Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 11, 255-
280

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                         MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                       by
                                SAMUEL P. BATES.

                     PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 255

                            PART I.  GENERAL HISTORY.

                                   CHAPTER XI.

                   SEVERE FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG.

WHEN, upon the night of the 1st, General Sickles had brought his corps upon the 
field, he had thrown out the Sixty-third Pennsylvania regiment to picket along 
the Emmittsburg pike, its left covering the cross-road leading from the Peach 
Orchard to Little Round Top.  Early on the morning of the 2d, this regiment was 
pushed forward upon the skirmish line to a fence running parallel with the pike, 
in rear of Joseph Sherfy's  house.  As early as nine o'clock in the morning,  
fire was opened upon this regiment, and a company of sharp-shooters was sent out 
to feel the  enemy in a piece of wood in front, which soon returned, reporting 
that it was swarming with the foe.  Skirmishing continued active, until finally 
the enemy's sharpshooters crawled stealthily up to a low stone fence just in 
front of the line of the Sixty-third, when his fire became hot and very 
destructive.
  The order sent to Sickles on the morning of the 2d, was to bring his corps 
into position upon the left of Hancock, on ground vacated by Geary.  As Geary 
had simply bivouacked in mass without deploying in line, Sickles reported to 
Meade that Geary had no position, and that there was no position there, meaning 
that it was low and commanded by ground in its front, rendering it untenable.  
Meade repeated his general instructions; whereupon Sickles went to headquarters, 
and representing the great disadvantages of the position indicated, asked Meade 
to go with him over that part of the field.  This Meade excused himself from 
doing, nor could he spare General Warren for that purpose; but General Hunt, 
Chief of artillery, did go, to whom Sickles

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 256 

pointed out the ground, more elevated and commanding, a half or three-quarters 
of a mile in front, which he proposed to occupy.
  It should here be observed that between Seminary and Cemetery ridges, which 
run nearly parallel with each other, is a diagonal ridge connecting them, which, 
touching Cemetery Hill at its northern extremity, and extending past the Peach 
Orchard, soon strikes Seminary Ridge, and along the crest of which runs the 
Emmittsburg pike.  It nowhere attains to any great eminence, but affords 
excellent ground for artillery.  From the Peach Orchard to Round Top is broken, 
rugged, and in part wooded surface, which it was exceedingly desirable to hold, 
inasmuch as it would have afforded cover for the enemy to have worked his way up 
very near to the position which is now known as Cemetery Ridge, and from which 
he could have assaulted with great advantage.  In fact, there is a space from a 
half to three-quarters of a mile to the right of the Little Round Top swell, 
where there is no ridge at all, but low, swampy ground instead, easily commanded 
from the Emmittsburg Ridge, with a curtain of woods to the left reaching out in 
front of the Round Tops.  Sickles believed this ground ought to be occupied, and 
seems to have had the sanction of Hunt in that opinion; but receiving no direct 
order from Meade to do so, he held his columns back, momentarily expecting the 
final mandate of his chief.  At eleven o'clock the firing between the 
skirmishers on the Emmittsburg road being very sharp, General Birney, who 
commanded the division holding the extreme left of the line, by direction of 
General Sickles, sent a regiment and a battalion of sharp-shooters to 
reconnoitre.  This reconnoissance showed that the enemy was moving in three 
columns under cover of the woods to the left.  At length General Sickles, 
finding his outposts gradually driven back, determined to await no longer for 
more explicit orders, and moved out his whole corps upon the advance ground, 
Birney's division stretching from a point near the Devil's Den, in front of 
Round Top somewhat en echelon over the rough wooded heights, his right bending 
back and resting at the Peach Orchard, and Humphreys' division extending along 
the Emmittsburg pike from Peach Orchard to a point nearly opposite, but a little 
in advance of Hancock's left, thus leaving a slight break in the line at that

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 257

point.  Technically, this fulfilled the direction of Meade.  His left rested at 
Round Top, and his right connected with Hancock; but being so much advanced, it 
was necessarily very long and presented too much front for so small a corps to 
cover.  Besides, it formed an angle at the Peach Orchard, where was open ground, 
which was consequently a source of weakness.
  He had scarcely got his corps out upon the line he had decided to take, when 
he was summoned to a council of officers at Meade's headquarters.  Perceiving 
that the enemy was about to attack him, and feeling the necessity of his 
personal supervision, he excused himself from attending, in the meantime 
hastening forward his troops and posting his batteries; but he soon after got a 
peremptory order to report, and turning over the command of the corps to General 
Birney, he hastened back with all speed.  Before he had reached headquarters the 
battle opened; but spurring on, he was met at the door by Meade, who excused him 
from dismounting, and said he would soon join him on the field, the council 
having broken up, as the guns announced the opening of the fight.  On reaching 
the ground and hastily examining the position which the corps had taken, General 
Meade remarked that it was too much advanced, and expressed his doubt about 
being able to hold it.  Sickles observed that it was not too late to withdraw; 
but to this Meade objected and said he would send up the Fifth to put in upon 
the left, and to the right troops could be called from General Hancock, while a 
free use of the reserve artillery was tendered.  General Meade's headquarters 
were not over a three minutes' walk from a position on Hancock's front, where 
the whole ground, both the advance and more contracted lines, was plainly 
visible.  Why General Meade did not give explicit orders for the formation on 
the left early in the day and himself see that the proper dispositions were 
made, seems inexplicable, and can only be accounted for on the supposition that 
he did not anticipate that the enemy would attack from that direction.  In the 
document above quoted it is reported that in answer to Sickles' urgent need of 
preparation to meet the enemy, Meade remarked: "Oh! Generals are all apt to look 
for the attack to be made where they are."  No possible business of the 
Commander-in-chief could have been more important or more pressing than this.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 258 

