Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 14, 313-
324

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                         MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                       by
                                SAMUEL P. BATES.

                     PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 313

                            PART I.  GENERAL HISTORY.

                                   CHAPTER XIV.

                       THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG.

GENERAL LEE was now satisfied that a further attempt to maintain the contest 
would be fruitless, and consequently determined to yield to the inevitable, and 
make good his retreat.  And now was seen the great strategic advantage to him of 
the possession of Gettysburg; for he was able to control the shortest routes to 
the Potomac.  Had the Fairfield road been under the control of the Union army, 
Lee's retreat could have been cut off. But his army lying across the two 
shortest roads leading to Williamsport, he was able to retire without the danger 
of serious interruption.  In his report, Lee says: "Owing to the strength of the 
enemy's position, and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the 
engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies 
rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were.  Such of the wounded as 
were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, 
were ordered to Williamsport.  The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, 
and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield."  This was the most 
direct road.  But the wounded who could bear transportation were started back 
during the night of the 3d; and all day long of the 4th the two roads - the one 
by Fairfield and the other by Chambersburg, until the mountain was passed, and 
thence by Greenwood and Waynesborough - were incessantly filled with the trains.
  As already noticed, Colonel Stone, of the Bucktail brigade, was wounded 
severely in the action of the first day, and fell into the enemy's hands.  His 
Adjutant-General, Captain John E. Parsons,

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 314 

afterwards Colonel of the One Hundred and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania regiment, 
unwilling to desert his bleeding chief, remained to care for him and was also a 
prisoner.  During the rest of the battle, he was kept under guard at a rebel 
hospital.  In the following letter he records the varying hopes and fears by 
which his bosom was swayed as the dreadful hours wore on, and points out the 
first intimations which he interpreted as evidence that victory had at last 
crowned the Union arms: "On the morning of the 2d of July," he says, "I obtained 
permission from the rebel General Hood to move Colonel Stone, and to remain with 
him.  With the assistance of two soldiers, we carried him on a stretcher to a 
stone farmhouse a half mile to the rear, and some 200 yards to the north of the 
Baltimore pike.  We found the house deserted by the family and in a sad 
condition; portions of the floor torn up for plunder, the beds ripped open and 
feathers scattered over the house, and the hand of the spoiler visible on every 
side.  We found a soldier of the Iron brigade in the house, mortally wounded.  
He died by our side that night.
  "During the afternoon of the 2d, the house was taken possession of by the 
Surgical corps of Hayes brigade, 'Louisiana Tigers,' as their Brigade Hospital.  
The desperate charges made by this brigade on the evening of the 2d brought 
ambulance after ambulance of their wounded to the hospital.  I could gather 
nothing satisfactory from their surgeons or their wounded as to the result of 
the day; but they were in good spirits and appeared sanguine of success in the 
end.  Some of the officers who were slightly wounded, said to me that they were 
certain of success, and had marked out on their pocket-maps the line of march to 
Baltimore, Washington, Philadelphia, and New York.  On the evening of the 3d, 
however, they seemed depressed in spirits, which first gave me the intimation of 
our victory.  On the morning of the 4thm they commenced to haul to the rear all 
of their wounded that were able to be removed.  Then I was satisfied that our 
army was victorious and that the enemy was getting ready to retreat.  When I 
asked some of the officers who were so sanguine only the day before, why they 
were hauling their wounded back, they said it was only to a place where water 
was more abundant.  But their defeat was obvious on all sides.  Depressed in 
spirits

THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG - 315

and demoralized in manner, they hurriedly took their departure, and next morning 
at daylight, I found that the whole rebel army, except a light line of cavalry, 
had fled, leaving our hospital and the houses and barns about us filled with the 
worst of their wounded.  By nine o'clock the cavalry line withdrew, concentrated 
on the Chambersburg pike in front of our hospital, and took their departure, 
followed in a short time by our cavalry.  Colonel Stone was taken in an 
ambulance to Gettysburg and our surgeons took charge of the rebel wounded.  Both 
the Colonel and myself were treated kindly by the surgeons and officers at the 
hospital.  A portion of the rebel army passed our hospital in their retreat"
  The condition of the rebel army was now such that its Commander's best efforts 
were required to save it.  The great thoroughfares on the direct line to 
Williamsport, it is true, were his, and by judicious dispositions and prompt 
action, he had a good prospect of bringing it off; but the longer he delayed, 
the more precarious his situation became; for, while his own force was 
constantly dwindling the Union army was in a fair way to receive important 
accessions, the militia in the Cumberland Valley and at Harrisburg, and troops 
from the James being already on the way.  General Imboden, who had been sent by 
Lee with his independent mixed command of cavalry and mounted infantry, for the 
destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and had come up into 
Pennsylvania by the way of McConnellsburg, had arrived on the field at 
Gettysburg a little after noon of the 3d, at the moment when the last grand 
charge was in full tide.  His men were fresh and to him Lee called and entrusted 
the removal of the wounded.  Imboden has published an account of the doings of 
that night of horrors in which he labored to carry back to Virginia such as 
could, and, though in a dying state would be removed:
  "When night closed upon the grand scene," he says, "our army was repulsed.  
Silence and gloom pervaded our camps.  We knew that the day had gone against us, 
but the extent of the disaster was not known except in high quarters.  The 
carnage of the day was reported to have been frightful, but our army was not in 
retreat, and we all surmised that with tomorrow's dawn would come a renewal of 
the struggle; and we

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 316 

knew that if such was the case, those, who had not been in the fight would have 
their full share in its honors and its dangers.  All felt and appreciated the 
momentous consequences of final defeat or victory on that great field.  These 
considerations made that, to us, one of those solemn and awful nights that every 
one who fought through our long war sometimes experienced before a great battle.  
Few camp fires enlivened the scene.  It was a warm summer's night, and the weary 
soldiers were lying in groups on the luxuriant grass of the meadows we occupied, 
discussing the events of the day, or watching that their horses did not straggle 
off in browsing around.
  "About eleven o'clock a horseman approached and delivered a message from 
General Lee, that, he wished to see me immediately.  I mounted at once, and 
accompanied by Lieutenant McPhail of my staff, and guided by the courier, rode 
about two miles toward Gettysburg, where half a dozen small tents on the 
roadside were pointed out as General Lee's headquarters for the night.  He was 
not there, but I was informed that I would find him with General A. P. Hill, 
half a mile further on.  On reaching the place indicated, a flickering, solitary 
candle, visible through the open front of a common tent, showed where Generals 
Lee and Hill were seated on camp stools, with a county map spread upon their 
knees, and engaged in a low and earnest conversation.  They ceased speaking as I 
approached, and after the ordinary salutations, General Lee directed me to go to 
his headquarters and wait for him.  He did not return until about one o'clock, 
when he came riding along at a slow walk and evidently wrapped in profound 
thought.  There was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was 
about.  The moon was high in the heavens, shedding a flood of soft silvery 
light, almost as bright as day, upon the scene.  When he approached and saw us, 
he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount.  The effort to do so 
betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him, but 
before I reached him he had alighted.  He threw his arm across his saddle to 
rest himself, and fixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence upon his 
equally weary horse, the two forming a striking group, as motionless as a 
statue.  The moon shone full upon his massive

THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG - 317

features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine 
countenance before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had 
passed.  I waited for him to speak until the silence became painful and 
embarrassing, when to break it, and change the current of his thoughts, I 
remarked in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue
  "'General, this has been a hard day on you.'
  "This attracted his attention. He looked up and replied mournfully:
  "'Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,' and immediately relapsed into his 
thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his 
reflections, I said no more.  After a minute or two he suddenly straightened up 
to his full height, and turning to me with more animation, energy, and 
excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, he addressed me in a 
voice tremulous with emotion, and said:
  "'General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's 
division of Virginians did to-day in their grand charge upon the enemy.  And if 
they had been supported, as they were to have been - but for some reason, not 
yet fully explained to me, they were not - we would have held the position they 
so gloriously won at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have 
been ours.'
  "After a moment he added in a tone almost of agony:
  "'Too bad! Too bad!! Oh! too bad!!''
  "I never shall forget, as long as I live, his language, and his manner and his 
appearance and expression of mental suffering.  Altogether, it was a scene that 
a historical painter might well immortalize had one been fortunately present to 
witness it.  In a little while he called up a servant from his sleep to take his 
horse; spoke mournfully, by name, of several of his friends who had fallen 
during the day; and when a candle had been lighted, invited me alone into his 
tent, where, as soon as we were seated, he remarked: 'We must return to 
Virginia.  As many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home.  I have 
sent for you, because your men are fresh, to guard the trains back to Virginia.  
The duty will be arduous, responsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will 
be harassed by the enemy's cavalry.  I can

