Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 8, 188-
206

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                         MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                       by
                                SAMUEL P. BATES.

                     PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 188

                            PART I.  GENERAL HISTORY.

                                  CHAPTER VIII.

              PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE.

GETTYSBURG, upon the slopes and hills around which the great battle was fought, 
a quiet village of 2500 inhabitants, is the capital of Adams county, 
Pennsylvania.  For miles around, the country is for the most part gently 
rolling.  The soil is fertile, and kept under a high state of cultivation, 
little timber being left standing.  To the northwest, eight or ten miles away, 
is the South Mountain chain, extending from northeast to southwest, until lost 
to view in the dim distance.  "From an elevation a little below the Monterey 
House on the summit of South Mountain," says one long schooled by European 
travel, "the view of the flat lands extending towards the Susquehanna, as far as 
the eye can reach, is magnificent in the extreme.  I have seen few views in 
Italy which exceed it in romantic beauty."
  In the neighborhood of Gettysburg are several minor ridges, parallel to this 
principal one.  That to the west of the town, and but half a mile away, is known 
as Seminary Ridge, from the fact that upon its brow, where it is crossed by the 
Chambersburg Pike, are located the buildings of a Theological School of the 
Lutheran denomination.  It is also known as Oak Ridge.  Beyond this, at 
intervals of a quarter of a mile, or less, are two or three other slight ridges, 
and a mile and a half out is Willoughby Run.
  To the east and south of the town is a ridge whose general direction is 
parallel to the others, but broken and quite irregular, at some points rising 
into much higher and bolder outline than the opposite Seminary Ridge, and at 
others falling away to a level, or even lower than the intervening plain.  This 
is desig-

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE - 189

nated Cemetery Ridge, from the beautiful Evergreen Cemetery located upon the 
summit of its nearest approach to the town, and by the side of which is the 
National ground where now sleep those who there fell.  A little to the west and 
south is Zeigler's Grove, a half acre or more of forest oaks.  From this the 
ridge, which presents a shelving rock on the west of a few feet in height, is 
well defined for a mile south, when it falls away, and for at least another half 
mile is low, wet, clay soil, where it is entirely lost, but again suddenly 
breaks out into bold, rugged, rocky, wooded ground, and terminates in a granite 
spur known as Little Round Top.  Beyond this, and separated from it by a narrow 
valley, is Round Top, much more rugged and precipitous than its neighbor, and 
attaining a height of four hundred feet above the waters of neighboring streams.  
"When the force which folded and raised up the strata," says Professor Jacobs, 
in his "Later Rambles at Gettysburg," "which form the South Mountain was in 
action, it produced fissures in the strata of red shale, which covers the 
surface of this region of country, permitting the fused material from beneath to 
rise and fill them, on cooling, with trap dykes, or greenstone and syenitic 
greenstone.  This rock, being for the most part very hard, remained as the axes 
and crests of hills and ridges, when the softer shale in the intervening spaces 
was excavated by great water-currents into valleys and plains."
  Science thus renders a reasonable account of the huge masses of rock which are 
reared in the most various and fantastic shapes upon the sides and summits of 
these bold mounts, the casting about of which, in a superstitious age, may well 
have been regarded as the sport of the giants.  At a little way beyond the 
Cemetery, in the opposite direction, the ridge makes a sharp turn nearly at 
right angles to its main course, and at less than half a mile distant reaches up 
into a bold and precipitous headland, looking towards the town, known as Culp's 
Hill; and further to the right is Rock Creek, which stream cuts through the 
ridge at less than a mile away, separating Culp's from Wolf's Hill, still 
farther to the right.  At the time of the battle, all this beautiful country was 
clothed in verdure; the fields were covered with waving grain, whitening for the 
harvest; the flocks and herds,

