Local History: Chapter XIV - Part I: The Revolution: Bean's 1884 History of Montgomery Co, PA Contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by Susan Walters USGENWEB NOTICE: Printing this file by non-commercial individuals and libraries is encouraged, as long as all notices and submitter information is included. Any other use, including copying files to other sites requires permission from the submitters PRIOR to uploading to any other sites. We encourage links to the state and county table of contents. บบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบ BEAN'S HISTORY OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA บบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบบ 158 (cont.) CHAPTER XIV. - PART I THE REVOLUTION. THE memorable events associated with the movements of the Continental army, under the personal direction of General Washington, in the autumn of 1777 and winter of 1778, will always render Eastern PICTURE OF THE INDEPENDENCE BELL APPEARS HERE Pennsylvania conspicuous in the annals of the Revolution. The provincial conservatism and peaceful character of the people who had permanently settled in the Schuylkill Valley woke slowly and painfully to the warlike preparations which preceded Lord Howe's attack upon Philadelphia, and when reverses befell our armies on the Brandywine a profound sense of alarm pervaded the capital city, shared by many sorrowing homes that lay on the line of March, and within limits certain to be desolated by hostile armies. 159 "The spirit of 1776," which animated leaders and Revolutionists, was by no means universal in the province. Society was divided by well-marked differences of opinion, stoutly maintained at the cost of large estates, the sacrifice of comfortable homes, domestic pleasures and social advantages. A century and more of time has well and wisely obscured from public notice the bitter feuds and political animosities that prevailed in this locality during and for many years after the close of the struggle. The student of our colonial era is amazed, at the uncompromising character of the men and measures of the period. The British officers found ready friends in every township from the Brandywine to the Delaware, from the fatal massacre of Paoli to its attempted repetition upon the force of Lafayette at Barren Hill. The Tory, not less for his King than for the love of his gold, was ever ready to peril his life and honor; on the other hand, the Revolutionists resorted to confiscation of property, banishment and imprisonment of those who declined to espouse their cause. For eight years these alienations prevailed, until society seemed to be known, in the common parlance of the day, as "Rebel" and "Tory." No just conception of the scope and magnitude of the campaign organized for the defense of Eastern Pennsylvania and the capital city in the autumn of 1777 can be realized unless it comprehend the movements and results of the two principal armies of the Middle States, and for whose conduct Washington, as commander in chief, was responsible to the Continental government. [See Note 14-1.] To disconcert him by strategy, to compel him to battle with troops superior in armament and discipline, and to overwhelm him with numbers was the general and well-matured plan of the enemy. [Note 14-1.] On the 19th of June, 1775, Washington received his commission and instructions as "General and Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United Colonies, and of all the forces raised or to be raised by them, and others who shall voluntarily offer their services and join the army for the defense of American Liberty." The favor lavished on the new chief of the Northern Department raised a doubt whether Washington retained authority over him, till Congress resolved, August, 1777, that "they never intended to supercede or circumvent his power." Bancroft's "History of the United States," vol. v. p. 591. [FINIS Note 14-1.] The preparations of the home government to this end were commensurate with the reasonable hope of success; and the belief that the resources of men and means so lavishly confided to commanders would speedily end the conflict, and compel submission to the mother-country, was shared by many of the wayward and doubting of the period. The efforts of Washington through the winter of 1777 to organize a powerful army for the ensuing campaign are a matter of history. The hopes inspired from time to time by the flattering reports which reached his headquarters were cruelly disappointed, and he found himself not only powerless to take the aggressive, but unequal to that measure of defensive warfare necessary to preserve his long lines unbroken. The steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported him and the American cause through the, gloomy scenes of the preceding year did not forsake him, and that sound judgment which applies to the best advantage those means which are attainable, however inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan of operation was adapted to that which he believed the enemy had formed. He was persuaded either that General Burgoyne would endeavor to take Ticonderoga, and penetrate to the Hudson, in which event General Howe would co-operate with him, by moving up that river and possessing himself of the forts and high grounds commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at New York by sea, after which the combined armies would proceed against Philadelphia. To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to defend the three great points alike vital to the country --Ticonderoga, the Highlands of the Hudson and Philadelphia --against two powerful armies so much superior to his in arms, numbers and discipline, it was necessary to make such disposition of his troops as would enable the several departments to reciprocally aid each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal magnitude, which were alike endangered, though widely divergent. To effect these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from New Jersey to North Carolina, inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed in New Jersey. The situation in May, 1777, was critical, and called into activity the magnificent horoscope of the commander-in-chief. In camp at Morristown, with an effective rank and file, excluding cavalry and artillery, of less than six thousand men, after a winter of ceaseless anxiety in camp and field and vain endeavor to secure large and certain accessions to his army, the enemy certain to assume the aggressive as soon as the season would warrant the movement of troops; the Howes in possession of New York City with an army twice the number of his own, with a navy at command large enough to transport it with the speed of the winds to any point on the coast deemed vulnerable; General Burgoyne with ten thousand veteran and volunteer troops on Lake Champlain, and Colonel St. Leger with a co-operating army of veterans, Tories, and savages in the Mohawk Valley, waiting orders to march at the earliest practicable moment. As late as June 18th, says a distinguishes historian [Bancroft] "the cares of the Northern