Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Samuel P. Bates, 1876 - Part 1, Chapter 9, 207-
237

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                         MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                       by
                                SAMUEL P. BATES.

                     PHILADELPHIA: T. H. DAVIS & CO., 1876.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 207

                            PART I.  GENERAL HISTORY.

                                   CHAPTER IX.

                      FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

BEING well assured that the enemy was about to attack him, Buford was early in 
the saddle, and had made the most imposing disposition to meet them which his 
little force would admit.  Had he had at his back the half million of troops, 
that a farmer's wife, in reply to inquiries of rebel officers, had declared were 
in Gettysburg, he could have scarcely made one more so.  But in addition to 
being imposing it had the virtue of being effective, and when the rebels came on 
"booming, skirmishers three deep," as Buford had predicted, they met a stubborn 
resistance.
  His skirmish line extended from the point where the Millerstown road crosses 
Willoughby Run, following the somewhat tortuous bluff bordering the left bank of 
that stream across the Chambersburg way, and thence around crossing the 
Mummasburg, Carlisle, and Harrisburg pikes, and the railroad, reaching quite to 
Rock Creek, thus covering all the great highways entering the town from the 
north and west.  In rear of this, upon a ridge running parallel with Seminary 
ridge, and a half mile from it, were posted the rest of his forces dismounted.  
Covering the roads on which the enemy was expected first to advance were planted 
the guns of his light batteries.
  Having every disposition made, he watched eagerly for any indication which 
could disclose the purpose of the foe.  He had not long to wait; for the enemy, 
being in strong force, and intent on seizing the coveted prize, which he now 
believed was within his grasp, moved up his skirmishers.  The first shot was 
delivered by the enemy at a little before ten o'clock, which was responded to on 
the Union side by three single shots, the signal

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 208

for a general discharge along the skirmish line, and the Battle of Gettysburg 
was begun.
  As Buford's men for the most part fought dismounted, the enemy at first took 
them for infantry, and consequently moved tardily, and with much circumspection, 
giving time for the First corps, which was now rapidly approaching, to come up.  
So from the opening, fortune favored the Union arms.  A constantly increasing 
skirmish fire was continued for half an hour, when the enemy, having brought up 
his artillery, opened with much spirit.  The guns of Buford answered promptly, 
and maintained the contest gallantly, preserving the delusion that he was well 
supported.  The fury of the fight increased at every moment, and Buford saw that 
the weight of numbers bearing on him would soon press him off the field; but not 
an inch was yielded, though he had every preparation made for retiring to 
Cemetery Hill when he could hold out no longer.  It was a moment of gloom and 
anxiety to that true heart.  Would he be left to his fate, and be at last 
obliged to sacrifice that vantage ground he had striven so hard to hold?
  The signal officer, above quoted, had early in the morning taken his station 
in the cupola of the Theological Seminary, whence the country for many miles 
around lay open to view.  "The engagement," he says, "was desperate, as we were 
opposed to the whole front of Hill's corps.  We held them in check fully two 
hours, and were nearly overpowered when, in looking about the country, I saw the 
corps flag of General Reynolds.  I was still in the Seminary steeple, but being 
the only signal officer with the cavalry, had no one to communicate with, so I 
sent one of my men to Buford, who came up, and looking through my glass, 
confirmed my report, and remarked: 'Now we can hold the place!'"  With what joy 
was the eye of the leader gladdened as he beheld the folds of that flag floating 
upon the morning air, and read in its bright emblems the assurance of succor! 
"General Reynolds," continues the signal officer, "and staff came up on a gallop 
in advance of the corps, when I made the following communication: 'Reynolds, 
himself, will be here in five minutes.  His corps is about a mile behind."  
Buford returned and watched anxiously my observations made through my signal-
telescope.

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 209

When Reynolds came up, seeing Buford in the cupola, he cried out: 'What's the 
matter, John?' 'The devil's to pay,' said Buford; and going down the ladder, 
Reynolds said: 'I hope you can hold out until my corps comes up,' 'I reckon I 
can,' was the characteristic reply.  Reynolds then said: 'Let's ride out and see 
all about it,' and mounting we rode away.  The skirmishing was then very brisk, 
the cavalry fighting dismounted.  Buford said: 'General, do not expose yourself 
so much;' but Reynolds laughed, and moved nearer still."
  Having closely reconnoitred the field, he requested Buford to hold fast the 
position he had, and said that he would bring up the whole right wing of the 
army of which he had been put in formal command on the previous morning by the 
new chief, as rapidly as it could be concentrated.  He then dispatched his staff 
officers, one to Howard, who was already on the way, with orders to bring up his 
corps with all possible dispatch; another to Sickles, to look for the Third 
corps; and a third to hasten on the divisions of the First corps.  Having shown 
his determination by these orders to concentrate and to fight, Reynolds again 
mounted and rode back to meet the head of his column.  As he was descending the 
hill, after having passed the Seminary, accompanied by his escort, he met an old 
man, possessing an air of authority, whom Reynolds asked if he could not point 
out a shorter way back to the Emmittsburg road than by the centre of the town, 
by which he had come.  The old man was John Burns, who had been entrusted by his 
fellow citizens with the office of Constable, and for several days had been 
watching for suspected persons, having already a number of rebel spies and 
messengers locked up in the Gettysburg jail.  Burns assented to the request of 
the General, and recognizing the need of haste, at once started down a by-street 
on a rapid run, the cavalcade dashing on after him.  Burns' blood was now up, 
and he watched eagerly for Reynolds' return.  Having come near the town with the 
leading division, Reynolds determined to strike across the fields by the most 
direct route to the Seminary, and ordered the fences leveled.  "The pioneers," 
says Burns, who watched every movement with the greatest interest, "made the 
fences fly with the bright axes.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 210

  When General Reynolds arrived at the front, the enemy were pressing the 
cavalry with much energy, and he accordingly led his troops at once to its 
support.  Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division had the advance.  Three 
regiments of this brigade, the Seventy-sixth and One hundred and Forty-seventh 
New York, and the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, Reynolds ordered Wadsworth, 
accompanied by Cutler, to take to the right of the line facing westward, north 
of the bed of an old unfinished railroad, while Reynolds himself took the two 
remaining regiments, the Ninety-fifth New York and the Fourteenth Brooklyn, with 
Hall's battery to the south of the railroad grading, and posted them on a line 
with, but a little in advance of the other regiments of the brigade, the battery 
being placed upon the pike.  As the infantry moved up, the cavalry retired.  The 
regiments to the right of the cut had scarcely got into position before they 
were heavily engaged with superior numbers.  General Cutler, in a letter to 
Governor Curtin, written soon after the battle, said: "It was my fortune to be 
in advance of the morning of July 1st.  When we came upon the ground in front of 
the enemy, Colonel Hofmann's regiment, the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, being the 
second in the column, got into position a moment sooner than the others, the 
enemy now advancing in line of battle in easy musket range.  The atmosphere 
being a little thick, I took out my glass to examine the enemy.  Being a few 
paces in the rear of Colonel Hofmann, he turned to me and inquired, 'Is that the 
enemy?' My reply was, 'Yes."  Turning to his men he commanded, 'Ready, right-
oblique, aim, fire!' . . . The fire was followed by other regiments instantly; 
still, that battle on the soil of Pennsylvania was opened by her own sons, and 
it is just that it should become a matter of history.  When colonel Hofmann gave 
the command, 'aim,' I doubted whether the enemy was near enough to have the fire 
effective, and asked him if he was within range; but not hearing my question, he 
fired, and I received my reply in a shower of bullets, by which many of the 
Colonel's men were killed, and wounded.  My own horse, and those of two of my 
staff, were wounded at the same time."
  Hill's corps, a force of 30,000 men in three divisions, had crossed the South 
Mountain in the order of Heth's, Pender's, and

