Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 10, 238-
254

Contributed for use in the USGenWeb Archives by Judy Banja jbanja@msn.com and 
transcribed by Judy Banja, Judith Bookwalter, Cyndie Enfinger, Linda Horn, 
Margaret Long, Patricia Martz, Barbara Milhalcik, Leah Waring and Marjorie B. 
Winter

Copyright 2003.  All rights reserved.
http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm
http://www.usgwarchives.net/pa/pafiles.htm
________________________________________________

                         MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                       by
                                SAMUEL P. BATES.

                     PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 238

                            PART I.  GENERAL HISTORY.

                                    CHAPTER X.

                  MARSHALLING FOR THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

BUT where, during all this long day of carnage, was the rest of the army?  Why 
were these two feeble corps left from early morn, until the evening shadows 
began to set, to be jostled and torn without succor?  Were there no troops 
within call?  Was not the very air laden with the terrible sounds of the fray?  
Was not the clangor of the enemy's funs more persuasive than the summon of staff 
officer?
  The order of General Meade for the march of the several corps of the army on 
the 1st would carry the Third corps to Emmittsburg.  But General Sickles says in 
his testimony, that he had reached Emmitsburg on the night of the 30th.  This 
place is ten miles from Gettysburg.  The Third corps had been placed under the 
command of Reynolds as the leader of the right wing of the army, and he had sent 
a staff officer on the morning of the 1st, to summon it forward.  It had no 
farther to march than had Howard's corps, and following the course that Howard 
went-the by-way leading to the Taneytown road-not so great a distance.  But 
Sickles had that morning received the circular of Meade, indicating the purpose 
to concentrate on Pipe Creek, though containing no order.  It was his plain 
duty, therefore, to have responded, had the message reached him, to the call of 
Reynolds.  But to this he seems to have paid no attention.  In his testimony, 
Sickles says:  "I was giving my troops a little repose during that morning. . . 
.  Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, I got a dispatch from General 
Howard, at Gettysburg, informing me that the First and Eleventh corps had been 
engaged during the day with superior force of the enemy, and that Gen-

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 239

eral Reynolds had fallen; that he (Howard) was in command, and was very hard 
pressed, and urging me in the most earnest terms to come to his relief with what 
force I could.  I, of course, considered the question very anxiously.  My 
preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg were to go there and hold that 
position with my corps, as it was regarded as a very important flanking 
position, to cover our rear and line of communication."  In this testimony, 
Sickles ignores the early summons of Reynolds, which a staff officer, Captain 
Rosengarten, asserts was sent by an aid with great dispatch and immediately 
after Reynolds had reached the front.  But Sickles says, "My preliminary orders 
in going to Gettysburg.:"  Is this a misprint in the testimony, and should it 
read Emmittsburg?  If Gettysburg, then to what order does he refer?  General 
Meade had given no such order.  If Gettysburg, he must refer to an order which 
he had received from Reynolds, which he disobeyed, probably allowing the 
circular of Meade, which had no binding effect, and which bore that declaration 
in so many words on its face, to override it.  But when, between two and three 
o'clock he received the summons of Howard, he concluded to respond to it.  
Moreover, it would seem that besides the order of Reynolds and the appeal of 
Howard, other messages had reached Sickles before he decided to go to 
Gettysburg.  An article, published in the "Rebellion Record," vol. viii., page 
346, contains this statement:  "Besides numerous reports, the following brief 
communication reached him [Sickles], which accidentally fell into my hands:  
'July 1, Gettysburg.  General Sickles:  General Doubleday [First corps] says, 
For God's sake, come up with all speed, they are pressing us hard.  H. T. Lee, 
Lieut. A. D. C.'"
  It is but justice to Sickles, however, to say, that when he had once decided 
to go, he moved rapidly, and that his character as a soldier, established on 
many a bloody field, was never to shun a fight.  He was among the few officers 
in the army who evidently relished one.  He says:  "I therefore moved to 
Gettysburg on my own responsibility.  I made a forced march, and arrived there 
about the time that General Howard had taken position on Cemetery Hill.  I found 
his troops well posted in a secure position on the ridge.  The enemy, in the 
meanwhile, had

