Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 5, 116- 140 Contributed for use in the USGenWeb Archives by Judy Banja jbanja@msn.com and transcribed by Judy Banja, Judith Bookwalter, Cyndie Enfinger, Linda Horn, Margaret Long, Patricia Martz, Barbara Milhalcik, Leah Waring and Marjorie B. Winter Copyright 2003. All rights reserved. http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm http://www.usgwarchives.net/pa/pafiles.htm ________________________________________________ MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA by SAMUEL P. BATES. PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876. MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 116 PART I. GENERAL HISTORY. CHAPTER V. THE FIRST CAMPAIGN. THE authors of the Rebellion, in their mad haste to fire the Southern heart, did not seem to realize that they were wielding a two-edged sword. Major Anderson, who, with his little garrison, had been shut up in Fort Sumter for many weeks, while the South Carolina Secessionists were preparing powerful batteries bearing upon it, had given notice that his provisions would be exhausted on the 15th of April, and that he would then be compelled to peacefully evacuate. But to allow him to depart without bloodshed, and they to take quiet possession, did not answer the fell designs of the conspirators. Edmund Ruffin, a suggestive name, who had been sent from Virginia to assist in inciting to action, declared, "The first drop of blood spilled on the soil of South Carolina will bring Virginia and every Southern State to her side." Mr. Gilchrist, a member of the Alabama Legislature, in addressing Mr. Davis and a part of his Cabinet, at Montgomery, said: "Gentlemen, unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama, they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days." Accordingly, at midnight of the 11th, but four days before hunger would have obliged the garrison of Fort Sumter to withdraw, signal guns were fired, and soon afterwards a bombardment was opened upon the fort from heavy guns at Cumming's Point, Sullivan's Island, Fort Moultrie, and the whole circumference of works erected for its destruction. The fort was in no condition for defence, and after making such resistance as was possible, and suffering from the heat of the burning barracks, which had THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 117 been fired by the insurgents' missiles, Major Anderson surrendered. The first shot at Sumter may have had the effect designed - that of stirring the heart of the South - but it no less effectually aroused the heart of the North. The feeling expressed by a soldier by profession, who had grown grey in the service of his country, the late Colonel Seneca G. Simmons, who fell at the climax of the battle at Charles City Cross Roads, was a fair illustration of the effect which that shot produced upon the Northern mind. When the first intelligence was received, with much emotion, he exclaimed: "I have been a friend of the Southern people, and in the line of my duty would have lain down my life in their defence; but why did they fire upon the old flag?" and in his compressed lips and flashing eye was read the answer. In that resolute, grizzly-bearded, silent soldier, with bosom heaving with resentment, was personified the twenty millions of the North. A little more than a month before this, Mr. Lincoln had been inaugurated, and in his address on that occasion, he had declared his intention, while neither having any right nor desire to interfere with Slavery in the States where it then existed, nevertheless, to take care, as the Constitution enjoined upon him, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. After expressing this, his sworn duty and determination, he appealed in a strain of pathetic tenderness and fraternal feeling rarely excelled, for an observance of the obligations resting on all alike. "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen," he said, "and not in mine, are the momentous issues of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect, and defend it. I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies - though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearth-stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely it will be, by the better angels of our nature." MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 118 When, therefore, in disregard of the warning and the appeal, the insurgents at Charleston fired upon the flag, and sought by every device known to modern warfare to destroy a fort of the nation, and slaughter its garrison, the President had but one recourse, and every citizen who regarded the National honor, felt a like obligation. Accordingly, on the 15th of April, he issued his proclamation calling out the militia of the several States, to the number of 75,000 men, and convening Congress in extra session on the 4th of July. The troops thus called, he stated, would be used probably to repossess forts, places, and property unlawfully seized. But the insurgents, intoxicated by their first triumph, talked loudly of more considerable aggressions. "No man can foretell," said the rebel Secretary of War, Walker, in response to a serenade of Davis and his Cabinet, on the occasion of the fall of Sumter, "the events of the war inaugurated; but I will venture to predict that the flag which now floats on the breeze will, before the 1st of May, float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington, and if they choose to try Southern chivalry, and test the extent of Southern resources, will eventually float over Faneuil Hall, in Boston." The Richmond Examiner, of the 13th, said: "Nothing is more probable than that President Davis will soon march an army through North Carolina and Virginia to Washington," and a few days later, in a strain of grandiloquent appeal, said: "From the mountain tops and valleys to the shores of the sea, there is one wild shout of fierce resolve to capture Washington City at all and every human hazard." Instead, therefore, of repossessing forts, places, and property unlawfully seized, or of coercing a State, as the seceders had cried out against, Mr. Lincoln was obliged, first of all, to defend himself, the Government, and its archives from the actual assaults of the enemy. Insurgent forces were drilling within sight of the Capitol itself almost from the moment of his inauguration. Indeed, a skilfully arranged disposition of the military under the command of General Scott alone guaranteed safety for his induction into office. The plan for the capture of the Capital was ingeniously laid. The rebellious element in Baltimore, which had been purposely THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 119 strengthened by a rushing thither of reckless and daring men from many parts of the South, was able, for the time, to control the city. Its local Government, and even the Executive of the State, were understood to be lukewarm in their support of the National authority, and openly hostile to the passage of troops from the North over Maryland soil in their march to the Capital. If, therefore, the means of communication