  Unfortunately for General Sickles, Buford's cavalry, which had been posted on 
the left flank of his corps, was ordered away at a time when the enemy was 
moving in that direction, and its place was left unsupplied until it was too 
late to be of any use on that day.  General Pleasanton in his testimony says: 
"On the 2d of July, Buford's division having been so severely handled the day 
before, was sent by me back to Westminster, our depot, to protect it, and also 
to recruit."  These were worthy objects, and Buford had well earned a claim to 
repose;, but at the moment when the enemy was swarming forth upon that flank 
which had been reported by Hancock as the one most vulnerable, it is almost 
beyond belief that General Pleasanton should have ordered the cavalry entirely 
away, before other and equally reliable troops were ready to relieve them.  It 
left unchecked the whole power of the enemy's force to be employed in turning 
that flank.
  Lee had early seen the importance of the ground which General Sickles had been 
so intent to occupy, and had determined to make his main attack to regain it.  
He says in his report: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a 
position, from which if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could 
be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus 
enable us to reach the crest of the ridge.  That officer was directed to carry 
the position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the 
enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified.  General Hill was 
instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent 
reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any 
opportunity that might present itself to attack."
  This plan was studiously carried out, though the attack of Ewell was not 
coincident with that of Longstreet, being nearly two hours delayed, perhaps- 
designedly, in the hope that troops would be taken from his front to strengthen 
other parts of the line, and would leave him an easier task in carrying it, an 
event which did actually transpire.  As it was planned that the weight of the 
attack should be made by Longstreet, he was active all through the early part of 
the day in getting his troops and his guns upon that part of the field where he 
could make it with the hope of success.  It has been asserted that Longstreet 
vigorously

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 259

opposed the making this attack until his division under Pickett, which was still 
at Chambersburg, should come up, significantly saying that he did not wish to be 
compelled to walk with one boot off.  But, having been peremptorily ordered by 
Lee to fight, he did not hesitate.  Having only two divisions, those of Hood and 
McLaws, he led them around upon the extreme Union left.  Instead of being able, 
as perhaps he had hoped, to wedge his way in upon the rear of the Union column, 
which to him appeared to be holding the line of the Emmittsburg road, he found a 
line refused, and nearly at right angles to that road stretching away to Round 
Top.  To face that refused line he formed his own line, with Hood upon the right 
and McLaws upon the left, leaving the front, occupied by Graham and Humphreys to 
be faced by Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and along the commanding ground 
upon the left he planted thick his artillery.  To face these two powerful 
divisions of Longstreet, Sickles could only oppose the two weak brigades of Ward 
and De Trobriand.  Ward, who was upon Sickles' left, opposite Hood, had posted 
his brigade across the open ground covering the approach to Little Round Top, 
his left extending across the front of Round Top, and his right reaching up into 
the wooded ground beyond the wheatfield.  De Trobriand had posted two of his 
regiments, the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania and the Fifth Michigan, upon 
the front in line with Ward; but with his right refused and reaching back 
towards the Peach Orchard, making it conform to the advantages of the ground.  
He held two of his regiments in reserve, the Fortieth New York and the 
Seventeenth Maine, while the Third Michigan was deployed as skirmishers to cover 
the open ground to his right and connect with the left of Graham.
  Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, General Birney, who was in 
temporary command of the Third corps, having for some time been watching the 
columns of the enemy, now plainly visible, ordered Clark's rifled battery in 
position to the left of the Peach Orchard, to open on them.  It did so with good 
effect.  The enemy's guns, which had been brought up in large numbers, were 
wheeled into position, and answered; and soon after, along, all that ridge, 
where he had advantageously posted battery upon battery, seemingly an 
interminable line, the

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 260 

fire was terrific, and the very air was filled with shots and bursting shells, 
like hail in the thick coming storm.  The brigade of Graham, in rear of which 
the Union guns were posted, was fearfully exposed, as it occupied both legs of 
the angle.
  For some time the fire of artillery was appalling.  But this was only the 
prelude to more desperate work.  Longstreet had formed his lines under cover, 
and was now moving down to strike the extreme Union left a stunning blow and if 
possible crush it.  But he found the troops of Ward prepared.  With screeches 
and yells the foe pressed on; but before the deliberate aim of that veteran 
brigade they were forced to fall back.  Ward realized from the strength of the 
attack that his weak line would be unable to withstand another, and called for 
supports.  De Trobriand sent the Seventeenth Maine, which took position behind a 
low stone wall, to the left of the wheatfield, where its fire would have a 
deadly effect if the line of Ward should be forced back.  Soon afterwards the 
Fortieth New York, the last reserve, was hurried away to the support of Ward, 
and took position, on his extreme left and front, so as to block the way to 
Little Round Top, which was now in imminent danger of falling into the enemy's 
hands.  But the foe did not stop to carry that part of the line at once, but 
bore down in succession upon one part after another along Birney's whole front, 
rapidly reaching forward towards the Peach Orchard.  The front of Ward had 
hardly been reinforced before De Trobriand was struck.  "Allons-y ferme, et 
tenons bon! Il n'y a plus rien en reserve," was the word of that well schooled 
and skilled leader.  Knowing full well that the storm would soon reach them, his 
men had brought together the rocks and trunks of trees which they found lying 
about, and when the men in grey came swarming on not twenty paces distant, a 
crash of musketry, like the crack of a thunderbolt, arrested for a moment their 
progress; but recovering themselves they answered the fire, and the fusilade was 
rapid. "Des deux cotes, chacun visait son homme, et malgre toutes les 
protections du terrain, morts et blesses tombaient avec une effrayante 
rapidite." It was an unequal struggle; for the enemy were thrice their strength; 
but the accuracy of their fire was unsurpassed.  "Never have I seen," says De 
Trobriand, "our men strike with equal

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG. - 261

obstinacy. It seemed as though each one of them believed that the destiny of the 
Republic depended upon the desperate vigor of their efforts."
  But if the assault proved deadly to De Trobriand's men, who had a good 
position and were shielded by some works, how fared the troops of Graham, who 
were on open ground, and had no protection except such as accidentally fell to 
their lot?  The position at the Peach Orchard was a commanding one for 
artillery, and could the pieces have been protected by lunettes, as were those 
of Steinwehr, they could have defied the whole weight of opposing metal from 
right to left, that was brought to bear upon them.  But they were naked, and 
were forced to endure the brunt of a concentric fire.  As for the infantry, the 
cut where the roadbed makes up to the Emmittsburg way afforded some protection 
while the artillery fire was hottest; but when that slackened, and a charge of 
the enemy's infantry came, there was no alternative but to boldly face it.  Then 
it was that Greek met Greek, and bayonets were crossed in the deadly encounter.  
The One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania, of Graham's brigade, was posted in 
support of these guns, facing south, when this charge came.  They were lying 
down, and apparently were not seen by the foe as they swept forward, looking 
only to the guns, which they confidently regarded as their certain spoil.  But 
waiting until they had come near, the tried men of this regiment sprang to their 
feet, and pouring in a well-directed volley, dashed at them with the bayonet.  
Swept down by ranks, and bewildered by the suddenness of the apparition, the 
enemy halted and for a moment attempted to beat back their assailants.  But the 
tide was too strong to stem, and they fled with precipitation.  The horses of 
the Union artillery had all been killed, and many of the officers and men had 
fallen.  The ammunition was well nigh spent.  The guns were accordingly seized 
and drawn back by the infantry to the rear of the road-bed.
  Fortunately for the rest of Graham's line, and for that of Humphreys, the 
order of General Lee to Hill was only to threaten the force in his front, and 
watch for a favorable opportunity to attack, and consequently that officer for 
some time contented himself with simple demonstrations, and a vigorous fire of 
artillery.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 262