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 240

not made any serious attack upon him during my march."  The concluding statement 
is a mistake, as the time between two and five o'clock marked the most severe 
and disastrous struggle of the day.
  The Twelfth corps, according to Meade's programme, was to march from 
Littlestown, ten miles from Gettysburg, to Two Taverns, which would bring it 
within five miles of the battlefield, four and a quarter from Cemetery Hill.  
The march was commenced at six in the morning, and, after passing Two Taverns, a 
line of battle was formed.  The following is from the diary of an officer who 
commanded a regiment in Kane's brigade:  "July 1st, marched at six A. M., a 
short distance; passed Two Taverns, a line of battle was formed.  The following 
is from the diary of an officer who commanded a regiment in Kane's brigade:  
"July 1st, marched at six A. M., a short distance; passed Two Taverns; formed 
line of battle; heavy firing in front; a report that the First and Eleventh 
corps are engaged with the enemy."  The enemy's Whitworth gun could have sent a 
bolt nearly this distance.  The smoke from the field must have been plainly 
visible.  The roar of the battle was constantly resounding.  But here the corps 
remained idle during the whole day.
  It is the first duty of a soldier to obey the orders of his superiors.  "All 
inferiors are required to obey strictly and to execute with alacrity and good 
faith, the lawful orders of the superiors appointed over them."  This is the 
fundamental principle of military discipline, the foundation stone on which the 
whole superstructure of an army rests.  The order was to move from Littlestown 
to Two Taverns, and, moreover, there was the intimation from General Meade that 
he desired, in case any part of the army was attacked, that it should held the 
enemy in check until it could fall back on the line of battle selected.
  But notwithstanding all this, there is enough in the orders and circulars of 
Meade to have warranted General Slocum in moving up to the support of these 
distressed corps.  In his order for July 1st, Meade enjoins upon his officers to 
be at all times prepared, "all ready to move to the attack at any moment."  In 
his circular proposing the concentration of Pipe Creek, he says:  "Developments 
may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present 
position."  The order issued to the commander of the Fifth corps, at seven 
o'clock on the evening of the 1st, is in these words:  "The Major-General 
commanding

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 241

directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if 
not already ordered to do so by General Slocum.  The present prospect is, that 
our general engagement must be there.  Communicate with General Slocum, under 
whose directions you are placed by the orders of this morning.  The General had 
supposed that General Slocum would have ordered you up."  From all this it would 
seem that General Meade anticipated, that if the forces in advance were 
attacked, any corps within supporting distance would go to their assistance; 
that it would act upon the Napoleonic principle, "March to the sound of the 
enemy's guns."  Indeed, the order to the Fifth corps indicates clearly that 
Meade not only expected that Slocum himself would move up, but that he would 
have ordered the fifth corps forward.  It appears that Slocum did finally move 
on his own responsibility, but not until the fighting was over; for Hancock, in 
his testimony, says:  "General Slocum arrived about six or seven o'clock.  His 
troops were in the neighborhood, for they apparently had been summoned up before 
I arrived, by General Howard possibly, as well as the Third corps."  But why so 
tardy in his movements?  It is of little moment at what hour Howard summoned 
him, if he summoned him at all.  The guns of the foe had been sounding the call 
all the day long.  A fifteen minutes' ride would have carried him to Cemetery 
Hill, where he could have overlooked the whole field, or by his staff he could 
have held almost momentary communication with the front.
  The Fifth corps had marched on the 30th through Liberty, Union Bridge, and 
Uniontown, and had encamped for the night two miles beyond the latter place.  It 
moved at five o'clock on the morning of the 1st, and at two in the afternoon 
halted near the Pennsylvania State line.  At dark the march was resumed, and not 
until two of the following morning was the column halted, having passed through 
Hanover, to which place the order of Meade carried it, McSherrystown, and 
Brushtown, between which and the field it bivouacked.  This corps was therefore 
beyond call, unless it could have been put upon a more direct route than that by 
Hanover.
  The Second corps, General Hancock, rested at Uniontown during the 30th, and on 
the morning of the 1st moved up to 