could be cut, and troops moving southward delayed until a sufficient force had been quietly gathered, the National seat of Government, with all its public property, including vast stores of military weapons and material, would fall an easy prey. But, like many other schemes of Southern leaders, this proved abortive. The defeat of the plans was largely due to the prompt arrival of Pennsylvania soldiers. As soon as the President's call, which was issued on the 15th of April, was received at Harrisburg, Governor Curtin made haste to repeat it throughout the Commonwealth, and soon a tide of messages was flowing in, from officers of companies tendering the services of their commands. The first thus to respond, which from their good state of discipline and readiness to move, could be made available, were the Ringgold Light Artillery of Reading, Captain James McKnight; the Logan Guards of Lewistown, Captain John B. Selheimer; the Washington Artillery, Captain James Wren, and the National Light Infantry, Captain Edmund McDonald, both of Pottsville; and the Allen Rifles, Captain Thomas Yeager, of Allentown. The first of these, the Ringgold Artillery, was remarkably well drilled and officered, and had been formed more than ten years previous. Its commander, Captain McKnight, had received intimations that his company would be called for in case of emergency. When the news came of the attack on Sumter, the company was drilling in a field at some distance from the city. The intelligence created intense excitement, and the call was loudly made to be led at once to the aid of the Government. At the request of the author of this volume, Captain McKnight prepared a full and very interesting account of the service of his command, from which extracts are presented: "The company," he says, "was armed with four six-pounder brass field-pieces and caissons, with the full equipments of artillerists, including sabres. The MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 120 men were very efficient in drill, and previous to the dread tocsin of actual war, had made several excursions, and lodged more than once upon the tented field. . . . Previous to the outbreak of hostilities, I deemed it prudent to get my company into the best possible condition. Indeed, as early as January, 1861, it was intimated to me, through General William H. Keim, that the services of the Ringgolds would probably be required before long. The General, I recollect, asked me how much time would be needed to get ready. My reply was, that we were ready at any moment, and, as he spoke in behalf of the State, though privately, not to occasion unnecessary alarm, from that time the Ringgolds considered their services offered to the Government. Therefore frequent, almost daily drills were practiced. When the news came that Fort Sumter had been fired upon, with the unanimous consent of the company, I held it in instant readiness for the service of the General Government. This was before President Lincoln made his call for 75,000 men. "It was a memorable day for us when the dispatch, announcing the attack on Fort Sumter, reached us. We were at drill about a mile and a half from the city, at about half past eleven A. M. The effect was electrical. All were impatient to start at once. This was on the 15th. Next day, the 16th, marching orders reached us from Harrisburg, from Governor Curtin himself. I immediately got my men together, read the communication, and on the same afternoon at 2 o'clock, was ready to start; but by the advice of the General Superintendent of the Reading Railroad Company, G. A. Nicholls, instead of taking the special train offered, we waited for the regular evening train which started at 6 o'clock. At 8 o'clock P. M., we arrived in Harrisburg, and reported 152 men to the Secretary of State, Colonel Slifer, the Governor being absent in Washington." Mr. Slifer telegraphed for orders to the Secretary of War, and received an immediate response directing that the company be forwarded at once. An order to this effect was issued to Captain McKnight, but was soon after countermanded, that other troops then on the way might join him, and all proceed in a body. Had this order been executed the Ringgolds would have reached Washington at three o'clock on the morning of the 17th. But THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 121 they were compelled instead to remain in Harrisburg. The four other companies named above arrived early on the morning of the 17th, and on the morning of the 18th company H of the Fourth Artillery, under command of Lieutenant Pemberton, afterwards General Pemberton of the Rebel Army, came in from the West, having been ordered to Fort McHenry in Baltimore. The six companies, accordingly, moved by the same train over the Northern Central Railroad. By direction of the Secretary of War Captain McKnight's company left its guns, caissons, and equipments, except sabers, at Harrisburg, to the sore displeasure of the men. The Regulars, to the number of some forty or fifty, had their muskets, as had also a part of the Logan Guards. With the exception of these, and the sabers of the Ringgolds, the party was entirely unarmed. They arrived in Baltimore at half past three in the afternoon. Of their progress, Captain McKnight gives the following account: "At Baltimore it was necessary for us to march a distance of about two miles to the Washington depot, and we proceeded in the following order; first was company H, Fourth United States Artillery, and then followed in succession the Logan Guards, Allen Rifle, Washington Artillery, National Light Infantry, and the Ringgold Light Artillery. It will thus be seen that my company occupied the second post of honor, the Regulars having the first. The detail of our march through Baltimore I cannot give in more truthful or forcible language than that employed by my friend, Captain E. L. Smith, in a letter addressed to his brother-in-law, the Hon. J. Depuy Davis, State Senator from this county (Berks), bearing date Washington, April 20th, 1861. Captain Smith, it is but proper to say, left his position as a leading lawyer and rising public man in the community, and joined by company as a private; but before the expiration of our company's service he received his commission as Captain in the Regular Army. He says: 'We were under strict orders to say nothing to any one about our reception at, and march through Baltimore. It was feared, that if all the circumstances of our reception in that city were made public, the effect would be to alarm and intimidate. The attack of the mob on the Massachusetts volunteers yesterday (19th) has removed the injunction of secrecy, and I proceed to MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 122 give you an account of our passage. We were accompanied from Harrisburg by a body of regulars from the West, numbering some forty or fifty, and the volunteers from Schuylkill, Lehigh, and Mifflin counties, in all some 400 strong. A large force of police met us, upon our landing at the depot, to escort us on our march of about two miles to the Washington Railroad terminus. We were greeted by the