OHIO STATEWIDE FILES - Know your Ohio: Ohio in the Civil War Pt 13b *********************************************************************** OHGENWEB NOTICE: All distribution rights to this electronic data are reserved by the submitter. Reproduction or re-presentation of copyrighted material will require the permission of the copyright owner. The submitter has given permission to the USGenWeb Archives to store the file permanently for free access. *********************************************************************** File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by Darlene E. Kelley http://www.genrecords.net/emailregistry/vols/00026.html#0006374 November 27, 1999 *********************************************************************** Historical Collections of Ohio Diaries of S. J. Kelly Plains Dealer Know Your Ohio by Darlene E. Kelley *********************************************************************** Ohio in the Civil War -- part 13 B. The Military Telegraph Service -- Especially important was the technical work of Bates, Chandler, and Tinker enciphering and deciphering important messages to and from the great contending armies, which was done by code. Stager devised the first cipher, which was so improved by the cipher operators that it remained untranslatable by the Confederates to the end of the war. An example of the method in gneral use, given by Plum in his " History Of the Military Telegraph " is Lincoln' dispatch to ex-secretary Cameron when with Meade. south of Gettysburg. Brilliant and conspicuous service was rendered by the cipher operators of the War Department in translating Confederate cipher messages which fell into Union hands. A notable incident in the field was the translation of General Joseph E.Johnson's cipher message to Pemberton, captured by Grant before Vicksburg and forwarded to Washington. More important were the two ciper dispatches from the Secretary of War at Richmond, in December. 1863, which led to a cabinet meeting and culminated in the arrest of Confederate conspirators in New York City, and to the capture of contraband shipments of arms and ammunition. Other intercepted and translated ciphers revealed plans of Confederate agents for raiding Northern towns near the border. Most important of all were the cipher disclosing the plot for the wholesale incendiarism of leading hotels in New York, which barely failed of success on November 25, 1864. Beneficial and desireable as were the civil cooperation and management of the telegraph service in Washington, its forced extention to armies in the field was a mistaken policy. Patterson, in the Valley of Virginia, was five days without word fron the War Department, and when he was sent a dispatch, July 20th that Johnson had started to reinforce Beauregard with 35,200 men, this vital message was not sent to McDowell with whom touch was kept by a service half- telegraphic and half-courier. The necessity of efficient field-telegraphs at once impressed military commanders. In the west, Freemont immediately acted, and in August 1861, ordered the formation of a telegraph battalion of three companies along lines in accord with modern military practice. Major Myer had already made similar suggestions in Washington, without success While the commercial companies placed their personnel and material freely at the Government's disposal,they viewed with marked disfavor any military organization, and their recommendations were potent with Secretary of War Cameron. Fremont was ordered to disband his battalion, and a purely civil bureau was substituted, though legal authority and funds were lacking. Efforts to transfer quartermaster's funds and properly to this bureau were successfully resisted, owing to the manifest illegality of such action. Indirect methods were then adopted, and Stager was commissioned as a Captain in the Quartermaster's Department and his operators given the status of employees. He was appointed general manager of the United States telegraph lines, November 25,1861, and six days later, through some unknown influence, the Secretary of War reported ( incorrectly, be it known ), " that under an appropriation for that purpose at the last session of Congress, a telegraph bureau was established." Stager was later made a colonel, Eckert a major, and a few others captains, and so eligible for pensions, but the men in lesser positions remained employees, non-pensionable and subject to draft. Repeated efforts by petitions and recommendations for giving a military status were made by the men in the field later in the war. The Secretary of War disapproved, saying that such a course would place them under the orders of Superior officers, which he was most anxious to avoid. With corporation influence and corps rivalries so rampant in Washington, there exsisted a spirit of patriotic solidarity in the face of the foe, in the field that ensured hearty cooperation and efficient service. While the operators began the sence of individual independance that caused them often to resent any control by commanding officers, from which they were free under the Secretary's orders, yet their common sense speedily led them to comply with every request from commanders that was not absolutely incompatible with loyalty to their chief. Especially in the public eye was the work connected with the operations in the armies which covered Washington and attacked Richmond, where McClellan first used the telegraph for tactical purposs. Illustrative of the courage and resourcefulness of operators was the action of Jesse Bunnell, attached to General Porter's headquarters. Finding himself on the fighting line, with the Federal troops hard pressed, Bunnell, without orders, cut the wire and opened communication with McClellan's headquarters. Superior Confederate forces were then threatening defeat to the invaders, but this battle-office enabled McClellan to keep in touch with the situation and ensure Porter's position by sending the commands of French, Meagher, and Slocum to his relief. Operator Nichols opened an emergency office at Savage's Station on Stimner's request, maintaining it under fire as long as it was needed. One of the great feats of the war was the transfer, under the supervision of Thomas A. Scott. of two Federal army corps from Virginia to Tennessee, consequent on the Chickamauga disaster to the Union arms. By this phenomental transfer, which would seem impossible without the military telegraph, twenty-three thousand soldiers, with provisions and baggage, were transported a distance of 1,233 miles in eleven and a half days,from Brstoe Station Virginia to Chattanooga,Tennessee. The troops had completed half their journey before the news of the proposed movement reached Richmond. While most valuable elsewhere, the military telegraph was absolutely essential to successful operations in the valley's of the Cumberland and of the Tennessee, where very long lines of communication obtained, with consequent great distances between the separate armies. Apart from train-dispatching, which was absolutely essential to transporting army supplies for hundreds of thousands of men over a single track railway of several hundred of miles in length, an enormous number of messages for the control and cooperation of separate armies and detached commands were sent over the wires. Skill and patience were necessary for efficient telegraph work, especially when lines were frequently destroyed by Confederate incursions or through hostile inhabitants of the country. Of great importance and of intense interest are many of the cipher dispatches sent over these lines. Few, however, exceeded the ringing messages of October 19, 1863, when Grant, from Louisville, Kentucky, bid Thomas " to hold Chattanooga at all hazards," and received the laconic reply in a few hours, " I will hold the town till we starve," Here, as elsewhere, appeared the anomaious conditions of the service. ********************************************** to be continued in part 13-C