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 190

revelling in abundant pasturage and sated by cool fountains, rested beneath 
refreshing shade; the whole presenting with all its innumerable concomitants a 
rare picture of repost and peace.
  General Lee had, for several days, been halting at Chambersburg, while the 
main body of his army was concentrating about that place, and his advance corps 
under Ewell was reaching out towards the Susquehanna, approaching the stream at 
Columbia and Harrisburg, evidently feeling for a crossing.  When his purposes 
were thwarted at the former point by the burning of the bridge, the division 
sent in that direction was ordered to march to Carlisle, plainly indicating the 
intention of moving the entire army that way.  General Hooker had concluded, 
from the fact that he did not take a pontoon train along with him, that Lee did 
not design to cross the Susquehanna, and so expressed himself to General Meade.  
But at this season of the year that stream is shallow and fordable at many 
points.  His scouts were already searching for them, as has been shown in the 
case of the one captured.  But of his purposes we are not left to conjecture.  
In his official report he says: "Preparations were now made to advance upon 
Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th, information was received from a scout 
that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and 
that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain."
  Of Hooker's intention to march upon Williamsport, and break up his 
communications, or even of the passage of the Potomac by the Union army, up to 
this time, Lee knew nothing.  That he should have so long remained in ignorance 
of these movements was due to the mishaps which befell the operations of that 
division of his cavalry under Stuart.  When about to cross the Potomac, Lee had 
ordered that daring cavalry leader to remain on guard at the passes of the Blue 
Ridge, leading to the Shenandoah Valley, and observe the movements of the Union 
forces, and should they attempt to cross the Potomac, he was to make 
demonstrations upon their rear, so as to detain them as long as possible in 
Virginia.  But, in the event of their passage, he was also to cross, either on 
the east or west side of the Blue Ridge, as to him should seem best, and take 
position upon the right flank of the main rebel column.  So far south had his 
demonstrations

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE - 191

carried him, however, that Stuart determined to cross at Seneca, some distance 
to the east of the point where the Union army had passed.  When once over he 
found it impossible to reach his chief, and take position upon the flank as 
ordered, the Union army being interposed.  He accordingly kept northward, 
passing through Hanover, and did not arrive at Carlisle, where he expected to 
find the main rebel column, until the 1st of July, after Ewell had been recalled 
from that place and was on his way to Gettysburg.  He was at Carlisle met by a 
messenger from Lee ordering him forward to the scene of conflict, but did not 
arrive until the result of the battle had been well-nigh decided, and the star 
of his chief had gone down in blood.  The need of cavalry was sorely felt by Lee 
in the manoeuvres preliminary to the fight, as he was thereby stripped of the 
means for ascertaining the whereabouts of the antagonist, and his flanks and 
rear were indifferently protected.  Thus are the plans even of great leaders the 
sport of fortune.
  The moment Lee became aware of the position of the Union army he initiated 
movements to checkmate it.  "As our communications," he says in his report, 
"with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further 
progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the 
mountains.  Accordingly Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from 
Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to 
march from Carlisle."  Thus on the evening of the 29th, orders went out for a 
concentration, and on the following morning the whole rebel army was marching on 
Gettysburg.
  This point had been well reconnoitred by the enemy's forces while on their way 
to York, Early having passed the night there four days before.  It possessed 
great strategic value.  So easily are the rugged features which surround it 
shunned, that great highways approach it from almost every point of the compass, 
centring here like spokes in the hub of a wheel, those from Shippensburg and 
Carlisle on the north, from Harrisburg, York, and Hanover on the east, from 
Baltimore, Littlestown, Taneytown and Emmittsburg on the south, and from 
Fairfield and Chambersburg on the west.  Several of these roads were 
macadamized, and