mob, which I judged from their appearance to be of all classes, with loud cheers for Jeff. Davis and Secession, and the display of disunion badges accompanied with groans for Lincoln and the Wide-Awakes, with whom it was our misfortune to be at once identified. The Secessionists are, as yet, evidently of the opinion, that no one but a Republican of the North will fight for the government. This delusion, which, in their situation is, perhaps, natural enough, encourages them, as much as anything else, to hold out against us, in the hope of a reaction in the North in their favor, on the part of the Democrats. The mob hemmed us in on every side, outnumbering ourselves by at least a hundred to one. I must do the rowdies of Baltimore the justice to say that they proved themselves the most accomplished of their class. To tell you that they indulged in the vilest billingsgate conveys not the slightest idea of the Baltimore vocabulary, which is sui generis, abounding in taunt so remarkable in its ingenuity, that it was next to impossible not to reply to it, accompanied by appropriate gesticulations, superior to anything I have ever seen in the whole range of the theatre. . . . Without the most positive orders from our Captain under no circumstances to utter a word, it would not have been in my nature to have remained silent or passive. The first insult I heard was from a person, who, from his dress, et cetera, might have passed for a gentleman: "You Ugly _____," said he, close to the Captain's face, "but you can't help it, poor devils, you didn't make yourselves." "The whole lager-beer posse," said another, "will hardly make manure enough for one little cotton-plant; their sour-krout carcasses aren't guano nohow." Sometimes they would pitch into some particular individual with the vilest personal allusions, which, if the matter had not been so serious, would have provoked deserved laughter. "Do you see that tall four-eyed monster?" said one, pointing to a spectacled private, "Jeff. Davis will ventilate his window-panes in THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 123 nine days." It would fill a volume to detail their smart and opprobrious sayings which were leveled at us all along the route, so near to our ears indeed, that it required the resolution of veterans to bear them. Fists were brandished close to our noses, and the most fearful menaces used. The regulars who accompanied us were our main reliance in case of an attack. The police did good service; but it was plain, from the smiles of many of them at the jests of the crowd, that they were acting from a sense of duty only, and were not in sympathy with us. The regulars by their example did much to keep us from giving rein to the anger and indignation with which every breast was swelling. They marched like so many statues of bronze, seemingly deaf to the din and uproar about them. You will be surprised to learn that not a man of our company was armed except with his sabre. Our swords indeed were formidable enough in their way, but would not have deterred the mob had they known we were without other weapons. They evidently supposed us to be well prepared for any emergency, and our soldierly bearing assisted the delusion. Competent military men, who saw and have heard of our conduct, have expressed surprise that volunteers, and, indeed, many of us the rawest recruits, were so well equal to the critical condition of affairs. The slightest response, upon our side, to the insult of the mob, would have precipitated one of the bloodiest street fights imaginable. What made this ordeal the more trying to us was the fact, that we did not apprehend any molestation. We were fortified in this idea by our reception at every way-station on the road. The enthusiasm in the rural districts of Maryland for us, the display of the old Union banner, the approving smiles of the ladies, and the waving of handkerchiefs from every country mansion, showed that the Union feeling in Maryland was no less strong than that of our own State. Even in the very suburbs of Baltimore, these Union manifestations were observable, and in the city itself, many were the quiet spectators, who looked as if they longed to approach, but thought it wise to refrain. At some points shouts for the Union were given with a will, responded to by the execrations of the mob. One little fellow, an Irishman, at the Washington depot, told us not to fear, that our friends out-numbered the mob, and in case of need would stand by us. He MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 124 was at once surrounded by the frantic crowd, and it was a spectacle worth beholding and never to be forgotten, to see him alone, maintaining himself and his sentiments against thousands. He would speedily have been overwhelmed, but the police rescued him. Having endured this terrible ordeal of threatening and abuse, we were thrown pell-mell into cattle cars for Washington. But no sooner were we placed aboard than an attempt was made by the mob to detach the engine from the train and run it away. This was only prevented by the engineer and his assistants drawing revolvers, and threatening to shoot any who dared make the attempt. At length we were dismissed for the Capital, amid the yells and execrations of the hellish ruffians; while incessant showers of stones, brickbats, and other missiles from their infuriated hands saluted the cars. Yet by remarkable good fortune, not a man was hurt, and we arrived here at 7 1/2 o'clock of the same day, and were assigned quarters in the Hall of the House of Representatives. . .'" The arrival of these companies caused great rejoicing at the Capital, as the city was entirely destitute of defences or defenders, and there was hourly expectation of the approach of the enemy. It was a matter of congratulation that they had escaped a collision with the turbulent element which raged and seethed around them in the streets of Baltimore. The company of regulars that headed the column had filed off to go to Fort McHenry, their destination, while on the march through the city, and had left the volunteers to pursue their way alone. This was the signal for renewed insults and intensified shoutings; but the Logan Guards, who were left at the head of the column, were uniformed and armed very nearly like the regulars, and by preserving a bold front and passions immovable, they escaped harm. They had had no food since leaving Harrisburg, and were worn out with fatigue and hunger; but their wants were speedily supplied and the Capitol was warmed and lighted up, at once transforming its dismal and almost mournful aspect into one of comfort and cheer. As the brilliant lights shone forth, the rumor spread through the city that a large force of Northern troups, armed with Minie rifles, were quartered in the Capitol. Mr. Lossing gives the following account of the origin of this rumor, which, by creating, THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 125 the impression that a much larger force had arrived than was actually there, may have saved it from capture: "This rumor was started by James D. Gay, a member of the Ringgold Light Artillery, who