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 242 

Taneytown, arriving there at eleven o'clock, where were General Meade's 
headquarters.  This place was fourteen miles away, and this corps was therefore 
not available.
  The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, the only remaining one, was at Manchester, 
thirty-four miles away.
  Intelligence did not reach Meade of the fighting at Gettysburg until after 
noon.  In his testimony he says: "The moment I received this information, I 
directed Major-General Hancock, who was with me at the time, to proceed without 
delay to the scene of the contest; and having in view this preliminary order 
[circular] which I had issued to him, as well as to other corps commanders, I 
directed him to make an examination of the ground in the neighborhood of 
Gettysburg, and to report to me, without loss of time, the facilities, and 
advantages and disadvantages of that ground for receiving battle.  I furthermore 
instructed him that in case, upon his arrival at Gettysburg - a place which I 
had never seen in my life, and had no more knowledge of than you have now - he 
should find the position unsuitable and the advantages on the side of the enemy, 
he should examine the ground critically as he went out there, and report to me 
the nearest position in the immediate neighborhood of Gettysburg where a 
concentration of the army would be more advantageous than at Gettysburg."  This 
order was issued to General Hancock at ten minutes past one, P. M., of the 1st.  
It would seem from the reference to his preliminary circular that General Meade 
had been confidently anticipating a mere checking of the enemy's advance at 
Gettysburg, and a final concentration either upon Pipe Creek or upon some 
intermediate position, where his army could all be brought up and marshalled 
before the work of battle should begin.  In that circular the details of the 
whole movement were sketched, and that evening would have brought to each corps 
an order for the march in accordance therewith, had not the battle been 
precipitated.  For the execution of such a movement, his headquarters at 
Taneytown were in the right position.  It is upon the supposition that he 
entertained a confident expectation that this movement would be finally 
executed, that we can explain his refusal to go earlier to the field himself, 
and that he delayed so long the sending any one to represent him.

MARSHALLING FOB SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 243

  To this cherished purpose of Meade, his Chief of staff, General Butterfield, 
was strongly opposed.  Against the original issue of the circular he had exerted 
his influence both with Meade, and also with officers high in command, who had 
the latter's confidence.  And now, as General Hancock was about to proceed to 
the front, clothed with ample powers to act, Butterfield urged the importance of 
a forward rather than a retrograde movement.  In his testimony he says: "Before 
General Hancock left for Gettysburg, I stated to him my views of the matter.  I 
told him that I hoped as he was vested with this authority, he would not, if 
circumstances were such that it could be avoided, have the army fall back; that 
I thought the effect upon the morale of the army would be bad."  Leaping into an 
ambulance, that he might have an opportunity to consult his maps, Hancock went 
forward.  Warren, Chief of engineers, upon information received from Buford that 
the enemy were moving down upon him from the direction of Fairfield, had been 
sent by Meade, some time earlier to Gettysburg to examine the ground.  It 
appears, besides, that before he started, news had come that Reynolds had been 
killed.  This would indicate that Meade was kept well informed throughout the 
day of what was passing at the front.  As he was only fourteen miles away, an 
hour and a half would suffice to bring him intelligence, or have carried him 
upon the field.  Warren mistook his road and went by the way of Emmittsburg.  He 
arrived upon the field shortly after Hancock, and they were soon joined by 
Sickles of the Third corps, and Slocum of the Twelfth.  The presence of so many 
corps commanders was hailed with satisfaction.  It gave assurance that their 
troops were on the way, and that the brave men who had battled heroically 
through that terrible day were not to be wholly abandoned to their fate.
  General Hancock in his testimony says: "I found that, practically, the fight 
was then over.  The rear of our columns, with the enemy in pursuit, was then 
coming through the town of Gettysburg."  If such was the fact, it must have been 
between four and five o'clock when he arrived.  By virtue of his order from 
Meade he at once assumed command on the field, though he was outranked by both 
Howard and Sickles, and had they resisted his assumption he would have found 
himself powerless.  Upon

