OHIO STATEWIDE FILES OH-FOOTSTEPS Mailing List ----------------------------------------------------------------------- USGENWEB NOTICE: These electronic pages may NOT be reproduced in any format for profit or presentation by other organization or persons. Persons or organizations desiring to use this material, must obtain the written consent of the contributor, or the legal representative of the submitter, and contact the listed USGenWeb archivist with proof of this consent. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by OH-FOOTSTEPS Mailing List ------------------------------------------------------------------------ OH-FOOTSTEPS-D Digest Volume 99 : Issue 101 Today's Topics: #1 Sandusky Co. History 3 [leaann1@bellsouth.net] ------------------------------ X-Message: #1 Date: Mon, 15 Feb 1999 02:24:17 -0800 From: leaann1@bellsouth.net Subject: Sandusky Co. History 3 Historical Collections of Ohio Henry Howe LL. D. Published 1904 copyright 1888 Sandusky County The Enemy Open Fire The enemy now opened their fire from their six-pounders in the gun-boats and the howitzer on shore, which they continued through the night with but little intermission and with very little effect. The forces of the enemy consisted of 500 regulars, and about 800 Indians, commanded by Dickson, the whole being commanded by General Proctor in person. Tecumseh was stationed on the road to Fort Meigs with a body of 2000 Indians, expecting to intercept a reinforcement on that route. Major Croghan through the evening occasionally fired his six-pounder, at the same time changing its place occasionally to induce a belief that he had more than one piece. As it produced very little execution on the enemy, and he was desirous of saving his ammunition, he soon discontinued his fire. The enemy had directed their fire against the northwestern angle of the fort which induced the commander to believe that an attempt to storm his works would be made at that point. In the night, Captain Hunter was directed to remove the six-pounder to a block house, from which it would rake that angle. By great industry and personal exertion, Captain Hunter soon accomplished this object in secrecy. The embrasure was masked, and the piece loaded with a half-charge of powder, and double charge of slugs and grapeshot. Early in the morning of the 2nd, the enemy opened their fire from their howitzer and three six-pounders, which they had landed in the night, and planted in a point of woods, about 250 yards from the fort. In the evening, about 4 o'clock, they concentrated the fire of all their guns on their northwest angle, which convinced Major Croghan that they would endeavor to make a breach and storm the works at that point; he therefore immediately had that place strengthened as much as possible with bags of flour and sand, which were so effectual that the picketing in that place sustained no material injury. Sergeant Weaver, with five or six gentlemen of the Petersburgh volunteers and Pittsburgh blues, who happened to be in the fort, was intrusted with the management of the six-pounder. Assault and Repulse of the British Late in the evening, when the smoke of the firing had completely enveloped the fort, the enemy proceeded to make the assault. Two feints were made towards the southern angle, where Captain Hunter's lines were formed; and at the same time a column of 350 men was discovered advancing through the smoke, within twenty paces of the northwestern angle. A heavy galling fire of musketry was now opened upon them from the fort, which threw them into some confusion. Colonel Short, who headed the principle column, soon rallied his men, and led them with great bravery to the brink of the ditch, calling to his men to follow him, and in a few minutes it was full. The masked port-hole was now opened, and the six-pounder, at the distance of thirty feet, poured such destruction among them that but few who had entered the ditch were fortunate enough to escape. A precipitate and confused retreat was the immediate consequence, although some of the officers attempted to rally their men. The other column, which was led by Colonel Warburton and Major Chambers, was also routed in confusion by a destructive fire from the line commanded by Captain Hunter. The whole of them fled into the adjoining wood, beyond the reach of our fire-arms. During the assault, which lasted half an hour, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from their howitzer and five six-pounders. They left Colonel Short, a lieutenant and twenty five privates dead in the ditch; and the total number of prisoners taken was twenty six, most of them badly wounded. Major Muir was knocked down in the ditch, and lay among the dead, till the darkness of the night enabled him to escape in safety. The loss of the garrison was one killed and seven slightly wounded. The total loss of the enemy could not be less than 150 killed and wounded. Retreat of the British When night came on, which was soon after the assault, the wounded in the ditch were in a desperate situation. Complete relief could not be brought to them by either side with any degree of safety. Major Croghan, however, relieved them as much as possible, he contrived to convey them water over the picketing in buckets, and a ditch was opened under the pickets, through which those that were able and willing, were encouraged to crawl into the fort. All who were able, preferred, of course, to follow their defeated comrades, and many others were carried from the vicinity of the fort by the Indians, particularly their own killed and wounded; and in the night, about three o'clock, the whole British and Indian force commenced a disorderly retreat. So great was their precipitation that they left a sail-boat containing some clothing and a considerable quantity of military stores; and on the next day, seventy stand of arms and some braces of pistols were picked up around the fort. Their hurry and confusion were caused by the apprehension of an attack from Gen. Harrison, of whose position and force they had probably received an