Department were thrown upon the American commander-in-chief, and Schulyler besieged him with entreaties to supply his wants and remedy all that was going wrong." As commander-in-chief of America, Washington watched with a peculiar care Northern Department 160 Alarmed at Schuyler's want of fortitude, he ordered Arnold to his command, also Lincoln, who was acknowledged popular among the New England troops. Besides detaching these two distinguished officers and assigning them to the Northern Department, he added to their command General Glover's brigade of Continental troops, and yielded Colonel Morgan's corps of riflemen, upon request being made through Congress for them. The Continental army, under the immediate command of Washington, charged with the defense of the capital city, was the objective-point of the grand campaign, and the coveted prize of Lord Howe. To engage it in battle, to thoroughly defeat and dispirit it, to seize, fortify and garrison Philadelphia, then quickly transfer the bulk of his army to cooperate with Burgoyne, and insure his triumph over Schuyler and Gates on the Hudson, was a consummation to which all energies were directed. The persistence of Washington in declining battle, save in his fortified camp at Middlebrook, his constant readiness to attack the flank of his sagacious adversary should he attempt to cross the Delaware, there to be confronted by Arnold with a hastily improvised army, compelled General Howe to change the general plan of operations for the season, and rendered all further co-operation between him and, Burgoyne impossible. While employed in discomfiting Howe, he was actively engaged in resisting the impending advance of St. Leger and Burgoyne. Says Marshall: "He hastened the march of those generals designed to act in that department, pressed the Governors of Eastern States to reinforce there treating army with all their militia, and made large attachments of choice troops from his own army. The fame of being himself the leader of the victorious army did not, with false glare, dazzle his judgment or conceal the superior public advantage to be derived from defeating Burgoyne." Having used his best efforts to hasten the concentration of troops from the Eastern States, and overcome in some measure the shock to public confidence resulting from the loss of Ticonderoga and the disastrous retreat of General St. Clair; having strengthened the willing hands of General Schuyler in bringing into the field the militia of New York State, rendering the victory at Bennington and other minor points possible, and witnessed the departure of Lord Howe from New York Bay, he turned the head of his devoted columns toward the Delaware, massing his army at Germantown early in the month of August, 1777. For days and weeks the work of marshaling new troops, collecting supplies and fitting the command to resist the impending attack by Howe went on. The commander-in chief was in daily consultation with committees of Congress, heads of departments, and for the first time met the youthful and heroic Lafayette, who was by him assigned to duty on his staff, with the rank of major-general. The public mind became feverish and excited in anticipation of events now certain to affect the gravest interests of the colony. War, with its desolation, its bloody horrors, its blighting consequences upon society and sacrifice of life, was at the threshold of a community devoted by sentiment, religion, and pecuniary interests to peaceful pursuits. Evidence of disaffection increased with the certainty of Howe's approach, and when his presence, with fleet and army, in the Chesapeake Bay was announced, it was deemed politic by the government that Washington should march his army through the city as he moved south to meet the advance of the foe. It was accordingly done, and the 24th of August 1777, was a memorable day in the history of the capital city, as well as in the lives of the patriotic soldiers. Who received at every square the most marked consideration at the hands of the populace, who were wild in their demonstrations of joy as divisions marched by them under commanders who had grown into popular favor, resulting from their distinguished services in the field. On the other hand, the displeasure of those who, from a sense of duty, adhered to the mother country was manifest in the frowning faces and silent contempt with which they apparently treated the unusual events of the day. The story of the campaign which was opened by this movement of the Continental army, to meet and resist the combined operations of the enemy, to save the capital if possible, and to preserve the army, though the city should be lost, has always possessed a rare interest to Pennsylvanians who participated in it and to their descendants. Other fields, in other States, before and afterwards, witnessed the brighter triumph of our arms and the more immediate results of victories won; but nowhere on the long and varying line of battle were more sanguinary engagements fought, in no campaign of the protracted struggle was the suffering of the troops so continuous and severe, at no time was the solicitude of the commander-in-chief so keenly exercised or the patriotism of the people more sorely tried. The field of Eastern Pennsylvania presented a tempting prize to the British commander at the period referred to. Philadelphia was the seat of the colonial and continental government. Its occupation by the enemy, it was thought, would greatly dispirit the colonists from Massachusetts to South Carolina. Howe's point of attack being selected but fifty-one miles south of the city, with no natural barriers to resist the advance of his land forces, assuming, not without reason that Washington's army had been weakened by detachments sent to the Northern Department, he was confident that, with a few days' easy marches and perhaps a battle, the fall of the capital 161 would follow. Then a rapid march across New Jersey, and he would be able to co-operate with Burgoyne and St. Leger, and overwhelmed Gates in New York. With these results accomplished, his fleet securely anchored in the Delaware, a base of operations for fresh conquest farther south would be finally established, and the work of subduing the colonists so nearly done as to assure the home government of ultimate success and prevent the interposition of those friendly offices of France, growing more and more imminent each succeeding mouth. One more consideration entered into the plans of the campaign upon the part of the enemy. The settlement was largely of Englishmen. And it was therefore assumed, because of the influential following of Penn and the many devotees of the Established Church, that sentiments of loyalty to King George would be inspired anew by their presence, and terms of accommodation, permanent in character, would be suggested and accepted as inevitable. Washington promptly drew his line of battle between the approaching enemy and the capital city. Conscious of the overwhelming disparity of numbers, impressed with the importance of preventing the concentration of Howe's forces with those from which he had