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 211

Anderson's; and Longstreet's corps, of like strength and divisions, was 
following in the order of McLaws', Hood's, and Pickett's; the latter, however, 
left for one day at Chambersburg to hand forward the ammunition, reserve 
artillery, and trains safely, and to hold itself in readiness to come up the 
moment the battle should wax warm.  Ewell, who commanded the remaining corps, 
and was coming in from Carlisle and York, had started from Heidlersburg early on 
the morning of the 1st, and with his three divisions was marching in the order 
of Early's, Rodes', and Johnson's.  The divisions of Heth and Pender were the 
first to strike the head of the Union army.  As they arrived upon the field they 
were deployed upon the bluff overlooking the west bank of Willoughby Run, Heth 
upon the right and Pender upon the left, and at commanding points along this 
bluff the artillery was planeted.  At the point where the rebel line was formed, 
there is a cross-road running north, and from it another branching east and 
approaching the town in general course nearly parallel with the Chambersburg 
pike.  On this, Pender advanced and finally reached out towards Oak Hill, a 
commanding eminence, destined to be an important point in the day's battle, and 
in the direction in which Ewell was approaching.
  General Doubleday, who had been directed to bring up the two remaining 
divisions of the First corps, having seen them fairly in motion, galloped 
forward and overtook the first division just as it was filing through the fields 
at the foot of Seminary Ridge, and immediately sent his aid, Lieutenant Martin, 
to General Reynolds for instructions.  The aid returned bringing orders for 
Doubleday to attend to the Millerstown road, the next south of the Chambersburg.  
Midway between these two roads was a triangular piece of woods, the base resting 
on Willoughby Run, and the apex reaching up towards the Seminary Ridge, the 
elevation on which Cutler's troops were forming, cutting through its upper 
extremity.  "These woods," says Doubleday, "possessed all the advantages of a 
redoubt, strengthening the centre of our line, and enfilading the enemy's 
columns should they advance in the open space on either side.  I deemed the 
extremity of the woods, which extended to the summit of the ridge, the key of 
the position."  To seize and hold this, therefore, was of prime necessity.

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 212 

  The brigade of Meredith followed close upon that of Cutler, and the latter had 
scarcely got into position, before it also came upon the field.  It was composed 
of Western men, gallant soldiers, and gallantly led.  It was known as the Iron 
Brigade.  This tongue of wood, the importance of which General Doubleday had 
recognized, was also coveted by the enemy, and Archer's brigade of Heth's 
division had been sent across the run to occupy it, and was already advancing 
upon its base when Meredith arrived.  Not a moment was to be lost, if it was to 
be saved to the Union side.  Doubleday detached one regiment, the Sixth 
Wisconsin, to remain as a reserve, and immediately ordered the others to form 
and charge into the woods.  "I urged them," says Doubleday, "to hold it to the 
last extremity.  Full of the memory of past achievements, they replied 
cheerfully and proudly, 'If we can't hold it, where will you find the men who 
can?'"  Led by the Second Wisconsin in line, under Colonel Fairchild, since 
Governor, and followed, en echelon, by the Seventh Wisconsin, Nineteenth 
Indiana, and Twenty-fourth Michigan, this sturdy body of men dashed forward.  As 
the leading regiment was approaching the wood, General Reynolds, accompanied by 
two aids, Captains Mitchell and Baird, and an orderly, Charles H. Veil, rode up, 
and ordering it to advance at double-quick, joined in the charge.  As it moved 
he exclaimed, "Forward! men, forward! for God's sake, and drive those fellows 
out of the woods."  He then turned to look for his supports and to hasten them 
on.  The woods were full of the enemy's sharp-shooters, and as he turned he was 
struck in the brain, and never spoke more.  An abler or more devoted soldier 
perished not in the Union cause.  His fall was not noticed by the troops, who 
swept on, and pressing Archer's brigade closely, compelled it to surrender, 
taking 1000 prisoners, and Archer himself, who was brought in by private Patrick 
Maloney of Colonel Fairchild's regiment, who afterwards fell on the field of his 
heroic exploit.  The enthusiasm of the charge was so great that the brigade was 
carried across the run, and was formed on the high ground beyond.  Seeing that 
this was too far in advance of the main line, it was ordered back and posted in 
the woods.
  General Doubleday was now informed of the fall of Reynolds, by which sad event 
the whole responsibility of maintaining the

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 213

fight was thrown upon him.  At about this time, and before Doubleday could 
communicate with his officers, other disasters fell upon his little force.  The 
enemy having formed in two lines in front, and to the right of Cutler's brigade, 
advanced upon it in vastly superior numbers, while another force charged up the 
railroad cut, and attacked the guns of Hall's battery.  So overwhelming was this 
onset, that Wadsworth was induced to order Hall to retire with his guns to the 
Seminary Ridge, and also to withdraw the three regiments of Cutler's brigade 
posted north of the cut.  One of these regiments, the One Hundred and Forty-
seventh, under Major Harney, failed to receive the order, and remained upon the 
front battling with the swarming foe until nearly annihilated, and so far 
surrounded as to preclude the possibility of withdrawing.  Hall had again been 
ordered forward, and the guns of his battery did fearful execution by the free 
use of canister.  He had held in check the charging columns for some time; but 
seeing his supports withdrawn and his guns in danger of being lost, and 
receiving a summons from Wadsworth, he fell back.  The last gun to retire lost 
all its horses, and before the men sent to rescue it could accomplish the 
purpose, they were either shot or taken prisoners, and the gun was for the time 
left upon the field.
  At this junction Doubleday was for the first time able to give attention to 
that part of the ground.  Seeing that the right of his line had been crushed, 
and that the disaster, if not speedily repaired, would work the ruin of his 
corps, he sent for his reserve regiment, the Sixth Wisconsin, and forming it 
upon the enemy's flank, at right angles to the line of battle, ordered a charge.  
To save themselves from the determined front presented by this regiment the 
enemy sprang into the railroad cut near by, and commenced a murderous fire from 
this sheltered position.  As the Sixth moved it was joined by the two regiments 
of Cutler, which had been originally posted on the left of the cut.  The 
struggle for a time was desperate, and while some of the enemy gave token of 
surrender, the more resolute still held out.  Finally, Colonel Dawes of the 
Sixth threw a squad into the cut upon his right, so as to enfilade the enemy's 
line, and pressing him in front, carried the position at the point of the 
bayonet.  A por-

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 214

tion of two regiments of Davis' brigade with their battle flags were taken 
prisoners, and marched off to the rear.  This relieved the One Hundred and 
Forty-seventh, which had been surrounded and had suffered fearful losses, and 
the gun of Hall's battery, that had been left, was rescued.
  So bold a manoeuvre astonished the enemy, and gave assurance to the troops 
which Wadsworth had ordered back, insomuch that the line was reestablished, and 
one of Tidball's batteries was advanced to take the place of Hall.  Tidball's 
guns were soon hotly engaged, and after replying to the enemy with spirit and 
effect for some time, they were relieved by Captain Reynolds'.
  Though suffering severe losses in killed and wounded, this single division of 
only two brigades had achieved a marked success, two brigades of Heth's 
division, Archer's and Davis', having been broken and large numbers captured, 
and the ground originally taken triumphantly held.  This furnished a favorable 
opportunity to have retired, and taken position on more defensible ground.  But 
Doubleday, who was still in chief command on the field, did not deem it wise to 
withdraw until a more determined fight had been made.  He believed that General 
Reynolds, who had been placed in command of the whole right wing of the army, 
and who enjoyed the full confidence of his chief, had taken this position with 
the intention of holding it until supports should come up, which had been 
already ordered and whose arrival was hourly expected, and of preventing the 
enemy from gaining possession of the town.  He was aware that the remaining 
divisions of his own corps were near at hand, that the Eleventh corps was 
approaching, and that the Third and Twelfth corps were within striking distance.  
He accordingly determined to hold fast and breast the storm.  A passage of his 
official report discloses the patriotic devotion with which, at this perilous 
moment, he was actuated.  "A retreat," he says, "without hard fighting has a 
tendency to demoralize the troops who retire, and would in the present instance, 
in my opinion, have dispirited the whole army, and injured its morale, while it 
would have encouraged the enemy in the same proportion.  There never was an 
occasion in which the result could have been more momentous upon our national 
destiny.  Final success in this war can only be

