Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 7, 158- 187 Contributed for use in the USGenWeb Archives by Judy Banja jbanja@msn.com and transcribed by Judy Banja, Judith Bookwalter, Cyndie Enfinger, Linda Horn, Margaret Long, Patricia Martz, Barbara Milhalcik, Leah Waring and Marjorie B. Winter Copyright 2003. All rights reserved. http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm http://www.usgwarchives.net/pa/pafiles.htm ________________________________________________ MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA by SAMUEL P. BATES. PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876. MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 158 PART I. GENERAL HISTORY. CHAPTER VII. PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER. No part of Virginia, which in the late war was everywhere ploughed by battle, has more stirring associations, than that bordering upon the Rappahannock. At the head of navigation, upon the right bank of this stream, is Fredericksburg, and a dozen miles above this, on the same side, but a little back from the river, is Chancellorsville. For nearly a year, from October, 1862, to June, 1863, the two contending armies, that of the Potomac, and that of Northern Virginia, had lain stretched out upon the opposite banks, warily watching each other, but principally concentrated about the town of Fredericksburg. Twice during that time the Army of the Potomac had crossed and offered battle, first under General Burnside at Fredericksburg, on the 13th of December, 1862, a most inclement season, and again under General Hooker, at Chancellorsville, on the 2d and 3d of May. In both of these engagements, that army had been repulsed, and had returned decimated and dispirited to its old camps. In the latter battle, the rebel army had achieved a victory with only a part of its ordinary strength, heavy columns, upwards of 40,000 men, having been sent away under some of its most trusted Generals, Longstreet, Hill, Picket, Hood, Garnett, Anderson, Jenkins, and Pettigrew, to operate against the Union troops south of the James, principally at Little Washington, North Carolina, and at Suffolk, Virginia, with the design of regaining all that coast. Failing in carrying either of those places either by assault or by direct approaches, the siege of the latter, which had been conducted by Longstreet in person, had been raised on the very day that the most desperate fighting was in progress at FROM FREDERICKSBURG TO GETTYSBURG [map] PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 159 Chancellorsville. The new rebel department which had been erected in that locality, and over which General Longstreet had been placed, was broken up, and the troops thus released were hurried away to join General Lee upon the Rappahannock. Elated by two great victories, and made confident by the large accessions of strength he was receiving, the rebel chieftain at once began to meditate a systematic invasion of the North. In this he was seconded by the Government at Richmond. If a permanent lodgment could be made on Northern soil, great advantages were promised, and the hope, from the beginning cherished, of transferring the theatre of war to that section, would be realized; the great network of railroads concentring at Harrisburg could be broken up; the supply of coal from the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania, the almost sole reliance for the entire navy of the Union, could be deranged; the casting of heavy guns for both the army and navy, at Pittsburg, could be impeded; and foreign Governments, seeing the vitality displayed, might thereby be induced to recognize the new power as a nation. Doubtless political considerations at home also urged on the leaders to this enterprise. But greater than all these, the rebel President had learned that Vicksburg must fall before the victorious armies of Grant, and he hoped by a brilliant campaign on Northern soil to break the crushing weight of the blow thus impending from the West. An invasion seemed to promise some if not all of these advantages. Having gained victories so easily upon the Rappahannock, General Lee argued that he could gain them with equal ease upon the Susquehanna. Turning to the Union army, now commanded by General Hooker, he saw in its condition ample matter of encouragement. It was dispirited by defeat. There was a want of harmony among its Generals, and especially between its Commander and the General-in-chief of all the armies, Halleck. Besides, the time of about 40,000 nine-months' men had expired, and the places which they had left vacant had not been filled. But there was one untoward circumstance, the importance of which, in his overweening self-confidence, he had failed to recognize. On that evening in May, at Chancellorsville, when with the force of an avalanche his massed columns had been precipi- MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 160 tated upon the Union army, Stonewall Jackson, that thunderbolt in war, who had led his legions victorious in almost every battle, had fallen, mortally wounded, and borne forever from the theatre of mortal strife. In his confidence the whole army and the entire South shared, and on the morning of the 3d of June, just one month from the close of the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee put his columns in motion for a campaign in the North. He, however, skilfully masked his movements, leaving Hill's corps to occupy his old camps upon the immediate Union front, upon the Rappahannock, and to hold, apparently with his accustomed strength, the intrenchments along all the heights, and sending clouds of cavalry to hover upon his right flank. He also exercised unceasing vigilance to prevent any one from crossing the river who could carry intelligence of his purposes into the Union lines, and all of Hooker's scouts who had been sent across to ascertain what movements were in progress were seized, not one of them returning. But nothing could escape the keen eye of Hooker. The most insignificant change of camp was noted, and its interpretation divined. As early as the 28th of May, he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton: "It has been impossible for me to give any information concerning the movements of the enemy at all satisfactory. I have had several men over the river, but, as they do not return, I conclude that they have been captured. The enemy's camps are as numerous and as well filled as ever. It was reported to me this morning, by General Gregg, that the enemy's cavalry had made their appearance in the vicinity of Warrenton, on the strength of which I have ordered on to that line Buford's division, to drive them across the river and to keep them there. If necessary, I will send up additional forces. . . . In the event a forward movement should be contemplated by the enemy, and he should have been reinforced by the army from Charleston, I am in doubt as to the direction he will take, but probably the one of last year, however desperate it may appear - desperate if his force should be no greater than we have reason to suppose. The enemy has always shown an unwillingness to attack fortified positions; still, you may rest assured that important movements PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 161 are being made, and, in my opinion, it is necessary for every one to be watchful. The enemy has all his cavalry force, five brigades, collected at Culpeper and Jefferson. This would indicate a movement in the direction of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and this it is my duty to look after." We see in this dispatch already prefigured in the mind of Hooker the probable course which the rebel army would take. Intimations continued to come to him from various sources strengthening this opinion. A Savannah paper had published an outline of the contemplated invasion, which had reached the Northern press. The movement of rebel troops northward was also discovered and reported to him from a signal station in the First corps. To enable the rebel army to move with assurance of success, its commander had been allowed to draw every available man, taking the columns from before Suffolk, from North Carolina, from Virginia in the direction of Tennessee, and from the rebel Capital. A like concentration was not attempted on the Union side. Dix was at Fortress Monroe, Peck at Suffolk, Foster in North Carolina, Heintzelman in the Department of