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 192

there was in addition a railroad leading out to the Northern Central Road by way 
of Hanover.  Should Lee concentrate his army here, he would secure a route to 
his base at Williamsport, much shorter than by Chambersburg, over which he could 
bring up his ammunition, and in case of disaster, hold in for retreat.  It would 
give him the control of a complete system of roads, any one of which, he could 
move upon at will as policy should dictate.  In case of being attacked and 
forced to fight a battle there, he would have an abundance of good solid ways in 
his rear, on which to manoeuvre his troops, and take his heavy guns from one 
part of the line to another, -a consideration of great importance, as a battle 
is not unfrequently lost by the delay imposed in constructing a road over some 
brook or impassable slough, or in cutting through an impenetrable wood for the 
passage of guns and ammunition.
  But it was not alone the rebel commander who had regarded with a soldier's eye 
the strategic value of Gettysburg.  General Pleasanton says: "I may say here 
that I had studied that whole country the year before very carefully indeed, all 
the roads and topographical features, and was probably about as well posted in 
regard to it as any officer in the army. . . .I was satisfied from my general 
knowledge of the country-and so mentioned to General Meade several times-that 
there was but one position in which for us to have a fight, and that was 
Gettysburg."
  At the moment when these orders went out from Lee for the rebel army to 
concentrate at Gettysburg, the Union army was reposing at Frederick and was upon 
the eve of marching to find the enemy, under the belief that he was still moving 
towards the Susquehanna.  The 28th was the Sabbath, and "that day," says General 
Hooker, "I designed to give my army to rest," an example of regard for the 
Sabbath as noble as it is unusual in military operations.  But at dawn on the 
morning of that day he was relieved of command.  To the army his removal came 
like a thunder-clap from a cloudless sky.  To the rank and file he had become 
greatly endeared, for he had brought his command from a condition of 
demoralization to one of great efficiency.  To strike down a popular commander 
in the very face of the enemy, and one the eve of a great battle, was an act, 
that in

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTSYBURG UNDER MEADE - 193

almost any other country, would have been attended with extreme hazard.  But the 
temper of that army was known to be one of intense devotion ot the National 
cause, and full confidence was felt that it would fight under any commander, or 
even without a commander if need be.  The course of General Hooker at this 
critical moment was one of the most disinterested patriotism and gallantry.  In 
his farewell order he says: "Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the 
commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not 
without the deepest emotions.  The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so 
many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this 
army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to 
me, a willing and hearty support."  By the testimony of General Butterfield, 
General Hooker had advised, in case he was relieved, that General Meade should 
be appointed in his place, and when the officers who had served under him called 
in a body to bid him farewell at his departure, he said that "General Meade was 
a brave and gallant man, who would undoubtedly lead them to success, and that he 
hoped that all who regarded him, or his wishes, or his feeling, would devote 
every energy and ability to the support of General Meade."
  The new commander had made a good record.  He had been with that army from its 
organization, and the Beaver Dam Creek, at Gaines' Mill, at Charles City Cross 
Roads, at the second Bull Run, and more especially at Fredericksburg, he had 
exhibited the qualities of an able soldier.  In his order, he said: "By 
direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the 
Army of the Potomac.  As a soldier, in obeying this order-an order totally 
unexpected and unsolicited-I have no promises nor pledges to make.  The country 
looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile 
invasion.  Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, 
let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let 
each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the 
decision of the contest.  It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the 
command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever 
appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements;

MARTIAL DEES OF PENNSYLVANIA - 194

but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the 
discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me."
  His first care was to acquaint himself with the late movements, and exact 
position of the enemy, and the plans and purposes of General Hooker.  To this 
end he retained the officers who had formed General Hooker's military family-
General Butterfield, chief of staff, General Warren, chief of engineers, General 
Hunt, chief of artillery, and General Williams, adjutant-general.  He himself 
had a conference with General Hooker, before his departure, respecting his plan 
of campaign; but that he might be fully assured of the latter's purposes, he 
requested General Butterfield to have another official conversation with the 
retiring chief, and make himself thoroughly conversant with the movements in 
contemplation.
  The operations indicated by Hooker were in the main adopted.  General Meade 
very cogently inferred from the movements of the enemy that it was his intention 
to cross the Susquehanna, a purpose which Lee declares he was acting on up to 
the evening of the 29th.  Accordingly, in his telegram accepting the position to 
which he had been assigned, he said: "Totally unexpected as it has been, and in 
ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can 
only now say that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping 
Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his 
attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him 
battle.  I would say that I trust that every available man that can be spared 
will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force."  In 
response to this latter request, not only the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which 
had been the bone of contention between Hooker and Halleck, and the withholding 
of which was the immediate cause of the former's resignation, was placed at his 
disposal, but also the entire force of militia at Harrisburg, under General 
Couch, and such forces as could be used from the departments of West Virginia, 
Baltimore, and Washington, from Fortress Monroe, and even the returning troops 
from North Carolina, were hurried forward to his support, thus proving 
conclusively that it was not