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 318 

spare you as much artillery as you require, but no other troops, as I shall need 
all I have to return to the Potomac by a different route from yours.  All the 
transportation and care of the wounded will be entrusted to you.  You will 
recross the mountain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport, 
by any route you deem best, without halting.  There rest and feed your animals, 
then ford the river, and make no halt till you reach Winchester, where I will 
again communicate with you.'  As I was about leaving to return to my camp, he 
came out of his tent and said to me in a low tone:
  "'I will place in your hands, to-morrow, a sealed package for President Davis, 
which you will retain in your own possession till you are across the Potomac, 
when you will detail a trusty commissioned officer to take it to Richmond with 
all possible dispatch, and deliver it immediately to the President.  I impress 
it upon you, that, whatever happens, this package must not fall into the hands 
of the enemy.  If you should unfortunately be captured, destroy it.' . . . . 
Shortly after noon, the very windows of heaven seemed to have been opened . . . 
. The storm increased in fury every moment.  Canvas was no protection against 
it, and the poor wounded, lying, upon the hard, naked boards of the wagon-
bodies, were drenched by the cold rain.  Horses and mules were blinded and 
maddened by the storm, and became almost unmanageable.  The roar of the winds 
and waters made it almost impossible to communicate orders.  Night was rapidly 
approaching, and there was danger that in the darkness the confusion would 
become worse confounded.  About four P. M. the head of the column was put in 
motion and began the ascent of the mountain.  After dark I set out to gain the 
advance.  The train was seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road.  It was 
moving rapidly, and from every wagon issued wails of agony.  For four hours I 
galloped along, passing to the front, and heard more - it was too dark to see - 
of the horrors of war than I had witnessed from the battle of Bull Run up to 
that day.  In the wagons were men wounded and mutilated in every conceivable 
way.  Some had their legs shattered by a shell, or minie ball; some were shot 
through their bodies; others had arms torn to shreds; some had received a ball 
in the face or a jagged piece of

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shell had lacerated their heads.  Scarcely one in a hundred had received 
adequate surgical aid.  Many had been without food for thirty-six hours.  Their 
ragged, bloody, and dirty clothes, all clotted and hardened with blood - were 
rasping the tender, inflamed lips oŁ their gaping wounds. Very few of the wagons 
had even straw in them, and all were without springs.  The road was rough and 
rocky. The jolting was enough to have killed sound strong men.  From nearly 
every wagon, as the horses trotted on, such cries and shrieks as these greeted, 
the ear:
  "'O God! why can't I die?'
  "'My God! will no one have mercy and kill me, and end my misery? 
  "'O!stop one minute, and take me out and leave me to die on the roadside.'
  °'I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear children! what will become of 
you?' 
  "Some were praying; others were uttering the most fearful oaths and 
execrations that despair could wring from them in their agony.  Occasionally a 
wagon would be passed from which only low, deep moans and sobs could be heard.  
No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers.  On, on; we must move on.  
The storm continued and the darkness was fearful.  There was no time even to 
fill a canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the drivers and the 
guards, disposed in compact bodies every half mile, all were wounded and 
helpless in that vast train of misery.  The night was awful, and yet in it was 
our safety, for no enemy would dare attack us when he could not distinguish 
friend from foe . . . . It was my sad lot to pass the whole distance from the 
rear to the head of the column, and no language can convey an idea of the 
horrors of that most horrible of all nights of our long and bloody war . . . . 
After a good deal of harassing and desultory fighting along the road, nearly the 
whole immense train reached Williamsport a little after the middle of the day. . 
. . The dead were selected from the train - for many had perished on the way - 
and were decently buried.  Straw was obtained on the neighboring farms; the 
wounded were removed from the wagons and housed; the citizens were all put to 
cooking, and, the army surgeons to dressing wounds."