exaggerated account. Gen. Harrison's Movements It was the intention of General Harrison, should the enemy succeed against Fort Stephenson, or should they endeavor to turn his left and fall on Upper Sandusky, to leave his camp at Seneca and fall back for the protection of that place. But he discovered by the firing on the evening of the first, that the enemy had nothing but light artillery, which could make no impression on the fort, and he knew that an attempt to storm it without making a breach, could be successfully repelled by the garrison; he therefore determined to wait for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers under Colonel Rennick, being the advance of 700 who were approaching by the way of Upper Sandusky, and then to march against the enemy and raise the siege, if their force was not still too great for his. On the 2nd he sent several scouts to ascertain their situation and force; but the woods were so infested with Indians, that none of them could proceed sufficiently near the fort to make the necessary discoveries. In the night the messenger arrived at headquarters with intelligence that the enemy were preparing to retreat. About 9 o'clock, major Croghan had ascertained from their collecting about their boats, that they were preparing to embark, and had immediately sent an express to the commander-in-chief with this information. The general now determined to wait no longer for the reinforcements, and immediately set out with the dragoons, with which he reached the fort early in the morning, having ordered Generals McArthur and cass, who had arrived at Seneca several days before, to follow him with all the disposable infantry at that place, and which at this time was about 700 men, after the numerous sick, and the force necessary to maintain the position, were left behind. Finding that the enemy had fled entirely from the fort, so as not to be reached by him, and learning that tecumseh was somewhere in the direction of Fort Meigs, with 2000 warriors, he immediately ordered the infantry to fall back to Seneca, lest Tecumseh should make an attack on that place, or intercept the small reinforcements advancing from Ohio. Gallant Soldiers In his official report of this affair, Gen. Harrison observes that, "It will not be among the least of General Proctor's mortification's that he has been baffled by a youth, who had just passed his twenty first year. He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle, Gen. George R. Clarke." Captain Hunter, of the 17th regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with great propriety; and never was there a set of finer young fellows than the subalterns, viz.: Lieutenants Johnson and Baylor of the 17th, Meeks of the 7th, and Ensign Shipp and Duncan of the 17th. Lieutenant Anderson of the 24th, was also noticed for his good conduct. Being without a command, he solicited Major Croghan for a musket and a post to fight at, which he did with the greatest bravery. "Too much praise," says Major Croghan, "cannot be bestowed on the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates under my command, for their gallantry and good conduct during the siege." The brevet rank of Lieutenant Colonel was immediately conferred on Major Croghan, by the President of the United States for his gallant conduct on this occasion. The ladies of Chillicothe also presented him an elegant sword, accompanied by a suitable address. We take the above from Dawson's "Life of Harrison," where it is quoted from some other source. In defending Gen. Harrison from the charges of cowardice and incompetency in not marching to the aid of the garrison previous to the attack, Dawson says; Unjust Criticism of Ge. Harrison The conduct of the gallant Croghan and hid garrison received from every quarter the plaudits of their countrymen. This was what they most richly deserved. There was, however, some jealous spirits who took it into their heads to be dissatisfied with the course pursued by the commanding general. The order which was given to Colonel Croghan to evacuate and destroy the garrison previously to the attack, was loudly condemned, as well as the decision of the council of war, to fall back with the troops at Seneca, to a position twelve miles in the rear. Both these measures, it has been said, were determined on by the unanimous advice of the council of war. It is not to be presumed that such men as composed that board, would have given advice which was in any way derogatory to the honor of the American arms. Every individual among them either had, before or afterwards, distinguished himself by acts of daring courage and intrepidity. We do not profess to be much acquainted with military matters, but the subject appears to us so plain as only to require a small portion of common sense perfectly to comprehend it. At the time that the determination was made to withdraw the garrison from Sandusky, it must be recollected that the general had only with him at Seneca about 400 infantry and 130 or 140 dragoons. The enemy, as he was informed by General Clay in the letter brought by Captain M'Cune, amounted to at least 5000. With such a disparity of force, would it have been proper to have risked an action to preserve the post of Lower Sandusky, which of itself was of little or no importance, and which, the garrison being withdrawn, contained nothing of any value? Important Posts The posts of Fort Meigs and Upper Sandusky were of the utmost importance; the former was amply provided with the means of defense, and was in no danger; but the latter, weak in its defenses, and with a feeble garrison, containing many thousands of barrels of flour and other provisions, the sole resource of the army for the ensuing campaign, was to be preserved at any risk. The position at Seneca, was not in the direct line from Fort Meigs to Upper Sandusky. The enemy, by taking the direct route, would certainly reach it before General Harrison, as several hours must have elapsed before he could have been informed of their movement, even if it had been discovered the moment