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 215

obtained by desperate fighting, and the infliction of heavy loss upon the 
enemy."
  But the successes thus attained were not suffered to remain long undisputed.  
New actors were rapidly coming upon the scene.  Pender's division, which had not 
yet been engaged, was now deployed, and on the Union side, the two remaining 
divisions of the First corps, Rowley's and Robinson's, arrived on the field.  
Robinson was at first ordered to hold his men in reserve, and to throw up a 
barricade in front of the Seminary, to which, in case of necessity, the line of 
battle could retire.  Rowley's-Doubleday's own before taking the corps-was 
divided.  One brigade, commanded by Colonel Chapman Biddle of the One Hundred 
and Twenty-first Pennsylvania, was sent to the left to cover the Millerstown 
Road, and the left flank of the Iron brigade.  Biddle made a skilful disposition 
of his troops, sending two companies of skirmishers forward to occupy a brick 
house and stone barn considerably to the front of his line, who did fearful 
execution upon the advancing enemy, without being themselves exposed.  Later in 
the day they were obliged to abandon this coigne of vantage to escape as the 
enemy in overwhelming numbers advanced, and the buildings were finally burned.
  Stone's brigade, which was composed of the One Hundred and Forty-second, One 
Hundred and Forty-ninth, and One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania regiments, 
and was known as the Bucktail Brigade, sturdy men from the forest region, was 
posted an open ground to the right of Meredith, where they were much exposed.  
Stone was a man of undaunted courage, and accustomed to manoeuvre troops in the 
face of the enemy, having led a battalion of the original Bucktail regiment upon 
the Peninsula with eminent skill.  Doubleday had great confidence in this fine 
body of men, and assigned it to this most critical portions of the field.  "The 
men," says Doubleday, "were in very fine spirits, and were elated to the highest 
degree.  One division that I had [Rowley's} was composed almost entirely of 
Pennsylvanians.  I made short speeches to each regiment as it passed and went 
into action, and the men were full of enthusiasm.  I had assigned one brigade 
under Colonel Stone to quite an open position, where they were shelled pretty 
severely.  Colonel Stone remarked, as

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 216

he took the position, 'We have come to stay.'  This went quickly through his 
brigade, the men adopting it as a watchword; they all said, 'We have come to 
stay,' and a very large portion of them never left that ground."
  In gaining his position, Stone showed the most determined spirit.  The 
skirmish line which he sent forward to occupy a fence on his front towards 
Willoughby Run, had to meet unshielded the deliberate fire of a heavy line of 
the enemy's skirmishers, who already had possession of it.  But disregarding the 
rapid fall of companions they rushed on, drove out the foe, and held the fence 
against every attempt to regain it.
  But now a new terror threatened.  The veteran troops of Ewell, Stonewall 
Jackson's old corps, men who had rarely been led but to victory, had been 
marching since early morn from Heidlersburg, and the head of the column was 
already deploying, the skirmishers pushing into every nook and sheltered way 
where they could come unobserved upon the Union line.  Devin's brigade of 
cavalry was there, and though its commander had expressed his confidence the 
night before that he could hold his own for twenty-four hours, before midday he 
found himself hard pressed.  Never was a line of cavalry put to severer strain.  
The ground whereon it stood was open, with no advantageous positions from which 
to fight.  The advance of Ewell was first felt on the Hunterstown Road.  The 
instant the firing commenced, Devin disposed his men so as to strengthen that 
part of the line.  "Shortly after this," says the signal officer, "the prophecy 
of Buford was fulfilled.  'Booming skirmishers three deep' came, nearly a mile 
long, and it seemed that a handful of men could not hold them in check an 
instant.  But taking advantage of every particle of fence, timber, or rise in 
the front, they held the forces of Ewell temporarily in check."  The fighting on 
the part of Devin was dismounted, and proved very effective, that whole front, 
looking northward, being held by that small cavalry force aided by the light 
guns of Calef, until relief came.
  Reynolds had early on the morning of the 1st ordered Howard, who was in the 
neighborhood of Emmittsburg, to move up to Gettysburg in compliance with Meade's 
order of march for this day.  "I am very clear and distinct," says Captain 
Rosengarten

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 217

of Reynolds' staff, "in my recollection of the fact that one of General Howard's 
aids [Captain Hall] reported to General Reynolds as we were near Gettysburg, the 
early arrival of the Eleventh corps on the Taneytown Road.  General Reynolds 
made some inquiries as to the condition of the men, and the distance of the 
divisions from each other, and then desired the aid to return to Howard, with 
orders to move on rapidly to Cemetery Hill where he would be put in position.  
When Reynolds got to the front, and found the pressing need for troops, and the 
long intervals between the arrival of successive divisions, he sent back to 
Cemetery Hill, and to the Eleventh corps, to bring the head of Howard's column 
up to the front.  He was killed long before the return of the aid who carried 
this message."
  Howard's corps had rested in the neighborhood of Emittsburg on the night of 
the 30th, but had moved early, and finding the road leading to Gettysburg 
occupied by the trains, and by Robinson's division of the First corps, had moved 
to the right on a by-way leading to the Taneytown Road, and was still on this 
way eleven miles from Gettysburg, when the messenger of Reynolds met him.  
General Buford, ever watchful, remained near his signal officer, regarding every 
movement of friend and foe.  "One of my men at the glass," says the signal 
officer, "came down to me with a message, saying that they saw another infantry 
corps, and thought that it must be Howard's.  This proved to be the case.  
Buford then ordered me to ride as fast as my horse could carry me, and ask 
Howard to come up on the double-quick.  I did so.  He ordered his batteries 
forward, but his men came slowly."
  Howard had ridden up, when he found that the First corps was engaged, in 
advance of his column, arriving at about one o'clock, and, ranking Doubleday, 
assumed command of the field.  Doubleday continued in command of the First 
corps, that of the Eleventh being turned over to Carl Schurz.  The Eleventh was 
composed of three divisions, commanded by Generals Von Steinwehr, Barlow, and 
Schemmelfinnig.  The division of Von Steinwehr, with the artillery, was posted 
on Cemetery Hill, in accordance with the order of Reynolds, and the division of 
Barlow and Schemmelfinnig were moved forward, and relieved the cavalry brigade 
of Devin, north of the town, Barlow on the right, reaching around