  While this wave of battle, commencing at Round Top, rolled on towards the 
Peach Orchard and dashed with such fearful violence against the faces of that 
devoted Third corps, the calls for reinforcements were long and loud.  Every man 
of the Third corps was almost from the first put in, making altogether barely 
one single thin line, and not a musket in reserve.  It is no wonder that the  
time seemed long, and the troops summoned appeared tardy in coming.  General 
Birney says: "I sent a staff officer to General Sykes, asking him to send me up 
at once the division that had been ordered from his corps to support me; that an 
attack by the enemy was imminent, and that I thought it would be made at once.  
The staff officer saw him, and he returned for answer that he would come up in 
time; that his men-were making coffee and were tired, but that he would be up in 
time.  He came up with one of his divisions in about an hour."  General Sykes 
may have made the answer attributed to him; but he was a regular army officer, 
and he was not the man to disregard an order upon the field of battle, or 
execute it tardily.  He had a long distance to march and what, in his extremity 
seemed a full hour to Birney, may have actually been less.
  General Warren, after proceeding with Meade to inspect the position of 
Sickles, just after the battle opened, had, by the direction of the latter, 
proceeded to Little Round Top.  "From that point," Warren says, "I could see the 
enemy's lines of battle.  I sent word to General Meade that we would at once 
have to occupy that place very strongly.  He sent, as quickly as possible, a 
division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of 
battle, I should think a mile and a half long, began to advance, and the battle 
became very heavy at once."  The first onset, as we have seen, was stayed by 
Birney's division.  But the fiery and impetuous Hood, he who attacked Sherman 
with such daring before Atlanta, had discovered that Little Round Top was not 
occupied, and that only a thin curtain, composed of the Ninety-ninth 
Pennsylvania, hung in its front.  This rocky fortress was the great prize of the 
day.  Could he break through the feeble force which held its front and plant 
himself amid the rocks and fastnesses of that precipitous height, the whole army 
of Meade might beat itself against it in

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSPURG - 263

vain attempts to dislodge him.  Taking only his most trusted men he formed them 
for the death grapple and led them forth.  He pointed to the dark ground whereon 
he desired them to plant their footprints.  It was enough.  Where had their bold 
leader ever led them, that was not to victory?  But before they had reached the 
thin line which they thought easily to brush away, supports had come.  The 
Fortieth New York was there, the Sixth New Jersey and the Fourth Massachusetts 
had been gathered in, and now the path across Plum Run, which they had hoped to 
stealthily pass, they found closed.  But they were desperate men, formed with 
ample supports, and as the repeated blows of the battering ram will finally 
loosen the strongest wall, and topple it down, so did the head of this column by 
the mere weight of numbers force its way through, and press rapidly forward to 
climb the heights unopposed.  But as they dash heedlessly on, suddenly a sheet 
of flame leaps out from the very roots of the mountain, that sweeps down the 
boldest and the bravest, and throws back that fiery column in disorder and 
confusion.  Whence so suddenly have come these bold defenders?  Ten minutes 
before and not one was there; but the hill all peaceful and unguarded was 
inviting approach.
  When General Warren arrived upon this hill, as the battle opened, he found 
there only some officers who had been using it for a signal station.  When these 
signal officers saw the long lines of the enemy sweeping on, inferring that 
Sickles would be totally unable to check them, they commenced folding their 
flags to make way for the men in grey.  But Warren, knowing instinctively that 
all was lost if that hill was lost, bade them unfurl their flags and signal on 
the supports that were approaching.  Eagerly he had watched that first assault, 
and when he saw the enemy's line broken and driven back, he secretly rejoiced; 
for now he knew that hope still remained.  He saw at a glance, what a terrible 
effect the plunging fire, of artillery would have, delivered from this eminence, 
if guns could once be got upon its summit.  Hazlett's battery in the 
neighborhood was immediately ordered up, and by almost superhuman exertions was 
brought upon the glad crest.  And now seeing the head of Barnes' division of the 
Fifth corps approaching on the double quick to reinforce

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 264 

the Third, he assumed the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, and 
ordering it upon Little Round Top.  Passing rapidly to the rear of the mountain, 
Vincent hastened his men into position at its very base; the Sixteenth Michigan, 
Lieutenant Colonel Welch, upon the right, facing the wheat field; next it the 
Forty-fourth New York, Colonel Rice, facing the Devil's Den; by its side its 
twin regiment, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Captain Woodward, facing the 
little valley between the two mounts, and not inaptly called the Valley of the 
Shadow of Death; and upon the extreme left, looking towards the rear of Round 
Top, was the Twentieth Maine, Colonel Chamberlain.  So hastily had they been 
brought upon the field that they had not stopped to load.  The work of formation 
was momentary, and before the men had been five minutes settled behind the huge 
boulders which lie scattered over all its broad breast, away to the left was 
heard, says Captain Judson of the Eighty-third, "a loud, fierce, distant yell, 
as if all pandemonium had broken loose, and joined in the chorus of one grand, 
universal war-whoop."  Three lines deep, at double-quick, with bayonets fixed, 
on came that mass of Hood's impetuous men.  It was the supreme moment, and the 
stoutest held his breath, grasping with firmer grip his trusty piece.  Not upon 
the Old Guard in its most desperate hour ever rested a graver trust.  The weight 
of the shock fell upon the Forty-fourth New York, and the Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania.  The first impulse was scarcely broken, ere the line was new 
formed, and from behind rocks and trees, at close quarters, a most deadly fire 
was poured in.  Again and again with fresh troops and ever increasing numbers 
did the enemy assault; but each time to be thrown back broken and bleeding.  
"Hundreds of them," says Judson, "approached even within fifteen yards of our 
line, but they approached only to be shot down or hurled back, covered with 
gaping wounds.  It was a death grapple in which assailant and assailed seemed 
resolved to win or fall in the struggle."
  As soon as Colonel Vincent had discovered that this assault was coming, he 
dismounted, and sent an aid to General Barnes, requesting immediate 
reinforcements.  "Tell him," said he, "the enemy are coming in overwhelming 
force."  When the enemy found himself spending his strength in futile attempts 
to carry

