Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 15, 325-
340

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                         MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                       by
                                SAMUEL P. BATES.

                     PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 325

                            PART I.  GENERAL HISTORY.

                                    CHAPTER XV.

                    THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

THE battle of Gettysburg, as an agency in determining the result of the contest 
between the Government and its assailants was the most important of the war.  It 
was the beginning of the end.  That little crown of saplings which Pickett made 
the mark towards which his troops were to aim, and which a part of them did 
actually reach, has been styled the "high-water mark of the rebellion."  The 
star which, to that moment, had appeared in the ascendant, began to pale and 
move to its setting.  Though in a military view many of its features are open to 
question, its lessons are not the less important.
  Lee has been blamed for being dilatory on the first day.  He had undoubtedly 
sent Hill forward on that morning to seize and hold Gettysburg, and seems not to 
have been aware that Union troops were there in much force, though he could not 
have been ignorant of the fact that a corps of the Union infantry was, on the 
night of the 30th, near at hand.  He no doubt anticipated that the arrival of 
Ewell upon the flank of the Union line would be ample for effecting the complete 
overthrow of the small Union force assembled.  Anderson's division of Hill's 
corps rested all day at Cashtown, in hearing of, and in plain view of the 
battle.  But Hill no doubt considered that he had as many troops on the field as 
he could use to advantage, and expected at every fresh onset that the First 
corps would yield.  But the obstinacy of that intrepid body of men disappointed 
his most sanguine expectations, and delayed his progress in possessing the town 
till near nightfall.  The rebel commander seems to have done all that a prudent 
officer; regarding all the

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 326 

chances, could have been expected to do.  It was the unlooked-for and 
unsurpassed valor of that First corps which balked his plans; for how could a 
body of eight thousand men, reduced finally to less than three, be expected to 
stand up nearly the whole day against twenty thousand, in an open field fight?
  Lee is also severely censured for not having pressed his advantage on the 
evening of the 1st, after the First and Eleventh corps had been driven from 
before the town.  "The attack," says Lee, in his official report, "was not 
pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered 
advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops."  But what were the 
prospects of success, had Ewell attacked?  It is not probable that either Lee or 
Ewell would have held back, had a flattering promise of victory been presented.  
A direct assault upon the front and face of Cemetery Hill would assuredly have 
been attended by a bloody repulse.  There was no point, commencing with the 
Baltimore pike and extending half way around on Culp's Hill, where one could 
have been made with any better hope of success; for the guns of Stevens and the 
division of Wadsworth completely covered that ground, which afforded excellent 
opportunities for defence.  Ewell might have pushed in, past Wadsworth's right, 
over Rock Creek and through the dense forest, as he did on the following 
evening; but it was difficult ground, and entirely unexplored; besides, the 
Twelfth corps was just then coming up on the Baltimore pike, and could have at 
once been wheeled into position to have met any advance from that quarter.  Were 
the prospects any better on the Union left?  Had Ewell advanced in that 
direction, he would first have had to encounter the cavalry of Buford, drawn out 
so as to completely cover that flank, with his artillery admirably posted for 
terrible execution, his skirmishers dismounted, and line of battle formed in 
such beautiful order, that it drew forth from that able soldier, General Warren, 
when he came upon the field, exclamations of admiration.  He would, in addition, 
have come immediately under the fire of Steinwehr's guns on Cemetery Hill, which 
would have completely enfiladed his lines.  But had he been successful in 
passing Steinwehr's guns, and in routing the hero Buford, he would then have 
found Geary's division of the Twelfth corps