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 218

to Rock Creek, and Schemmelfinnig extending towards Seminary Hill, but not quite 
reaching the right of the First corps.
  In the meantime the divisions of Pender and Heth, of Hill's corps, had 
developed their full strength, nearly three times that of the entire First 
corps, and the troops of Pender had extended their line upon the left until they 
grasped the hands of Rodes' division of Ewell's corps.  At the point where these 
two corps joined, Oak Hill rises to a considerable altitude.  This hill is 
really a part of Seminary Ridge, but a little to the west of it.  Here powerful 
batteries were planted so as to enfilade the First corps line of battle.  This 
necessitated a change of the Union front.  The whole line might have been 
withdrawn to Seminary Ridge; but as that ridge is in some parts open, a line of 
battle would have there been enfiladed from Oak Hill.  Accordingly, Doubleday 
ordered Wadsworth to retire his force north of the railroad bed to the crest of 
Seminary Ridge, which was wooded, and Reynolds' battery was also withdrawn.  
Captain Reynolds himself had received a shot in the eye, but refused to leave 
the field.  This modification of the line necessitated a change of position of 
Rowley's division.  Stone, leaving Wister's regiment facing westward, brought 
his two remaining ones, first Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight's, and finally Colonel 
Dana's, into the Chambersburg pike so as to face northward.  This left a 
considerable interval between Stone and Cutler.  Through this, Cooper's battery, 
which had been posted in the wheatfield in rear of Stone, also facing northward, 
answered the enemy's heavy guns on Oak Hill.  At the same time Biddle's brigade 
was likewise faced northward to support the guns of Cooper.
  Though Howard had arrived on the field and was now in chief command, he was 
wholly occupied in directing his own corps, leaving the First entirely to the 
management of Doubleday.  "General Buford now reported to me," says Doubleday, 
"that the rebel General Ewell, with his whole corps, was coming down from York 
on my right flank, making another 30,000.  I sent word to General Howard and 
requested him to keep Ewell off my flank, as I had as much as I could do to 
attend to A. P. Hill.  About the same time I received an order from General 
Howard, to this effect:  'Tell Doubleday to fight on the left, and I will

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 219

fight on the right.'  A little later, he sent word to me that if forced back I 
must try and hold on to the Seminary.  These were all the orders I received from 
him during the day, that I remember."
  The First corps, with Buford's two brigades of cavalry, had borne the brunt of 
the battle.  It was destined still to do so.  There had been a lull in the 
storm, the enemy apparently preparing to crush at one blow the small force which 
they had now learned was checking them.  This they were well able to do.  For 
they had in hand Heth's and Pender's divisions of Hill's corps, and Rodes' and 
Early's of Ewell's, a full half of the entire rebel army, with the remainder in 
supporting distance.  "At about half past one in the afternoon," says Colonel 
Stone in his official report, "the grand advance of the enemy's infantry began.  
From my position I was enabled to trace their formation for at least two miles.  
It appeared to be a nearly continuous double line of deployed battalions, with 
other battalions in mass as reserves."  As this powerful body advanced, its 
formation being continuous, it could not conform to the Union line, which as we 
have seen was irregular.  In consequence of this the rebel left became first 
engaged, striking the northern extremity of the First corps line.  As there was 
here a gap between the First and Eleventh corps, Doubleday ordered Robinson, who 
had been held in reserve, to send one of his brigades, that of Baxter, to fill 
it.  The latter arrived in time to meet the enemy's advance; but his small 
brigade proved insufficient to measure the open space, and though fighting 
gallantly, driving back the enemy, and taking many prisoners and three battle-
flags, he was constantly out-flanked and exposed to a hot enfilading fire.  
Recognizing the danger which threatened at this point, Doubleday ordered General 
Robinson himself with Paul's brigade, his last remaining reserve, to this part 
of the field.  Stewart's battery of the Fourth United States Artillery was also 
sent to the assistance of Robinson.  Although Robinson was still unable to close 
the opening at the angle made by the two corps, yet by swinging his right around 
upon the Mummasburg road, he was enabled to protect the flank and prevent the 
enemy from marching in.
  The battle now waxed warm, the enemy attacking with the

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 220

most determined valor.  At that point in his long line, as it originally 
advanced, opposite that where Cutler's left ended, it had separated, the 
southern extremity holding back before Meredith and that part of Stone's brigade 
which looked westward and the northern portion sweeping up to meet Cutler and 
Baxter.  This gave that part of Stone's line which looked northward, and 
Cooper's battery, a good opportunity to attack upon the flank as the hostile 
lines swept past, and, though at long range for infantry, with excellent effect; 
and when the troops of Baxter dashed gallantly forward, the rebels seeing 
themselves pushed on three sides, surrendered in large numbers and were swept 
into the Union lines.  Repeated assaults were made upon Paul and Baxter with 
ever fresh troops, as if determined to break through and bear down all before 
them.  But more daring or skilful leaders than Robinson, Paul, and Baxter were 
not in the whole army, and their men were of the same spirit; and though 
suffering grievously at every fresh onset, hurled back the foe and maintained 
their ground intact.  In one of these fierce assaults, General Paul, the veteran 
commander of the First brigade, while gallantly encouraging and directing the 
fight, was severely wounded, losing both his eyes.
  While the chief force of the attack fell upon Robinson and Wadsworth, Stone 
was able to effectually supplement their operations; but when the enemy, unable 
to make an impression, turned upon Stone, Robinson and Wadsworth were too far 
away to return the compliment, and the blow fell with withering effect.  In two 
lines, formed parallel to the pike, and at right-angles to Wadsworth, the enemy 
first advanced upon Stone, who, anticipating such a movement, had thrown one of 
his regiments under Colonel Dwight forward to the railroad cut where the men 
awaited the approach.  When arrived at a fence within pistol shot, Dwight 
delivered a withering fire.  Nothing daunted, the hostile lines crossed the 
fence, and continued to move forward.  By this time Dwight's men had reloaded, 
and when the advancing foe had arrived close upon the bank, they delivered 
another telling volley.  They then leaped the bank and vaulted forward with the 
bayonet, uttering wild shouts, before which the rebels fled in dismay.  On 
returning, Dwight found that the enemy had

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 221

planted a battery away to the west, so as to completely enfilade the railroad 
cut, making it untenable; whereupon he returned to his original position of the 
pike.
  At this juncture, Colonel Stone fell, severely wounded, and was borne off, the 
command devolving upon Colonel Wister.  Foiled in their first attempt, with 
fresh troops the rebel leaders came on from the northwest, that if possible the 
weak spot in the Bucktail line might be found.  But Wister, disposing the 
regiment which in part faced the north to meet them, checked and drove them back 
from this point also.  Again, with an enthusiasm never bated, they advanced from 
the north, and now crossing the railroad cut, which the rebel guns guarded, 
rushed forward; but a resolute bayonet charge sent them back again, and that 
front was once more clear.  Believing that a single thin line unsupported, 
unrenewed, and unprotected by breast-works, must eventually yield, a determined 
attack was again made from the west; but with no better results than before, 
being met by the intrepid Colonel Huidekoper, who had succeeded to the command 
of Wister's regiment, and though receiving a grievous wound from the effect of 
which he lost his right arm, the ground was firmly held, and the enemy was sent 
reeling back.
  But the wave of battle as it rolled southward reached every part in turn, and 
the extreme Union left, where Biddle's brigade was posted, at length felt its 
power.  A body of troops, apparently an entire division, drawn out in heavy 
lines, came down from the west and south, and overlapping both of Biddle's 
flanks, moved defiantly on.  Only three small regiments were in position to 
receive them; but ordering up the One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, 
which had been detached for special duty, and throwing it into the gap between 
Meredith's and his own, and wheeling the battery into position, Biddle awaited 
the approach.  As the enemy appeared beyond the wood, under cover of which they 
had formed, a torrent of death-dealing missiles leaped from the guns.  Terrible 
rents were made; but closing up, they came on undaunted.  Never were guns better 
served; and though the ground was strewn with the slain, their line seemed 
instantly to grow together.  The infantry fire was terrific on both sides; but 
the enemy, outflanking Biddle, sent a 