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 265

the centre of Vincent's line, he moved over to the left and attacked with 
renewed vigor the Sixteenth Michigan.  That regiment had a weaker position and 
was less protected than the rest of the line, and when the pressure upon it 
became heavy, it yielded somewhat to the current and was fast giving way, 
exposing that flank to sudden turning.  At that instant, the One Hundred and 
Fortieth New York, of Weed's brigade, which had been sent to support and 
reinforce Vincent, came upon the field, and moved down to the wavering line.  In 
doing so it was much exposed, receiving a volley by which the gallant O'Rourke, 
who, commanded the regiment, was killed, and large numbers of the rank and file 
were laid low.  Confusion followed, and it seemed for the moment that it, too, 
would give way.  But Vincent, seeing the peril of the hour, rushed from point to 
point, threatening and encouraging by turns, and by the aid of his officers, 
finally succeeded in bringing order out of confusion, and the enemy was again 
foiled.  When once the line had become settled, and felt in a measure protected, 
it was invincible.  The personal courage and activity of Vincent saved the 
brigade from what promised inevitable destruction.  But his tireless intrepidity 
made him a mark for the enemy's sharp-shooters, and he paid the forfeit with his 
life.  He was standing upon a rock part way down the declivity, watching the 
movements of the enemy, when he was struck in the groin by a minie ball,and was 
borne helpless and bleeding with a mortal hurt from the field.  He was succeeded 
by Colonel Rice, of the Forty-fourth, who on assuming command immediately passed 
along the line, encouraging the men to strike for their fallen leader a deadlier 
blow, and insisting that they must hold the position to the very last extremity.
  In making his assaults thus far, the foe had done so with a strong hand, his 
ranks having been well filled. But now they were visibly weakened, many having 
fallen, and many others having chosen secure positions behind rocks, were loth 
to leave them; some even climbed into the tree tops, and hid themselves in the 
thick foliage of the branches, keeping up from their concealments a most galling 
fire.  But the enemy had not yet reached the left of the brigade line, and, 
finding the valley open, he determined to again marshal his forces and make one 
more

MARTIAL DBE DS 0.P PENNSYLVANIA - 266 

resolute struggle for the mastery.  Forming under cover of the wood, they 
advanced, and now, with a fury apparently inspired by desperation.  The 
Twentieth Maine met them, as had the other regiments, "with a volley which had a 
staggering effect; but though fearful destruction followed the deadly missiles 
the survivors rushed on unchecked, and were soon upon Chamberlain's men.  In the 
haste of coming into position, they had neglected to fix bayonets; but clubbing 
their muskets and with the might of mad men, braining their assailants, these 
hardy sons of the forest beat back the foe, and finally succeeded in shaking 
them off.  But now a new peril threatened.  The enemy had been repulsed, though 
not destroyed.  He was still defiant, and the left flank of the Twentieth was 
entirely unprotected and unsupported.  Early in the fight, Colonel Chamberlain, 
seeing the danger to which he was exposed from this cause, had swung the left 
battalion around until it faced in the opposite direction to the other extremity 
of the brigade line.  The enemy saw his advantage, and, immediately pushing 
through, vigorously attacked this battalion.  Chamberlain called upon Captain 
Woodward for a company to support him in this dire extremity.  This the Captain 
was unable, from paucity of his own numbers, to do, but sent word that he could 
stretch out his line, which relieved a part of Chamberlain's regiment, and 
enabled him to maintain his ground and to protect the flank.  The enemy's 
bullets were now falling in the rear of the right of the brigade line, coming 
from exactly the opposite direction from what they had in the earlier part of 
the contest.  But the force of the enemy's daring was by this time in a measure 
spent, and in fifteen minutes his fire began to slacken.  Chamberlain now saw 
that his time had cone, and ordering his left battalion to fix bayonets, he led 
it with the greatest gallantry, and with inspiriting cheers in which the voices 
of the whole brigade joined - in a counter-charge which swept the dispirited foe 
back in utter rout.  At this juncture, a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves, 
also of the Fifth corps, which had been sent to the support of Vincent, charged 
up the hill and helped to swell the shout of victory.  The enemy, believing that 
heavy reinforcements had arrived, gave up the contest, and Colonel Chamberlain, 
swinging his whole regiment

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 267

around upon the front, cleared the valley between the Round Tops, his left 
sweeping the declivity of Round Top.  Over five hundred prisoners were taken by 
this brigade alone, including two Colonels and fifteen other commissioned 
officers, and over a thousand stands of arms.  That narrow valley was strewn 
with the dead and the wounded, mangled in every conceivable way in which 
relentless battle leaves its victims.  Behind one single rock were found, after 
the battle, twenty-five dead bodies, many wounded, doubtless, having crawled 
behind it for shelter and there yielded their lives.
  The severely wounded, who were taken prisoners, were in the main boastful and 
defiant.  The attacking column was principally composed of Alabama and Texan 
troops.  They spoke in a manner dissatisfied with the result, which they had in 
no way anticipated.  They acknowledged that they had been badly cut up; but said 
that only one brigade had yet been engaged, while there were two others behind 
them ready to follow up the assault.  One experience, however, of that dark 
valley was enough, and no further advances were made to enter it.
  No prouder victory was achieved on any part of that bloody field, nor one 
which more largely contributed to the accomplishment of the final triumph, than 
that of this small brigade of Vincent, composed of less than twelve hundred 
muskets, supported and aided by Weed's brigade and Hazlett's battery; but 
principally fought by this handful of men.  No valor could have exceeded theirs.  
Their spirit is illustrated by an incident which occurred at a moment when the 
fight was at its climax.  An overgrown, uncouth but resolute young man, 
belonging to company F, of the Eighty-third regiment, who had a sheltered 
position behind a rock, was noticed to rise up when he fired in such a manner as 
to expose nearly his whole body.  He was repeatedly cautioned, and called to, to 
"get down."  Finally, irritated by the reprimand, he drew himself up to his full 
proportions, and swaying his brawny arm in an impressive gesture, at the same 
time calling upon God to witness, he exclaimed: "I am on the soil of old 
Pennsylvany now, and if they get me down they'll have to shoot me down."  The 
feeling prevailed throughout the army that it was now on northern soil, and to 
the last man they would fight before they would yield an inch.