Washington, Schenck at Baltimore, Tyler at Harper's Ferry, and Milroy at Winchester. Over the troops in these several districts, General Hooker had no control, and when a detachment from one of them near Harper's Ferry received an order from him, its commander refused to obey it, as did General Slough at Alexandria, when a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserve corps was ordered up to the front. Against this isolation Hooker remonstrated repeatedly. In concluding an important dispatch of the 5th of June, he said; "In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of his Excellency, the President, the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army. Under the present system all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others - at least such is my situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it as I feel the necessity for concert, as well as vigor of action." But his appeal was not heeded, whether from lack of confidence in his MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 162 ability to direct operations on so large a scale, or whether it was deemed better to have minor movements under the control of the head of the army at Washington, is not apparent. In the midst of his efforts to harmonize counsels, and centralize the Union forces, intimations thickened from all sides tending to the one conclusion, that Lee's army had been largely reinforced, and that it was secretly moving on an important campaign, either of invasion, or to turn the right flank of the Union army. Should he find the former supposition to be correct, General Hooker, in the communication quoted from above, desired permission to cross the Rappahannock, and fall upon the isolated portion left in his front. The reply of Mr. Lincoln is characteristic, and illustrates remarkably the clearness of his conceptions, and the homely but pointed similes with which he enforced them: "Yours of to-day," he says, "was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments, and have you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair change to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck." The opinion of Mr. Lincoln, expressed in his quaint but forcible way, must be acknowledged remarkably just, and withal is so modestly propounded that it cannot fail to commend itself to the most violent advocate of the opposing view. A small force in the intrenchments, upon those frowning heights which had PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 163 been before attacked with such disastrous results, would have been equal to a much larger one in the attacking column. That he might, however, discover what was really behind the works on his front, the Sixth corps was ordered down to Franklin's crossing of the Rappahannock a little below Fredericksburg, on the morning of the 6th of June, and a portion of it, under command of General Howe, was thrown across. A strong demonstration showed that the enemy was in heavy force in front, and that the heights, for a distance of twenty miles, were still firmly held, Hill's entire corps of 30,000 men being present. But that he might seem to threaten the rebel rear and retain his troops as long as possible, Hooker kept the Sixth corps in position at the river, with the Fifth at Banks' and the United States Fords, and as late as the 12th threw across two pontoon bridges as if to pass over. Lee, in his official report, says: "General Hill disposed his forces to resist their advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather than attack, the movements in progress were not arrested. Determined to be satisfied of the real position of the rebel infantry, Pleasanton, who commanded the cavalry, was ordered to cross the Rappahannock at the fords above, at daylight on the morning of the 9th, with a strong column, stiffened by 3000 infantry, and attack the enemy's cavalry camp, - supposed to be located in the direction of Culpeper. A severe battle ensued in the neighborhood of Brandy station, in which the enemy was roughly handled. But the rebel infantry coming to the rescue, Pleasanton was obliged to withdraw. From information obtained and official papers captured, it was learned that the enemy's cavalry, which, by accessions from the Shenandoah Valley and from North Carolina, now numbered 12,000 men, and had, the day before, been reviewed by General Lee, was on the following morning, the 10th, to have started on a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. The result of this reconnoissance was two-fold, and proved very important to the Union commander. It crippled the enemy's cavalry in such a manner that it did not recover so as to be effective in the campaign upon which it was about entering, giving an evil omen to its opening scene; and it disclosed the fact that MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 164 two corps of the enemy, those of Ewell and Longstreet, were well on their way towards the Shenandoah Valley. It also demonstrated the very unpleasant fact that Lee's cavalry was at least a third stronger than Hooker's. Having abundant force to seize and hold all the fords of the river, the enemy was secure from attack while on the march, and when the valley was reached, by holding the passes of the Blue Ridge, he was completely protected by this great natural wall. Convinced that the movement of the opposing army was not a feint, but the opening of a real campaign northward, on the morning of the 12th, Hooker ordered General Reynolds to assume command of the right wing of the Union army, consisting of the First, his own, Third, and Eleventh corps, and all the cavalry, and proceed with it along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, to Manassas, a movement correspondent to that which the enemy was making, though upon an inner circle, with Washington as a centre; and on the following day ordered the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps into motion northward. The moment the Union forces disappeared behind the hills of Stafford, Hill withdrew from his position and followed Lee. Ewell, who was in the advance, had crossed the Shenandoah river at Front Royal and passed down behind the great mountain range which walls it in on the south; but Longstreet, seeing the Union army moving away from him, felt secure in marching by the more direct route on this side of the Blue range, and entered the valley by Snicker's Gap. Hill moved upon the track of Ewell. That his left flank might be protected from incursions from West Virginia, Lee sent Imboden with a body of cavalry toward Romney, who destroyed the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, effectually cutting off communication from Union forces operating in that direction. The old counsel of keeping a force at Harper's Ferry to guard the mouth of the valley, and prevent incursions into Maryland and Pennsylvania, had been persevered in, and when the enemy's cavalry sent forward under Jenkins approached, closely followed by the infantry of Ewell, they found a Union force at Winchester of 7500 men under General Milroy, and another at Harper's Ferry under General Tyler of 10,000, - too many troops to throw PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 165 away, and too few to cope with the numbers brought against them, enough to tempt to enterprise, and give zest to the play. Again was this the field of shame, disaster, and defeat. By a strange oversight, neither General Halleck nor the Secretary of War had informed General Milroy, who was first to be struck, that the rebel army was moving in force down the valley, and he had no intimation of the fact until the head of Ewell's column was upon him. He made such resistance as was possible, but was speedily routed, and all his guns and many of his men fell into the enemy's hands. On the night of the 14th, having ascertained that two corps of the rebel army, numbering 60,000 men, were upon his front, and being convinced that further resistance was useless, he had determined, in council of war, to cut his way out. He accordingly spiked his guns, and leaving all his trains which had not already been sent away, marched at two in the morning of the 15th; but at a point four miles out on the Martinsburg pike, he encountered a heavy column under Johnson posted to intercept him, and though making a gallant fight was unable to move the foe. His forces were broken, and while many of them escaped and made their way into the