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 244 

this point General Hancock says: "However, I did not feel much embarrassment 
about it, because I was an older soldier than either of them.  But I knew that 
legally it was not proper, and that if they chose to resist it, it might become 
a troublesome matter to me for the time being."
  He proceeded to post the troops as they came up, accepting the general 
disposition of Howard.  General Geary of the Twelfth corps, who had come on in 
advance of General Slocum, was posted upon the high ground towards Round Top.   
"The enemy," says Hancock, "evidently believing that we were reinforced, or that 
our whole army was there, discontinued their great efforts . . . . There was 
firing of artillery and skirmishing all along the front, but that was the end of 
the day's battle."  Soon after arriving, Hancock informed Meade that he could 
hold the ground until dark, and at twenty-five minutes past five he sent the 
following despatch: "When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops 
had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town.  We have now taken up a 
position in the Cemetery, which cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, 
easily turned.  Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on 
the right.  But we have as yet no troops on the left, the Third corps not having 
yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up.  If so, his flank march will 
in a degree protect our left flank.  In the meantime, Gibbon [in whose command 
the Second corps had been left] had better march on so as to take position on 
our right or left to our rear as may be necessary, in some commanding position . 
. . . The battle is quiet now.  I think we shall be all right until night.  I 
have sent all the trains back.  When night comes it can be told better what had 
best be done.  I think we can retire; if not we can fight here, as the ground 
appears not unfavorable with good troops."
  Soon after sending this note, General Hancock turned over the command to 
General Slocum, who had now arrived, who outranked him, and to whom he had been 
instructed before leaving headquarters to deliver it, and returned to Taneytown.  
Before his arrival, Meade, acting upon the information he had received, had 
decided, to fight at Gettysburg, and had sent out orders to all the corps to 
march for that place. To Sedgwick, who had the

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBUBG - 245

largest corps, and was farthest away, frequent messengers were dispatched at 
intervals through the night, urging him to hasten his march with all practicable 
speed.  His trains he ordered back to Westminster, and here he established his 
base of supply, a railroad leading to this place being utilized for the purpose.  
Having thus set his whole army in motion, he broke up his headquarters at 
Taneytown at a little before midnight, and pushed forward to Gettysburg.  It was 
one o'clock on the morning of the 2d of July before he arrived upon the field.  
The centre of the line passed through the Cemetery, and the soldiers who had 
battled through the fearful day were sleeping amid the graves.  As the numerous 
cavalcade entered the place of the dead, and now of the living also, the 
sleepers started up as if in resurrected forms, but quickly settled back to 
their slumbers, overcome by the weariness that was oppressing them.
  While these things were passing in the Union camps, what was transpiring in 
the rebel?  Lee, as well as Meade, had not been present during the fighting of 
the first day.  He also arrived at the front during the night, and vigorously 
addressed himself to the task of preparing his army to continue the battle.  As 
we have already seen, he had promised his Lieutenants, before leaving Virginia, 
that he would not fight an offensive battle.  But the game had been precipitated 
in his absence, and it was now difficult to decline the wager.  The result of 
that day's work had, on the whole, been encouraging to him.  Though he had lost 
some prisoners he had captured more, and though he had suffered grievously in 
killed and wounded, he had likewise inflicted severe losses upon the Union 
corps, which he had driven from their position.  He had also gained possession 
of the field, and of the town with all its network of ways.  He says in his 
report: "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being 
unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of 
the troops.  Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and in the mean time 
every effort was made to ascertain the number and positions of the enemy, and 
find the most favorable point of attack.  It had not been intended to fight a 
battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy; but 
finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 246 