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 327

in position, upon a line stretching away to Round Top, and behind Geary was the 
balance of the entire Twelfth corps, and the Third corps, General Sickles, 
already beginning to arrive.  So that, on whatever side Ewell had chosen to have 
attacked, he would have been repulsed.
  A criticism is also made against the rebel leader, that his attacks on the 2d 
were disjointed and incoherent, and they have been compared to a balky team 
swaying back and forth upon a swingle-tree.  On the contrary, they seem to have 
been made with rare skill.  It was apparently a misfortune to him, that the day 
had not been a few hours longer; but he made his attacks as soon as he could get 
his troops into position.  His first effort was to brush away Ward's brigade, so 
as to open the way to Round Top.  The obstinacy of Ward's men foiled this first 
attempt.  It was necessary, before a second was made, that heavy attacks should 
be delivered along the whole line to the Peach Orchard, to prevent 
reinforcements being sent to Ward, which had been really despatched by 
DeTrobriand, and to draw attention from the grand object of the fight, the 
possession of Round Top.  The second attempt was successful, Hood breaking 
through Ward's line, but only to find Vincent in position on the very mount 
itself, which he had hoped to seize; and Lee was again foiled.  The constant 
sending of reinforcements into the slaughter-pen above and around the Wheatfield 
necessitated constant fighting, as he had seized the Peach Orchard, the key to 
the position, from which he could easily repulse every force sent against him, 
and where he could inflict far greater loss than he himself sustained.  Hill 
withheld his attack until he saw Birney's line crumble and Humphreys' division 
fearfully exposed, and then made his determined assault at the very moment when 
he could with absolute certainty inflict the greatest damage, and gain the most 
signal success.  Had Wright, at the moment when he made his successful charge, 
and had a number of Union guns turned upon their former possessors, been 
supported by the troops which Hill had ordered to go, the result would, without 
much doubt, have effected the complete rout of the Union army.  This should be 
considered the crisis when the rebel army came nearest to a triumph, and where 
the failure, at the exact instant, of Posey,

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 328 

Mahone, and Pender to advance, cost Lee the battle.  As soon as it was 
discovered that these operations had failed, and before troops could arrive from 
other parts of the field to stay his course, Ewell attacked on the extreme rebel 
left, and here delay was not a disadvantage; for the troops which had all the 
day been in position upon that part of the field, and which would have given him 
a bloody reception, had, a few moments before, been withdrawn, to reinforce 
other portions of the line, and Ewell was left unopposed to overrun that part of 
the field; so that the delay was to him a positive advantage.  The only part of 
the line which received any help from timely reinforcement that the delay set at 
liberty, was where Carroll's brigade went to the aid of Howard.  But this 
support would no doubt have been spared to go, if the Tigers had charged at the 
instant that Hill did on the left.  Ewell has been blamed for not pushing his 
advantage further, on the night of the 2d; but he was unable, on account of the 
creek, the forest, and the rugged nature of the ground, to take his artillery 
with him; and it would not have been safe to have advanced further without it, 
as troops could have turned upon him from all quarters, and the reserve 
artillery on Benner's Hill would have easily reached him the instant he came in 
sight.  The probabilities are, therefore, that he would not have got off with 
his troops without losing heavily in captures, had he done so.
  Finally, Lee has been roundly berated for having made the last grand charge at 
all, and if he did make it, for having made it with so weak a column.  It must 
be confessed that no one of his operations on the Gettysburg field shows so 
great a lack of insight into the conditions upon which he was acting, and 
reflects so little credit upon his military skill as this.  But he had been led 
to take a hopeful view of the result of a heavy blow at this point, by the 
success which had attended the charge of a single brigade here on the day 
before, that of Wright.  If so weak a column can accomplish so great results, 
what may we not expect from the assault of a body many times more powerful, 
fresh for the work, ably led, and preluded by an artillery fire that the world 
has rarely seen paralleled, was the problem that was presented before him; and 
although he must have been sanguine of success, or he would never have ordered 
it, yet he must have con-

CONDUCT OF THE BATLE AT GETTYSBURG - 329

templated it with the deepest solicitude, and only adopted it as his last 
desperate chance.  But he failed to appreciate at its full value the fact that 
the field was nearly a level plain between the two lines, and that the instant 
his infantry crossed their works they came under view and concentrated fire of a 
full half of the Union army.  Had the column been composed of thirty thousand 
instead of fifteen or eighteen, the result could not have been other than it 
was; for before they could have crossed that mile and a quarter of space, and 
reached the Union lines, they would have been so nearly annihilated as to have 
had little force remaining; and had any considerable body made a lodgment, the 
major part of the Union army could have been there to meet it, and it would have 
resulted in a grand hand to hand combat in which the Union men would have sold 
their lives dearly, and to the last one.  Lee put in as many men as could afford 
to do, and more would have been of no avail, the whole Union army being within a 
fifteen minutes' run of the place, most of it within five, and their resolution 
was beyond parallel in the history of warfare.  This last act of Lee must ever 
be regarded as the one which had the least promise of success, and one the least 
defensible on sound principles of military tactics.
  As an offensive battle, Gettysburg will be esteemed as one, on the whole, well 
fought on the part of the rebel leader.  Had Lee, after the first day, sat down 
upon Seminary Ridge, and manoeuvred to induce the Union side to have attacked, 
and have kept a portion of his cavalry busy foraging in his rear, he might 
possibly have gained such an advantage as to have secured a temporary triumph.  
It would have been fatal for him to have waited very long, for troops were being 
gathered up and sent to the Union side from all quarters, and in a few days he 
would have been too weak to have fought even a defensive battle.  On the other 
hand, had he succeeded in bringing on an immediate battle, and been successful, 
he could never have long maintained his triumph, or have long remained on 
Northern soil.  It is doubtful if he could have reached either Baltimore or 
Washington; for there would have still been an Army of the Potomac, a force at 
Harper's Ferry of 10,000, 36,000 in the Department of Washington, 25,000