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE - 195

a necessity of holding the troops at Harper's Ferry, but a distrust of Hooker's 
ability as a soldier, which made Halleck unwilling to give them to him.
  Orders were accordingly issued on the 28th, for the army to move forward on 
the following morning, in fan shape, in three columns, from Frederick, where it 
had been principally concentrated, on to a line represented by the road running 
from Emmittsburg to Westminster, the First and Eleventh corps being directed to 
Emmittsburg, the Third and Twelfth to Taneytown, Second to Frizelburg, Fifth to 
Union Mills, and the Sixth to New Windsor; the cavalry, likewise in three 
columns, moving upon the flanks of the infantry-Buford upon the left, Gregg upon 
the right, and Kilpatrick in advance-and this order of march was continued on 
the 30th.  On this latter day Stuart, who, with the main body of the enemy's 
cavalry, had been hanging upon the rear of the Union army, and having crossed 
the Potomac at Seneca, was moving up on the right flank, fell in with Kilpatrick 
at Hanover, and had a sharp encounter, in which the enemy was worsted, and one 
battle-flag and a number of prisoners were taken.
  The order of march issued on the 30th, for the movement of the army on the 1st 
day of July, was for the Third corps to go to Emmittsburg, Second to Taneytown, 
Fifth to Hanover, Twelfth to Two Taverns, First to Gettysburg, Eleventh to 
Gettysburg in supporting distance, and Sixth to Manchester.  General Reynolds 
had been continued in command of what had been the right wing, now getting into 
position upon the left, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps. And 
the cavalry, and as he was now approaching the enemy, he had turned over the 
command of his own corps, the First, to General Doubleday, and was himself 
directing the general movements.
  In the meantime, the orders issued by General Lee on the evening of the 29th, 
for all his forces to concentrate at Gettysburg, were being executed, but not 
with the usual enterprise and daring, the rebel commander sorely feeling the 
need of his cavalry, that which he had depended on having been isolated, as we 
have seen, and by the fight of Hanover been pushed still farther away towards 
the Susquehanna.  He says in his report:

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 196

"The march towards Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been, 
had the movements of the Federal army been known."  Had his cavalry been 
present, those movements would have been observed, and constantly reported to 
him.  Thus, precisely what had happened to Hooker at Chancellorsville, the 
absence of cavalry, and which lost him the battle, befell Lee in this campaign.  
The strategic prize was Gettysburg.  Whichever party should seize that, would 
strike with great advantages in his favor.
  But while the two armies were approaching, each with imperfect knowledge of 
the other's movements, for a death grapple, the Union commander was unaware of 
the change which had occurred in the plans of his antagonist, and supposed him 
still pushing forward to cross the Susquehanna.  Hence, while Lee was making all 
possible speed to concentrate on the Union flank, Meade, all unsuspicious of 
danger, was moving, much scattered, to catch Lee before he should get across.  
But the moment Ewell's forces began to fall back from before Harrisburg, they 
were followed up by the militia at that place, under General William F. (Baldy) 
Smith, who had been assigned by General Couch to that duty.  As Ewell withdrew 
from Carlisle, Smith entered it, but, as the enemy thought, in too much haste, 
and turned upon him.  A sharp skirmish ensued, and the solid shot from the 
enemy's battery, planted upon an eminence to the south of the place, tore wildly 
through the astonished city.  No great injury was done, but the anger of the foe 
at the obstinacy of Smith, in not again surrendering the town, was vented in 
firing and utterly destroying the United States barracks, near that place, and 
the arsenal of supplies.  This determination of Smith to press upon the rear of 
the rebels disclosed their purpose of concentrating, and the intelligence was 
flashed over the wires to Washington, and thence to Westminster, which had now 
become the base of intelligence as well as of supply to the Union force.  On the 
30th, Couch telegraphed to Halleck: "My latest information is that Early, with 
his 8000 men, went towards Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight 
a great battle there.  At Carlisle, they said they were not going to be 
outflanked by Hooker."  No man was more active or successful in gaining