Union lines, the killed, wounded, and missing numbered more than half of his command. That Lee should not out-manoeuvre him, and by powerful demonstrations northward, suddenly turn and come in upon his rear, Hooker moved slowly, keeping himself constantly informed of the progress of the main body of his antagonist's force, and sending the Second corps to Thoroughfare Gap, and a division of cavalry supported by the Fifth corps, to Aldie. At this point a brisk action occurred with the cavalry of Stuart, wherein the latter was pushed back through Upperville into Ashby's Gap, by the division of General Gregg, supported by General Kilpatrick. "We took," says General Pleasanton, "two pieces of artillery, one being a Blakeley gun, together with three caissons, besides blowing one up. We also captured upwards of sixty prisoners, and more are coming in, including a Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and five other officers, besides a wounded Colonel, and a large number of wounded rebels in the town of Upperville. They left their dead and wounded upon the field. Of the former I saw MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 166 upwards of twenty. We also took a large number of carbines, pistols, and sabres. In fact, it was a most disastrous day for the rebel cavalry. Our loss has been very small both in men and horses. I never saw the troops behave better, or under more difficult circumstances." It was now thoroughly apparent to Hooker that the rebel army was intent not merely on crossing the Potomac but on pushing the invasion as far north as the Army of the Potomac would allow. He had, on the 15th, six days before this latter engagement, telegraphed to the President: "I now feel that invasion is his settled purpose. If so, he has more to accomplish, but with more hazard, by striking an easterly direction after crossing than a northerly one. It seems to me that he will be more likely to go north and to incline to the west. He can have no design to look after his rear. It is an act of desperation on his part, no matter in what force he moves." Hooker never appears to better advantage than in the few sentences here quoted, except it be in the manoeuvres preliminary to Chancellorsville. He seems as conversant with his adversary's plans and purposes as does that adversary himself, and his movements are timed with a skill unexampled to completely shield Washington, and to be in readiness to strike should the opportunity be presented. This is now made apparent by General Lee's own report. "The position occupied by the enemy," he says, "opposite Fredericksburg, being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. . . . In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success." What those valuable results were, may be inferred from the rumors which found their way into the Southern press, and were commented on in the most extravagant and visionary manner. The Richmond Whig, of July 1st, counting confidently on success, said: "If it be true that the Confederate forces occupy Harrisburg, the attention of the Commanding General will no doubt be PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 167 directed to the coal-fields, which lie within forty or fifty miles of that city. His first aim will be to cut all the railroad connections, and thus put a stop to the transportation of fuel. His next will be to destroy the most costly and not easily replaced machinery of the pits. Whether he would stop at this is questionable. He might set fire to the pits, withdraw the forces sent out on this special duty, and leave the heart of Pennsylvania on fire, never to be quenched until a river is turned into the pits, or the vast supply of coal is reduced to ashes. The anthracite coal is found in large quantities in no other part of the world but Pennsylvania. Enormous quantities are used in the United States navy, the countless workshops and manufactories of the North, in the river boats and even upon locomotives. It cannot well be replaced by any other fuel. The bituminous coal which is found near Pittsburg would not answer the purpose, even if it would bear the cost of transportation. Our troops already hold the railroads and canals leading from the Cumberland coal-fields. All that is needed is to seize the anthracite fields, destroy the roads and machinery of the pits, set fire to the mines and leave them. Northern industry will thus be paralyzed at a single blow. These views may have induced General Lee to move upon Harrisburg. We doubt whether he would fire the mines, but the destruction of the Mauch Chunk Railroad and pit implements would be as legitimate as blowing up tunnels and aqueducts, or burning bridges. Of one thing we may be sure, that whatever is best to be done will be done by General Lee, and if he thinks proper to destroy the Pennsylvania mines they will certainly be destroyed." Three days before this was written, General Lee records in his report: "Preparations were now made to move on Harrisburg," showing that the Richmond papers, though mistaken as to the result, were correctly informed of the purposes of the Confederate chieftain. While the armies of Hooker and Lee were moving northward, only separated from each other by a mountain chain, the States north of the Potomac, which lay directly in their way, began to take the alarm. But a narrow section of Maryland had to be traversed before the southern border of Pennsylvania would be MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 168 reached, a country luxurious with waving grain, plenteous flocks and herds, and orchards bending with mellow fruit, tempting the hand of the spoiler. For the defence of the border no preparations had been made, and no power existed capable of arresting the march of the veteran army of the enemy, other than an equally strong and well disciplined force. The attempt to have kept a body of militia, or even of trained soldiers unskilled in battle, to guard it, would have been as impracticable as it would have been useless. But to prepare for temporary defence, and to succor the army of the Union in its grapple with its adversary, which was sure to come, was now the part of discretion; and accordingly, on the 9th of June, two military departments were erected, one embracing all that part of Pennsylvania east of Johnstown and the Laurel Hill range, with headquarters at Harrisburg, at the head of which Major-General Darius N. Couch was placed, and the other, the portion of the State west of that line, together with parts of West Virginia and Ohio contiguous, with headquarters at Pittsburg, and to the command of which Major-General William T. H. Brooks was assigned. These officers were charged with organizing troops within their respective districts, under the title of departmental corps. In this work they were powerfully aided by Governor Curtin, who issued his proclamation on the 12th, assuring the people of the danger impending, and urging them to enlist in the proposed organizations, and on the 14th especially called upon citizens of African descent to rally around the standard of the State. But little progress was made in the work of gathering troops. Men were slow to come. It was at a season of the year when every laboring man was needed to gather the maturing crops, and every walk of life had been already depleted to swell the ranks of the National armies. It would seem, too, that even those in authority were not impressed with the belief that an invasion by the whole rebel army was meditated. In his proclamation, Governor Curtin said: "Information has been obtained by the War Department, that a large rebel force, composed of cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry, has been prepared for the purpose of making a raid into Pennsylvania;" and General Couch, in his order announcing the formation of his corps: "To pre- PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 169 vent serious raids by the enemy, it is deemed necessary to call upon the citizens of Pennsylvania to furnish promptly all the men necessary to organize an army corps of volunteer infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to be designated the Army Corps of the Susquehanna." Unfortunately for getting an immediate strong force to act for the emergency, it was announced by General Couch that the troops "would be mustered into the service of the United States, to serve during the pleasure of the President, or the continuance of the war." The