the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the 
mountains with our large trains.  At the same time the country was unfavorable 
for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he 
was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the 
mountains with regular and local troops.  A battle thus became, in a measure, 
unavoidable.  Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first 
day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the 
army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack."
  He could not reasonably have expected to invade the North, and make a campaign 
in an enemy's country without fighting whenever occasion offered.  He could 
hardly have been so credulous as to have indulged the hope of moving at his own 
sweet will to despoil and ravage, of flitting from city to city and making 
requisitions upon a defenseless people, unopposed.  His army, moreover, was full 
of fight, and now more than ever believed itself invincible.  It is true that it 
was forced to acknowledge that the Army of the Potomac had never been known to 
fight so stubbornly before as on this day; but the assurance of all was 
unshaken.  Prof. Jacobs, who was a citizen of Gettysburg, and was at his home 
throughout the mighty throes of the conflict, in his hand-book of the battle, 
says: "The portion of Rodes' division which lay down before our dwelling for the 
night, was greatly elated with the results of the first day's battle, and the 
same may be said of the whole rebel army.  They were anxious to engage in 
conversation - to communicate their views and feelings, and to elicit ours.  
They were boastful of themselves, of their cause, and of the skill of their 
officers; and were anxious to tell us of the unskilful manner in which some of 
our officers had conducted the fight which had just closed.  When informed that 
General Archer and 1500 of his men had been captured, they said, 'Tomorrow we 
will take all these back again; and having already taken 5000 (!) prisoners of 
you to-day, we will take the balance of your men to-morrow.'  Having been well 
fed, provisioned, and rested, and successful on this day, their confidence knew 
no bounds.  They felt assured that they should be able, with perfect ease, to 
cut up our army in detail, - fatigued as it was by long

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 247

marches and yet scattered, for only two corps had as yet arrived.  Resting under 
this impression, they lay down joyfully on the night of the first day."
  With soldiers impelled by such feeling, Lee could not well withhold battle 
when thrust in his face.  Besides, his pride as a soldier would not allow him 
now to show a timid front.  Mr. Swinton very justly remarks upon this point: 
"What really compelled Lee, contrary to his intent and promise, to give battle, 
was the animus and inspiration of the invasion; for, to the end, such were the 
'exsufflicate and blown surmises' of the army, and such was the contempt of its 
opponent engendered by Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, that there was not 
in his ranks a barefoot soldier in tattered gray but believed Lee would lead the 
Confederate army into Baltimore and Washington, if not into Philadelphia and New 
York.  To have withdrawn, therefore, without a battle, though materially easy, 
was morally impossible; for to have recrossed the Potomac without a blow, and 
abandoned the invasion on which such towering hopes had been built, would have 
been a shock beyond endurance to his army and the South."
  The leaders of both armies being now on the field, and both having decided to 
fight there, we may well conclude that they were deeply solicitous and busy in 
maturing their plans.  General Lee established his headquarters at the little 
stone house of Mrs. Thompson, on the right of the Chambersburg road, where it 
crosses Seminary Ridge.  The rebel army consisted of nine divisions, as already 
noticed.  Of the three under Ewell, two, Rodes' and Early's, had been in the 
first day's conflict.  The other, Johnson's, did not arrive until the fighting 
was over, and too late to assist in renewing it, which was contemplated.  This 
corps was posted on the rebel left, Rodes' division occupying Middle street, the 
crest of the eminence on which the town is built, and extending to the Seminary 
Ridge, Early taking position next, stretching through the eastern part of the 
town, and upon his left was Johnson.  Hill's corps was formed upon the right of 
Ewell's, the point of junction forming almost a right-angle, with Heth upon the 
left, Anderson upon the right, and Pender in the Centre, Heth and Pender having 
sustained the brunt of the hard fighting of the first day.  Upon the right of 
Hill, and joining

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 248

Anderson, were two divisions of Longstreet's corps, McLaw's first, and next him 
Hood's.  These two divisions of Longstreet encamped during the night of the 1st 
within three miles of Gettysburg on the Chambersburg road, and hence did not get 
into position until late in the forenoon of the 2d.  Longstreet's third 
division, Pickett's, did not come up until the 3d.  Thus the entire rebel 
infantry, with the exception of this last division, was practically on the field 
ready for action early on the morning of the 2d, and had not been worn by long 
marches.
  The Union army, in this particular, was less fortunate.  For two days the 
corps had been stretching away at their best movement to overtake the enemy 
before he should cross the Susquehanna, and now they had imposed the added duty 
of a sudden and unlooked-for concentration upon the very extremity of a line 
over thirty miles in length.  General Meade, soon after coming upon the field, 
took up his headquarters at a little frame house on the Taneytown road, just in 
rear of, and to the south of Zeigler's Grove.  It was sheltered from infantry 
fire by the swell in the ground, but much exposed to artillery, as the sequel 
proved.  As soon as it was light, Meade was in the saddle, and proceeded to 
examine the ground and to post his forces.  General Howard, with what was left 
of his corps, was directed to remain upon the Cemetery Hill to the right and 
left of the Baltimore pike.  His men were sheltered by the stone walls and 
houses about the foot of the hill, upon the summit of which Steinwehr had 
planted his guns.  Upon Howard's right was Wadsworth's division of the First 
corps, which held the western section of the wooded, and towards the enemy, 
precipitous and rocky Culp's Hill.  To the right of Wadsworth the Twelfth corps, 
General Slocum, was assigned, and a portion of it was in position that night.  
Geary's division had, however, been brought upon the field late in the 
afternoon, and two brigades of it posted in the neighborhood of Round Top, on 
the extreme left.  Two divisions of the First corps, which had been led in the 
fight of the previous day with so much gallantry by Doubleday, Rowley's and 
Robinson's, were held in reserve in rear of Cemetery Hill.  The Second corps, 
General Hancock, which had been in bivouac three miles from the field on the 
Taneytown road during the