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 330

militia at Harrisburg, an army upon the James, and besides, the whole North was 
full of men, who at the first tocsin of disaster, would have flocked to the 
Union standard.
  In considering the conduct of the Union commander, many palliating 
circumstances must be allowed to have weight.  He was, in the first place, 
pitted against a veteran soldier, who had almost from the first commanded the 
Army of Northern Virginia - an army which had been formed and moulded under his 
eye, and which he had led to triumph on numberless fields - whose men had 
implicit confidence in him, amounting to a blind infatuation, and who was 
surrounded by a corps of Lieutenants of rare ability, sincerely devoted to their 
chief, and impelled by one idea - at all hazards beat the foe.  Meade, on the 
other hand, had only been three days at the head of the army, had never 
exercised an independent command before, and had only led a division in battle, 
the Fifth corps at Chancellorsville not having been seriously engaged.  His army 
was dispirited by frequent defeats, and the corps and division commanders, for 
political and other reasons, were far from being that homogeneous body that 
clasped hands about the rebel chieftain.
  Nevertheless, Meade was a soldier by profession, and it is just that his 
management of the battle should be subjected to discussion upon the principles 
that govern that profession.  The lessons which the battle should furnish can 
never be appreciated or learned until it be examined without fear or favor, and 
with a desire to discover what were its real phases.
  The first error which Meade committed was in allowing his corps to become so 
widely scattered, that at the moment of opening the battle the two extremes were 
over thirty miles apart.  In the presence of an enemy, or in close proximity to 
him, it would have been a sound principle to have kept the infantry in as 
compact a body as possible.  It is true that Meade seems to have been marching 
under the impression that the enemy was pushing for, or actually crossing the 
Susquehanna.  But he should have held his army so in hand that he would at any 
time have been prepared for a change in the enemy's plans, and not have been  
bound to this one theory.  Nothing was more likely than that the enemy should do 
precisely what he did 

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 331

do, when he found the Union army moving in close upon his flank, intent on 
fighting him.  It is unfortunate, at the least, that Meade should have been so 
deficient in scouts and spies as to have been so long ignorant of the enemy's 
intention to concentrate at Gettysburg, and to have first learned it through the 
Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad company, telegraphed from Harrisburg 
to Washington and from Washington back to the field.  Could that knowledge have 
reached him twelve hours earlier, the order of march would have been essentially 
modified, and the two corps would not then have been thrust forward into the 
jaws of the enemy without the power to support them.
  On the first day, it was unfortunate that the circular which he sent out was a 
circular and not an order; for while he and a part of his corps commanders 
regarded it as having the force of an order, others of them understood it to 
have no effect other than an intimation.  It was of so mixed a character that 
two could scarcely understand it alike.  For, while it indicated a purpose to 
fall back and concentrate on Pipe Creek, it still declared that contingencies 
might arise in which it would become expedient to fight from the present 
position.  Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday, Howard, and Sickles when he learned that 
the battle was on, believed that such contingencies had arisen, while Meade 
himself ignored that part of his circular entirely, and clung to the part which 
would carry his army back to Pipe Creek, where he could leisurely prepare 
himself to fight.  It would seem that he never forgave Doubleday and Howard for 
holding on at Gettysburg and fighting the whole day, instead of retiring and 
allowing him to carry out his preconceived plan.  Technically and morally, 
Doubleday and Howard were undoubtedly right.  In doing as they did, they obeyed 
the strict orders of Meade, and they avoided the demoralizing effect of running 
from the face of the enemy.  As the battle resulted, it may be looked upon as 
almost a direct interposition of Providence.  Meade was slow in going to the 
field, because he doubtless believed that the left wing would finally fall back, 
and then he would concentrate as he had intended.  Both Slocum and Sickles were 
morally culpable for not going to the assistance of the forces engaged at 
Gettysburg on the first day, Slocum having full warrant for doing so in the 
orders