majority of men were deterred, by this condition, from enlisting, who, to meet the emergency, if one really existed, would have come promptly forward. The inference derived from the language of Governor Curtin, and of General Couch, left the impression that no invasion in force was anticipated, but that the General Government was desirous of taking advantage of the threatened rebel advance to obtain soldiers for the National armies. In the two former years, these rumors had been frequent, but had never resulted in any material harm to the State, and it was now scarcely credited that the enemy would be so adventurous as to come, with all his legions, upon Pennsylvania soil. But the disposition of the enemy to advance became daily more apparent. On Sunday evening, June the 14th, affrighted contrabands from the Shenandoah Valley commenced arriving in Greencastle, the first town in Pennsylvania over the border, and soon after reached Chambersburg, bringing intelligence of the route of Milroy, and the rapid advance of the head of the conquering rebel column. As it was known that at Winchester and Harper's Ferry there was a strong army corps, it was now perceived that the enemy was coming in earnest. "On Monday morning," says Mr. McClure, in an article published in the Chambersburg Repository, "the flood of rumors from the Potomac fully confirmed the advance of the rebels, and the citizens of Chambersburg and vicinity, feeling unable to resist the rebel columns, commenced to make prompt preparation for the movement of stealable property. Nearly every horse, good, bad, and indifferent, was started for the mountains as early on Monday as possible, and the negroes darkened the different roads northward MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 170 for hours, loaded with household effects, sable babies, etc., and horses, wagons, and cattle crowded every avenue to places of safety. The hegira thus commenced received a fresh impetus at nine o'clock on that morning, by the arrival of the advance of Milroy's wagon train, which had escaped across the Potomac, and was making haste to put itself beyond the reach of the enemy. As the long dusky train wound through the town, and for hours continued to wend its weary way, affright seized the inhabitants and spread wildly through the country. Valuable stock of all descriptions was put upon the road northward, and did not halt in its course until the Susquehanna had been left behind. The more common and less valuable was hurried away to the mountains and by-places. The great covered bridge across the Susquehanna at Harrisburg presented a scene of ceaseless activity, and never was such a toll business done there before. Milroy's train reached it first, and in its rear came an endless stream of human beings of every age and size, and beasts and four-footed things innumerable. By night the steady tramp and rumble of the heavy teams lulled the senses of the weary, and through the long hours of the sultry June day, a cloud of dust rose constantly far down the valley, reaching forward and across the stream, as far in the opposite direction as the eye could penetrate. With the fine impalpable particles settling down ceaselessly, rider and horse, vehicle and occupants, flocks, herds, all were enveloped, until thick folds wrapped them like a garment. Not until the 15th did the General Government seem to be fully impressed with the seriousness of the situation, or realize that the predictions of Hooker, made ten days before, were the words of truth and soberness. On that day, the President issued a proclamation for 100,000 men from the States immediately menaced, to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged; 50,000 from Pennsylvania, 30,000 from Ohio, and 10,000 each from Maryland and West Virginia. Governor Curtin seconded the call by a proclamation, in which he said: "That it is the purpose of the enemy to invade our borders with all the strength he can command is now apparent. Our only defence rests upon the determined action of the citizens of our Commonwealth. I therefore PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 171 call on the people of Pennsylvania, capable of bearing arms, to enroll themselves in military organizations, and to encourage all others to give aid and assistance to the efforts which will be put forth for the protection of the State, and the salvation of our common country." Indications of mischief thickened so rapidly at Harrisburg, that preparations were commenced for removing the archives of the Government, and in the hours of a short summer night, the papers of all the departments, even to the 28,000 volumes of the State Library, and the fine old portraits of the Governors, were securely put upon cars and moved to Philadelphia. The excitement likewise ran high at Pittsburg. Fears were entertained that the rebel army, or at least a strong detachment, might bear westward, especially if, in a general battle, the enemy should prove victorious. Engineers were accordingly employed in locating and planning forts, and thousands of busy hands were at work in constructing them. The merchants and mechanics organized themselves into military companies for the defence of the city; business was suspended, all the bars, restaurants, and drinking saloons were closed, and the sale or giving away of liquors stopped. On the 15th, General Jenkins crossed the Potomac, and cautiously made his way northward. The rebel army was in need of transportation and supplies, and Jenkins from the first kept a sharp look out for these. Greencastle was possessed without opposition, and in due time Chambersburg. Of his entrance to the latter place Mr. McClure, in the article above quoted, gives a facetious account, though it was to his own sore spoliation. "Jenkins," he says, "had doubtless read the papers in his day, and knew that there were green fields in the 'Green Spot;' and what is rather remarkable, at midnight he could start for a forty-acre clover-patch belonging to the editor of the Repository without so much as stopping to ask where the gate might be found. Not even a halt was called to find it; but the march was continued until the gate was reached, when the order 'file right!' was given, and Jenkins was in clover. Happy fellow, thus to find luxuriant and extensive clover, as if by instinct. By the way of giving the Devil his due, it must be said that, although there were over sixty acres of wheat, and eighty acres of corn and oats, MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 172 in the same field, he protected it most carefully, and picketed his horses so that it could not be injured. . . . For prudential reasons the editor was not at home to do the honors at his own table; but Jenkins was not particular, nor was his appetite impaired thereby. He called upon the ladies of the house, shared their hospitality, behaved in all respects like a gentleman, and expressed very earnest regrets that he had not been able to make the personal acquaintance of the editor. We beg to say that we reciprocate the wish of the General, and shall be glad to make his acquaintance personally - 'when this cruel war is over.' . . . General Jenkins also had the fullest information of the movements of the editor of this paper. He told, at our house, when we had left, the direction we had gone, and described the horse we rode." For nearly a week, Chambersburg and all the southern part of Franklin county was occupied by the rebel forces, busy in gathering horses, which were regarded as contraband of war, and in seizing whatever goods of every variety that could be of use to them, pretending payment by delivering in exchange their worthless Confederate scrip. Though falling upon all this afflicted region with a crushing weight, yet in telling the story, their chronicler, Mr. McClure, yields to a grim humor. "True," he says, "the system of Jenkins would be considered a little informal in business circles; but it's his way, and our people agreed to it perhaps, to some extent, because of the novelty, but mainly because of the necessity of the thing. But Jenkins was liberal - eminently liberal. He didn't stop to higgle about a few odd pennies in making a bargain. For instance, he took the drugs of Messrs. Miller, Spangler, Nixon, and Heyser, and told them to make out a bill, or if they could not do that, to guess at the amount and the bills were paid. Doubtless our merchants and druggists would have preferred