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE - 197

accurate information, or divining the purposes of the enemy, than the Hon. 
Thomas A. Scott, Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and 
subsequently Assistant Secretary of War.  In this, as in the management of the 
great corporation with which he is associated, he showed Napoleonic vigor.  On 
the same day, Couch, from information furnished by Scott, again telegraphed:  
"Lee is falling back suddenly from the vicinity of Harrisburg, and concentrating 
all his forces.  York has been evacuated.  Carlisle is being evacuated.  The 
concentration seems to be at or near Chambersburg; the object, apparently, a 
sudden movement against Meade, of which he should be advised by courier 
immediately;" and a little past midnight Couch sent still another telegram:  
"Information just received, leads to the belief that the concentration of the 
forces of the enemy will be at Gettysburg, rather than at Chambersburg.  The 
movement on their part is very rapid and hurried.  They retired from Carlisle in 
the direction of Gettysburg, by the way of the Petersburg pike.  Firing about 
Petersburg and Dillstown this P. M., continued some hours.  Meade should, by all 
means, be informed and prepared for a sudden attack from Lee's whole army."
  At about the same hour, July 1st, at a quarter before one in the morning, 
General Schenck telegraphed from Baltimore: "Lee, I think, is either massing his 
troops, or making a general retreat towards Cumberland Valley.  Most likely the 
former.  They are so near that I shall not be surprised if a battle comes on to-
day."
  Up to the moment of receiving these messages, which did not reach him until 
the morning of the 1st of July, General Meade had been moving his army forward 
by rapid marches towards the Susquehanna under the apprehension that Lee was 
intent on crossing that stream.  It is true that he had obtained reports which 
induced him, on the evening of the 30th, to issue a circular to each corps 
commander, saying: "The Commanding General has received information that the 
enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg.  It is the 
intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until 
the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed. . . . Corps 
commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, upon 
receiving order, to march against the

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 198

enemy. . . . The men must be provided with three days' rations in haversacks, 
and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person."
  It would seem from the following telegram from Meade to Halleck, sent at seven 
o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July, that Meade had not yet been apprised 
of the important messages from Schenck and Couch, quoted above, and which were 
dispatched to Washington at a little after midnight"  " My positions to-day are, 
one corps at Emmittsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at Two 
Taverns, one at Manchester, one at Hanover.  These were ordered yesterday, 
before receipt of advices of Lee's movements. . . . The point of Lee's 
concentration, and the nature of the country, when ascertained, well determine 
whether I attack him or not."
  Thus it will be seen that thirty-six hours had elapsed from the time Lee had 
issued orders for all his forces to concentrate at Gettysburg, before Meade 
became fully aware that such a concentration was in progress, and during all 
those hours, pregnant with the gravest issues, he was moving on, "fan-shape," as 
he terms it, by this time sweeping a broad belt of more than thirty miles, 
intent upon striking the enemy before he should cross the Susquehanna, or while 
entangled upon the stream.  This is evident from his telegram to General Halleck 
of the 29th, in which he says: "If he [Lee] is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall 
rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his 
rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do."  The purpose here 
expressed is confirmed by his testimony before the committee of Congress on the 
Conduct of the War: "I determined," he says, "and so notified the General-in-
chief, that I should move my army as promptly as possible on the main line from 
Frederick to Harrisburg, extending my wings on both sides of that line as far as 
I could consistently with the safety and rapid concentration of that army, and 
should continue that movement until I either encountered the enemy, or had 
reason to believe that the enemy would advance upon me; my object being at all 
hazards to compel him to loose his hold on the Susquehanna, and meet me in 
battle at some point.  It was my firm determination, never for an instant 
deviated from, to give

