written: 1819 Francis Browne v. William Dula From Wilkes November Term 1819 In a charge of forswearing, unless it appear from the accompanying words, that a judicial forswearing was meant, the Plaintiff must shew upon the record, that the Defendant alluded to some particular forswearing, which amounted to perjury. Therefore, where the Plaintiff charged in his Declaration, that the Defendant said of him. "He swore a lie and I can prove it," and there was no colloquium set forth of any judicial proceeding, the Plaintiff was nonsuited. This was an action on the case, for slanderous words spoken of the Plaintiff. The declaration charged, that "Whereas, Francis Browne is a good, true, honest, just and faithful citizen of this State, and as such hath always behaved and conducted himself, and until the committing of the several grievances by the said William Dula, hereinafter mentioned, was always reputed, esteemed and accepted, by and amongst all his neighbors, and other good, worthy citizens of the State, to whom he was in any wise known, to be a person of good name, fame and credit; and whereas he hath never been guilty, nor until the time of committing the several grievances by the said William Dula, herein-after mentioned, been suspected of being guilty of perjury or any other such crime, by means of which said premise; he hath deservedly obtained the good opinion and credit of all his neighbors, and other good and worthy citizens of this State to whom he was in anywise known, to-wit, at Wilkes aforesaid; yet the said William Dula well knowing the premises, but greatly envying the happy state and condition of the said Francis Browne, and contriving and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure the said Francis Browne in his said good name, fame and credit, and to bring him into public scandal, infamy and disgrace, with and amongst all his neighbours and other good citizens of this State, and also to cause him to he suspected and believed, by those neighbours and citizens, to be guilty of perjury, and that he had subjected himself to the pains and penalties, by the laws of this State, inflicted upon persons guilty of said crime, and to harrass and ruin the said Francis Browne, heretofore, to-wit, &c, then and there in the presence and hearing of the said last mentioned citizen, falsely and maliciously spoke and published of and concerning the said Francis Browne, these false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words, that is to say. "He swore a lie and I can prove it," meaning that the said Francis Browne had committed wilful and corrupt perjury; by means of committing which said several grievances. Upon the trial of the cause, the Plaintiff proved, that he and one James Allison were standing together in the street in Wilkesborough. The Defendant walked up, and addressing himself to Allison, said. "You are a good man and I like you; but that man (pointing to the Plaintiff) is a rascal, he swore to a lie against me and I can prove it." Allison was well acquainted with the Plaintiff and Defendant, and had heard that upon the trial of an indictment against Defendant in Wilkes Court, the Plaintiff had been examined as a witness for the State, and the record of this prosecution was given in evidence. The Jury gave a verdict for the Plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the question, whether the words as laid in the declaration, were actionable. The Court was of opinion, that as the declaration did not set forth any colloquium to which the inuendo could have reference, the words as charged were not actionable; and gave judgment accordingly. The Plaintiff appealed. Taylor, Chief Justice: It is established by a long series of cases, that to say a man is forsworn, or that he has taken a false oath, generally and without reference to some judicial proceeding, is not actionable; and the reason is that in the latter case a perjury is charged, for which, were, the charge true, the party would be liable to be indicted and punished; in the other, a breach of morality is imputed, of which the law does not take cognizance. In a charge of forswearing, unless from the accompanying words, it is clear that a judicial forswearing was meant, the Plaintiff must shew upon the record that the Defendant alluded to some particular forswearing which amounted to perjury. Thus, in a declaration for saving "A. B. being forsworn, compounded the prosecution," no introduction of extrinsic facts is necessary, since an indictable forswearing must have been meant. But in declaring for the words, "he has forsworn himself in Leake Court," it is necessary to shew that Leake Court was one in which the offense of perjury could have been committed. Actions of slander do not lie upon inference. It has been held, that to accuse another of having forsworn himself, generally, is actionable, 2 Buls, 40; but it seems now perfectly settled that such an accusation is not actionable, unless it appear from the accompanying circumstances, to have meant such a forswearing as would constitute the offense of perjury. File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/nc/wilkes/court/williamd861wl.txt This file has been created by a form at http://www.poppet.org/ncfiles/ File size: 5.7 Kb