greenbacks to Confederate scrip, that is never payable and is worth just its weight in old paper; but Jenkins hadn't greenbacks, and he had Confederate scrip, and such as he had he gave unto them. Thus he dealt largely in our place. To avoid jealousies growing out of rivalry in business, he patronized all the merchants, and bought pretty much everything he could conveniently use and carry. Some people, with antiquated ideas of business, might call it stealing to take PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 173 goods and pay for them in bogus money; but Jenkins calls it business, and for the time being what Jenkins calls business was business. . . . Jenkins, like most doctors, don't seem to have relished his own prescriptions. Several horses had been captured by some of our boys, and notice was given by the General commanding that they must be surrendered or the town would be destroyed. The city fathers, commonly known as the town Council, were appealed to in order to avert the impending fate threatened us. One of the horses, we believe, and some of the equipments were found and returned, but there was still a balance in favor of Jenkins. We do not know who audited the account, but it was finally adjusted by the Council appropriating the sum of $900 to pay the claim. Doubtless Jenkins hoped for $900 in 'greenbacks,' but he had flooded the town with Confederate scrip, pronouncing it better than United States currency, and the Council evidently believed him; and, desiring to be accommodating with a conqueror, decided to favor him by the payment of his bill in Confederate scrip. It was so done, and Jenkins got just $900 worth of nothing for his trouble. He took it, however, without a murmur, and doubtless considered it a clever joke." Of a piece with the above is the account of Jenkins himself: "He graduated at Jefferson College in this State, in the same class, we believe, with J. McDowell Sharpe, Esq., and gave promise of future usefulness and greatness. His downward career commenced some five years ago, when in an evil hour he became a Member of Congress from Western Virginia, and from thence may be dated his decline and fall. From Congress he naturally enough turned fire-eater, secessionist, and guerilla. He is of medium size, has a flat but good head, light brown hair, blue eyes, immense flowing beard, of a sandy hue, and rather a pleasant face. He professes to cherish the utmost regard for the humanities of war, and seemed sensitive on the subject of his reputation as a humane military leader." The sudden removal of horses, flocks, and herds, into the mountains, and across the Susquehanna before his arrival, greatly interfered with the purposes of Jenkins; yet he succeeded in sweeping together a vast body of plunder, which he hurried away to the Potomac, and into the folds of the main force. He came MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 174 down upon the fairest and wealthiest portion of Franklin county, and, as he retired, separated into squadrons, which scoured every road and byway, spending some time at Greencastle, Waynesboro, and Welsh Run, and at Mercersburg a detachment crossed Cove Mountain and penetrated to McConnellsburg, passing on down the valley from that point. It would appear that Lee had hoped by this demonstration to have induced Hooker either to rush forward and cross the Potomac, and thus uncover Washington, or to have tempted him to attack the rebel army while on the march northward, when a rapid concentration would have been made, and a defensive battle fought, in which Lee felt confident of a victory. These purposes are plainly disclosed in Lee's report. He says: "With a view to draw him (Hooker) further from his base, and at the same time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg from the valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court House on the 15th, and advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. . . . As these demonstrations (Jenkins') did not have the effect of causing the Federal army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the valley." But Hooker was too wary to be caught in either of these traps, and while beating back the enemy through the passes of the minor range of mountains which still interposed between himself and Longstreet, and guarding well his flank, he was in no haste to advance into Maryland. Mr. Lincoln, in his great anxiety to protect the entire territory of the North, and to ward off the disgrace of invasion, had telegraphed to Hooker on the 16th: "Your idea to send your cavalry to this side of the river may be right, probably is; still, it pains me a little that it looks like the defensive merely, and seems to abandon the fair chance now presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line stretched from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania." But to this Hooker says: "With all deference to the views of his Excellency, the President, it appeared to me that the wisest course for me to pursue was to move the army on a concentric but inner circle to PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 175 the one followed by the enemy, and endeavor to keep abreast of his main column. This would relieve me from all embarrassment concerning my communications and supplies, and would enable me to act promptly, with my force concentrated, in thwarting the general designs of the enemy. To have followed the plan suggested, it seemed to me that I would be marching the army away from the point at which it was most needed." Close upon the heels of Jenkins followed Ewell, who, with 12,000 men and sixteen pieces of artillery, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 15th, the same day that the former reached Chambersburg. He did not advance far, however, remaining between the bank of the stream and the borough of Hagerstown, and, like an attentive gallant, gracefully handing the plunder of Jenkins across to Lee. From the 15th to the 22d, this delightful work was continued without material change, Lee receiving much needed stores, and bringing up the rear of his army. In the meantime, the troops called out to meet the emergency gathered slowly. On the 16th, Governor Curtin addressed an appeal to the people of Philadelphia, in which he exhorted them to come forward at once, to close their places of business, and apply their hearts to the work. But the apparent halt in the rebel column at the Potomac, and its inactivity beyond that of gathering supplies, created the impression that the main body was not coming. The leading editorial of the Philadelphia Press on the morning of the 17th contained the following view: "As we understand the situation, as it appears at midnight, there is less ground for alarm than prevailed during the day. The rebels have occupied Chambersburg; but beyond that point no force is known to be advancing. . . . This suggests to us that the rebels have too great a dread of Hooker to divide themselves in his front, and that, while they might rejoice in the opportunity of occupying and holding Pennsylvania, they would not dare to do so with a powerful army on their line of communications." Great consternation, however, prevailed at Harrisburg, and endless trains still continued to move out of the valley across the Susquehanna. Rifle-pits were thrown up in Harris' Park to command the ford just below the island. A large fort, inclosing several acres, was surveyed by competent engineers on the bluff MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 176 just above the heads of the bridges leading to the city, and messengers were sent through every street requesting the inhabitants to set out empty barrels upon the side-walks to be used in constructing it. Day and night the work was vigorously pushed. Just beneath the soil was a loose shale, not of sufficient solidity to require blasting, but so much so as to render the labor difficult. A heavy earthwork was finally completed, with dry ditch and numerous platforms for guns. Half a mile in advance was a minor work erected upon a bold spur which commanded the valley on all sides. The few clumps of trees which dotted the fields here and there were swept away, as was also the grove, grateful for shade, and relief of the prospect from the city's side which stood upon the utmost summit, where the main fort was located. A span of each bridge was severed, ready for instant destruction, but supported by props until the necessity should