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 332

and circulars of Meade, and Sickles having early in the day been ordered up by 
Reynolds, and having no valid excuse for disregarding the summons.  But here 
again that unfortunate circular comes to the surface, and is allowed to outweigh 
every other consideration.
  When General Meade had become satisfied that Gettysburg was a suitable place 
to fight the battle, he showed great energy and skill in concentrating his army, 
and bringing up his remote corps.  It was not until seven o'clock on the evening 
of the 1st that he came to this decision. It was after eight before the Sixth 
corps got the order to move, and having to go from Manchester by the way of 
Westminster, had thirty-four full miles to make, and yet it arrived at two of 
the following afternoon.  All the rest of his army was practically on the field 
at two in the morning.
  General Hancock assumed command as the two broken corps came back through the 
town, and as troops from other corps began to arrive.  His dispositions were 
skillfully made, and it was the firm front he was able at once to present that 
staid the hand of the enemy and made it impossible for him to push further his 
advantage.
  Meade's examination of the field on the morning of the 2d must have been 
extremely superficial and partial - a grave error.  He appears to have been 
strongly impressed with the belief that the enemy would attack him upon the 
right, and to that part of the field he must give his exclusive attention.  He, 
accordingly, put the whole of the Twelfth corps there with orders to fortify it 
thoroughly, and during the forenoon held the Fifth corps in reserve near by, 
intending also to put the Sixth in there as soon as it should arrive.  It may be 
that the experience of other fields had taught him to expect that the tactics of 
the enemy would bring him upon that flank.  At Beaver Dam Creek, Malvern Hill, 
Bull Run, Antietam, and Chancellorsville, the enemy had moved upon the Union 
right flank, and he may have anticipated that the same manœuvre would here be 
repeated.  When he found the enemy slow in opening the battle, he himself 
decided to attack from that side.  But after his engineer and General Slocum, 
who was to lead the assault, had reported the ground

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 333

impracticable for an advance, he seems to have become dissatisfied with the 
field, and despondent, and the conviction is forced upon us from his own conduct 
and sayings, and the testimony of a number of his officers, that he meditated 
changing to ground better suited to offensive operations; not necessarily to 
Pipe Creek, but to the first ground which he could find adapted to manœuvring 
his army.
  In consequence of his mind being occupied with this idea, he appears to have 
neglected to look to his left, or to make the necessary preparations for a 
defensive battle.  According to the testimony of Sickles, he discredited the 
idea of the enemy attacking him upon that side, lightly remarking, when the 
dangers to which that part of the line was exposed were urged, that Generals 
always believe that their positions are the ones in most danger, and up to the 
very moment when the battle opened, he seems to have been busy with other 
schemes, and to have given little or no attention to preparation for an attack 
from that quarter.  The consequence was, that when the battle opened his troops 
were not in position, and were actually pushed out to the ground which they 
occupied under fire.  To the repeated importunities of Sickles for orders, and 
for him to go personally upon the ground, he turned a deaf ear, and even refused 
to send his engineer, General Warren, who was certainly the person of all others 
most suitable to represent him in the decision of such a question.
  It seems the more strange that he should have neglected to make his 
dispositions upon the left strong, as Hancock, in making his report upon the 
advantages of this ground for a battle, had particularly pointed out that, as 
being the weak part, and liable to be turned.  It may be thought that the blame 
of this unpreparedness was due to the failure of Sickles to take the position 
assigned him.  But this explanation is in no way satisfactory.  Meade was early 
informed that Sickles was in trouble about his position, and by repeated 
messages was kept advised that the left of his line was not fixed and in 
readiness for battle.  Sickles was evidently very solicitous about his 
formation.  He saw that the ground in a direct line from the Cemetery Ridge to 
Round Top was unsuitable, being low and marshy, commanded by