recently separated, believing that his dispositions in the Northern Department were such as would insure success, his great work in hand now was to "delay" the enemy in the accomplishment of a purpose which, with the means at hand, he might not ultimately defeat. His hostile attitude on White Clay Creek and display of resources put Howe upon his caution, who, pleading the want of cavalry --which in truth he greatly felt --lost days and weeks in feeling his way from the place of debarkation. Twenty-three days elapsed before he drew the American commander to determined battle on the Brandywine, and then he was obliged to concede to him the choice of position. On the 11th of September 1777, the battle of Brandywine was fought. The plan of the engagement, as subsequently revealed, the necessities which induced it, the skillfully executed movement of the enemy upon the right of the patriot army, the inefficiency of Washington's mounted troops in not disclosing the movement of Cornwallis at an earlier hour in the day, the uncertain and embarrassing reports that reached him from sources that should have been reliable, the partial surprise, and the heroic, though ineffectual, effort to meet and resist a fierce attack from a direction unlooked for, the deeds of valor upon the part of officers who sought to retrieve misfortune by personal daring. and the usual conduct of battle-shocked troops have gone into history, and been graphically described by Marshall, Botta, Lossing, Headley, Bancroft and others less distinguished in history, it may be but by no means less truthful in narrative. [See NOTE 14-2.] [NOTE 14-2.] The arrival of Sir William Howe in the Chesapeake Bay late in the month of August 1777, with an army eighteen thousand strong removed all doubt in the mind of Washington as to the designs of the enemy, and in his judgment left but one proper course to pursue: to give battle to the enemy. He at once proceeded to concentrate all his forces. Orders were issued directing detachments to join the main army by forced marches, while the greatest activity prevailed in all the departments, in order to prepare the army for a vigorous campaign. In order to strengthen the regular or Continental army, and have in process of organization a reserve force, the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware and the northern part of Virginia were direct to report to the main army. As soon as the forces thus concentrated were in a condition to move, Washington commenced his march to meet Howe. In order to encourage the patriots and overawe, if possible, the any disaffected residents of Philadelphia, who were fully apprised of the designs of the enemy, Washington concluded to march his troops through the principal streets of the city as he moved South. The movement continued southward, until the advance guard reached White Clay Creek, Delaware, when it halted, while the main body of the army took position on the left bank of Red Clay Creek, the right wing resting on the town of Newport on the then great road to Philadelphia, and the left wing extending to the town of Hockesen, in the direction of the Delaware River. The enemies, who by this time had disembarked, were in position on the left bank of the Elk River. With the advanced guards as far north as Gray's hill. General Maxwell, of the patriot army, with his corps of riflemen, held the line on White Clay Creek with slight defensive earthworks. In advance of Maxwell there were employed four regiments of cavalry, composed of nine hundred men including persons of every description. These partisan soldiers, composed of independent organizations, occupied the country is as far south as Iron Hill. And did good service in watching the movements of the enemy and reporting the same to the commander-in-chief. The enemy, having completed his preparations to advance upon Philadelphia, commenced a flank movement upon the right of Washington, and succeeded in compelling him to fall back to the Brandywine River, which he crossed at Chadd's Ford, on the 10th of September, end went into position. Here he determined to give battle to the enemy if he attempted to advance upon him, believing, as be did that Philadelphia could only be saved by a victory. The centre of Washington's army covered Chadd's Ford, his right wing extending in the direction of Birmingham Meeting-House, northwest of the ford, and the left, several miles south of the ford, was held by General Armstrong, who commanded the Pennsylvania militia. The front, on the south or right bank of he river, was occupied by Maxwell's riflemen, who had been delaying the advance of the enemy's cavalry. The situation was critical. The stake for which the impending battle was to be fought on the morrow involved the fate of the capital of the new nation, and, to an unusual degree, the hopes of the people who had resolved to sever their political relations with Great Britain. On the other hand, Howe, with a finely appointed army, which outnumbered that of Washington, felt that victory was within his grasp -only a silver thread, which the morning sun would betray, and mark as the coming line of battle, lay between him and the coveted prize. At the dawn of day on the morning of the 11th the British army was in motion. Howe had formed his army into two grand divisions. The one designed to make a feint on the position of Washington, at Chadd's Ford, was commanded by General Knyphausen, the Hessian, the other, the flanking column, was commanded by Lord Cornwallis. They moved up its right flank on south side of the Brandywine some fifteen miles, crossing at Jeffries' and other ferries, where the headwaters unite, and where the stream is narrow and easily forded. While this movement was in progress, unknown to Washington, the advance of General Knyphausen fell in with the troops commanded by General Maxwell, on the south side of the river, and a skirmish ensued. Maxwell's forces fell back, were promptly reinforced, and in turn drove the English back upon the original line. Knyphausen immediately brought up his reserves, and compelled Maxwell to retire to the north side of the river. 