arrive for its demolition. Jenkins, having brought in his cattle and horses gathered during the week to the Potomac, worshipped on Sunday with Ewell at Hagerstown, and early Monday morning, the 22d, headed again towards Chambersburg, now accompanied by the infantry of Ewell's corps. Rodes and Early, the division commanders of Ewell, moved in advance, the former reaching Chambersburg on the 23d, followed by Johnson. Maryland was by this time thoroughly aroused. The Councils of Baltimore had appropriated, on the 16th, $400,000 for defence, and the labor of fortifying was vigorously pushed, earthworks being erected around the north and west sides of the city. To provide against a sudden incursion of cavalry, the streets were barricaded with barrels and hogsheads filled with bricks and sand, where it could be effectually stopped. At Harrisburg, the camp which had been established began to swarm with volunteers, and the white tents were spread out far and wide. On the 19th, Captain William H. Boyd, who had been instrumental in saving Milroy's train, was dispatched with his company from Harrisburg on cars to Shippensburg, where, finding the road impassable, he mounted and rode to Greencastle, back to Chambersburg, and forward again to Greencastle before he found an enemy. Here he had a smart skirmish with the head of the hostile column, now on its second advance. Boyd continued PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 177 upon its front, observing and reporting its progress, and dashing in upon its trains at every favorable point. On the 20th, a force under the command of Brigadier-General Knipe, consisting of E. Spencer Miller's Battery and two regiments of militia, moved down the Cumberland Valley to occupy Chambersburg. But, finding on his arrival near that the rebel cavalry were already there, with infantry advancing to their support, he fell back, skirmishing as he went, until he reached Carlisle. In the meanwhile, General Imboden, of the rebel cavalry, who had been sent out by Lee upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, having broken up that line and rendered the canal useless, thus preventing troops from West Virginia from coming suddenly upon the flanks of the rebel main force, in obedience to his orders struck boldly out towards Fulton county, and after a short skirmish with a fragment of the First New York Cavalry, occupied McConnellsburg. Early on Sunday morning, the Philadelphia City Troop, an organization which had been preserved since the days of the Revolution, and which in that struggle acted as body-guard to Washington, now composed of about forty members, some of them the descendants of its original members, with holy memories of that early service, arrived in Gettysburg, and in company with a small body of mounted militia, under Captain Bell, moved out upon the Chambersburg Pike towards the South Mountain. At Monterey, a little village on the way, they came up with a party of rebel skirmishers, with whom they exchanged shots. These reconnoissances were repeated on the 23d, and on the following day Colonel William W. Jennings, with the Twenty-sixth regiment of the Pennsylvania militia, one company of which, under Captain F. Klinefelter, was composed principally of students from the Pennsylvania College and from the Theological School, both located at Gettysburg, arrived in town. Major Granville O. Haller, of General Couch's staff, had been sent by that officer to represent him at this point, and assume command of all the Union forces. His conduct of affairs was most unfortunate. At the moment when veterans of the enemy were advancing on the town, he ordered this regiment of undisciplined men out to meet them - a most suicidal policy, which must have resulted in its MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 178 certain capture had not Colonel Jennings, who was an officer of experience, skilfully withdrawn it in time. Major Haller was subsequently dismissed from the service, "for disloyal conduct," strengthening the belief which was entertained at the time, that he was not devoted to the cause he represented. At Chambersburg, General Ewell separated his two advance divisions, sending Early in the direction of Gettysburg, and Rodes towards Carlisle and Harrisburg. Early reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of Friday, the 26th, with Gordon's brigade of 5000 men, and took possession unopposed, having been preceded by a battalion of cavalry, which dashed in, uttering demoniac yells, and delivering an indiscriminate fire from their pistols. He made large demands for sugar, coffee, flour, salt, bacon, whisky, onions, hats, and shoes, amounting in value to $6000, or in lieu thereof, $5000 in money. The town council pled poverty, and he appearing to be satisfied that the place was poverty-stricken, abandoned his suit, getting neither goods nor money. Early remained in town over night, but his forces hurried on to Hanover and York, that they might come upon those places before all the valuables they contained had been spirited away, and they be found as bare as was Gettysburg. At Hanover Junction the work of destruction on the Northern Central Railroad began, as it had likewise been practised on the Gettysburg Branch. Bridges were burned, tracks torn up, rails twisted, and rolling stock demolished. Soon after the departure of Early from Gettysburg, on Saturday the 28th, three mounted Union scouts came in from Emmittsburg, where the advance of Pleasanton's cavalry then was, who captured two of the enemy, one of them a chaplain, bearing a dispatch from Ewell, then at Shippensburg, to Early, cautioning the latter about advancing too fast. At noon of the following day two regiments of Union cavalry, under General Cowpland, arrived from Emmittsburg, on a reconnoissance. They encamped for the night near by, and departed on the following morning in the direction of Littlestown. The Twentieth regiment of emergency militia had been sent out from Harrisburg, under Colonel Thomas, to guard the Northern Central Railroad and the Wrightsville branch. But as PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 179 the veteran troops of Early advanced, Thomas was obliged to fall back, a part of his regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sickels, towards Wrightsville, and the remainder towards Harrisburg. Major Haller, with the City Troop, had also retired before the rebel advance, and had reached Wrightsville for the purpose of defending the passage of the magnificent bridge which there spanned the Susquehanna. Early was likewise eager to grasp that rich prize, as it would afford, if once securely in rebel hands, ready means of throwing Lee's entire army across a wide and difficult stream, that would otherwise prove a formidable barrier in his way. Its importance had been recognized by General Couch, who had four days before sent Colonel Frick, with the Twenty-seventh emergency regiment, with instructions to hold it to the last extremity, and subsequently ordered, if likely to fall into the enemy's hands, to destroy it. Upon his arrival, he was met by the City Troop and a part of the Twentieth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sickels, and was joined by four companies of militia, three white and one colored, from Columbia, situated at the eastern head of the bridge, a detachment of convalescent soldiers from the hospital at York, and the Petapsco Guards, in all less than 1500 men. Frick took position on commanding ground, a half mile back from the western head of the bridge, and proceeded to fortify. Early, who was doubtless kept constantly advised of the number and character of the forces set to guard the bridge, had no sooner reached York, than he hurried forward Gordon's brigade, well provided with artillery, to seize it. Frick made a stubborn resistance, and in the fighting which ensued, had several wounded. Having no artillery with which to meet that of the enemy, and being greatly outnumbered by veteran troops, he soon saw that he would be compelled to yield. He had ordered his engineer to prepare one span of the bridge to be blown up in case it became necessary to abandon it. When, therefore, he was forced back, he ordered the match to be applied; but the train failed to ignite the powder, and the only alternative remaining was to apply the torch, and that immense structure, more than a mile and a quarter in length, lighting up the heavens for many miles