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 249

night, arrived early in the morning, and was placed to the left of Howard, its 
line stretching along the crest of Cemetery Ridge from Zeigler's Grove, where 
its right rested, in the direction of the Round Tops.
  The Third corps, General Sickles, as it arrived on the evening of the 1st, was 
massed for the night to the left of the Eleventh corps. Two brigades of this 
corps and two batteries were left at Emmittsburg to guard that line, but were 
relieved during the night and arrived at the front at about day-break.  A 
singular adventure occurred to the division of General Humphreys, while upon 
this march.  It was after four o'clock in the afternoon before he started from 
Emmittsburg.  He took the road running nearly two miles to the west of the main 
road, and moved up upon that flank.  Having been cautioned by a note from Howard 
against running into the enemy as he approached the field, General Humphreys, 
when about half way to Gettysburg, desired to move over to the east, and thus 
avoid that ground where the enemy was known to be; but Colonel Hayden, who had 
been sent as guide, insisted that Sickles had directed him to conduct the column 
by the way leading to the Black Horse tavern, the very ground where the enemy 
lay.  Humphreys unwillingly consented to move on, but ordered the column to 
close up, and directed the men to move silently as they approached the 
neighborhood of Gettysburg.  At midnight he suddenly found himself confronting 
the enemy in his camps. "We found," says Humphreys, "that the enemy were posted 
there in force.  They were not aware of my presence, and I might have attacked 
them at daylight with the certainty of at least temporary success; but I was 
three miles distant from the reminder of the army, and I believed such a course 
would have been inconsistent with the general plan of operations of the 
Commanding General.  As soon as I found what was the exact condition of things, 
I retraced my steps, and moved my command by the route I have already indicated, 
bivouacking near Gettysburg about one A. M. on the 2d of July . . . . It shows 
what can be done by accident.  If any one had been directed to take a division 
to the rear of the enemy's army and get up as close as I did unperceived, it 
would have been thought exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to do it."

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 250 

  In the morning General Geary's division, which had remained during the night 
near Round Top, was ordered over to Culp's Hill, where the rest of the Twelfth 
corps was in position, the Third corps was moved out farther to the left to the 
ground which had been occupied by Geary, and the Second corps was interposed 
between the Third and the Eleventh.
  The Fifth corps as it arrived was held in reserve in rear of Cemetery Hill, 
but was eventually moved over to the extreme left occupying the Round Tops and 
supporting the Third corps.  The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, not getting upon 
the march until eight o'clock on the evening of the 1st, coming by the way of 
Westminster, and having thirty-four miles to move, did not arrive on the field 
until two in the afternoon of the 2d.  It was held in reserve, for the most 
part, in rear of the left flank.
  The general form of the line thus established and which, though varied 
somewhat in the course of the fight, was finally settled down upon, has been 
compared by De Peyster to a Limerick fish-hook.  The head, where the cord is 
attached, is exactly represented by the Round Tops. The point is at the easterly 
extremity of Culp's Hill, where is Spangler's Spring. The centre of the curve is 
represented by the Cemetery Hill, where the dead of the battle now repose, and 
directly opposite the town.  The short curve from the point to the centre of the 
curve of the hook is one and three-fourths miles; the long curve or shank, two 
and three-fourths.  Oak, or Seminary Ridge, along which the enemy's right lay, 
is opposite the shank and at a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half 
away.  Opposite the Cemetery Hill the rebel line left Seminary Hill, passing 
through the town and resting upon Benner's Hill opposite Culp's Hill.  If the 
position of the cavalry upon the two flanks be included, the length of the Union 
line was over five miles, and that of the enemy, forming the segment of a 
concentric circle, over seven.
  In rear of the Union line were the Taneytown and Baltimore pikes, connected by 
cross roads, which afforded admirable means for moving troops and guns quickly 
from one part of the line to another, thus offering all the advantages in this 
respect which could have been enjoyed by holding the town itself.  On one of 
these cross roads was parked the reserve artillery.  To complete