162 Batteries were immediately placed in position, and a furious cannonade opened upon the American line, while the disposition of troops, now plainly visible, was of such a character as indicated an intention to force a passage of the river at the point covered by the centre of Washington's army. The advance upon this part of the line was promptly met with counter dispositions of troops by the commander-in-chief, and the enemy seemed to be foiled in every effort to cross the river at this point. Meanwhile Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the flanking column, by a well-conceived and unobserved line of march, reached the forks of the Brandywine, crossing at Trimble's and Jeffries' Fords, without opposition, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, and then turning down the river, took the road to Dilworth, in order to strike the right flank of the American army. This was a most critical hour on that memorable day. The fact that Cornwallis had reached a position on the flank of Washington's army was at the hour spoken of unknown to him. Various reports reached his ear; about noon he received a report that General Howe was In command of a large body of the enemy, who were moving on his right flank. Upon this information, which he deemed reliable, he immediately conceived the idea of recrossing the river with the main body of his army, overwhelm Knyphausen before Howe could reach him, very properly concluding that the advantage thus obtained would more than compensate for whatever loss he might sustain by leaving his right wing exposed to the assault of Howe and Cornwallis. Accordingly, he ordered General Sullivan to pass the river at an upper ford and attack Knyphausen on his left, while he in person should cross lower down, and fall upon his right. They were both in the act of moving their troops when a second report arrived, representing what had really taken place as false, or, in other words, that the enemy had not crossed the headwaters of the Brandywine, and hence the army of Howe was not divided for the day, and therefore not in such a position as to invite the attack designed by the commander-in-chief. Deceived by this false intelligence, Washington recalled General Greene, who crossed the river with the advance. Time now was of incalculable value, and the want of a reliable body of cavalry was severely and fatally felt. The confusion and conflict of reports received at headquarters, the inability to determine whether the demonstration of Knyphausen was the prelude to an attack in force of the entire army of Howe upon the centre of the line at Chadd's Ford or a feint to cover a movement in great force upon the right of the position, rendered the situation painfully uncertain. Strange to say, yet it seems to be authoritatively stated, that a citizen, in the person of Squire Cheyney, was the first man to give Washington reliable information of the enemy's approach upon his right wing or flank. He was well mounted and incidentally had been within a short distance of the enemy, and with trouble made his escape and hastened with the utmost speed to communicate the fact, doubtless unconscious of the terrible importance his message bore. Washington at first was unwilling to believe his statement, classing it with the exaggerated and stampeding reports that had been embarrassing him during the entire day's operations. He put the squire to the test. He ordered him to dismount and draw a draft of the roads in the sand, and give a clear description of the movement of the troops he reported to have seen. This was promptly and skillfully done. Washington still appeared to doubt the statement, unwilling to believe that he had so fatally misconceived the operations of the army up to so late an hour in the day. Cheyney was a pure and devoted patriot; his whole soul was in the cause. Conscious of the truth of his statement, although unaware of its great importance, comprehending the doubt still in the mind of Washington, he exclaimed, "Take my life, General, if I deceive you!" Washington was at length convinced, and a few moments afterwards found that the enemy were within sight of his extreme right wing. As soon as, the approach of Cornwallis is upon the right flank became a certainty, General Sullivan, who was in command of that wing of the army, made every proper disposition of the troops at his disposal to resist it. The position of the troops was taken on the commanding ground above Birmingham Meeting-House, the left extending toward the Brandywine, both flanks being covered by densely wooded country. His artillery was well posted; the position had great advantage for defensive operations, and but for the fact that one brigade of this division was absent from the line, having been withdrawn some hours previous to join in the intended attack upon Knyphausen, and therefore could not reach the position which it left in time to defend it, the results would certainly have been modified, if in no other particular than that of delaying his march until Washington could have made the necessary dispositions to meet it, or if unable to meet it, then to have fallen back upon a new position. The attack upon the outpost of General Sullivan was followed up with overpowering numbers, which quickly developed the length of his line. This done, the British commander hastened his formation, and attacked the patriot troops with the utmost impetuosity. The engagement became equally fierce on both sides about four o'clock in the afternoon. For some length of time, says Botta, the Americans defended themselves with great valor, and the carnage was terrible. But such was the emulation which invigorated the British and Hessians that neither the advantages of the situation, the deadly effect of the artillery, the ceaseless fire of musquetry, nor the unshaken courage of the line from one end to the other could resist the onslaught. The fury of the enemy was directed toward Sullivan's left flank, which, after a gallant resistance, gave way. This success upon the part of Cornwallis was quickly followed up, the troops were thrown into confusion, the line felt the shock, wavered a few moments, and then gave way In rapid retreat. Sullivan's men fled into the woods in their rear, their pursuers following on the great road toward Dilworth. Upon the first fire of the artillery, Washington, having no longer any doubt of what was passing, had pushed forward the reserve to the aid of Sullivan, but this corps, on approaching the field of battle, under the immediate direction of General Greene, was met by the very men to whose succour they had been rapidly marching, in full retreat. A proper disposition was at once made to receive the fugitives, and, after their passage to the rear, Greene conducted the retreat in good order, checking the pursuit of the enemy by a continual fire of the artillery, which covered his rear. Having at length reached a defile covered on both sides with woods, he again went into position, with the full determination to finally check the advancing foe. The troops of General Greene were composed of Virginians and Pennsylvanians, and their conduct in defense of this position is said to have been remarkable for its gallantry and heroism. Conspicuous among those on the line of battle, and in immediate command, were General Muhlenburg and Colonel Stephens. General Knyphausen, finding the Americans to be fully engaged on their right, and observing that troops opposed to him at Chadd's Ford were engaged by those withdrawn under Greene to the support of the right wing, began to make his dispositions for crossing the river in reality. 