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 320 

Imboden was unable to obey the instructions of Lee, to pause only to feed his 
beasts at Williamsport, and then ford the rive and push on to Winchester; for 
the sudden rains of the previous day had converted the Potomac into a raging 
torrent, giving it a tide of ten or twelve feet above the fording stage; and 
during the absence of the enemy, General French, who was stationed at Frederick, 
had sent up an expedition which had partially destroyed the pontoon bridge.  
Imboden, accordingly, parked his train, consisting of ten thousand animals and 
all the wagons, and disposed of the wounded about the town.  Until some portion 
of the rebel army should come, he knew that his situation was precarious.  He 
had twenty-two field guns and one Whitworth siege piece.  These he planted most 
advantageously upon the hills just above the town, and held his troops, about 
three thousand in number, in readiness to repel an attack.  On the morning of 
the 6th, Buford and Kilpatrick approached, and made vigorous demonstrations, 
dismounting their men and assaulting with great determination.  But Imboden's 
artillery, which was skilfully distributed and effectively served, proved 
formidable, and by concentrating his forces upon the point attacked, made 
himself more than a match for the assaulting column.  Towards evening FitzHugh 
Lee with a powerful body came to the relief of Imboden, followed closely by 
Stuart, and the Union forces were obliged to withdraw.  The rebel infantry soon 
after began to arrive, and all further demonstrations were futile.
  As has been noticed, General Meade, the moment the result of the grand charge 
of Longstreet on the afternoon of the 3d was decided, had ridden to the left of 
the line, and ordered a demonstration there, with the intent to put in a heavy 
force and assault the rebel position; but the troops were slow in moving, and 
before they could be got ready, it was too late to make the attempt.  Several 
officers have since testified, that they favored such an attack, and strongly 
advised General Meade to make one.  General Hancock says: "I think that our 
lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great 
victory.  I was very confident that the advance would be made.  General Meade 
told me before the fight, that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the 
Fifth and Sixth corps on the

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enemy's flank; I, therefore; when I was wounded and lying down in my ambulance, 
and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if 
he would put in the Fifth and Sixth corps, I believed he would win a great 
victory.  I asked him afterwards when I returned to the army, what he had done.  
He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and 
moved so slowly that nothing was done before night.'
  It is possible that an instant advance by a strong column, had one been in 
readiness, might have broken the rebel line.  But the probabilities were against 
it.  There were, at most, but about 18,000 men in the enemy's assaulting column 
in the grand charge.  Where was the rest of the rebel army?  Principally 
concentrated upon Seminary Ridge, a good defensible position, running over with 
artillery at every point.  The very best dispositions had doubtless been made of 
all but Longstreet's attacking force, that it was possible to make, to meet any 
such counter assault as would naturally be anticipated.  Hence there is little 
doubt that a direct assault upon that line would have proved to the Union side 
as disastrous as had that of Longstreet to the rebel.
  During the evening and night of the 3d, the enemy's line on Seminary Ridge was 
greatly strengthened.  Ewell's entire corps was drawn in and placed behind it, 
and ample security taken for defending every point.  It was a position nearly as 
strong by nature as that where the Union army was planted.  It is true, that the 
rebel army had suffered severely.  But so had the Union.  Feeling himself strong 
in his position, Meade courted attack.  May we not believe that Lee, with a 
similar sense of security, would have welcomed a Union advance?  This view, 
reasoning upon the knowledge which the Union Commander then had, had a strong 
warrant, and is doubtless that which influenced General Meade in withholding an 
attack.  By information since obtained, we learn that such was the fact.  
Swinton, in his 'Army of the, Potomac,' gives the testimony of General 
Longstreet, who said to him: "I had Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I 
had a heavy force of artillery; I should have liked nothing better than to have 
been attacked, and have no doubt