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direct and a doubly destructive oblique fire, before which it seemed impossible 
to stand.  But though the dead fell until the living could fight from behind 
them as from a bulwark, they stood fast as if rooted to the ground.
  It was upon this part of the field, and soon after Stone's brigade had come 
into position, that an old man with hair of grizzly grey, dressed in a long 
swallow-tailed coat, and a silk hat badly battered and worn, carrying a musket, 
came up at a rapid walk through the wheatfield, from the direction of the town, 
and desired permission to fight.  Colonel Wister, to whom he addressed himself, 
asked him if he knew how to shoot.  He answered that he would show them whether 
he could or not if they would give him a chance.  "Where is your ammunition?" 
inquired Wister.  Slapping his hand upon his pocket, he replied:  "I have it 
here."  Colonel Wister told him that he could have a chance to fight, but 
advised him to go to the woods where the Iron brigade was posted, as he could 
there shelter himself.  This did not suit the old man's idea of fight, and he 
persisted in going forward to the skirmish line at the fence, upon the extreme 
front, and here he fought so long as that fence was held.  Few were the useless 
shots he fired, and many a foeman was made to bite the dust before the sweep of 
his faithful rifle.  When that skirmish line retired he was the last to leave.  
He subsequently fought with the Iron brigade until the end of the battle, and 
was left wounded upon the field.  That old man was constable John Burns, the 
only civilian, so far as known, who fought in the battle of Gettysburg.
  While the battle was raging with such fury on the First corps front, it was 
warmly maintained on the right, where two divisions of the Eleventh corps had 
been posted.  When General Howard first arrived on the field, and became aware 
that the enemy was advancing in great force from the north, he saw at a glance 
that Seminary Ridge would not for a moment be tenable, unless the descent from 
this direction could be checked.  Ewell, who was upon that front, seemed 
indisposed to make a determined assault until the bulk of his corps was up, and 
he could act in conjunction with the forces of Hill, advancing from the west.  
He accordingly pushed Rodes with the advance division over upon the right

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until it formed a junction with the Hill.  He likewise sent the division of 
Early upon the left until he flanked the position which the cavalry of Buford 
was holding.  Howard saw the great disadvantages of the field which he would be 
obliged to contend upon, and doubtless from the first realized that sooner or 
later both corps would have to fall back, unless he should receive timely and 
powerful support.  In his anxiety to hold the town until evening, and until the 
balance of the army could come up, he committed the fatal error of attempting to 
string out his two divisions in one thin, continuous line, so as to cover the 
whole open front, upon any part of which the enemy could mass and easily break 
through, or by planting his artillery in commanding positions, could rake with 
an oblique and even an enfilading fire.  Had Howard, instead of attempting to 
cover the whole front with an attenuated line, selected some commanding 
positions on which to have planted his artillery, and instantly have thrown up 
simple works for the protection of the pieces, and so posted his infantry as to 
have charged upon any force that should have attempted to wedge its way through 
the unoccupied spaces, as was done in the case of the First corps; or, had he 
made the north bank of the north branch of Stevens' Run his main line, making 
the almshouse a fortified point, which would have enabled him to hold a strong 
reserve ready to meet any assault from whatever direction it should come, there 
is no doubt that the ground would have been longer and more successfully held, 
perhaps with the fruits of captives and standards.  Bloody work may have been 
entailed; but with skilful management the enemy would likely have suffered much 
greater losses, as he would have been forced to be the attacking party.
  But, notwithstanding this seeming error, the fact must ever remain apparent, 
that the task attempted by Howard was a difficult one.  When he  came upon the 
field, he found the First corps on ground of its own selection, skillfully 
posted for meeting a front attack, but incapable of holding its own when pressed 
upon its flanks, and indeed at that moment most seriously threatened with 
capture.  The position left for him to take, and which he was forced to occupy 
to save the First corps, was one not easily defensible, and by the time his 
corps arrived upon the

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 224

field the enemy was already upon the front and flanks of that position, or in 
easy supporting distance, in numbers treble those he could bring to oppose to 
them.  It is evident, therefore, that he went there with the expectation of 
playing a losing game; that he realized that he could only interpose a temporary 
check, and thereby be enabled to withdraw to a more favorable position; and 
though he might by a more skilful disposition of his forces have made a more 
stubborn resistance and have withdrawn his little army with less loss, yet the 
possibility of permanently holding that position unaided could not reasonable 
have been entertained.
  But there was one labor which was being executed at this time under the 
direction of General Howard which proved of vital importance in the final cast 
of the battle: it was the fortifying of Cemetery Hill.  This is the boldest and 
most commanding ground upon the central portion of the line where the struggle 
during the two succeeding days occurred.  Reynolds had noticed the great 
advantage it presented, and had designated it as the position on which to hold 
his reserves, and as a rallying point in case he was forced back from the more 
advanced position in front of the town where he had made his stand, and had 
himself early fallen.  When Howard came up he left one division under General 
Alexander Von Steinwehr upon this hill, with directions to have it posted most 
advantageously to hold the position, and to cover retiring troops.  Around the 
base of this hill were low stone walls, tier above tier, extending from the 
Taneytown Road around to the westerly extremity of Wolf's Hill.  These afforded 
excellent protection to infantry, and behind them the soldiers, weary with the 
long march and covered with dust, threw themselves for rest.  Upon the summit 
were beautiful green fields, now covered by a second growth, which to the tread 
had the seeming of a carpet of velvet.
  Von Steinwehr was an accomplished soldier, having been thoroughly schooled in 
the practice of the Prussian army.  His military eye was delighted with this 
position, and thither he drew his heavy pieces, and planted them on the very 
summit, at the uttermost verge towards the town.  But the position, though bold 
and commanding, was itself commanded, and Steinwehr instantly realized that 
there would be blows to take as well as to give.  No

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 225

tree, no house, no obstruction of any kind shielded it from the innumerable 
points on the opposite hills, from Benner's on the extreme right, beyond Wolf's 
Hill, around far south on Seminary Ridge to the left; but it stood out in bold 
relief, the guns presenting excellent targets for the enemy's missiles the 
moment he should come within artillery range.  However powerful and effective 
his own guns might prove, while unassailed, Steinwehr saw that they would be 
unable to live long when attacked, unless protected.  Nor would any light works 
be of avail.  There was no time to build a fort, for which the ground was 
admirably adapted.  He accordingly threw up lunettes around each gun.  These 
were not mere heaps of stubble and turf, but solid works of such height and 
thickness as to defy the most powerful bolts which the enemy could throw against 
them,  with smooth and perfectly level platforms on which the guns could be 
worked.  If the First and Eleventh corps performed no other service in holding 
on to their positions, though sustaining fearful losses, the giving opportunity 
for the construction of these lunettes and getting a firm foothold upon this 
great vantage ground, was ample compensation for every hardship and misfortune, 
and the labor and skill of Steinwehr in constructing them must ever remain 
subjects of admiration and gratitude.
  When Barlow, who commanded the division of the Eleventh corps which took the 
right of the line in front of the town, was going into position, he discovered a 
wooded eminence a little to the north of the point where the Harrisburg road 
crosses Rock Creek, and here he determined to make his right rest.  It was the 
ground which the skirmish line of Devin had held.  But as the cavalry retired 
the enemy had immediately thrown forward a body of skirmishers to occupy it.  To 
dislodge these, Barlow sent forward Von Gilsa's brigade.  At the Almshouse the 
line halted, and knapsacks were thrown aside.  It was then ordered to advance at 
double-quick.  The order was gallantly executed, and the wood quickly cleared.  
Dispositions were made to hold it, and Wilkinson's battery of the fourth United 
States was advanced to its aid.  The watchful Von Gilsa, however, soon 
discovered that the enemy was massed upon his flank, the brigades of Gordon and 
Hayes of Early's division being formed under cover