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 251

the requirements of a fortified camp, in rear of Cemetery Hill, are Power's and 
McAllister's Hills, gentle eminences, on which were planted powerful batteries 
to protect the reserve artillery, and which were eventually used to admirable 
advantage, in driving back the enemy upon the right flank.
  After examining the field, General Meade decided to assume the offensive, and 
to attack from his right.  The enemy's position was here plainly visible, and 
his line at several points appeared to be vulnerable.  Opposite the Union left, 
the enemy's movements were screened by a curtain of wood, and to attack directly 
on that side would have necessitated a movement over a long stretch of perfectly 
open ground, where the advancing troops would have been raked from front and 
flanks by interminable lines of the enemy's guns.  Meade's intention was to use 
the Twelfth, Fifth, and Sixth corps for the attacking column.  But the latter 
corps was still upon the march, and would not reach the field for several hours.  
He accordingly ordered General Slocum, who was to lead the assault, to prepare 
to move with his own and the Fifth corps.
  But to any one who has been on the ground, or who has regarded attentively an 
intelligible description of it, the difficulty of moving troops, and the 
impossibility of taking artillery forward from that flank will be apparent, and 
when once out upon the open ground it will be observed how every rood is 
commanded from eminences on all sides.  Slocum, after making a careful study of 
the position, reported that he did not think that an attack would have promise 
of success, which opinion was concurred in by Warren, who had been sent by Meade 
for the purpose of examining it, and the design was abandoned.  It is not 
apparent why Meade should ever have thought of attacking from that flank; for 
had he driven the enemy he would have encountered a great obstacle at the town 
itself; and had he driven him to Seminary Ridge, he would have been attacking 
him in an exceedingly strong position, thus reversing the Battle of Gettysburg.  
Besides, had the enemy been driven from this stronghold, he would have been 
pushed over upon the left flank of the Union army, the most dangerous and 
menacing position into which he could have been forced, as he would have been 
nearing his base, and been getting

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 252 

upon direct lines to Washington, which would have inevitably forced the Union 
leader into a change of base.  No more encouraging outlook was presented from 
the left centre.  Upon the extreme left was wooded, rugged ground, which also 
presented obstacles to an attack.
  It appears, from the testimony of several officers high in command, that the 
mind of General Meade at this juncture was much exercised.  He had concentrated 
his army within a very small compass.  Should he remain inactive the enemy 
might, by keeping up a show of strength upon his front, flank him upon the left, 
and gain a great advantage over him.  Indeed the very excellence of his position 
for defence was in itself a weighty argument for believing that the enemy would 
decline the offer of battle, and seek by adroit manoeuvring, to turn the Union 
army out of its stronghold.  Military critics have descanted with much warmth 
upon Lee's lack of skill and judgment in making a direct attack upon Meade in 
this formidable position.  "With the groans of the victims of Malvern Hill," 
says De Peyster, "repeating in thunder tones the condemnation of Magruder, Lee 
exposed himself to a severer judgment for a greater act of reckless disregard of 
the commonest military - and common - sense.  He had heard the whole world 
resound with the censure heaped upon Burnside for giving into his hand to work 
his will upon it, the army of the Potomac, wasted in attempting to storm the 
heights of Fredericksburg, and yet he imitated the action.  The French military 
critic, Roussillon, remarks, 'Lee, like Burnside at Fredericksburg, committed 
the fault of attacking in front, a position at once very strong in itself and 
vigorously defended.' . . . Imagine the effect of a similar turning movement on 
the part of Lee.  It would not only have placed him upon the roads constituting 
our lines of supplies, and have given him the major part of our trains, but have 
planted him between the Northern army of succor and Washington and Baltimore.  
In other words, it would have delivered up everything in the rear of the army of 
the Potomac into the hands of the rebels."
  What these critics censure Lee for not doing, Meade, during the ominous 
stillness of that long summer day, strongly suspected he was doing.  Hence when 
he found by the report of Slocum and

MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG - 253

his own observations that he was in a bad position for assuming the offensive, 
he appears to have been casting about for a more favorable outlook, and, in case 
he found that the enemy was seeking to turn his position, that he might be in 
condition to defend himself, and prevent his trains and base from being cut off.  
Accordingly, as soon as his Chief of staff, General Butterfield, who had been 
left at Taneytown during the night to hasten the march of the Sixth corps, 
arrived at headquarters, he was directed to prepare an order for the withdrawal 
of the army from this position, should circumstances render it necessary.  
Butterfield objected that he was unacquainted with the location of the different 
divisions and corps of the army with relation to the roads it would be proper 
for them to take, and would need to go over the field first.  Meade replied that 
he could not wait for that; and to remove the objection made a draft of the 
field, showing the position of all the troops, and the roads in their vicinity.  
With this, and by the aid of maps, Butterfield drew the order, which, on being 
shown to Meade, received his approval.  As it was of the greatest importance 
that in case it was issued, it should be accurate, permission was obtained from 
Meade to show it to corps commanders, to solicit any suggestions they might make 
for improving it.  It was shown to General Gibbon, among others.  On seeing it, 
he was struck with astonishment, exclaiming: "Great God! General Meade does not 
intend to leave this position?" inferring that the order had been drawn with the 
intention of issuing it.  The preparation of this order rests upon the testimony 
of Butterfield.  General Meade testified that he had no recollection of 
directing it to be drawn, or of having seen it after it was drawn, but that he 
only ordered his Chief of staff to familiarize himself with the location of the 
troops, so that if in any contingency he should need to issue such an order, it 
could be readily prepared.  That preparations were made for executing this order 
is supported by the following instructions promulgated by Meade, at or before 
ten o'clock on the morning of the 2d: "The staff officers on duty at 
headquarters will inform themselves of the positions of the various corps - 
their artillery, infantry, and trains - sketch them with a view to roads, and 
report them

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 254 

immediately, as follows: Third corps, Colonel Schriver; Second corps, Lieutenant 
Colonel Davis; First corps, Lieutenant Perkins; Twelfth corps, Lieutenant 
Oliver; Fifth corps, Captain Cadwalader.  It is desired to know the roads on or 
near which the troops are, and where the trains lie, in view of movements in any 
direction, and to be familiar with the headquarters of the commanders."
  It is, therefore, of small moment whether the order was actually prepared or 
not.  Nor is it any disparagement to General Meade, if the order was prepared 
and approved by him.  As a precautionary measure it was eminently proper, and 
instead of being imputed to him as a reproach, should be, in view of the 
uncertainty as to the designs of the enemy, accredited as an act of wise 
generalship.  That it was merely a precautionary measure is clearly apparent 
from the following dispatch sent to General Halleck, at three o'clock in the 
afternoon: "I have today, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I 
having a strong position for defence.  I am not determined as yet in attacking 
him till his position is more developed.  He has been moving on both my flanks 
apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements.  I have delayed 
attacking to allow the Sixth corps and parts of other corps to reach this place, 
and to rest the men.  Expecting a battle I ordered all my trains to the rear.  
If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the 
enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack.  If I find it hazardous 
to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear, and 
interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at 
Westminster.  I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible.  In the 
engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and 
towards evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the First and 
Eleventh corps to fall back from the town to the heights on this side, on which 
I am posted.  I feel fully the responsibility resting on me, and will endeavor 
to act with caution."