was in Washington City, on business, at the time of their arrival. He was already an enrolled member of a temporary home- guard in Washington, under Cassius M. Clay, which we shall consider presently, and was working with all his might for the salvation of the city. After exchanging greetings with his company at the Capitol, he hastened to Willard's Hotel to proclaim the news. In a letter to the writer, he says: 'The first man I met as I entered the doors was Lieutenant-Colonel Magruder [who afterwards abandoned his flag, and was a General of the Confederate army]. I said, "Colonel, have you heard the good news?" "What is it," he asked. I told him to step to the door. He did so. Pointing to the lights at the Capitol, I said, "Do you see that?" "Yes," he answered, "but what of that?" "Two thousand soldiers," I said, "have marched in there this evening, sir, armed with Minie rifles." "Possible! so much!" he exclaimed, in an excited manner. Of course, what I told him was not true, but I thought that, in the absence of sufficient troops, this false report might save the city.' Mr. Gay's 'pious fraud' had the desired effect." These five companies, the van of the great army which followed, were immediately supplied with arms and accoutrements, and were put to barricading the Capitol with barrels of flour and cement, and large sheets of boiler iron. Their arrival was opportune, and the promptitude and courage which they displayed was made the subject of the following resolution, unanimously passed by the House of Representatives: "That the thanks of this House are due, and are hereby tendered to the 530 soldiers from Pennsylvania, who passed through the mob of Baltimore, and reached Washington on the 18th of April last, for the defence of the National Capital." On the following day, with kindred zeal General William F. Small, of Philadelphia, who had early in the year recruited and organized a body of troops known as the Washington Brigade, acting under orders of the Secretary of War, also attempted to pass through Baltimore. General Small had started on the even- MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 126 ing of the 18th, with instructions to have the train bearing him taken through Baltimore before daylight, so as to avoid the mob; but through treachery or culpable negligence, he was delayed, and did not reach that city until noon. The Massachusetts Sixth, under command of Colonel Jones, had arrived in Philadelphia on the evening of the 18th, on its way from Boston to Washington, and had encamped for the night, intending to proceed on the following day; but intelligence having been received at midnight that violence would probably be offered at Baltimore, Colonel Jones ordered the long roll beaten, and at one o'clock on the morning of the 19th, started by special train on the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, hoping to pass through the hostile city before its population should be astir. Mr. Felton, President of this road, says: "I called the Colonel and principal officers into my office, and told them of the dangers they would probably encounter, and advised that each soldier should load his musket before leaving, and be ready for any emergency." This advice was acted on; but the train did not reach that place until near noon, having joined General Small on the way, and come in ahead of him. The track extends through the city, but for nearly two miles the cars have to be drawn by horses. Before reaching the city, Colonel Jones had issued the following order to his men: "The regiment will march through Baltimore in columns of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be abused, insulted, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front, and give no heed to the mob, even if they throw bricks, stones, and other missiles; but if you are fired upon, and any one of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him." As soon as the engine was detached, five cars, containing seven companies, were drawn by horses rapidly through the city, and reached the Washington depot without molestation. It was sometime before the car containing the next company moved; but when it did, it was taken along singly, and was very soon thrown from the track, and the men were attacked by the mob with bricks and stones, and finally with pistols. The fire was THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 127 returned by the company, and the fight continued with unabated fury until it rejoined the seven companies which had preceded it. The remaining three companies, with the band, had been detained on the road. When they finally reached the depot, they found the track demolished and the rails carried away. Their only alternative was then to march through the city. They had scarcely started when they were assailed by every imaginable taunt and insult, and soon by missiles of every description, a pile of paving stones having been purposely loosened, ostensibly to repair the street. Finally fire arms were brought into use; but not until two of the soldiers had been killed and a number wounded did this courageous band of only about two hundred heed the insults and deadly attacks of the thousands of mad men by whom they were surrounded. They then received orders to fire, and under their well-directed aim, numbers of the mob began to drop and give way before them. They finally reached their destination, and with their comrades, moved off for Washington. Five of the soldiers were killed and thirty-six were wounded. It is a circumstance worthy of mention, that this was the 19th of April, the anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, where the first blood was shed in the War of Independence, and the first victims at Baltimore in the new war were from the county of Middlesex, Massachusetts, in which are Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, and some of the attacked were the descendants of the men who contended on those historic fields. In the meantime, General Small had arrived, and finding the track demolished, saw at once that all hope of being taken through in cars was gone. His men were ununiformed and unarmed, but with the true spirit of a soldier he determined to brave every peril, and march through the city. The mob, having done with the Massachusetts men, now returned maddened by the taste of blood, to wreak their vengeance upon the Pennsylvanians. For a time, General Small was able to breast the storm, but finding the tumult thickening and his men unarmed, after having one killed and a number wounded, he decided to withdraw and return to Philadelphia. Not satisfied with its victory, the mob followed up the defenceless soldiers and pelted them with stones and clubs, pursuing the train so long as a missile MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 128 could be made to reach them. Before this determination had been taken by General Small, and while his men were still struggling in the street, the Mayor of the city and Police Commissioners sent the following telegram to Mr. Felton at Philadelphia: "Withdraw the troops now in Baltimore, and send no more through Baltimore