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 226

of the wooded ground on either side of Rock Creek, and ready to advance upon 
him.  He was very much in the situation of the right of the Eleventh corps at 
Chancellorsville, the enemy massed and ready to come down, as did Jackson, upon 
front, flank, and rear.  Barlow found it impossible to hold this advanced 
position, and was obliged to allow that wing to fall back to the neighborhood of 
the Almshouse.
  On the left, in the direction of the First corps right, the brigade of Colonel 
Von Amesburg was placed, with Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries.  The extreme 
left was occupied by the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania.  This regiment was much 
reduced in numbers, and in attempting to cover a long space it could present 
little more than a skirmish line, which rested at a fence, by a crossroad 
connecting the Carlisle and the Mummasburg ways.  The Eleventh corps line had 
hardly been established, before the enemy, whose dispositions had been mainly 
perfected previous to its arrival, came down upon it with overwhelming might.
  On the southern slope of seminary Ridge, or a prolongation of the First corps 
line northward, was a commanding position which the enemy could not be prevented 
from occupying, and where he now planted his artillery so as to send an oblique 
and very destructive fire upon the left of the Eleventh corps.  From this point 
also, having massed his infantry, he came on, sweeping past the right of the 
First corps, and breaking and crumpling the left of the Eleventh.  The right of 
the First being thus turned was obliged to retire, and was carried back.  At 
this juncture, Early, who was already massed on the extreme right flank of the 
Eleventh, also advanced.  Near the Almshouse he met a stubborn resistance, and 
in the midst of the fight the gallant Barlow was wounded, and fell helpless into 
the enemy's hands.  Shemmelfinnig, too, while attempting to stay his troops, and 
hold them up to the fight, was taken prisoner, but subsequently managed to 
escape, and rejoined his command.  Stands were made at intervals, and the enemy 
held in check; but it was impossible to stay the onset.  Until the town was 
reached the retirement was comparatively deliberate and orderly; but when 
arrived there, being huddled in the narrow streets, subjected to a rapid fire 
from batteries which raked them, and the enemy's

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 227

swarming infantry intent on their destruction or capture, the men fell into 
confusion.  Their officers strove to save them by ordering them into the cross 
alleys.  But this only added to the confusion, the men either not understanding 
the commands, or hoping to escape the fire of the foe, and over 1200 were made 
prisoners in less than twenty minutes.
  While this was passing upon the right, the enemy assaulted upon the left with 
no less vigor, but not with the same success.  Though the First corps had now 
been five hours in the fight, some portions of it six, and without supports or 
reliefs, it still stood fast, determined to make good the cry which they at the 
first had raised, "We have come to stay."  But when it was known that the right 
of the corps had been turned, and that the Eleventh corps was falling back, it 
became evident that the position which had been so long and so gallantly held, 
and withal with such substantial fruits, would have to be given up.  Baxter's 
brigade, which had fought with stubborn bravery upon the right, was brought to 
the rear of the ridge at the railroad cut, where it defended a battery and still 
held the enemy advancing from the north in check.  Paul's brigade having lost 
its commander, in retiring became entangled, and a considerable number fell into 
the enemy's hands.  On the left, Meredith's and Biddle's brigades were ordered 
to fall back and cover the retirement of the balance of the line.  Wister, who 
had succeeded to the command of Stone's brigade upon the fall of the latter, had 
likewise received a severe wound, and had turned over the brigade to colonel 
Dana.  At a barricade of rails which had been thrown up early in the day by 
Robinson's men, a final stand was made, and here the chief of artillery, Colonel 
Wainwright, had posted his batteries, those of Cooper, Breck, Stevens, and 
Wilbur, thus concentrating twelve guns in so small a space that they were 
scarcely five yards apart.  Captain Stewart's battery was also in position on 
the summit, two pieces on either side of the railroad cut.
  Encouraged by this falling back, the enemy was brought up in masses, as to an 
easy victory, and forming in two lines, swept forward.  As they approached, the 
artillery opened upon them, Stewart's guns being so far to right and front that 
he could enfilade their lines.  Their front line was by this concentrated

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 228

fire much broken and dispirited, but the second, which was also supported, 
pressed on.  When arrived within musket range their advance was checked, and the 
firing for a short time was  hot.  The rebels, who greatly outnumbered the small 
Union line, now began to show themselves upon the left flank.  Seeing that the 
position could not much longer be held, Doubleday ordered the artillery to 
retire, and it moved in good order from the field, wending its way back to 
Cemetery Hill.  But before the pieces were all away the enemy had gained so far 
upon the flank as to reach it with his musketry fire, shielding himself behind a 
garden fence which runs within fifty yards of the pike.  Before the last piece 
had passed, the fire had become very warm, and the horses attached to this gun 
were shot.  The piece, consequently, had to be abandoned, together with three 
caissons.
  The infantry held its position behind the barricade, successfully checking the 
enemy in front, the men showing the most unflinching determination, Captain 
Richardson, of General Meredith's staff, riding up and down the line waving a 
regimental flag, and encouraging them to duty.  But the enemy was now swarming 
upon the very summit of the ridge upon the left flank of Doubleday.  So near had 
they approached, that Lieutenant Colonel McFarland while reconnoitring to 
discover their exact position, received a volley which shattered both legs.  
"When all the troops at this point," says General Doubleday, "were over-powered, 
Captain Glenn, of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, in command of 
the Head-quarter Guard, defended the building [Seminary] for full twenty minutes 
against a whole brigade of the enemy, enabling the few remaining troops, the 
ambulances, and artillery, to retreat in comparative safety."
  And now was seen the great advantage in the position of Steinwehr's reserves.  
As the begrimed cannoniers, and the beasts foaming with the excitement of 
battle, and the sadly thinned ranks of infantry exhausted by six hours of 
continuous fighting, filed through the town and approached Cemetery Hill, they 
came as to the folds of an impregnable fortress.  Here at length was rest and 
security.  Whenever the foeman attempted to follow, they came immediately into 
range of Steinwehr's well-posted guns, and at every stone wall and building was 
an abattis

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 229

of bayonets.  The heroic Buford, who had first felt the shock of battle, and 
during the long hours of this terrible day had held his troops upon the flanks 
of the infantry, joining in the fierce fighting as opportunity or necessity 
required, and who, from his watchtower had scanned and reported every phase of 
the battle, was now at the critical moment a pillar of strength.  The 
insignificant division of Steinwehr would alone have presented but a narrow 
barrier to a powerful and triumphant foe, intent on pushing his advantage, and, 
to the left where the country is all open, and nature presents no impediment to 
an advance, it could have been flanked and easily turned out of its position.  
But here, like a wall of adamant, stood the veterans of Buford, with guns 
skillfully posted, ready to dispute the progress of the enemy.  His front was 
tried, and the attempt was made to push past him along the low ground drained by 
Steven's Run, where some severe fighting occurred.  But he maintained his ground 
intact, and that admirable position, where the army at length fought and won the 
battle, was again saved.  General Warren, the Engineer-in-chief of the army, who 
first came upon the field at this crisis, says in his testimony:  "General 
Buford's cavalry was all in line of battle between our position there and the 
enemy.  Our cavalry presented a very handsome front, and I think probably 
checked the advance of the enemy."  Indeed the spirit of Buford, like a good 
angel, seemed to be constantly hovering over the entire field of that first day.  
One of the best read of our military critics says of him:  "He not only showed 
the rarest tenacity, but by his personal capacity made his cavalry accomplish 
marvels, and rival infantry in their steadfastness, not only in the battle 
itself, but afterwards, when deployed in the intervale drained by Steven's Run, 
west of Gettysburg."  He died not long after from the effect of protracted toil 
and exposure in this campaign.  "On the day of his death," says the "American 
Cyclopedia of 1863," "and but a little while before his departure, his 
commission as Major-General was placed in his hands.  He received it with a 
smile of gratification that the Government he had defended appreciated his 
services, and gently laying it aside soon ceased to breathe."
  On the right of Steinwehr's position were the rugged heights