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE - 199

battle wherever, and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of 
course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer-that when 
I came into his immediate neighborhood some manoeuvres might be made by me with 
a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be 
secured by him."
  As soon, however, as it became evident to him that the enemy had let go of the 
Susquehanna, and was rapidly concentrating on his flank, he instantly realized 
that a change of policy was necessary.
  He accordingly issued a circular on the morning of the 1st of July, of which 
the following extracts indicate the purport: "From information received the 
Commanding General is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in 
this direction has been accomplished, viz: the relief of Harrisburg and the 
prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Pennsylvania beyond the 
Susquehanna.  It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the 
enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of 
success.  If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, 
after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other 
impedimenta, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of 
battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at 
Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek.  For this purpose 
General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at 
Gettysburg, two corps [First and Elevneth] by the road to Taneytown and 
Westminster, and after crossing Pipe Creek, deploy towards Middleburg.  The 
corps at Emmittsburg [Third] will be withdrawn, by way of Mechanicsville, to 
Middleburg.  General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and 
Two Taverns [Fifth and Twelfth] and withdraw them by Union Mills. . . . The time 
for falling back can only be developed by circumstances.  Whenever such 
circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and 
assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once by 
communicated to these headquarters, and to all adjoining corps commanders. . . . 
This order is communicated that a general

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 200

plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in 
strong force upon any portion of our present position.  Developments may cause 
the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions."
  Against the movements contemplated in this circular, which was merely a 
notification of the purpose which would be followed by an order when the trains 
of the several corps could be disposed of, and the movements of the enemy should 
make it advisable, some of Meade's officers entered vigorous protest.  But to 
the adoption of this plan he was incited by many weighty considerations.  He was 
convinced, from information hourly reaching him, that the whole rebel army, 
numerically stronger than his own, was rapidly concentrating, and was probably 
within striking distance of Gettysburg.  Should he push the two corps which he 
had approaching that place into the town, and attempt to hold it, the 
probabilities were that they would be fallen upon and annihilated before he 
could bring up the balance of his army to their support, one corps of which, the 
Sixth, was over thirty miles away.  It was his intention, therefore, that these 
two corps, instead of resolutely fighting the whole rebel army, should simply 
hold the attacking force in check, in case the enemy should assume the 
offensive, sufficiently to bring off the trains, and then concentrate his whole 
army before engaging in a general battle.  He was convinced, besides, that 
however excellent the position at Gettysburg might be, and however great its 
strategic value, it was then absolutely beyond his power to keep it from the 
enemy's grasp.  The sequel shows that both these catastrophies, which the quick 
military eye of Meade saw impending, did actually follow, the two corps being 
crushed with a loss of 10,000 of their number, and the town falling into the 
enemy's hands.  Meade did not know, having never been at Gettysburg, nor could 
nay one in his army have known, until he reached the ground, nor does any one 
now claim to have been aware, that there was a position outside the town which 
could be taken up after the town itself had fallen, that would prove more 
favorable for gaining a victory than the possession of Gettysburg itself, though 
counted upon as of so great value.  The whole advantage, to the Union side, of 
Gettysburg as a battle-ground,

PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE - 201

after the town was lost, consisted in the fact that a position was found near 
there which proved to be a good one from which to fight a defensive battle.  Not 
knowing that any such ground existed, and not having been advised by any of 
those who are now most loud-mouthed in claiming the credit of indicating 
Gettysburg as a favorable battle-field, the design of Meade to concentrate, made 
known in this circular, was a proper one, and dictated by the highest 
considerations of military policy.  Besides, if he could withdraw the isolated 
wing, now shown for the first time by the telegrams of Couch and Schenck to be 
threatened with destruction, and take the position a few miles to the rear, 
which he had selected, he would be brought nearer his own base, at Westminster, 
which could be held with only slight diminution of his strength for guard.  He 
would at the same time be drawing his antagonist still farther from his base, 
and would thereby make him so much the more vulnerable.
  It is true that to that portion of the army which was at the moment in advance 
of the line he had selected, the contemplated movement would appear like a 
falling back, and in that view might have a demoralizing effect.  General 
Butterfield says: "When General Meade presented this order to me, which was in 
his own handwriting, I stated to him that I thought the effect of an order to 
fall back would be very bad upon the morals of the army, and that it ought to be 
avoided if possible.  General Meade seemed to think that we were going ahead 
without any well understood plan, and that, by reason of that, we might be 
liable to disaster."  But the effect here deprecated by Butterfield would not 
have applied to the main body of the army, which was already on or near the line 
selected, and could have had no serious influence upon the wing touched.
  The only fault then that can be imputed to Meade in regard to this order, 
which was probably more a misfortune than a fault, was that he had allowed his 
antagonist to be thirty-six hours concentrating, before he discovered the fact, 
and he, in the meantime, marching on with corps scattered, and allowing a 
contingency to occur which necessitated such an order.
  There was, however, one consideration, which subsequent disclosures show to 
have been of the highest importance, that failed