or Maryland." Bethinking himself of the Seaford and Annapolis route, which would avoid Baltimore, and feeling confident that the bridges by way of Baltimore would be burned in any event, Mr. Felton answered: "I will withdraw the troops now in Baltimore, and send no more through the city till I first consult with you," being careful to say nothing about sending over other parts of Maryland; in fact, having already taken measures to secure the ferry- boat at Perryville. During the night following the 19th, a consultation was held at the house of General Patterson, Governor Curtin, Mr. Felton, Mr. Thompson, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad company, Mr. Hazlehurst, and Mayor Henry being present, at which it was decided, after considerable discussion, to adopt the Perryville route, and means were adopted to procure boats to ply between Perryville and Annapolis. As was anticipated, the bridges on the Baltimore road were burned that night, as were also those on the Northern Central; the telegraph wires were cut, and all communication with the North was severed. Hon. Morrow B. Lowry, who for nine succeeding years was State Senator from the Erie district, had the day before visited Harrisburg to offer his services to the Government, and had been sent by Governor Curtin to Baltimore to watch the progress of events, and keep the State authorities informed of what was transpiring. He arrived on the 19th, the day of the passage of the Massachusetts troups, and was witness to the wild storm and tumult of the dangerous elements in that turbulent city. "No pen," he says, "can describe the horrors of that scene. Upon the pavement at my feet flowed the first blood that was shed in the slaveholder's rebellion. I telegraphed to the authorities at Harrisburg and Philadelphia to send no more troops, as ample preparations existed at Baltimore to send them to bloody graves. Towards evening the railroad bridges on the Northern Central, as well as the Philadelphia and Baltimore Railroad were fired, and I was thankful to see the flames which would THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 129 prevent the approach of more victims. Late in the evening I succeeded in getting a carriage, and went to make a personal examination of the destruction which had been done to these roads, and satisfy myself that no more troops could be taken over them. I then drove to the Washington depot, where I found a car would leave at midnight. I availed myself of the opportunity and reached the Capital at daylight, glad to part company with the roughs who had accompanied me, and who appeared to be there for no good purpose. I drove immediately to the residence of General Cameron, then Secretary of War. His servant informed me that he had not been at home that night. We then drove to the War Office. There was no sentinel on the outside, and I found no one upon the first floor except a colored man sleeping in his chair in the hall, whom I did not disturb, but proceeded to the Secretary's room on the next story. Upon opening the door of the Secretary's private room, I found him sleeping soundly upon a lounge, being exhausted with a hard night's work. I awoke him, when he sprang to his feet, and, calling me by name, demanded by what means I came there. In a few words I communicated to him the condition of the bridges and telegraph lines, and in general the state of things in Baltimore. He at once said: 'Come with me and we will find General Scott.' His residence, a small brick house near the War Office, was soon reached. An old colored woman answered our call. We entered very unceremoniously, and proceeded to General Scott's room, a little bed place upon the floor above. General Cameron aroused him, and communicated the information I had brought. General Scott said: 'Do you know Mr. Lowry? Is he a reliable man?' On being assured of my reliability, turning to Mr. Cameron, he said: 'Call a meeting of the Cabinet at the President's house in the shortest possible time.' Mr. Cameron started at once to find Secretary Seward, and I proceeded to the White House. "It was now broad daylight. A servant admitted me, whom I prevailed upon, after some hesitation, to call President Lincoln and say to him that Mr. Lowry of Pennsylvania had startling intelligence to communicate. The President made his appearance half-dressed, and I related to him the story of the Baltimore mob, and the cutting off of communication North. Mr. Lincoln MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 130 realized the situation at once. Seeing my exhausted condition, he ordered refreshments for me, of which I stood greatly in need, having eaten nothing since noon of the previous day. It was evident that the salvation of Washington depended upon the government being able to prevent the destruction of the bridges and road between Perryville and Philadelphia, so as to keep the Annapolis route open. It was also evident that it must repair the bridges of the Northern Central, and the Philadelphia and Wilmington roads and force a passage for Northern troops through Baltimore. To further this it was determined that I should return, as best I could, to Philadelphia and Harrisburg. A slip of paper was given me, signed by Abraham Lincoln, and Simon Cameron, which read: 'Morrow B. Lowry has the confidence of the Government, and all its officers to whom he wishes to communicate must give him every facility in their power.' Concealing this about my person, at about ten o'clock, Saturday morning, I started back to Baltimore. I found a rougher set of men than I had gone over with, though some of them were the identical ones. The train was delayed, and we did not reach Baltimore until half-past three in the afternoon. "I did not like the attentions I received from some of those who had been my fellow-passengers, so, as they left the cars on the north side, I took the south, and continued my journey on foot heading for Philadelphia. I had a farm about two miles north on the Philadelphia road, and there was living on the place a man by the name of Shunk. I went to his house. He was absent on my arrival, but soon returned. He was not a Northern man in sentiment. I told him that it was important that I should reach Philadelphia that night, and that if he would put me through to Perryville, I would give him $100. He said he could not do it. The truth was, he was afraid to be seen with a Northern man. I then walked out through a lane, leading from my own premises to the Philadelphia Pike. I had hardly entered it, before I was arrested by a half dozen men, some on horseback, who took charge of me as being a suspicious character. Every lane and avenue out of Baltimore appeared to be guarded. I invited my captors to a neighboring saloon, and supplied them plenteously with whiskey, assured them that I was all right, and THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 131 took them back to Shunk, who vouched for me and satisfied them. After they left I arranged with Shunk to wait until midnight, when he said he would smuggle me through to the headquarters of an abolitionist named Felix Von Rueth, who lived in the