it had been commenced, a circumstance not very likely to happen. It therefore became necessary for the security of Upper Sandusky, that a position better adapted to that purpose should be assumed. There was another and most important reason for this movement; twelve miles in the rear of Seneca, towards Upper Sandusky, the prairie or open country commences. The infantry which the commander-in-chief had with him were raw recruits; on the contrary, the squadron of dragoons were well disciplined, and had seen much service. In the country about Seneca, this important corps could have been of little service; in the open country to the rear, they would have defeated five times their number of Indians. It was for these reasons that it was determined by the council of war, to change the position of the troops at Seneca. If this movement did take place, the propriety of withdrawing the garrison of Lower Sandusky was obvious. The place was extremely weak, and in a bad position. It was not intended originally for a fort. Before the war it was used as the United States Indian factory, and had a small stockade around it, merely for the purpose of keeping out drunken Indians. It was, moreover, commanded by a hill, within point blank shot, on the opposite side of the river. The School of Experience To those who suppose that Gen. Harrison should have advanced upon the enemy the moment he discovered that Sandusky was attacked, we must, in the language of the general and field officers were present on the occasion, "leave them to correct their opinions in the school of experience." Gen. Harrison had been reinforced a day or two before the siege of Sandusky, by the 28th regiment, raised in Kentucky. After having received this corps he could not have marched more than 800 effective men without risking his stores, and, what was still of more consequence, 150 sick at Seneca, to be taken by the smallest party of Indians. The scouts of the army brought information that the Indians were very numerous in the direction of Fort Meigs. The general conjectured that a large portion of the Indians were then ready to fall on his flank or rear, or the defenseless camp at Seneca, should he advance. The information he received from the British prisoners confirmed this opinion; a body of 2000 being there under the command of Tecumseh. At the moment of which we are speaking the volunteers of Ohio were rapidly approaching. Wise Course of General Harrison Now, under these circumstances, does any reasonable man believe that Gen. Harrison should have advanced with his 800 raw recruits against a force in front which he knew to be so much superior in numbers, and with the probability of having one equally large hanging on his flank? What would have been thought of his abilities as a general, even if he had been successful against Gen. Proctor (of which, with his small force, there was little probability), if in his absence Tecumseh, with his 2000 warriors, had rushed upon Camp Seneca, destroyed his stores, tomahawked his sick soldiers, and pursuing his route towards Upper Sandusky, defeated the Ohio volunteers, scattered as they were in small bodies, and finally ending his career with the destruction of the grand magazine of his army, upon the preservation of which all his hopes of future success depended? In all human probability this would have been the result had Gen. Harrison advanced to the relief of Fort Stephenson sooner than he did. It was certainly better to risk for a while the defense of that fort to the talents and valor of Croghan, and the gallant spirits who were with him, than to jeopardize the whole prospects of the campaign. About one and a half miles above Lower Sandusky, at the falls of the river, in the manufacturing village of Ballsville, containing one cotton and one woolen factory, two flouring mills, and about thirty dwellings. It was about half a mile southwest of this village, that Colonel Ball had a skirmish with the Indians a day or two previous to the assault of Fort Stephenson. There is, or was a few years since, an oak tree on the site of the action, on the road to Columbus, with seventeen hacks in it to indicate the number of Indians killed on the occasion. We have an account of this affair derived from one of the dragoons present: The squadron were moving towards the fort when they were suddenly fired upon by the Indians from the west side of the road, whereupon Col. Ball ordered a charge, and he and suite and the right flank being in advance, first came into action. The colonel struck the first blow. He dashed in between two savages and cut down the one on the right; the other being slightly in the rear, made a blow with a tomahawk at his back, when, by a sudden spring of his horse, it fell short, and was buried deep in the cantel and pad of his saddle. before the savage could repeat the blow, he was shot by Corporal Ryan. Lieut. Hedges (now Gen. Hedges of Mansfield) following in the rear, mounted on a small horse, pursued a big Indian, and just as he had come up to him his stirrup broke, and he fell head first off his horse, knocking the Indian down. Both sprang to their feet, when hedges struck the Indian across his head, and as he was falling buried his sword up to its hilt in his body. At this time Capt. Hopkins was seen on the left side in pursuit of a powerful savage, when the latter turned and made a blow at the captain with a tomahawk, at which the horse sprang to one side. Cornet Hayes then came up and the Indian struck at him, his horse in like manner evading the blow. Sergt. Anderson now arriving the Indian was soon dispatched. By this time the skirmish was over, the Indians, who were only about twenty in number, being nearly all cut down; and orders were given to retreat to the main squadron. Col. Ball dressed his men ready for a charge, should the Indians appear in force, and moved down without further molestation to the fort, where they arrived at about 4 P.M. -------------------------------- End of OH-FOOTSTEPS-D Digest V99 Issue #101 *******************************************