163 The ford was defended by a line of entrenchment and one battery. The troops left in defense of this position (commanded by General Wayne) successfully resisted the crossing of the Hessian general until the force of Cornwallis made their appearance on their right flank. This development convinced them of the hopelessness of their task, and they fled in disorder, abandoning their artillery, ammunition and stores to the enemy. [See NOTE 14-3.] In their retreat they passed to the rear of General Greene, who, with the unbroken troops under him, was still able to maintain the position he had selected, and was the last to quit the field of battle. Night finally came to the rescue of the vanquished, under cover of which the army retreated to Chester, and on the following day to Philadelphia. Hundreds of men who had become fugitives in the rapid retreat of the right wing, as well as of the extreme left wing, in retiring from the ford promptly rejoined the army again within twenty-four hours at Philadelphia. The loss of the Americans, however, was heavy. It is reported that three hundred were killed, six hundred wounded and nearly four hundred captured; they also lost eleven pieces of artillery. The loss of the enemy is reported to have been one hundred killed and four hundred wounded. -Historical Oration, Valley Forge, 1878 [FINIS NOTE 14-2.] [NOTE 14-3.] William Dunning, a blacksmith of Cumberland County, during the Revolution endeavored to serve his country by the construction of a wrought-iron cannon of a curious description. One of these is said to have fallen into the hands of the British at the battle of Brandywine, and is to this day preserved in the Tower of London and another unfinished specimen is said to be at the arsenal in Philadelphia. These singular pieces of ordnance were made of "wrought-iron staves, hooped like a barrel, with bands of the same material, excepting there were four layers of staves breaking joint, all of which were firmly bound together, and then boxed and breeched like other cannon." An obituary notice of Denning, who died in Mifflin township, in 1830, at the age of ninety-four, states that he was an artificer in the Revolutionary army, and that his was the only successful attempt ever made in the world to manufacture wrought-iron cannon. One of which he completed in Middlesex, Pa., and commenced another and larger one at Mount Holly, but could got no one to assist him who could stand the heat, which is said to have been so great as to melt the lead buttons on his clothes. The British, it is added, offered a stated annuity and a large sum to the person who would instruct them in the manufacture of that article, but the patriotic blacksmith preferred obscurity and poverty in his own beloved country, though the country for which he had done so much kept her purse closed from the veteran soldier until near the close of his long life. -Bishop, " History of American Manufactures," vol. i [FINIS NOTE 14-3.] The battle was lost, and its discouraging features were keenly felt by those who left the field in possession of the enemy. But its effects, as measured by them, were by no means as disastrous as intended or believed to be. Marshall, referring to the immediate results of the engagement, declares, "It was not considered decisive by Congress, the general or the army," [Marshall's "Life of Washington," vol. i p. 150.] and cites the fact that the government, upon receiving Washington's official report, immediately passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and directed him to complete the defenses of The Delaware. On the 15th, four days after this battle, the army was on the march to attack Howe, who, apprised of the movement, immediately put his army in motion, and the opposing armies met between the Goshen Meeting-House and the White Horse Tavern, on the table-land south of the Great Valley. The choice of position was again with Washington. Hostilities had actually commenced, when storm and flood rendered the movement of troops impossible, and disclosed the alarming fact that arms and ammunition were so seriously damaged that to further engage the enemy would be suicidal. This exigency decided temporarily the fate of the capital city, and doubtless hastened the period of, occupation by the British troops. The situation was critical, and the day certainly memorable. To retire upon Philadelphia and suffer a partial investment, leaving the country open from the Schuylkill Hudson, making a diversion in favor of Burggoyne not only possible, but probable, would be unwise for many reasons; to give up all further defense of the capital would subject him to severe criticism, [See remonstrance, Pennsylvania Assembly.] injuriously affect public affairs in the Middle States, in some measure discourage the troops, and increase the spirit of disaffection in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. [See Note 14-4.] [NOTE 14-4.] On the Morning Of the 18th a messenger arrived in the American camp, bringing letters from Putnam and Clinton, prematurely, but positively, announcing the surrender of the army of Burgoyne. Washington received them with joy unspeakable and devout gratitude for this signal stroke of Providence. "All will be well," he said, "in His own good time." The news circulated among the Americans in every direction, and quickly penetrated the camp of Sir William Howe. The difficulty of access to the upper chevaux-de-frise had rendered its reduction much more tedious than than was conceived; under a feeling of exasperated impatience, he gave verbal orders to Colonel Donop, who had a wish for a separate command to carry Red Bank by assault if it could be easily done, and make short work of the affair. On the 22d, Donop, with five regiments of Hessian grenadiers and infantry, four companies of yagers, a few mounted yagers, all the artillery of the five battalions and two English howitzers, arrived at the fort. Making a reconnaissance with his artillery officers, he found that on three sides it could be approached through thick woods within four hundred yards. It was a pentagon, with a high earthy rampart, protected in front by an abattis. The battery of eight-three pounders and two howitzers was brought up on the right wing, and directed on the embrasures. At the front of each of the four battalions selected for the assault stood a captain with the carpenters and one hundred men, bearing the fascinee that had been hastily bound together. Mad after glory, Donop, at half-past four, summoned the garrison in arrogant language. A defiance being returned he addressed a few words to his troops. Each colonel placed himself at the head of his division, and at a quarter before five, under the protection of a brisk cannonade from all their artillery; they ran forward and carried the abattis. On clearing it, they were embarrassed by pitfalls, and were exposed to a terrible fire of small arms and of grape-shot from a concealed galley, while two galleys, which the bushes bad hidden, raked their flanks with chain-shot. Yet the brave Hessians formed on the glacis, filled the ditch, and pressed on towards the rampart. But Donop, the officers of his staff, and more than half the other officers were killed or wounded; the men who climbed the parapet were beaten down with lances and bayonets; and as twilight was coming on, the assailants fell back under the protection of their reserve. Many of the wounded crawled away into the forest, but Donop and a few others were left behind. The party marched back during the night unpursued. As the British ships-of-war which had attempted to take part in the attack