MARTIAL DEEDS OP PENNSYLVANIA - 268 

  The loss upon the Union side in this struggle, on account of the shelter, was 
in numbers small in proportion to that inflicted on the enemy.  But upon the 
officers the blow fell with cruel force.  General Weed, who commanded the 
brigade which had come to the support, of Vincent, received a mortal wound, and 
while Captain Hazlett, whose battery had been brought upon the summit with so 
much difficulty, was bending over his prostrate form, endeavoring to catch his 
last broken accents, he also was struck by the fatal bullet, and fell lifeless 
upon the gasping form of his dying chief.  Thus fell Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett, 
the three chief commanders on the hill, and O'Rourke, the leader of a regiment, 
besides numbers of others of a less degree.
  When we consider the small chance by which this hill was saved to the Union 
arms, and its vital importance to the integrity of the whole army, the inquiry 
strongly presses itself, Why was it left so late unoccupied, and why was the 
opportunity of grasping it allowed to remain open all the day long, and until 
its summit was casting fitful shadows?  Is it answered, that General Meade had 
given Sickles orders to occupy it, and that he supposed it was firmly held?  
This can hardly be accepted as a satisfactory answer.  For, from the window of 
General Meade's headquarters, Little Round Top is plainly seen, and by using his 
glass he could have verified the belief at any moment, or by means of an aid he 
could have examined each nook and cranny of the hill every half hour in the 
whole day.  But General Sickles says, when he was ordered to relieve General 
Geary, he proceeded to do so, and notified General Meade that Geary had been 
simply massed and not in position, that he had executed the first order, and was 
awaiting further directions.  Finally, says Sickles, "Not having received any 
orders in reference to my position, and observing, from the enemy's movements on 
our left what I thought to be conclusive indications of a design on their part 
to attack there, and that seeming to me to be our most assailable point, I went 
in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me 
to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders.  I did not 
receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the 
enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 269

and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to 
retreat from Gettysburg."
  The testimony of General Meade conflicts somewhat with this statement.  He 
says: "I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the 
Third corps, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of 
the Second corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in 
general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock's left; and his 
left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was 
practicable to occupy it.  During the morning I sent a staff officer to inquire 
of General Sickles whether he was in position.  The reply was returned to me 
that General Sickles said there was no position there.  I then sent back to him 
my general instructions which had been previously given.  A short time 
afterwards General Sickles came to my headquarters, and I told him what my 
general views were, and intimated that he was to occupy the position that I 
understood General Hancock had put General Geary in, the night previous.  
General Sickles replied that General Geary had no position, as far as he could 
understand.  He then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his 
corps was, some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have 
some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery.  
He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner 
as, in his judgment, he should deem the most suitable.  I answered, 'General 
Sickles, certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given 
to you; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you.'  
And I directed Brigadier-General Hunt, my Chief of artillery, to accompany 
General Sickles, and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles 
thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his 
judgment."  General Sickles held his corps back until the last moment, and at 
length, when his outposts had been driven in, and the enemy was about to attack, 
took what has been called the advanced position, which General Meade expressed 
his disapprobation of, when he came upon the ground.  "I am of the opinion," 
says General Meade, "that General Sickles did what he thought was for the best; 
but I

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA 270 

differed from. him in judgment.  And I maintain that subsequent events proved 
that my judgment was correct, and his judgment was wrong.
  General Sickles, in his testimony, says upon this point: "I took up that 
position which is described in the report of General Halleck as a line from half 
to three-quarters of a mile in advance, as he says, and which, in his report, he 
very pointedly disapproves of, and which, he further says I took up through a 
misinterpretation of orders.  It was not through any misinterpretation of 
orders.  It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took 
it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was 
approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who 
accompanied me in the examination of it.  I took up the line because it enabled 
me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take - as 
they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force - would have rendered 
our position on the left untenable; and in my judgment, would have turned the 
fortunes of the day hopelessly against us.  I think that any General who would 
look at the topography of the country there would naturally come to the same 
conclusion."
  Thus we perceive that in respect to the two positions in general, the opinions 
of Meade and Sickles are diametrically opposed to each other.  But we should 
recollect that all this is testimony given after the event, when the questions 
at issue were under sharp discussion, when much feeling on the one side and on 
the other existed, and when the opinions were naturally colored by prejudice.  
Enough is however brought to light by the reports made at the time, and by this 
testimony, to enable us to form an intelligent conclusion concerning the 
occupation of Little Round Top.
  In his testimony, General Meade says. "his left [Sickles'] was to extend to 
Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable, to occupy it."  Two 
facts are deducible from this statement; first, that this commanding position 
was visible from his headquarters, and he was able for himself to have any 
moment determined whether it was occupied or not; and second, that he was in 
ignorance whether it was practicable to occupy it.