around with its flames, was utterly consumed. MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 180 At York, Early found a profusion of those things which he had failed to obtain at Gettysburg. He had come with five brigades of infantry, three batteries of artillery, and part of two regiments of cavalry. Being prepared to enforce his demands, and having a rich old city in his grasp, he made a requisition for supplies similar to that at Gettysburg, and in addition, for $28,000 in money. Should it be complied with promptly, he agreed to spare all private property; otherwise, he would take what he could find, and would not be responsible for the conduct of his troops while in the city. There appearing to be no other alternative, the stores and money were delivered, and he scrupulously kept his word, order being strictly enforced, and private property left untouched. A few facts recorded by Mr. Gall, of the Sanitary Commission, respecting the condition and habits of Early's men, as seen at this point, will serve as a fair specimen of the make-up of the entire rebel army: "Physically," he says, "the men looked about equal to the generality of our own troops, and there were fewer boys among them. Their dress was a wretched mixture of all cuts and colors. There was not the slightest attempt at uniformity in this respect. Every man seemed to have put on whatever he could get hold of, without regard to shape or color. I noticed a pretty large sprinkling of blue pants among them, some of those, doubtless, that were left by Milroy at Winchester. Their shoes, as a general thing, were poor; some of the men were entirely barefooted. Their equipments were light, as compared with those of our men. They consisted of a thin woollen blanket, coiled up and slung from the shoulder in the form of a sash, a haversack swung from the opposite shoulder, and a cartridge-box. The whole cannot weigh more than twelve or fourteen pounds. Is it strange, then, that with such light loads, they should be able to make longer and more rapid marches than our men? The marching of the men was irregular and careless, their arms were rusty and ill kept. Their whole appearance was greatly inferior to that of our soldiers. . . . There were not tents for the men, and but few for the officers. The men were busy cooking their dinner, which consisted of fresh beef, part of the York levy, wheat griddle cakes raised with soda, and cold water. PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 181 No coffee nor sugar had been issued to the men for a long time. . . . The men expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with this kind of food, and said they greatly preferred the bread prepared in the way they do it, to the crackers issued to the Union soldiers. I asked one of the men how he got along without a shelter tent. His answer was, 'First rate.' 'In the first place,' said he, 'I wouldn't tote one, and in the second place, I feel just as well, if not better, without it.' 'But how do you manage when it rains?' I inquired. 'Wall,' said he, 'me and this other man has a gum blanket atween us; when it rains we spread one of our woollen blankets on the ground to lie on, then we spread the other woollen blanket over us, and the gum blanket over that, and the rain can't tech us.' And this is the way the rebel army, with the exception of a few of the most important officers, sleeps. Everything that will trammel or impede the movement of the army is discarded, no matter what the consequences may be to the men. . . . In speaking of our soldiers, the same officer remarked: 'They are too well fed, too well clothed, and have far too much to carry.' That our men are too well fed, I do not believe, neither that they are too well clothed; that they have too much to carry, I can very well believe, after witnessing the march of the Army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. Each man had eight days' rations to carry, besides sixty rounds of ammunition, musket, woollen blanket, rubber blanket, overcoat, extra shirt, drawers, socks, and shelter tent, amounting in all to about sixty pounds. Think of men, and boys too, staggering along under such a load, at the rate of fifteen to twenty miles a day. On Tuesday morning, 30th, at about four o'clock, the last remaining brigade passed through the city, with flags flying and band playing, and took the road to Carlisle." While Early was demonstrating in the direction of Columbia, the remainder of the corps, and much the larger part, under Ewell's immediate command, proceeded towards Harrisburg. As it went, the Cumberland Valley Railroad was destroyed. The militia, who had taken post at Carlisle, were quickly driven before the strong columns of Rodes and Johnson, and the town was occupied. Here many of the rebels were at home; for some had been educated at Dickinson College, others had been sta- MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 182 tioned at the United States barracks, and a few had even married their wives here. But their visit now was not so agreeable as of yore, when, as gallant young collegians, or spruce officers, they had escorted the blushing maidens of the city, and been welcome at the firesides of its people. General Knipe, who was still in command of the force of observation, had fallen back before the rebel advance, until the night of the 28th, when he reached Oyster Point, within four miles of Harrisburg. The enemy having approached, apparently with the design of pushing on still nearer to the city, Knipe opened upon them with the guns of Miller's battery with good effect, causing a rapid movement to the rear. This was the nearest approach to the capital of Pennsylvania of the enemy in force, though his scouts were captured in and about the city. One, a powerful man, with a sinister face, and evidently a person of great daring, was taken in the vicinity of Camp Curtin, and was held under guard at the head-quarters of General Couch, where he was gazed upon by the curious. Another was seized while in the act of making drawings of the fort and its armament opposite the town. A little flat boat was overhauled in the Susquehanna river, on the night of the 1st of July, in which was a rebel with an ingenious contrivance for discovering the fords of the stream. He had a small stone suspended by a cord which, as he floated on down the main channel, would not impede his progress; but the moment he came to a shoal place, less than three or four feet deep, it would drag upon the bottom and stop his craft. In this way, the fords of the river were noted. A map was found upon his person, containing a draft of the river, with the fords above and opposite the city marked on the Cumberland shore for their entrance. In the meantime, troops had been rapidly assembling at the camps at Harrisburg, Pittsburg, and Philadelphia, and regiments were daily organized. As the enemy advanced, he broke up all means of communication, and was careful to spread false rumors. In the midst of the wild excitement which prevailed, it was difficult to sift the true from the false, and arrive at a just conclusion respecting the numbers, position, or purpose of the rebel army. A judgment could be formed by balancing probabilities, and the PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 183 most favorable view, the wish sometimes being father to the thought, was entertained. As late as the morning of the 26th, the New York Herald contained the following judgment: "We have no idea that General Lee meditates an advance upon either Harrisburg or Baltimore. In the one case, the trip would not pay expenses, as the broad, rocky Susquehanna river is in his way, and in the other case, his army, in getting into Baltimore, would get into a trap, from which Lee would never extricate it." And the Philadelphia Press of the 27th, but three days before the great battle began at Gettysburg, expressed the following opinion: "Our intelligence as to what force of rebels has entered Pennsylvania is still unsatisfactory and unreliable. Probably Ewell's corps, which is estimated to number about 34,000 men, is alone in this aggressive movement; although it would not greatly surprise us to learn that General Lee's entire force, having crossed the Potomac, is within supporting distance." So threatening, however, had the aspect of affairs become on the 26th, that Governor Curtin issued his proclamation calling for 60,000 State militia. He said: "Pennsylvanians! The