fell down the river, the "Augusta," of sixty-four guns, and the "Merlin "frigate grounded. The next day the "Augusta" was set on fire by red-hot shot from the American galleys all floating batteries, and blown up before all her crew could escape; the "Merlin" was abandoned and set on fire. From the wrecks the Americans brought off two twenty-four pounders. "Thank God," reasoned John Adams, "the glory is not immediately due to the commander-in-chief, or idolatry and adulation would have been so excessive as to endanger our liberties." By the 10th of November the British had completed their batteries on the reedy morass of Province Island, five hundred yards from the American fort on Mud Island, and began an incessant fire from four batteries of heavy artillery. Smith gave the opinion that the garrison could not repel a storming-party, but Major Fleury, the French engineer, reported the place still defensible. MUD ISLAND IN 1777 BEFORE THE BRITISH ATTACK, APPEARS HERE On the eleventh, Smith, having received a slight hurt, passed immediately to Red Bank; the next in rank desired to be recalled and early on the thirteenth the brave little garrison of two hundred and eighty-six fresh men and twenty artillerists was confided to Major Simeon Thayer, of Rhode Island. Who had distinguished himself in the expedition against Quebec, and who now volunteered to take the desperate command. Supported by his superior ability and the skill and cool courage of Fleury, the garrison held out gallantly during an incessant bombardment and cannonade. On the fifteenth, the wind proving fair, the "Vigilant," carrying sixteen twenty-four pounder, aided by the tide, was warped through an inner channel obstructions in the river had deepened, and anchored so near the American fort that they could send into it hand-grenades, and marksmen from the mast of the "Vigilant " could pick off men from its platform. PICTURE OF FORT MIFFLIN APPEARS HERE Five large British ships-of-war, which drew near the chevaux-de-frise kept off the American flotilla, and sometimes directed their fire at the fort on its unprotected side. The land batteries, now five in number, played from thirty pieces at short distance. The ramparts and blockhouses on Mud Island were honeycombed, their cannon nearly silenced. A storming-party was got ready; but, to avoid bloodshed, Sir William Howe, who on the fifteenth was present with his brother, gave orders to keep up the fire all night through. In the morning, Thayer sent the entire garrison but forty men over to Red Bank, and after midnight followed with the rest. When on the sixteenth, the British troops entered the fort, they found nearly every one of its cannon stained with blood. Never were orders to defend a place to the last extremity more faithfully executed. Thayer was reported to Washington as an officer of the highest merit; Fleury won well-deserved promotion from Congress. Cornwallis was next sent by way of Chester to Billingsport with a strong body of troops to clear the left bank of the Delaware. A division under Greene was promptly dispatched across the river to give him battle. But Cornwallis was joined by five British battalions from New York, while the American reinforcements from the northern army were still delayed. It therefore became necessary to evacuate Red Bank. Cornwallis, having leveled its ramparts, returned to Philadelphia, and Greene rejoined Washington, but not till Lafayette, who attended the expedition as a volunteer, had secured the applause of Congress by routing a party of Hessians. For all the seeming success, many officers in the British camp expressed the opinion that the States could not be subjugated, and should be suffered to go free. --Bancroft, "History of U.S. vol. vi" PICTURE OF PAOLI MONUMENT, APPEARS HERE. It was an hour of supreme interest in the struggle, and upon his decision hung the most momentous results. Assuming the entire responsibility, courting the 164 counsel of his subordinates, but acting upon his own mature judgment, he uncovered Philadelphia, detaching General Wayne, and directing him to attack the extreme left of the enemy, in the hope of detaining him until he could refit his army and renew. The conflict, providentially postponed Disasters seemed to repeat themselves in quick succession during those trying days. General Wayne's enterprise, from which further delay was ardently hoped, resulted in his early disclosure, occasioned by the betrayal of his position to the enemy by spy or Tory, promptly followed by a night attack, led by General Grey, characterized by a fierceness and brutality which has justly obscured the fame of that officer, and rendered his name forever odious in the annals of the Revolution. PICTURE OF WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS, WORCESTER, APPEARS HERE. The season of anxiety was intensified by this unexpected misfortune, followed by the removal of the seat of government, the establishment of new lines of communication, new sources of supplies, and the "perplexing maneuvers of Howe," which required counter-movements to prevent a farther advance into the interior of the State with a view to the destruction of government stores at Reading, or in the direction of the Hudson River 165 to relieve Burgoyne, who was then beseeching for reinforcements to save him from disaster. After a succession of feints by Howe, indicating his eager desire for more substantial conquests, he moved from the neighborhood of these hills, crossing the Schuylkill at Fatland Ford on the 22d day of September and from necessity rather than choice occupied Philadelphia on the 24th of the same month. Light brigades of Continental troops interposed between the enemy and the Delaware, and watched his movement in the direction of Philadelphia by day and night, while the main army under Washington took position on the hills of Perkiomen and Skippack. At this place reinforcements reached him, and his army, decimated by the untoward events of the campaign, was reported eight thousand Continental troops and three thousand militia present and effective for duty. With this force at command he determined upon further operations against the enemy, whose situation, as disclosed to him by information deemed reliable, invited rather than repelled attack. The plan of the battle of Germantown [See NOTE 14-5.] was then formed encamped upon the Perkiomen hills; from them, on the night of October third, the advance was made, and after it was fought and lost, on the day following (October 4th), to the same hills the army returned, defeated, it Is true, with considerable loss in killed, wounded and captured but with its organization unimpaired and its devotion to the cause still unbroken. Mr. Bancroft, in writing of this battle, says: "In the official report of this engagement the commander-in-chief stated with exactness the tardy arrival of Greene." And adds, "Had the forces trusted to that officer and the militia under Armstrong acted as efficiently as the troops with Washington, the morning might have been fatal to Howe's army. The renewal of the attack so soon after the defeat at the Brandywine, and