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 271

  There are no principles of military strategy more fundamental, more apparent 
to even the casual observer, or more vital to the safety of an army when 
deployed in line of defensive battle, than these: first, that the flanks of the 
infantry should be firmly posted, with some natural or artificial protection; 
and second, that the flanks should be well guarded by cavalry, ready at all 
times to make a stand and to give notice of the movements of the enemy.  Both 
these principles were violated, in this instance.  The whole left wing was 
unstable until the last moment, and the line was actually formed and the 
position finally taken, after the battle had begun, and Little Round Top, a 
fortress in itself, formed and fashioned by the fiat of the Almighty, ready for 
its armament and its defenders, was left entirely unoccupied until after the 
battle had begun to rage with great fury, and was finally saved from the 
clutches of the foe by the most determined and bloody fighting of troops which 
gained their position but five minutes in advance of their assailants.  The 
cavalry, too, was removed just before the battle opened, and was left unsupplied 
at a time when it was most needed.  It would seem as though the gates were swung 
wide open deliberately and purposely to allow the enemy to walk in.
  Is it offered, in defence of the Commander-in-chief, that he had ordered 
Sickles to occupy this ground?  This is not enough.  It was his duty to know 
that it was occupied and made firm.  Hour after hour passed, and he knew that it 
was not occupied; for he had the direct testimony of his senses, and Sickles was 
repeatedly informing him that he was not in position, both by messenger and in 
person, and begging that the chief, or some member of his staff, would examine 
the ground and give definite orders.  To the last moment no such orders were 
given, and Sickles was finally compelled to take position upon his own 
responsibility, and by the testimony of General Meade himself, under a 
discretion which was accorded him.  Sickles' forces were insufficient to cover 
his line and occupy Little Round Top; but he covered the front of that position 
and the approaches to it by causing his line to abut upon Round Top, which was 
impracticable for offensive or defensive purposes.  Troops were at the
disposal of Meade, with which Little Round Top might have been

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 272

covered early in the day; for the Fifth corps had arrived at two o'clock in the 
morning within easy call.  The responsibility of the non-occupation of this 
stronghold, so vital to the integrity of his position and the safety of his 
whole army, must rest with the  Commander-in-chief, and it must ever remain an 
inexplicable mystery how he could have permitted the hours to pass,--after the 
bloody experience of the preceding day, knowing that the whole rebel army was 
close in upon his front,--with his left wing in the disorganized condition in 
which the opening of the battle found it.
  Respecting the ordering away of the cavalry, no question has ever been made in 
the inquiries into the conduct of the battle.  But it was no less a grave 
violation of principle, and should have received the severest censure.  The 
fault cannot be imputed to General Pleasanton who commanded the cavalry, for 
having given the order without the knowledge of his chief; for had such been the 
case, why was not Pleasanton at once cashiered, as he would have richly merited?  
As the latter received no censure, we must conclude that it was either the 
direct order of Meade, or that it received his sanction.
  The enemy, in guarding his flank, exercised a commendable care, in marked 
contrast with the negligence of his opponent.  The extreme right of his line 
was, from the nature of the country, exposed and weak.  Accordingly, at the 
point where the Emmittsburg pike crosses the Seminary Ridge, which it does about 
three-quarters of a mile beyond the Peach Orchard, he built, as soon as he felt 
himself menaced, a strong and quite elaborate fortification with re-entrant 
angles so as to sweep the ground in all directions, and here he planted his 
heavy guns.
  Leaving the citadel that guards the left of the Union line in the firm grip of 
the gallant men who so heroically defended it, turn now to the further conduct 
of the fight on Sickles' front.  As soon as it was apparent that the enemy was 
intent on making a determined fight upon the Union left, realizing the danger 
which was threatening Sickles' thin line, General Meade exerted himself to the 
utmost to succor these hard-pressed men.  General Hancock, who had been called 
on for help, promptly sent an entire division composed of four brigades under 
General Caldwell.

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 273

General Humphreys, though expecting every moment to be himself attacked, and 
having a difficult position to hold, detached one of his regiments, having 
previously parted with one of his brigades, and hurried it away, in response to 
the urgent appeals of the aids of both Sickles and Birney.  The divisions of 
Barnes and Ayers of the Fifth corps were also brought up.
  While Hood was making his desperate onslaught upon the defenders of Little 
Round Top, McLaws, with the aid of Anderson's division of Hill's corps, was 
making a no less determined, and far more successful assault upon Birney's 
right.  It fell with the greatest weight upon that part of the line about the 
Peach Orchard; and here it was first broken.  But the brigade of De Trobriand 
had originally been formed principally facing westward, and as the enemy 
advanced to follow up the retiring forces on his front at the Peach Orchard, De 
Trobriand was still able to maintain his position, and to do good execution.  
But the pressure soon became too great for him to withstand, and he was obliged 
to give ground.  The enemy having forced his way in upon the wheatfield, was 
pressing upon his flank and rear.  It was a critical moment.  Instantly rallying 
the remnants of the Fifth Michigan, and the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, 
and by the aid of General Birney, who brought the Seventeenth Maine and a New 
Jersey regiment under Colonel Burling into line, he made a determined charge, 
and regained the lost ground and the stone wall which had afforded him 
protection.  This was the last effort of this brigade, for it was shortly after 
relieved by Zook's brigade of Caldwell's division.
  In the meantime, Barnes, with the divisions of Tilton and Sweitzer, had moved 
forward and taken position in a wood on the right of the wheatfield, Sweitzer 
upon the left and Tilton upon the right.  The ground occupied by the latter was 
rocky and wooded, while the left extended into an open ravine.  Barnes' division 
had scarcely gained its position, when the enemy was seen advancing up this 
ravine.  In danger of being outflanked, Sweitzer wheeled the several regiments 
of his brigade to the left and rear, giving the advantage of three lines 
supporting each other.  Sweitzer was thus able easily to hold his position.  But 
Tilton, having been less fortunately posted, was unable to main-

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 274

tain his ground.  This left Sweitzer in a perilous situation, and he likewise 
fell back.  The rugged country to the west and south of the Peach Orchard was 
now the dark and bloody ground, and over it the tide of battle swayed with 
destructive force.  The enemy had gained possession, and was doubtless settling 
down upon it to console himself for his grievous losses, when the division of 
Caldwell came to the rescue.  With the brigades of Cross and Kelley in advance, 
supported by Brooke and Zook, Caldwell swept forward.  No troops ever evinced 
greater valor, and the enemy was driven before them; but their losses were 
fearful, as the irregularities of the field enabled the enemy, who was concealed 
in advantageous positions, to rise up from unexpected quarters and pour in a 
most destructive fire.  Indeed, the contest had been so long and stubbornly 
maintained, that the foe was becoming desperate and impatient of further 
resistance.  The First brigade was commanded by the gallant Colonel Cross of the 
Fifth New Hampshire, who, while leading his troops in the most intrepid manner, 
was slain.  The situation was every moment becoming more and more complicated, 
as the enemy, having broken the line, was able to dispose his troops under cover 
so as to sweep the ground from several directions.  The wheatfield and the 
broken surface to its west had become a slaughter-pen.  As the second line, 
composed of the brigades of Brooke and Zook, came up, it was discovered that a 
battery had been so posted by the enemy as to greatly annoy the Union troops.  
Determined to capture or silence it, Colonel Brooke led a charge of his brigade.  
But though it was vigorously made, and with the most unwavering intrepidity, 
Brooke soon found his flanks exposed to a withering fire, which, if continued, 
would annihilate his line, and he was forced to withdraw, himself receiving a 
severe wound.
  The original position of Sickles, facing south, which had been held by Birney 
with such stubborn valor, had finally to be yielded, the supports which had been 
sent forward from the Second, Fifth, and Humphreys' division of the Third corps, 
being unable with all their strength to preserve it.  As Caldwell's division was 
gradually retiring, having been engaged in the most deadly encounters, and 
having sustained severe losses, Ayres' division of the