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 230

of Wolf's Hill, a natural buttress, unassailable in front from its abruptness, 
and though susceptible of being turned, as it was on the following evening, yet 
so curtained by an impenetrable wood as to convey the suspicion of danger 
lurking therein.  Early, who was in front of this hill, made some attempts to 
carry it, but, finding it apparently well protected, did not push his 
reconnaissance.
  As the two broken corps of the Union army ascended Cemetery Hill, they were 
met by staff officers, who turned the Eleventh corps to the right and the First 
corps to the left, where they went into position along the summit of the ridge 
stretching out on either hand from the Baltimore pike.  A ravine to the right of 
Cemetery Hill, and between that and Wolf's Hill, seemed to present to the enemy 
a favorable point of attack, and hither was at once sent Stevens' Maine battery 
and Wadsworth's division of the first corps.  Here Wadsworth immediately 
commenced substantial breast-works along the brow of the hill, an example which 
other troops followed, until the whole front extending to Spangler's Spring was 
surmounted by one of like strength.  Through that ravine the enemy did assail, 
but the preparations to meet him were too thorough to admit of his entrance.
  Thus ended the fighting of the first day.  It had proved a sad day for those 
two weak corps, battling as they had been obliged to against a foe nearly thrice 
their numbers.  The First corps had gone into the battle with 8200 men, and had 
come out with only 2450.  The Eleventh corps went in with 7400, only two 
divisions of which, however, being actually engaged, and retired with a little 
more than half that number.  But though the losses had been grievous and the 
survivors were worn out with the severity of the fight, yet was not honor lost.  
A most heroic and determined stand had been made.  Prisoners to the number of 
2500 had been taken, and the enemy had sustained a still greater loss in killed 
and wounded than had the Union side.  A position of great natural strength had 
been gained, and was now firmly held.
  Of the generalship displayed on the first day of fighting at Gettysburg there 
has been much speculation, and we can only judge by the official records, the 
dispositions upon the field, and by the results attained.  The questions have 
been raised, was 

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 231

the fighting at Gettysburg an accidental collision, unforeseen and 
unpremeditated?  Was General Reynolds justified in precipitating a battle there, 
and Doubleday and Howard in continuing it?  In one sense the collision was 
accidental.  Not until the evening of the 30th, and after the order for the 
movement of each corps of the army on the 1st day of July had been issued, was 
Meade made aware of the purpose of the enemy to let go the Susquehanna and 
concentrate.  It was not until the morning of the 1st of July that he learned 
that Lee was marching on Gettysburg.  It must be borne in mind, in considering 
the movements of the army, that the orders which were emanating from the brain 
of the leader had to be communicated to corps scattered over a belt of more than 
thirty miles.  During the day these corps were in motion, and hence it was 
impossible to arrest and change their courses as the movements of a single 
person or even a compact body of men could have been.  Time thus enters as an 
important element in the game.  A circular had been sent out indicating a 
cautious policy, and prefiguring what would be the order of the following day,--
a concentration on Pipe Creek.  But the positive orders for the movement of July 
1st carried the First corps to Gettysburg, the Eleventh to Gettysburg or 
supporting distance, the Third to Emmittsburg, the Second to Taneytown, the 
Twelfth to Two Taverns, the Fifth to Hanover, and the Sixth to Manchester, and 
the cavalry to front and flank well out in all directions.  The tone of the 
circular afterwards issued indicated that Meade would not have given the order 
for the march on the 1st had he known the purposes of the enemy sooner.  Hence 
we must conclude, that though he did not anticipate meeting the enemy when he 
issued the order, yet he received information on the morning of the 1st, when 
the movement of the corps was about to commence, that it was likely to result in 
a collision.
  On the side of the enemy, it would appear that General Lee had not expected a 
battle on this day.  He had become aware that the Union army was much scattered, 
and he did not suppose that a small fragment of that army would dare to bring on 
an engagement.  Lee's own account of it was this:  "The leading division of Hill 
met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of the 1st of July.  
Driving back these troops to within

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 232

a short distance of the town, he there encountered a large force, with which two 
of his divisions became engaged.  Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by 
the way of the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement."  Moreover, it would 
appear that if either Lee or Meade had anticipated a battle, he would have been 
at the front to direct it.
  But though Meade was aware before the collision did actually occur, that it 
was likely to, he seems to have hoped, and indeed have confidently expected that 
the effect of his cautionary circular would be to induce Reynolds to interpose 
only such resistance as became necessary to enable him to withdraw his corps in 
safety.  To understand why Reynolds disappointed this hope, and by a stubborn 
stand in an offensive position, brought on a general engagement, several 
circumstances must be taken into the account.  There appear to have been at this 
time at the head of the several army corps two classes of men, in temper and 
policy quite opposite to each other.  The one class was for pushing forward, and 
attacking and fighting the enemy wherever he could be found, and never ceasing 
to manoeuvre and fight until a victory was gained.  This party was totally 
opposed to falling back, but the rather intent on falling forward, and eagerly 
counseled against Pipe Creek, and in favor of Gettysburg.  On the other hand, 
Meade seemed inclined to a cautious policy, in which he received countenance, 
and was at this moment anxious to take up a defensive position in the hope of 
inducing the enemy to attack and allow him to fight a purely defensive battle.  
That Reynolds was of the former class there can be no doubt.  "When we crossed 
the river," says General Doubleday, "at Edwards' Ferry, I rode on to 
Poolesville, and while waiting for the troops to come up, had a conversation 
with Reynolds.  He was clearly of opinion that it was necessary to bring the 
enemy to battle as soon as possible.  He wished to put an immediate stop to the 
plundering by the enemy of Pennsylvania farms and cities.  He said if we gave 
them time by dilatory measures, or by taking up defensive positions, they would 
strip the State of everything.  Hence he was in favor of striking them as soon 
as possible.  He was really eager to get at them."
  But Reynolds was too true a soldier to disobey orders, however

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 233

much he may have differed in judgment from his chief, and though he must have 
known the temper and inward wish of that chief, he still had ample authority for 
pursuing the course he did.  In the first place, the circular was only 
admonitory.  The order of march for the day was absolute.  That order carried 
Buford's cavalry, and the First and Eleventh corps to Gettysburg.  The cavalry, 
which reached there first, had positive orders from Pleasanton to hold the town 
to the last extremity.  Reynolds found upon his arrival the cavalry heavily 
engaged.  There was no alternative but to go to its relief; and doubtless 
believing the position a good one from which to fight, immediately ordered up 
the three corps of the army under his command, well knowing that there were 
three other corps within supporting distance.  But, besides the order carrying 
Reynolds to Gettysburg, he had certain discretionary powers as to bringing on a 
battle, if not directly conferred, at least implied.  Among the instructions 
contained in the very order for the march of the army on this day are these:  
"The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all 
commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and 
Hanover.  Staff officers report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to 
leave for orders.  Prompt information to be sent into head-quarters at all 
times.  All ready to move to the attack at any moment."  In the circular to 
which frequent reference has been made, Meade says:  "Developments may cause the 
Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions."  And in 
a communication to General Reynolds, dated on the very morning that the battle 
opened, in which Meade freely unbosoms himself and discloses how much trust and 
confidence he reposes in Reynolds, he says:  "The Commanding General cannot 
decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack, until he learns 
something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating.  This 
he hopes to do during the day.  Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon 
the subject, at least so far as concerns your position. . . .  If the enemy is 
concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the General is not 
sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its 
character, either for an offensive or defensive position. . . . The