its partial success, inspirited Congress and the army. [NOTE 14-5.] The following letter, written by Lieutenant-Colonel T. Pickering, who was serving as adjutant general of the staff of General Washington at the battle of Germantown, dated Salem, Mass, August 23, 1826, will be read with interest in connection with the events of a day which opened so auspicious for American arms, and closed in gloom and disaster: "Sir: Nearly forty-nine years have elapsed since the battle or Germantown. Of course you may well suppose that many facts respecting it are beyond my power of recollection, while a few are indelibly impressed on my memory. General Washington, in his letter to Congress of October 5th, the day after the battle, says, that "the army marched about 7 o'clock on be evening of the 3rd, and that General Sullivan's advanced party attacked the enemy's picket at Mount Airy, or Mr. Allen's house, about sunrise the next morning, which presently gave way. His main body consisting of the right wing, following soon, engaged the light infantry and other troops encamped near the picket, which they forced from the ground. Leaving their baggage they retreated a considerable distance having previously thrown a party into Mr. Chew's house.' MAP OF APPROACHES TO GERMANTOWN APPEARS HERE. "The term here applied to the advanced corps of the enemy, that 'they were forced from the ground,' shows that they were in arms, and resisted their assailants, and that the previous brush with the picket, a guard always posted in advance on purpose to give notice of the enemy's approach roused the light infantry and other troops, who had the time enough to take their arms and form for action. They retreated of necessity before the greatly superior force of the whole right wing of our army. "But the 'leaving of their baggage' authorizes the inference that the had no knowledge of the march of the American army until the firing in the engagement with the picket guard gave the alarm. If, then, these advance corps of the enemy were not, in the strict sense of the words, surprised, -that is -'caught napping,' unprepared for action, -much less could the main body, posted in the centre of Germantown, two miles father off, have been surprised. The distance gave them ample time to prepare for action in any manner which the attack of their enemy should require. "You asked 'at what distance from Chew's house the attack commenced?' At that time I was a stranger to that part of the country. From my subsequent acquaintance with it, during my residence in Pennsylvania, I should estimate the distance from Mount Airy to Philadelphia 166 to be eight miles, Chew's house seven miles, and the centre of Germantown six miles. And these, I think, are the distances as I have occasionally heard them mentioned. "You ask 'how long a pause was made at Chew's house, and what space of time probably intervened between the beginning of the action and the general engagement at the head of the village?' The pause at Chew's house, in the manner I shall presently mention, probably delayed the advance of the rear division of our army into action for half an hour. "Taking the attack on the picket at Mount Airy as the beginning of the action, it was probably nearly half an hour before it became general as to the whole of Sullivan's column, and this general engagement must have commenced after he had passed Chew's house, for I saw not one dead man until I had passed it, and then but one, lying in the road where I fell in with General Sullivan. "I presume that following close upon the heels of the British battalion of light infantry and the Fortieth Regiment, which were retiring before him, Sullivan, with his column, had passed Chew's house without annoyance from it, for it must have taken Colonel Musgrave, who entered it with six companies of the Fortieth Regiment, some time to barricade and secure the doors and windows of the lower story, before he would be ready to fire from the chamber window and it was from them that the firing I saw proceeded. "In the march of the army, General Washington, following Sullivan's column, kept in the road leading to and through Germantown to Philadelphia. When he had entered the Northern part of the village, we heard in advance of us (I was riding by the General's side) a very heavy fire of musketry. General Sullivan's divisions were warmly engaged with the enemy, but neither was in sight. This fire was brisk and heavy, and General Washington said to me, 'I am afraid General Sullivan is throwing away his ammunition, ride forward and tell him to reserve it.' "I do not know what the precise idea, which at that moment struck the mind of the General. I can only conjecture that he was apprehensive that Sullivan, after meeting the enemy in front, kept up big brisk and incessant fire, when the haziness of the air and its increased obscurity, from the burning of so much powder, prevented his troops having such a distinct view of the enemy as would render their fire efficient. Be that as it may, the instant I received the general's orders I rode forward, and in the road, three or four hundred yards beyond Chew's house, met Sullivan, and delivered to him the general's orders. "At this time I had never heard of Chew's house, and had no idea that an enemy was in my rear. The first notice I received of it was from the whizzing of the whizzing-balls across the road, before, behind and above me as I was returning, after delivering the orders to Sullivan. Instantly turning my eyes to the right, I saw the blaze of the muskets, whose shots were still aimed at me from the windows of a large stone house, standing back about a hundred yards from the road. "This was Chew's house. Passing on, I came to some of our artillery that was firing very obliquely on the front of the house. I remarked to them that in that position their fire would be unavailing and that the only chance of their shot making any impression on the house would be moving down and firing on its front. Then immediately passing on, I rejoined General Washington. who, with General Knox and other officers, was in front of a stone house (nearly all the houses in Germantown were of stone), next northward of the open fields on which Chew's house stood. I found they were discussing, in Washington's presence, this question, --Whether the whole of our troops then behind should immediately advance, regardless of the enemy in Chew's house, or first summon them to surrender? "General Knox strenuously urged the sending of a summons. Among other things he said, 'It would be unmilitary to leave a castle in the rear.' I answered, 'Doubtless that is a correct general maxim; but it does not apply in this case. We know the extent of this castle, (Chew's house), and to guard against the danger of the enemy's sallying and falling on the rear of our troops, a small regiment may be posted here to watch them; and it they sally such a regiment will take them. But,' I added, 'to summon them to surrender would be useless. We are now in the midst of the battle, and its issues are unknown. In this state of uncertainly, and so well secured as the enemy find