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 334

ground to the front it, and to the left was a screen of wood and rocky surface 
that it would be dangerous to allow the enemy to take.  The altitude being 
considerably greater at the Peach Orchard than either Seminary or Cemetery lines 
opposite.  Sickles undoubtedly sincerely desired to get the true position, but 
still, to satisfy his chief and have his approval of whatever ground he should 
take.  When, therefore, Meade observed the solicitude of Sickles, and knew that 
he was liable at any moment to be attacked, it would appear that as a wise 
commander, knowing that a great battle was imminent, and intent on gaining a 
victory, he would not have rested until he had either thoroughly inspected every 
inch of the ground himself, or through his engineers, and have, early in the 
day, had his lines accurately traced and fortified, so far as we practicable, 
and the troops and their supports in position.
  But what are the facts?  Until the very opening of the battle, nearly four 
o'clock in the afternoon, he remained at his headquarters, situated near the 
centre of the field, from whence nearly every part was visible, with no 
preparation made to meet one of the most powerful and persistent assaults ever 
delivered on any field.  His Lieutenant, Sickles, tired of waiting, and learning 
from his skirmishers, who had been engaged since nine o'clock in the morning 
beyond the Emmittsburg road, and from his own observation, that the enemy was 
massing upon his left and evidently preparing for a determined attack, took up 
the ground which he deemed the best, which with his small corps he was barely 
able to cover, and the battle opened before he was entirely in possession, the 
guns having been pushed forward upon that part which was the key to the whole 
position - the Peach Orchard - after the enemy had opened fire.  The 
responsibility of this delay can never be shifted from the shoulders of General 
Meade.  He had had the whole day until four o'clock, to decide on and fortify 
his line, and he was fully aware, up to the last moment, that the troops were 
not in position, and that no works were being thrown up for their protection.  
If the short line, which he claims he intended Sickles should take, was the one 
to be occupied, it needed much labor in fortifying through the swampy ground at 
the head of Plum Run.  If the advance, or

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 335  

long line, which Sickles did take, then the key to the position - the Peach 
Orchard - should certainly have been fortified, as it was much exposed, though 
commanding.  A little work with the spade on this knoll would have rendered it 
impregnable.
  But the culpability of the delay in taking and fortifying this line, or 
whatever one was to be adopted, is more than matched by the failure to hold 
Little Round Top.  It was discovered by Warren, Meade's engineer, sometime after 
the battle had begun, and when the enemy was rushing with the force of the 
tornado to seize it, that it was entirely destitute of defenders, and that 
moreover it was a place of strength and importance.  He also, for the first 
time, now discovered that artillery could be used from its summit to good 
advantage, and also that it was practicable to bring guns upon it.  But why were 
these discoveries left to be made after the battle had begun?  Was not the 
advantage of that stronghold as apparent at six, or eight, or ten in the morning 
as at five in the afternoon?  It was finally occupied and held, but more by 
chance, or the overruling hand of Providence, than by any skill or strategy of 
the General.
  The idea has been advanced that Longstreet, in moving as he did, behind the 
screen of forest trees on Oak Ridge to the extreme Union left, was not designing 
to fight, but was preparing to march away upon the Union rear, to capture 
Meade's trains, and make conquest of Baltimore and Washington; and that he was 
arrested by the opportune advance and attack of Sickles.  But there is no 
evidence that such was the design, and every consideration of military strategy 
is against it.  Longstreet had but two of his divisions with him, and the other 
had not been ordered up, and was not soon expected.  Lee was too good a general 
to divide his army in the face of a united opponent, and allow himself to be 
destroyed piecemeal.  Besides, there were troops enough in Washington to have 
held Longstreet in check until other armies could come up, if not to have beaten 
him.  No!  Longstreet was moving to do precisely what he attempted to do, to 
capture Little Round Top and the wooded rugged ground in its immediate front, 
and had he not been attacked and arrested by the timely offensive of Sickles, he 
would doubtless have effected his purpose, and the battle would have been fought 
out on other ground.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 336