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General having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of 
affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and 
proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from 
you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note.  He feels that you 
know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and of the country 
than he does."  Thus, in three successive communications that came to Reynolds, 
the last before opening the battle, and one of these in the form of a positive 
order for his guidance, Meade urges his troops to be ready to move to the attack 
at any moment, states that developments may cause him to assume the offensive 
from the present positions, and finally discloses his indecision, and frankly 
declares that Reynolds is better able to judge of affairs on that part of the 
field than he is himself.
  Reynolds, accordingly, opened the battle in earnest and summoned his troops, 
doubtless with the expectation that he would be promptly supported by all the 
army as fast as it could be brought up.  What the result would have been had 
Reynolds lived, is impossible to divine.  He had scarcely marshaled his first 
battalions before he was slain.  The chief command upon the field then devolved 
upon General Doubleday, which, for upwards of two hours he continued to 
exercise.  It was during this time, and under his immediate direction, that the 
chief successes of the day were achieved, a large number of prisoners and 
standards having been captured in successive periods of the fight, and at widely 
separated parts of the field.  To any one who will traverse the ground held by 
the First corps from ten in the morning until after four in the afternoon, will 
note the insignificance in the number of its guns and of its muskets, as 
compared with those of the two divisions of Hill and one of Ewell which opposed 
it, and will consider the triumphs won, and how every daring attempt of the 
enemy to gain the field was foiled, it must be evident that the manoeuvring of 
Doubleday was admirable, and that it stamps him as a corps leader of consummate 
excellence.  For, mark how little equality of position he enjoyed, the opposing 
ridge and Oak Hill affording great advantage for the enemy's artillery, and how 
his own infantry stood upon open ground with no natural or artificial protection 
except in a short distance upon

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 235

his extreme right, where was a low stone wall.  Where, in the whole history of 
the late war, is this skill and coolness of the commander, or this stubborn 
bravery of the troops, matched?
  The chief looses of the day in killed, wounded, and prisoners occurred in the 
act of retiring to Cemetery Hill.  In conducting this, General Howard was 
responsible.  It was a difficult movement to execute.  The whole country where 
the fighting of the first day occurred, is so open that no movement could take 
place on the Union line that was not plainly visible from almost every part of 
the rebel line, affording ample opportunity to instantly checkmate any advantage 
in manoeuvre.  At twenty minutes past three in the afternoon, about the time 
that the onset of Rodes upon the point of junction of the First and Eleventh 
corps had penetrated the Union line and was carrying back the flanks of both, 
Buford, who had been watching everything from the signal-station in the cupola 
of the Seminary, wrote the following message to Meade through Pleasanton:  "I am 
satisfied Longstreet and Hill have made a junction.  A tremendous battle has 
been raging since half past nine A. M., with varying success.  At the present 
moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range 
of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west.  
General Reynolds was killed early this morning.  In my opinion there seems to be 
no directing person."  And then after his signature, he adds what doubtless 
seemed to his practical mind the cure-all for this trouble, "We need help now."
  To his practiced eye the outlook appeared gloomy.  The whole rebel army was 
now rapidly concentrating, and already swarming upon his immediate front, and 
there seemed wanting a controlling spirit on the field.  It was doubtless 
apparent to him, as it now is to every careful observer, that the time for the 
prompt action of the commander upon the field was fast passing, if not already 
gone.  If, when Howard found that he was no longer able to hold his advanced 
position, he had ordered some demonstrations on different parts of the field, 
and planting some pieces to have commanded the main thoroughfares over which his 
troops should retire, had withdrawn the two corps before the enemy advanced in 
overwhelming numbers and compelled him

MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA - 236

to go back, it is probable that he might have rescued the greater portion of his 
men who were eventually engulfed in the streets of the town, and were swept back 
as prisoners, and have saved many who were killed and wounded.
  Howard is without excuse for holding out so long, when the evidence was spread 
out on all sides before his eyes, that the enemy was coming down upon him with 
resistless power.  Some time before his forces were driven back, Doubleday sent 
his Adjutant-general, Halsted, to Cemetery Hill, to implore him either to send 
reinforcements from Steinwehr's division, or else order the hard-pressed troops 
at the front to fall back.  Halsted pointed out to him the advance of vastly 
superior forces on all sides, which he could plainly discern through his field 
glass.  But Howard even then refused to order a retreat, and said to Halsted:  
"You may find Buford and use him," although Buford had been fighting from early 
morning, and was still engaged.  It seems that Howard, at a council of corps 
commanders held at Chancellorsville just before the army retired across the 
river, voted to remain and fight, giving as a reason that the misconduct of his 
corps forced him always to vote for assaulting, whether it was the best thing to 
be done or not.  That senseless policy appeared to influence him here, and the 
troops of both corps had to pay the penalty of his temerity.  The commander of 
the First corps, according to his sworn statement, never received any orders to 
fall back, and it is a noticeable circumstance confirming this, that the First 
corps was the last to leave the ground, and it seems almost miraculous that it 
was brought off in tolerable order, and with insignificant loss in prisoners.
  The idea has been advanced that the fighting on this first day constitutes no 
part of the Battle of Gettysburg.  General Sickles says, "We in the army do not 
regard the operations of the two corps under General Reynolds as properly the 
Battle of Gettysburg.  We regard the operations of Thursday and Friday, when the 
whole army was concentrated, as the Battle of Gettysburg."  But wherefore?  Did 
not Reynolds fall in the Battle of Gettysburg?  Are the dead who there perished 
to be despoiled of their part in that great victory?  Shall the works and 
watchings of Buford be turned into nothingness?  Is the matchless heroism of

FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG - 237

that First corps on that blood-washed field to count for nought in the final 
winning?  Shall Doubleday, and Howard, and Steinwehr, have no credit for taking 
and holding that impregnable fortress on Cemetery Hill, where the battle was 
finished?  Is the taking up and fortifying that round no part of that great 
struggle?  Ay! rather was the fighting of that first day, and the planting 
immovable footsteps on the fastnesses of Cemetery Hill, THE BATTLE OF 
GETTYSBURG.   As well might it be said that the fight made by the gallant 
Sickles himself, and the glorious Third corps, baptized in blood as it was, 
constitutes no part of the battle.  As well might the struggles of McCook and 
Johnston, and Davis and Sheridan, and Rosseau and Negley be gainsayed in the 
Battle of Stone River; or the opening of the contest by Hooker in the Battle of 
Antietam.  No, no!  The glories of that battle cannot be divided, and 
apportioned, and parceled.  They are parts of one great whole.  Who knows of the 
battle of Oak Ridge!  How does it become the mouth to say that Reynolds fell at 
the battle of Willoughby Run!
  Is it asserted that the army was not all up on that first day?  Neither were 
they all up on the second or the third.  That glorious company who had gone down 
in the fight, and who, could they have been more promptly and cordially 
supported, might have been saved to come, were not up.  Is it said that the 
leader himself was not present?  His orders had carried those troops upon that 
ground and involved them in the fight, and any honors which were there finally 
gained are due to the stubborn execution of those orders.  Side by side on the 
now peaceful hillside, in order indiscriminate, lie the victims of that immortal 
field, reminding the pilgrim as he treads lightly by, that they are all the 
slain in the Battle of Gettysburg.