direction of Philadelphia, about ten miles out. Soon after midnight we started on horseback through fields and by-ways, he being familiar with the country. We did not reach our destination until after daylight on Sabbath morning. "Von Rueth received me kindly. At his house I found three or four wounded soldiers, who had been beaten back from Baltimore. I acquainted him with the great necessity which existed of my arriving early in Philadelphia, for I had learned that it was the intention of the conspirators that evening to burn some bridges east of Perryville, which would break up communication with Annapolis. Von Rueth gave me breakfast, and placing me in an old-fashioned gig, sent his son Flavius (a dashing young man) to drive me. We proceeded a few miles, when we came to a tavern where there were four or five hundred men assembled, armed with every conceivable weapon, to head back the Northern horde, whom they had been told would attempt to pass to Baltimore on the Philadelphia turnpike. When we came in sight of the house, it was evident that we could not pass unmolested. So we made a virtue of necessity, and drove boldly up to the door. Before we could alight, my name and business were demanded. Von Rueth told them I was a clergyman, whom he was taking to preach at Perryville that night. After satisfying them that I belonged to the Methodist Episcopal Church South, we were allowed to go on our way unmolested. I might not have had any trouble in crossing at Perryville, but feared to make the attempt, and kept south a mile or two, where Von Rueth left me. The river is wide at this point, but a man was induced to set me across in a crazy old skiff. I then walked through the marshy ground to the depot. I went at once to the telegraph office, and my heart was rejoiced to find, by the click of the instrument, that I could communicate with Philadelphia. It was about two o'clock Sabbath afternoon, when I telegraphed to General Patterson that I had important communications from the Government, and orders for him to send a strong force of men to guard every bridge between there MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 132 and Philadelphia. A special locomotive arrived in an incredibly short space of time, and I was not only in Philadelphia, but Harrisburg, before ten o'clock that night. I returned to Washington with General Butler on the first train over the road that had thus been so providentially saved for the Northern troops." On the 16th of April, Governor Curtin had appointed Major-Generals Robert Patterson and William H. Keim to the command of the troops called out by the Proclamation of President Lincoln of the preceding day, and shortly after, General Patterson was appointed by Lieutenant-General Scott, then General-in- chief, to command the Department of Washington, embracing the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia, with headquarters at Philadelphia. Before the route to Washington through Baltimore had been closed, General Patterson, acting upon the advice of Mr. Felton, had selected the Annapolis route, and had sent his aide, Hon. John Sherman, of Ohio, to Washington, to recommend it to the attention of the Government. The dispatches brought through by Mr. Lowry gave him authority to act, and he immediately took measures to make it abundantly secure, placing General Butler with the Massachusetts Eighth, and Colonel Lefferts with the New York Seventh, upon the road, who not only held it, but proceeded to repair the track and disabled engines, skilled mechanics being readily found in the ranks. The number of troops required from Pennsylvania under this first call was sixteen regiments of infantry, afterwards reduced to fourteen. When several of the border States refused to furnish men, the number from the States willing to contribute was increased, and twenty-five regiments were finally accepted. "Such was the patriotic ardor of the people," says Adjutant-General Russell, "that the services of about thirty regiments had to be refused, making in all more than one-half the requisition of the President." When the communication with Washington was severed, which remained so for several days, General Patterson was left without orders, and was obliged to act upon his own judgment. Foreseeing the desperate nature of the contest upon which the country was entering, and convinced that the small force called for three months would be unable to effect the pur- THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 133 pose for which they were summoned, and fearful that at the expiration of their term no troops would be in readiness to take their places, he assumed the responsibility of authorizing the formation of an additional force in the following words, addressed to the Governor of Pennsylvania: "I feel it my duty to express to you my clear and decided opinion that the force at the disposal of this Department should be increased without delay. I, therefore, have to request of your Excellency to direct, that twenty-five additional regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry be called for forthwith, to be mustered into the service of the United States." Steps were immediately taken to raise this force, and considerable progress had been made, when communication with the Capital was restored, and the Government, not feeling itself warranted in calling more troops, revoked the General's order, accompanying the notice of revocation with the statement "that it was more important to reduce than enlarge the number" already ordered. The first duty after securing the Annapolis route, was to open that by way of Baltimore, and as soon as the troops were organized and sufficiently in hand, it was promptly undertaken. The forces selected for this purpose were the Seventeenth Pennsylvania regiment, known in the militia as the First Artillery, T. W. Sherman's Light Battery, and five companies of the Third Regular Infantry, all under command of Colonel Francis E. Patterson, son of the General. By this time, however, the rebellious element in Baltimore had lost strength and daring, and the Union sentiment had assumed a power and a vitality which made itself felt. Colonel Patterson's force, therefore, marched in without opposition. The National authority thus established was maintained, and the tide of volunteers, which soon after began to flow towards the Capital, was not again interrupted. From the first dawning of the Rebellion, it was seen that Pennsylvania, by its long line of border contiguous to rebellious territory, was exposed to the invasion, or sudden sallies of the enemy. Pittsburg was a city of great wealth, and here were cast the heavy guns for the navy, siege guns for the army, and here much of the material for the war was manufactured. It lay, too, upon the track of a great thoroughfare for the passage of troops MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 134 to the Eastern army. It would, at any time, have been an important strategic point for the enemy to have held. But West Virginia proved true to the flag, thus interposing loyal territory, and the city was too far away from the eastern rebellious