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to impress the mind of the Union leader.  Suppose he had fallen back, and found 
a strong position, and got his army concentrated, would the enemy come forward 
and attack him in it?  General Lee says, in his official report: "It has not 
been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless 
attacked by the enemy."  Swinton, in his "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," 
says that after the conclusion of the war he had a conversation with General 
Longstreet, concerning this battle, in which the latter declared that "General 
Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical 
offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him."  It would seem, therefore, 
that any strong position selected and fortified by Meade would have been futile, 
as he would have been obliged, in the end, to have come out from behind his 
fastnesses, and have attacked.  But this does not militate against the soundness 
of his order for concentration, as that was imperative, before, with the hope of 
success, he could attack an enemy who had had thirty-six hours the start in 
drawing in his legions and compacting them for the onset.
  But a power above human wisdom was controlling events which set at nought the 
counsels of the wise.  Buford, who had been charged with moving upon the left 
flank of the Union army, with one of the divisions of cavalry, having encamped 
at Fountain Dale on the night of the 29th of June, started in the morning 
towards Gettysburg; but unexpectedly coming upon a detachment of the enemy's 
infantry, while on the way, which proved to be a part of Pettigrew's brigade of 
Heth's division of Hill's corps, which recoiled before him, he retraced his 
steps, not having orders to attack, to Fountain Dale, and thence moved to 
Emmittsburg, where he received orders to march to Gettysburg, from Pleasanton, 
chief of cavalry, and to hold the town to the last extremity, receiving 
assurance of support from the infantry.  On the same morning a portion of Heth's 
division of Hill's corps, which had crossed the mountains some days before, and 
had been engaged in gathering supplies of beef, flour, and grain, approached 
Gettysburg, accompanied with artillery, and a train of fifteen wagons, the 
whole, several thousand in number, forming a line a mile and a half in length, 
apparently having been ordered out to

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take possession of the town.  The head of this column had reached the crest of 
Seminary Ridge, and the pickets as far down as Mr. Shead's house, in the 
outskirts of the place, when it was halted.  After the officers, with their 
field glasses, had ridden back and forth for some time, reconnoitering and 
conversing with the inhabitants, the column countermarched, and at half-past ten 
had disappeared.  It is not difficult to account for this singular manoeuvre, 
for Buford, with his resolute cavalry division, was rapidly approaching.  As the 
enemy withdrew, they attempted an ambuscade when arrived at Marsh Creek, hiding 
themselves to right and left of the road, under cover of a wood that skirts the 
stream, while a minor force was thrown forward as a decoy.  But the disguise was 
too thin for the practiced eye of Buford.
  In an hour after the rebels had departed, the magnificent column of Buford 
arrived, and to the gladdened eyes of the inhabitants, unused to gaze on hostel 
pageants, it seemed indeed "terrible as an army with banners."  With the firm 
tread it moved up the main street of the town, and out upon the Chambersburg 
pike.  It consisted, at the time, of only two brigades, a third under Merritt 
being at Mechanicstown with the trains, one commanded by Colonel J. M. Gamble, 
composed of the Eighth Illinois, Eighth Indiana, and Eighth New York, the other 
by Colonel Thomas C. Devin, embracing the Sixth New York (Ira Harris), Ninth New 
York, and the Seventeenth Pennsylvania, and a battery of light guns of the 
Second Artillery, under Lieutenants Clark and Calef.  It was reputed to contain 
4000 men, and probably bore that number upon its rolls; but when drawn up for 
action could only present 2200 muskets.  At the distance of a mile and a half 
from the town it was deployed, Gamble across the Chambersburg, and Devin across 
the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads.
  Thus was the column of the enemy, which had approached the town in the early 
morning evidently for the purpose of taking forcible possession, foiled, and the 
advantage in the preliminary manoeuvre was with the Union side, an augury of 
ultimate triumph.  Gamble threw out his scouting parties towards Cashtown, and 
Devin towards Hunterstown, which scoured the county, capturing stragglers from 
the enemy, from whom import-