enemy is advancing in force into Pennsylvania. He has a strong column within twenty-three miles of Harrisburg, and other columns are moving by Fulton and Adams counties, and it can no longer be doubted that a formidable invasion of our State is in actual progress. The calls already made for volunteer militia in the exigency have not been met as fully as the crisis requires. I therefore now issue this my proclamation, calling for 60,000 men to come promptly forward to defend the State. . . . The time has now come when we must all stand or fall together in defence of our State, and in support of our Government." As the enemy approached Harrisburg, and the dangers of occupation thickened, preparations for meeting them were hastened. One of the wealthiest and most powerful corporations in the State, and one which was contributing immensely to the support of the National Government, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, had its property of many millions exposed to destruction. Vigorous measures were taken to save it. Block houses of sufficient strength to resist infantry attacks were erected so as to cover the bridges, and the great number of valuable locomotives MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 184 and vast quantities of rolling stock, kept at Harrisburg, were moved to Philadelphia. As soon as the advance-guard of the rebel army, consisting of Ewell's corps and Jenkins' cavalry, had commenced its march for the Susquehanna, striking for the bridges at Columbia and Harrisburg, Lee, who now had his remaining force in hand, prepared to follow, and on the 24th and 25th crossed the Potomac, Hill near Shepherdstown, and Longstreet at Williamsport. The two columns reunited at Hagerstown, and moved thence to Chambersburg, where they arrived and encamped on the 27th. Hooker had no sooner seen that his antagonist was about to cross the Potomac than he prepared to execute the corresponding movement; and on the 25th and 26th, one day behind Lee, he likewise passed over, effecting the crossing upon pontoons at Edward's Ferry. The Union General now realized that a battle could not long be delayed, and he was filled with anxiety lest his force should be insufficient to fight it with a fair prospect of success. He had ascertained by the most trustworthy testimony that the actual strength of the enemy's army then moving forward in to Pennsylvania, was 91,000 infantry, 5000 with the artillery numbering 280 pieces, and 11,000 cavalry, a grand aggregate of 107,000. This was a larger number by several thousands than he then had in hand, and would be fully equal to his with all the additions he could receive from the neighboring departments. He, accordingly, dispatched his Chief-of-Staff, Major General Butterfield, to Washington to obtain the returns of soldiers under General Heintzelman there, and under General Schenck at Baltimore, and from these two departments to organize a column of 15,000 troops to move without delay to Frederick, Maryland. Though he found under General Heintzelman over 36,000 men, yet it was deemed inadvisable by General Halleck, in view of the immense depots of material there accumulated, and the necessity of guarding the Capital, to lessen it. At Baltimore he found but a small force, there being 12,000 of Schenck's command at Harper's Ferry, and 7500 at Winchester, the latter having been already broken and nearly destroyed. Of the force under immediate command, General Schenck promptly ordered out Lockwood's Brigade, consisting of 2500 men. The force at PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 185 Harper's Ferry, now under the command of General French, was the only considerable one which Hooker could therefore hope to obtain. Accordingly, as soon as his army was across the river, he directed General Reynolds, in command of the right wing of the army, to send detachments to seize the passes of the South Mountain, at Turner's and Crampton's Gaps; and with the First, Third, and Eleventh corps to follow and take position at Middletown, across the Cotocton range, his object being to confine the rebel line of advance to the one valley in which he then was, and to bring a strong force within supporting distance should the enemy turn back from Pennsylvania and offer battle to the force which Hooker was about to send upon his rear. The Second and Sixth corps he ordered to Frederick. The Twelfth he directed to move to Harper's Ferry, which he accompanied in person, there to be joined by two strong brigades from General French's command, whence to march upon the enemy's line of communications at Williamsport, destroy his pontoon bridge at that point, and stop the enormous quantities of flour, grain, horses and horned cattle which were steadily flowing into Virginia. After visiting Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, and finding the point to possess no strategic value, presenting no obstacle to the invaders, defending no ford of the river, and being itself indefensible, he decided to abandon the post, and transfer the material collected there to Washington. This would release 10,000 good troops to join his army. "After ascertaining," he says, "that the public property could all be removed before twelve o'clock at night, I seated myself, and was engaged in writing an order for the abandonment at daylight. But what was his surprise and disappointment to receive at that moment a dispatch from General Halleck, saying": "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us. . . . I cannot approve of their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity." And this, after Halleck had himself placed the troops at this point under Hooker's control in the following words, telegraphed on the 22d: "In order to give compactness to the command of troops in the field covering Washington and Baltimore, it is proposed to place that part MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 186 of the Middle Department east of Cumberland, and commanded by General Schenck, under your direct orders. The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable." To this Hooker answered: "Yes, provided the same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenck and Heintzelman." To send the Twelfth corps alone to Williamsport, without the addition of French's troops, he did not regard advisable, as the enemy might suddenly turn upon and overwhelm it before he could bring up his supporting forces. He accordingly abandoned the movement, and ordered that corps to countermarch and follow the other troops to Frederick. He now felt that to have his plans thus interfered with, and his movements in the face of the enemy cut short when in full progress by one far from the field, who could not know the exigencies of the moment, would only result in shame and defeat to the army. He accordingly telegraphed, at one P. M. of the 27th, to General Halleck: "My original instructions were to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal, and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy." This desire was immediately granted, and at four o'clock on the following morning, Colonel Hardie, a special messenger from Washington, arrived in camp bearing an order relieving General Hooker from duty, and directing him to turn over the command of the army to General Meade, then at the head of the Fifth corps. Of General Hooker's ability as displayed in the preliminary movements at Chancellorsville, and in the movements up to the moment of yielding his authority, the best military critics award him very high praise. That he was right in demanding the use of the troops at Harper's Ferry, and in abandoning the post, is undisputed, and was virtually acknowledged by General Halleck himself, inasmuch as he allowed the successor of Hooker to take them. But Halleck, PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER HOOKER - 187 it appears, had distrusted the ability of Hooker from the first, and when it was proposed, in September, 1862, to make the latter the successor of General McClellan instead of General Burnside, and the President and five members of the cabinet were of that mind, Halleck opposed it, and, with the remainder of the President's advisers, succeeded in defeating him. Of this opposition to him Hooker was aware, when, finally, he was placed in chief command of the Potomac army, and in accepting the position, he made but one request of the President, that he would stand between Halleck and himself.