  When Meade finally awoke to the fact that the enemy was determined to fight, 
he aroused himself to the uttermost, and pushed forward supports with a lavish 
hand.  The Fifth corps, which had been resting since two that morning within a 
short distance of the field, and had come up in rear of Cemetery Hill during the 
forenoon, was sent over; portions of the Second, nearly the whole of the 
Twelfth, and portions of the Sixth which began to arrive at two in the 
afternoon, were pushed forward, and every part of Sickles' attenuated front was 
strengthened and patched.  But now his zeal to establish his left was as 
excessive as in the morning it had been wanting.  For when Sickles lost the 
Peach Orchard, the attempt to hold the parts of the line which were commanded 
and enfiladed from that key position was futile.  With the loss of this, had 
Meade contracted his line to the ground in front of Round Top held by Crawford 
and Wheaton, on the night of the 2d, and drawn in Humphreys' to the Cemetery 
Ridge before he was attacked and forced back, and then acted purely on the 
defensive, thousands of killed and wounded would have been saved, and his 
position upon the left centre would not have been placed in jeopardy.  But 
instead of this, brigade after brigade, and division after division were thrust 
out through the Wheatfield and over the wooded ground to the west and south of 
it, where the enemy rested in ambush to cut them down as fast as they came, and 
made that ground a slaughter-pen, with no advantage in the end.
  Not only was an injudicious use made of the troops thus hurried forward, but 
more than could by any possibility be used were called; and the strange error 
was committed of stripping the breastworks upon Culp's Hill and entirely 
denuding his right flank, a vital part of his line, a portion of those very 
troops, as if in mockery of his infatuation, and impelled by fate, marching far 
out of their way, and never reaching the field where it was intended to use 
them.  In the presence of the great peril, he seems to have lost the equipoise 
of his faculties.  When, finally, he had the whole of the Fifth and Sixth, all 
but one brigade of the Twelfth, two divisions of the First, and a considerable 
part of the Second transferred to the left in support of the Third, leaving but 
one brigade of the Twelfth,

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 337

and one small division each of the First and the Eleventh north of the Baltimore 
pike, then it was that the enemy attacked that weak and partially denuded line, 
at two points, with a fury and a determination almost past belief.  The 
abandoned works where should have been the left flank of the army, fell into the 
enemy's hands; but thanks to the intrepid valor of the few troops left upon that 
line, the foe was bloodily repulsed in his first assault, and held at bay in the 
other, and a great disaster was averted.  And here again the hand of Providence 
seems to have been interposed.  For the nature of the ground was such that the 
enemy could bring no artillery with him upon the right flank, and without it he 
was robbed of his fighting arm.  Could he have planted himself upon that rugged 
eminence with artillery, he might have fought as from a fortress, and bade 
defiance to his assailants.
  The error, we might be pardoned a stronger word, of removing almost the entire 
right wing, and leaving a strong position, which had been well fortified, and 
was vital to the integrity of the entire army, does not alone rest with the 
Commander-in-chief.  The responsibility must be shared by General Slocum.  
Slocum was in command of the right wing.  He knew thoroughly the ground, for he 
had reconnoitred it during the morning hours with a view of making an attack 
from it, and had regarded it of so much importance as to thoroughly fortify it.  
He should never have consented to the withdrawal of those troops without 
remonstrance; and a vigorous protest from him would have prevented it.  Or, if 
they were taken, he should not have rested till he had found troops, even though 
exhausted ones, to have taken their place.  Men were not wanting; for the whole 
Sixth corps was up and at hand.  A single brigade would have held it.  But it 
seemed as though the heads of the army were turned, and all grown giddy 
together.
  But with the setting of the sun on the evening of the 2d, the supremacy in 
generalship, which had been with the enemy, gravitated to the Union side.  The 
dispositions of the artillery on commanding eminences bearing upon the enemy on 
Culp's Hill, for repelling an advance and driving him out, were admirable, and 
the marshalling of the infantry was no less judicious and skilful.  There was 
none of that stripping of troops from one

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 338

part of the line and rushing them in superabundance to another, which had so 
blotted and shadowed the conduct of the preceding day.  But there was equipoise 
and a self-assurance, as of a General who felt the full command of his 
faculties, that is refreshing and inspiring to contemplate.  The manœuvres for 
regaining the lost ground were dexterously conducted, and would have soon 
resulted in the capture of large numbers of the foe had he not made a timely 
retreat.
  During the morning of the 3d, every arm of the service was kept in full tide.  
The cavalry was in strength, vigilant and active on either flank; the artillery 
was repaired and posted in abundance, well supplied with ammunition, and the 
infantry lines were everywhere strong, with ample supports well in hand to meet 
any emergency.  When, therefore, that supreme effort of the foe came on the 
afternoon of the 3d, it was met and repulsed, without weakening any other part 
of the line, and in the spirit of a master.  Another and another such assault on 
whatever part it might have come would have been welcomed with as determined a 
front as was this.
  Several Union Generals give it as their opinion in their testimony, that if 
Meade had immediately ordered a countercharge with a strong column, the enemy 
might have been routed and his army destroyed.  But such an opinion is in no 
case supported by any convincing reasons.  The enemy was well prepared to meet a 
countercharge, in good position and behind breastworks.  He had been prodigal of 
his ammunition; but Lee and Longstreet were too cool and calculating to have 
squandered all and not have saved enough to repel any assault that could have 
been made; beside, Longstreet expressly testifies that he was in readiness, and 
would have counted such an assault as a rare piece of good fortune.  The very 
same condition which made it easy for the Union forces to repulse Longstreet, 
would have been in that officer's favor had an attack been made upon him.  It 
was the fact that the ground between the two lines was perfectly open, enabling 
either side to see and prepare to meet a charge from the very moment of 
starting, and that in the whole distance to be passed over the advancing troops 
would be exposed to a destructive fire, certain to annihilate them, that 
rendered