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 275

fifth corps moved in, and though assailed with a fury that was appalling, it 
steadily fought its way forward, routing the enemy and succeeded in holding the 
important wooded ground in front and to the right of Little Round Top, which 
Sickles had guarded as so important to the retention of the field.  In the midst 
of the desperate fighting, which, like fiery billows swept over that devoted 
ground, General Sickles, who had exercised ceaseless vigilance and a tireless 
energy in maintaining the position and beating back the foe, fell, severely 
wounded, and was carried from the field, the command devolving upon General 
Birney.
  While these struggles were continued in the wooded and broken ground which 
enveloped in its dark folds the little wheatfield, now tangled and torn, and 
blood-washed, as masses of living valor were borne over it, the line facing 
west, composed of Humphreys' division and a part of Graham's brigade, did not 
escape unscathed.  Humphreys had sent out, early in the day, working parties who 
had levelled all the fences in his front, giving the opportunity for perfect 
freedom in manoeuvring his troops, and, at a little after four o'clock, had 
taken position along the diagonal ridge on which runs the Emmittsburg pike.  
Little beyond occasional demonstrations had thus far occurred upon his front.  
But the time was rapidly approaching when the favorable moment for attack, 
directed by the order of Lee, would come.  At a little after six, Humphreys 
received notice from Birney that Sickles had fallen, and that he was in command 
of the corps, that he was about to fall back from his position facing south, 
which was nearly at right-angles to Humphreys' line, and requesting the latter 
also to fall back, so as to connect with his right.  In other words, Humphreys 
and Graham were expected to swing back with Birney so as to keep the line 
intact.  This was accomplished in tolerable order, Birney's men maintaining a 
resolute front, and gallantly checking any undue forwardness of the enemy in 
following up.  but this movement left the right of Humphreys' division, where he 
clung to the Emmittsburg pike, in an exceedingly perilous position.  The enemy 
were not slow in discovering it, and now pressed upon him with terrible 
earnestness.  The interval between Humphreys' right and Hancock's left had been

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 276

filled by the Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Eighty-second New York, and 
subsequently two other regiments, all from the Second corps, were hurried 
forward to the support of Humphreys' hard-pressed line.  Humphreys says:  "I was 
attacked on my flanks as well as on my front.  I never have been under a hotter 
artillery and musketry fire combined.  I may have been under a hotter musketry 
fire.  For a moment, I thought the day was lost.  I did not order my troops to 
fall back rapidly, because, so far as I could see, the crest in my rear was 
vacant, and I knew that when troops got to moving back rapidly, it was 
exceedingly difficult to stop them just where you wanted to stop them.  At that 
moment I received an order to fall back to the Round Top ridge, which I did, 
slowly, suffering a very heavy loss."
  As will be seen by an examination of the position in which Humphreys found 
himself at this juncture, he could have scarcely been in a worse condition to 
receive a determined attack.  His division was almost in the shape of the side 
and the two ends of a parallelogram, and upon front and both flanks the enemy 
were rushing with the impetuosity of some demon guide.  They were some of the 
best troops of Anderson's fresh division, which had escaped the fight of the 
preceding day, and had been held in hand through the long hours of that terrible 
struggle upon the extreme left, ready to spring forward with the agility of a 
tiger leaping upon his prey.  These were the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and 
Wright.  Posey and Mahone stood next, and then the division of Pender.  It is 
asserted on the authority of a correspondent of the Richmond Enquirer, that 
these also had been ordered to advance.  But as the movement of each brigade 
upon the rebel right was to be the signal for the next upon the left to move, 
the failure of Posey caused all the others to be withheld.  The powerful brigade 
of Wright did come down with overwhelming force.  Humphreys was a soldier by 
profession, and skilled in hard fighting, and to his cool courage and 
determination is due the preservation of his line as it retired to the Cemetery 
Ridge.  So sudden was the onset, and so strong the pressure, that he was obliged 
to abandon three of his guns, the horses of which had all been killed.

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 277

  But as the enemy came within range of the Second corps, crouched behind the 
low stone wall on the Cemetery Ridge, in their pursuit of Humphreys' retiring 
troops, an oblique and very destructive fire was poured in upon them, producing 
terrible slaughter.  At a clump of trees, a little in advance of the Union line 
where a battery had been posted, the enemy had swarmed in considerable numbers, 
as they here found some protection from the rapid fire of the infantry.  Here 
they had seized a brass piece from which the cannoniers had all been killed or 
driven away.  Finding ammunition, they had loaded it and were turning it upon 
Owen's brigade, temporarily under command of General Webb.  The regiments upon 
the front line were instantly ordered by Webb to charge and recapture the piece.  
With a gallantry habitual to that brigade, the order was executed, and after a 
sharp and sanguinary struggle, the enemy was routed and the piece retaken.  It 
was instantly turned upon the retiring foe with deadly effect, helping them to 
make good time back to their lines.
  The enemy felt keenly this last repulse; for when they saw Humphreys' line 
falling back, they believed the day was won, confidently anticipating that he 
would be unable to stay its backward course, and reform it so as to present any 
considerable opposition to their own victorious and impetuous assault.  How 
great was their disappointment, the wails of their wounded, and the bitter 
reproaches of the survivors against their comrades who failed to support them, 
but too plainly tells.  The correspondent of the Richmond Enquirer, who was 
present upon this part of the field and witnessed the struggle, says:  "We now 
had the key to the enemy's stronghold, and, apparently, the victory was won.  
McLaws and Hood had pushed their line well up the slope on the right; Wilcox had 
kept well up on his portion of the line; Wright had pieced the enemy's main line 
on the summit of McPherson's [Zeigler's] heights, capturing his heavy batteries, 
thus breaking the connection between their right and left wings.  I said that, 
apparently, we had won the victory.  It remains to be stated why our successes 
were not crowned with the important results which should have followed such 
heroic daring and indomitable bravery.  Although the order was peremptory that