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 322 

I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received."
  But while Lee was invincible for the moment, he had no preparation for holding 
out any length of time.  Accordingly, as soon as darkness had closed in on the 
evening of the 4th, the main body of his army was put in motion towards 
Williamsport, leaving only a strong rear guard, to hold the Union forces in 
check should they attempt to follow, and before morning was beyond the reach of 
its pursuers, taking the two shortest roads which he completely controlled.  Lee 
himself, with his staff, had started at a little after midnight of the 3d, 
breakfasting on the morning of the 4th near C. Mussleman's house on the 
Fairfield road.
  In the Union camp, on the evening of the 4th, a council of war was called, at 
which the four following questions were propounded: "Shall this army remain 
here?"  "If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?"  "Do you deem it 
expedient to move towards Williamsport through Emmittsburg?"  "Shall we pursue 
the enemy, if he is retreating, on his direct line of retreat?"  Birney, 
Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren voted in favor of remaining until there was 
unmistakable evidence that the enemy was really on the retreat.  Newton, 
Pleasanton, and Slocum were for moving at once; and Howard was doubtful.  The 
council was unanimous in favor of moving by the left flank, instead of following 
the direct route taken by the enemy, only sending cavalry supported by a small 
infantry force to operate upon his rear.  Two reasons impelled to this last 
decision: first, the condition always imposed upon the Army of the Potomac, to 
cover Washington and Baltimore in addition to fighting the enemy; and second, to 
follow on the track of the foe would have no advantage, as the enemy, having the 
direct, short route to the Potomac, and having a night's march the start, was 
sure to reach there before either his flanks or his rear could be attacked to 
much effect, a strong rear guard being at all times ready to make a stubborn 
resistance.  His trains being already there, or at least well out of the way, 
and the roads all clear for his infantry, one night's march was ample to 
preclude all possibility of overtaking it, or of bringing it to bay.
  As soon as it became apparent, on the morning of the 5th, that

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the enemy was retreating, the Sixth corps, which had been held in reserve, and, 
so far as fighting was concerned, was fresh, though worn down with rapid 
marching, was put upon the pursuit on the Fairfield route.  At the Fairfield 
pass the column was halted, as Sedgwick did not deem it advisable to attack 
here, the enemy holding a strong position where he could easily repel many times 
his number.  Accordingly, Neill's brigade of infantry was detached, and, with 
the cavalry, followed the direct line of retreat by the Fairfield road, as did 
also another cavalry force by the Cashtown route, while the rest of the Sixth 
corps moved on through Boonsboro, and after crossing a little stream near the 
latter place, took up a position near Funkstown.
  The main body of the army remained at Gettysburg during the 5th, and large 
details were made to gather up the wounded and bury the dead.  On the 6th the 
army moved, halting a day at Middletown for needed supplies; and, after crossing 
South Mountain, and passing Boonsboro, came up with the enemy on the 12th, who 
had formed upon a line extending from Hagerstown to Downiesville, which he had 
fortified.  Lee had been unable to cross the Potomac, on account of its swollen 
condition.  Finding that his trains and wounded could not be got over, nor moved 
higher up without great danger, he determined to defend himself there; and 
though to fight a battle, with a raging and impassable river at one's back, is 
not an alternative to be chosen, it was one into which he was forced.  The 
ground favored his designs, and immense labor was bestowed to make it defensible 
and safe.  On the evening of the 12th, the Union army having by this time come 
up, a council of officers was held, at which all voted against an attack except 
two.  Accordingly, the blow was withheld, and the 13th was given to 
reconnoitring.  The result of that examination was such as to induce Meade to 
order the whole army to move up on the following morning at daylight with a view 
of assaulting.  But, during the night of the 13th, Lee commenced to withdraw, 
Ewell's corps fording the stream, and Longstreet and Hill crossing upon the 
pontoon bridge which had been reconstructed from parts of the old one recovered, 
and others improvised.  The stream was still at high tide, and Ewell's men found 
much difficulty in stemming it; but they "linked

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 324 

arms; and thus "interlaced and steadied, forded the river in mass, nearly 
shoulder deep, with the loss of but three men."
  Lee says, in his report, that the crossing was not completed until one P. M., 
when the bridge was removed.  If any considerable force did remain so late as 
this, he manoeuvred to preserve a strong front, and foiled every attempt of the 
Union troops to injure him.
  The management of the Battle of Gettysburg, on the part of the opposing 
armies, has been the subject of sharp criticism.  It is right, yea, it is the 
duty of a people who maintain military schools, and pretend to defend their flag 
by force of arms, to question closely the conduct of every battle, by the light 
of the established principles of military science, and endeavor to detect the 
errors committed, as well as the exemplification of meritorious conduct.  It is 
only by such a critical search, that the useful lessons of the past may be 
garnered.