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 339

it impossible for either party to make a front attack with any prospect of 
success.
  Maintaining his position firmly during the night of the 3rd and day of the 
4th, there was no hope of advantage by direct attack.  When the night of the 4th 
came, Lee was able to withdraw, under cover of darkness, without fear of 
molestation.  There was only left a rear-guard which on the morning of the 6th 
is was possible to reach.  To fight a rear-guard is always a bootless task; for 
while it presents only a small front, it can by falling back gradually, and 
taking strong positions, inflict great slaughter upon the attacking party, which 
must expose itself in approaching; and even if it is overpowered and captured, 
it is in itself so insignificant as to be of small account.
  To have followed Lee's rear-guard then would have cost an expenditure of blood 
not warranted by the fruits which gave promise of being gathered.  Having 
complete control of the two shortest routes to the Potomac, and one night the 
start, Lee was able to reach it without molestation, except such as the cavalry 
could interpose, which was inconsiderable.  Considering the situation in which 
the two armies were, relative to the roads leading to the Potomac, it was no 
lack of generalship on the part of Meade in allowing Lee to make unmolested the 
transfer; for it was inevitable, one night sufficing to put the major part 
beyond the reach of the pursuing army.  Once safely at the Potomac, Lee might 
have crossed immediately had the river been fordable, or had his bridges been in 
position; but these were gone and the waters were at flood. His only 
alternative, therefore, was to fortify, which he had ample time to do, the house 
of one night being enough. Meade might have followed by the direct roads over 
which the enemy had gone, whereby he would have saved several days.  But it 
would have been of no avail, as he would have found the enemy fortified, had he 
made the march with as much expedition as the enemy himself.  But he seems to 
have considered his instructions to cover Washington and Baltimore of as much 
importance while following a beaten foe, as in facing one in full strength.
  When Meade came again to confront the enemy, he found him in strong position 
and ready for a fight.  Had Meade

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 340

attacked, he would have met the fate of Magruder at Malvern Hill or Burnside at 
Fredericksburg.  It has been asserted that Lee was deficient in ammunition at  
Williamsport, and that a resolute attack would have insured success; but such 
was not the fact.  Meade says in his testimony:  "I had reason to believe that 
ammunition trains had been brought from Winchester, and crossed on the Ferry at 
Williamsport for the supply of General Lee's army. . . . I had positive 
information that ammunition trains had been ferried across at Williamsport;" and 
General Imboden, in the article above quoted, says: "This would have been fatal 
to us, but for the opportune arrival at the critical moment of an ammunition 
train from Winchester.  The wagons were ferried across to our side as soon as 
possible, and driven on the field in a gallop."  This was on the morning of the 
6th, so that when Meade came on the 12th, there was no lack of ammunition for 
all arms.
  There was only one contingency in which Meade can with justice be blamed for 
not attacking at Williamsport.  General Lee says in his report:  "Ewell's corps 
forded the river at Williamsport, those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the 
bridge.  Owing to the condition of the roads, the troops did not reach the 
bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed 
until one P. M., when the bridge was removed."  As at Gettysburg Lee held his 
front firmly until the evening of the 5th, giving no opportunity to attack with 
a prospect of success, and then retired under the cover of darkness, so here at 
Williamsport he held his impregnable ground until dark of the 13th, and again 
disappeared under the shelter of the night.  But if it be true that any 
considerable part of his army was on the North bank at daylight of the 14th, 
Meade is guilty of negligence for not knowing it and attacking.  It was the only 
occasion he had of striking a successful blow.  But the probability is that only 
a small number of the enemy's troops remained at that time in the morning when 
Meade could have got his forces forward to the points of attack, and then only 
the opportunity of fighting a rear-guard would have been presented.