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 278

all of Anderson's division should move into action simultaneously, Brigadier-
General Posey, commanding a Mississippi brigade, and Brigadier-General Mahone, 
commanding a Virginia brigade, failed to advance.  This failure of these two 
brigades to advance is assigned, as I learn upon inquiry, as the reason why 
Pender's division of Hill's corps did not advance--the order being,  that the 
advance was to commence from the right and be taken up along our whole line.  
Pender's failure to advance caused the division on his left--Heth's --to remain 
inactive.  Here we have two whole divisions, and two brigades of another, 
standing idle spectators of one of the most desperate and important assaults 
that has ever been made on this continent--fifteen or twenty thousand men 
resting on their arms, in plain view of a terrible battle, witnessing the mighty 
efforts of two little brigades (Wright's and Wilcox's, for Perry had fallen back 
overpowered), contending with the heavy masses of Yankee infantry, and subjected 
to a most deadly fire from the enemy's heavy artillery, without a single effort 
to aid them in the assault, or to assist them when the heights were carried. . . 
.  It was now apparent that the day was lost--lost after it was won--lost, not 
because our army fought badly, but because a large portion did not fight at 
all."
  Had all the enemy's troops advanced, as is here shown that they were ordered 
to do, it is doubtful whether the Union line, disorganized and broken as it was, 
and before the new and more contracted one had been fairly taken, would have 
been able to withstand the shock, and the impression of Humphreys, "For a moment 
I thought the day was lost," would have been realized.  In addition to the 
reason here given by the rebel correspondent for the failure of Pender and Heth 
to move, there is another far more weighty which probably influenced them:  
After the rough handling they received from the First corps on the day before, 
it is probable they had little stomach for another fight.
  There is no doubt that the successes which the enemy supposed he had gained 
here, by the unaided strength of one brigade, that of Wright, emboldened and 
encouraged him to make a second attempt at this very point on the following day.
  Upon the fall of sickles, General Hancock was ordered to turn over the command 
of his own corps to General Gibbon, and 

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG - 279

himself to assume the general supervision of the Second and Third corps.  This 
he did, establishing his headquarters midway between the Cemetery and Little 
Round Top, and proceeded to patch up the new line with such troops as were at 
hand.  The divisions of Doubleday and Robinson, of the first corps, were brought 
up and posted to the left of the Second corps.  Doubleday's division had been 
strengthened by ordering to it Stannard's brigade of Vermont troops some days 
before, but only joined on this day.  The enemy had been repulsed before 
Doubleday reached the front; but he sent forward part of the Thirteenth Vermont 
under Colonel Randall, and the One Hundred and Forty-ninth and One Hundred and 
Fiftieth Pennsylvania regiments, which together rescued six pieces of artillery, 
that in retiring had been abandoned.  The First Minnesota regiment also came up 
opportunely, which General Hancock led in person against a detachment of the 
enemy that was pushing through a part of the line under cover of a wood, and 
drove it back.  General Williams, who had succeeded to the command of the 
Twelfth corps, ordered Ruger's division forward, to which Lockwood's Maryland 
brigade was attached, and put it in upon the left of the First corps troops.  
Williams also ordered Geary's division, with the exception of Green's brigade, 
over to the left; but, through some strange oversight in the direction of march, 
it never reached the point indicated.
  The fighting upon the left continued with terrible earnestness until evening.  
Ayers' division of regulars was the last to advance into the mazes of this 
masquerade of death.  Sickles, Barnes, Caldwell, and Ayers had gone out upon 
this ground in their pride of strength; but they had all been forced back 
finally by reason of the break at the Peach Orchard, where the enemy had 
penetrated, and had thus been able to flank every fresh reserve that had been 
sent against him; and for this cause Humphreys, upon the right, had finally been 
compelled to retire.  All these disasters were the result of the loss of the key 
point, the little eminence at the Peach Orchard.  An angle in the line of battle 
formed as was this, is intrinsically weak, inasmuch as the direct impact can be 
brought to bear upon it from two directions.  But the same objection may be 
urged against the position of Steinwehr at the Cemetery.  Could

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 280

Sickles have taken this ground early in the day, and had lunettes and rifle-pits 
thrown up, he would have been invincible.
  But though the advance position on the Emmittsburg pike had to be given up, 
the wooded ground in front of Round Top, from the occupation of which by the 
enemy Sickles feared so much, was held.  It was just at dusk, and when Ayers, 
after having sustained severe losses and fought with the most determined valor, 
was retiring before a resolute and hopeful foe, that a brigade from Crawford's 
division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, which he had formed upon the fringe of 
Little Round Top, came dashing through the low ground drained by Plum Run, and 
with a chorus peculiar to this noted body of men, went to his relief.  Crawford 
had seized the brigade colors at the moment of moving, and, riding up and down 
the line, had called upon the men to make Pennsylvania their watchword, and to 
quail not upon its soil.  McCandless, of the Second Reserve, commanded, and led 
them on.  They had scarcely emerged from the hill, and begun to cross the low, 
swampy ground, when they were hailed by a shower of bullets.  But to such a 
welcome had they been inured on many a gory field, and it only had the effect to 
quicken their onward pace.  The rebels were ensconced behind a low stonewall at 
the edge of the wood.  But the bayonets and bullets of the Reserves were 
directed by hands too steady and resolute for successful resistance, and they 
were swept back.  Under this stone wall McCandless formed his line, and threw 
out his skirmishers to the edge of the Wheatfield.
  This ended substantially the fighting for the day on this part of the field.  
The other brigade of the Reserve corps, under Fisher, as we have seen, went to 
the support of Vincent's and Weed's brigades, and during the night, with the 
Twentieth Maine in the lead, climbed to the summit of Round Top, and with the 
aid of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, established a line and erected a 
substantial stone breastwork from the loose boulders and broken fragments that 
cover the breast of the mountain.  The enemy were at the westerly base of the 
hill, and were also fortifying, holding as far north as the Devil's Den, in the 
rocky cavern of which they took shelter.