armies to tempt them to make a difficult campaign to reduce it. But the Shenandoah Valley, of Virginia, leads naturally into the Cumberland Valley, of Pennsylvania. Indeed, one is but a continuation of the other. A heavy Union force was kept to guard the approaches to the Capital, and consequently the enemy sought to avoid exposing himself to a flank attack from that direction in moving for the invasion of the North, by interposing a great mountain range. The Shenandoah Valley, therefore, became the great natural highway for a hostile advance. How best to shut its mouth, and secure it against egress, was the first care of the Union leaders. Hence, when upon Virginia soil, the armies of Rebellion began to gather, General Patterson was sent into the Cumberland Valley to establish a camp and organize a force to guard the frontier, or if need be, drive back the enemy. His camp was formed at Chambersburg. With the exception of the Fourth and Fifth regiments, which were sent to Washington, the Twelfth, which was employed on the line of the Northern Central Railroad, and the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-second, which were stationed at Baltimore and vicinity, the entire twenty-five Pennsylvania regiments were gathered in Patterson's column. Upon his staff, and of his brigade and division commanders, were some of the ablest of the Union soldiers, who subsequently achieved a world-wide reputation. George H. Thomas, Abner Doubleday, David B. Birney, James S. Negley, and J. J. Abercrombie were among his subordinates, while Fitz John Porter and John Newton served upon his staff, and Keim, Cadwalader, and Stone led his divisions. Beauregard, who commanded the rebel army being marshalled on the plains of Manassas, early sent a force into the Shenandoah Valley, under the afterwards famous Stonewall Jackson, who was subsequently superseded in chief commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, Jackson remaining with him in a subordinate capacity. Johnston posted his forces at Harper's Ferry, and from that point, as headquarters, held the Valley in his firm grasp. Patterson's THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 135 First care was to drive Johnston back, and after opening the Baltimore and Ohio Railway and Canal, to push forward towards Winchester. When Johnston discovered that it was the intention of Patterson to cross and offer battle, he evacuated Harper's Ferry. So soon as General Scott learned this, he discouraged an advance by Patterson, apprehending that Johnston would be forced back and form a junction with Beauregard, thus increasing the complications in front of Washington. He accordingly ordered all the available field artillery, Regulars, and General Burnside's fine Rhode Island regiment, to Washington. When this order came, Patterson was already across the Potomac, and advancing confidently. Without artillery he could do nothing, and much to his chagrin, he was obliged to retire to the Maryland shore, at the same time remonstrating vigorously against being thus stripped of artillery and trained troops, and pleading earnestly to have them returned to him; but the order was imperative. Referring to this action, Hon. John Sherman, in a letter to General Patterson, said: "The great error of General Scott undoubtedly was, that he gave way to a causeless apprehension that Washington was to be attacked before the meeting of Congress, and therefore weakened you when you were advancing. No subsequent movement could repair that error." And General Patterson, in commenting upon this, says: "This, I venture to say, will be the conclusion of any one who dispassionately examines the subject. I was mortified and humiliated at having to recross the river without striking a blow. I knew that my reputation would be grievously damaged by it; the country could not understand the meaning of this crossing and recrossing, this marching and countermarching in the face of the foe, and that I would be censured without stint for such apparent vacillation and want of purpose." A few days after this, on the 20th of June, General Scott requested General Patterson to submit a plan of operations. This the latter did on the following day, just one month before the battle of Bull Run, and it was, in substance, to fortify and garrison Maryland Heights, transfer the depot of supply and reserve force to Hagerstown, and then move with the whole remaining force, horse, foot, and artillery, across the Potomac to Leesburg, - then to threaten the enemy in the Valley should he attempt to MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 136 advance to or cross the Potomac, - or join McDowell at Manassas the moment needed. This plan was rejected, and Patterson was ordered on the 25th to remain in front of the enemy, and if, in superior or equal force, to cross and attack him. As soon as his troops could be put in order he did cross, came up with Stonewall Jackson at Falling Waters, fought and defeated him, and pushed forward to Martinsburg and Bunker Hill. Patterson was ordered to hold Johnston in the Valley by making a demonstration on the day of the contemplated battle at Manassas. General Scott gave notice that the battle would be fought by McDowell on Tuesday, the 16th of July, and accordingly General Patterson made an active and noisy advance towards Winchester, causing Johnston, who was well entrenched there, to be reinforced from Strasburg, and who, as subsequently ascertained, was expecting an attack, and had his entire force in battle array. General Patterson had received, on the 13th, a telegram from General Scott, in these words: "I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, to make demonstrations so as to detain him in the Valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and it be hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keys' Ferry, Leesburg, etc." Well knowing that he was vastly inferior to Johnston in numbers, who, in addition to being well entrenched, had abundance of field and siege artillery, supposing that the contemplated battle at Bull Run was being fought on the 16th and 17th of July, as he had been advised it would be, and as he had been informed by telegram it had actually been begun on the latter day,* having seen his demonstration successful, he commenced on the 18th moving towards Keyes' Ferry, as he had been directed to do, and as the best officers in his column, in council of war, had advised. But the battle of Bull Run was not fought until the 21st, and Johnston, thus left free to join Beauregard, having a direct route open, and a railroad upon which to move, abandoned Winchester, and arrived upon the field of Bull Run in time to take an active *McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow.-Telegram of General Scott to General Patterson, of July 17. THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 137 part in the fight. It resulted disastrously to the Union arms, and General Patterson was blamed, and charged with the defeat. It was claimed that he should have attacked Johnston, or followed him, or reinforced McDowell, each of which was impracticable. General Abercrombie, a regular army officer, who commanded a brigade in Patterson's column, in March, 1862, rode over the round occupied by Johnston, at Winchester, and thus wrote to General Patterson: "I rode over the ground occupied by Johnston in July, and after a careful examination, I found that I had no reason to change my opinion as to the course you adopted. The works themselves were of no great strength, but the judicious disposition made of them, the favorable character of the ground, size, and number of guns, and numerical strength of force, ought to have defeated double the number. I think you may rely on this: Johnston had 26,000 volunteers that were mustered into the service, and between 6000 and 7000 of what they call militia, making some 32,000 or 33,000 men. The trenches extend some four or five miles. They commence at the turnpike leading to Charlestown, due east from Winchester, and run to the base of the hills west of the town, and at every few hundred paces we found platforms for heavy pivot guns, some of them rifled, so I am told. On the hills alluded to, some very heavy guns were admirable arranged, and commanded the whole valley. These, also, were made to traverse in every direction. Most of the earth-works were constructed with regard to the Martinsburg route. On the 16th, Johnston had his whole force under arms in battle order, and waited some hours, under the impression that you were approaching from Bunker Hill to attack him, and has since said he regrets not having attacked you. General Johnston had not less than 32,000 men, a very strong position, and between sixty and seventy guns, eleven of them pivot and of heavy caliber. I have conversed with a number of intelligent persons on the subject, and all agree very nearly as to the strength of Johnston's force and number of guns, and my own observations and personal inspection of the abandoned earth-works satisfy me of the correctness of their statements." On the other hand, General Patterson was operating with a force much inferior, deficient in cavalry, artillery and transporta- MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 138 tion, a considerable body of men ordered to him, for some cause having failed to reach him. "I was," General Patterson says, "probably operating with a force less by twelve regiments than the General-in-chief intended; a fact sufficient to explain his exaggerated ideas of the strength of my command. My largest force was accumulated at Martinsburg, about 18,200 men. When I marched from there, I had to leave two regiments, taking about 16,800 men with me, and deducting from them the sick, the rear, and wagon guards, I could not have gone into action with more than 13,000 men, and at the time Johnston marched from Winchester I could not have taken into action 10,000 men." Under these circumstances, to have attacked would have been fool-hardy, and sure to have entailed defeat. To have remained and made more determined, demonstrations would have availed nothing, as Johnston could have left his militia to man the intrenchments, and have moved away the moment he was needed, and Patterson would have been powerless to prevent it. It would have been equally impossible for the latter to have attempted to follow, for he could not have known when the movement would take place. Indeed, the advance of so weak a force in the face of one powerful as was that of Johnston, who could at any moment have been strongly reinforced from Manassas, was a most hazardous one, and one which the Government and country should have regarded itself well out of when Patterson brought off his forces in safety to Harper's Ferry. Another circumstance which made the situation of the Union commander of all the more delicate was, that the term of service of nearly his entire command had either fully expired or would expire in a few days. So great was the difficulty of maintaining himself until he could be reinforced by fresh troops to supply the place of those retiring, that he was obliged to appeal to the latter to remain in the field, which they did. But instead of bestowing upon these troops the meed of praise, which by their patriotism they richly merited, and regarding their commander with gratitude, the vials of denunciation and wrath were opened upon them in unstinted measure. General Patterson, in 1865, after the war was over, prepared THE FIRST CAMPAIGN - 139 a narrative of the campaign, with all the correspondence which passed between himself and the General-in-chief. In one of the opening paragraphs he says: "The arms of the country had recently met with a severe disaster at Bull Run, and the public, whose expectation of success had been of the most sanguine character, were correspondingly depressed. Although conscious that I had executed, as far as lay in my power, every order that I had received, and was in no degree responsible for a disaster that I could not prevent, I was not surprised that I, as well as every other officer holding any command of importance at the time, should be the object of popular clamor. I was quite satisfied, however, to await the returning sense of the people, and to abide by their decision, when the natural passion and disappointment of the hour should pass away, and the full knowledge of the facts should enable them to form an intelligent and dispassionate judgment. . . . It was of course desirable for those who had directed the movements at Bull Run to refer their defeat to an occurrence for which they were not responsible, and not allow it to be attributed to any want of foresight or military skill on their part." The fault of the positions of Patterson's and McDowell's armies in that first campaign of the war is now generally recognized. A hostile army cannot be confined and guarded like a flock of sheep. Instead of stationing forces at various points to check its motion, the true theory is to keep all the guarding forces in one compact body in readiness to move and fight as exigencies may require. To get the most power out of an army depends upon bringing the greatest accumulation of strength to bear upon the point of impact. If a stone mason desires to break a tough rock, he selects a hammer of sufficient weight to effect the purpose, and brings it to bear with the requisite force at some one point, instead of employing the same weight of metal in a number of small hammers, and applying them in futile attempts in several opposite directions. The two armies of Patterson and McDowell were separated by the two armies of Beauregard and Johnston, so posted, however, as to be practically one. The latter could, therefore, choose either of the opposing forces for attack, unite their MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 140 strength, and defeat that one, and then turn upon and demolish the other. This is precisely what happened at Bull Run. Beauregard and Johnston formed a junction, and defeated McDowell, and would then have turned upon Patterson, had he not opportunely withdrawn. For this separation of force in the plan of the campaign, neither Patterson nor the troops of Pennsylvania, who served under him, were responsible.