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 204

ant information was obtained.  Buford now became satisfied that the mass of the 
rebel army was converging towards Gettysburg, and that heavy columns were 
already in close proximity.
  A Lieutenant, who was signal officer of Buford's Division, reports the 
conversation of the chiefs on the occasion, which is published by General De 
Peyster in this "Decisive Conflicts": "On hours with Colonel Tom Devin, and 
while commenting upon the information brought in by Devin's scouts, remarked 
that 'the battle would be fought at that point,' and that 'he was afraid it 
would be commenced in the morning before the infantry would get up.'  These are 
his own words.  Devin did not believe in so early an advance of the enemy, and 
remarked that he would 'take care of all that would attack his front during the 
ensuing twenty-for hours.'  Buford answered: 'No, you won't."  They will attack 
you in the morning and they will come booming-skirmishers three deep.  You will 
have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive.  The enemy 
must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure 
it, and if we are able to hold we will do well.'  Upon his return, he ordered 
me, then First Lieutenant and signal officer of his division, to seek out the 
most prominent points and watch everything; to be careful to look out for camp-
fires, and in the morning for dust.  He seemed anxious, more so than I ever saw 
him."
  The judgment of Buford was just, showing that he was possessed of remarkable 
discernment and penetration.  Two divisions of Hill's corps were already across 
the mountains, the last to leave the Rappahannock, and the first to appear upon 
the front of the new field, while his remaining division and two divisions of 
Longstreet's corps were already upon the western slope ready to cross at dawn, 
and the body of Ewell's corps was in bivouac at Heidlersburg, only nine miles 
away.
  The Union army, too, had been moving thitherward, and at the moment when 
Buford was holding this conversation in the tent of Colonel Devin, Reynolds was 
bivouacking on the bank of March Creek, four miles away, with the First corps; 
Howard with the Eleventh was on the Emmittsburg road.

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some miles farther back, Sickels with the Third corps was at Emmittsburg, 
Hancock with the Second at Frizelburg, Slocum with the Twelfth at Littlestown, 
Sykes with the Fifth at Union Mills towards Hanover, and Sedgwick with the Sixth 
at Manchester.
  The army was now on Northern soil or verging upon it.  As they crossed the 
Pennsylvania line the fact was announced to the men from the heads of the 
columns, and the passage was signalized by the wildest enthusiasm, and 
demonstrations of joy.  Caps flew in air, shouts of rejoicing resounded, bands 
struck up the National airs, and the heavens echoed with patriot songs.  General 
Meade, recognizing the importance of exciting the fervor of his men, and intent 
on seizing every opportunity to heighten it, issued the following earnest 
appeal: "The Commanding General requests that, previous to the engagement soon 
expected with the enemy, corps, and all other commanding officers will address 
their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the 
struggle.  The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to 
this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to do so will 
leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and 
joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army.  Homes, firesides, 
and domestic altars are involved.  The army has fought well heretofore; it is 
believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever if it is 
addressed in fitting terms.  Corps commanders are authorized to order the 
instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour."
  General Reynolds, having been kept aware of the movements of the enemy by the 
ever watchful Buford, had taken up a strong position on the heights beyond 
Emmittsburg, on which, should he be assailed, he could make a good defence, and 
here he had passed the night of the 29th.  On the 30th he moved forward only a 
few miles, where he again formed his camp on ground from which he would fight if 
attached, until he could withdraw to his position of the night before near 
Emmittsburg.  But the night of the 30th passed peacefully, and on the morning of 
the 1st-the last of earth's morning for him-he was early astir, having been 
apprised of the near approach of the foe.

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Seeing that Buford was about to be attacked, he put Wadsworth's division, 
accompanied by Hall's Maine battery in motion towards Gettysburg, and sent for 
Doubleday, who was in command of the First corps.  After reading and explaining 
his telegrams, he directed Doubleday to move with the remaining two divisions 
close upon the footsteps of Wadsworth.  He then mounted his horse and rode 
rapidly towards the front.