themselves, they will not regard a summons. They will fire at your flag.' However, a flag was sent with a summons. Lieutenant Smith, of Virginia, my assistant in the office of adjutant general, volunteered his service to carry it. As he was advancing a shot from the house gave him a wound of which he died. Whatever delay in the advance of the division in our rear was occasioned by the pause at Chew's house. I am satisfied that Sullivan's column did not halt there at all, as mentioned by Judge Johnson. The column was certainly not in sight when the general sent me with the orders already noticed, and it is alike certain that it was then beyond Chew's house. Nor was the enemy forming under cover of the house, or I would have seen them. "When the orders were sent to our troops in the rear to advance I do not know, but it must have been subsequent to the sending of the flag, and, I should think, twenty minutes, at least, after it was found that in enemy was in the house. The general did not pass it at all. I had remained near him, until our troops were retreating, when I rode off to the right to endeavor to stop and rally I met retiring, in companies and squads; but it was impracticable. Their ammunition, I suppose, had generally been, expended. "In the foregoing letter from General Washington to Congress, he says, 'The attack from our left column, under General Green, began about three-quarters of an hour after that from our right.' You ask the cause of this. The answer is obvious. The right column, under General Sullivan, which Washington accompanied, marched on the dirt road to Germantown; Greene, with his column, was obliged to make a circuit to the left to gain the road which led to his point of attack. The columns thus entirely separated, and at a distance from each other, no calculations of their commanders could have insured their arriving at the same time at their respective points of attack. "Judge Johnson, in his 'Life of Greene,' has represented as 'almost ludicrous' the 'scene' exhibited by some writers of the discussion near Chew's house in the presence, of General Washington, in which it is hinted that opinions were 'obtruded, and that even the field officers may have expressed their opinions; but,' he adds, 'General Washington was listening to the counsels of his own mind and of his general officers.' I know, however, that he did listen to the discussion, and Lee (Light Horse Harry) commended a troop of horse that day on duty near the General's person. "This accounts for his determination to send the summons. 'Knox,' he says, 'being always high in the general's confidence his opinion prevailed.' Further, I must remark, that the general officers who the judge supposes to have been present and advising the commander in-chief, were in there proper places with their divisions and brigade. Knox alone, of the general officers, was present. Commanding in the artillery department, and the field pieces being distributed among the brigades of the army, he was always at liberty in time or action to attend the commander-in-chief. "Some two or three years since I wrote to Judge Johnson, informing him of his mistakes in the matter noticed in this paragraph. Others of his details of this battle, which are inconsistent with the statements I have here given to you, must be incorrect. 'The truth is that General Washington, not sanguine in his own opinion, and his diffidence being increased, probably, by a feeling sense of high responsibility as commander-in-chief, was ever disposed, when occasions occurred, to consult those officers who were near him in whose discernment and fidelity he placed a confidence, and certainly his decisions were often influenced by their opinions. This is within my knowledge. . "I am, etc., "T. PICKERING." The retreat of Washington from Germantown was accomplished without the loss of material. He retired to Skippack Creek, placed his wounded and disabled soldiers in hospitals wherever he could establish them, generally using the churches and other public buildings between the Perkiomen and Reading for that purpose. [FINIS NOTE 14-5.] 167 In Europe it convinced Frederick of Prussia and the Cabinet of France that the independence of America was assured." Information of the success of General Gates in the Northern Department reached the commander-in chief on the 18th of October, -one day after the surrender. The event was promptly made known to the army, and received by soldiers and citizens with manifestations of joy. Immediately the Continental troops under General Glover and Morgan's corps of riflemen were recalled from the Department of the North. Delay followed, with evident disinclination upon the part of General Gates to promptly obey the order of the commander-in-chief, and not until Colonel Hamilton was dispatched in person to renew the demand was the summons obeyed. Pending the movement of reinforcements from the North, the public mind, having recovered from the first effects of the reverses at Brandywine, Paoli and Germantown, perhaps unduly elated by the surrender of Burgoyne and its sequences, clamored for further aggressive movements against Howe. Partly in deference to this feeling, and to quiet the unfriendly criticism inspired by the disingenuous spirit subsequently more notoriously connected with the developments of the Conway cabal, Washington moved his army to the east, taking a strong position at Whitemarsh, from which he was able to watch the movements of the enemy, harass his outposts, cut off his source of supplies, give protection to the agricultural people and confidence to the public mind. Here after an ineffectual attempt [See NOTE 14-6.] on the part of the enemy to dislodge him, on the 5th and 6th of December, the campaign closed, Howe retiring within his lines of defense, reaching from the Delaware to the Schuylkill River. The war-worn and jaded condition of the patriot troops, the want of supplies, the hopelessness of further operations to repossess Philadelphia, and the approach of winter, all admonished the commander to seek shelter and repose for his army. [NOTE 14-6.] When General Howe took formal possession of Philadelphia, In the autumn of 1777, he established his headquarters in Second Street, fourth door below Spruce, in a house formerly occupied by General Cadwallader. Directly opposite resided William and Lydia Darrach, members of the Society of Friends. A superior officer of the British army, believed to be the adjutant-general (Major Andre), fixed upon one of their chambers, a back room, for private conference, and two officers frequently met there, with fire and candies, in close consultation. About the 2d of December the adjutant-general told Lydia that they would he in the room at 7 o'clock, and remain late, and that they wished the family to retire early to bed, adding that when they were going away they, would call her to let them out and extinguish their fire and candles. She accordingly sent all her family to bed; but as the officer had been so particular her curiosity was excited. She took off her shoes, and put her ear to the keyhole of the conclave, and overheard an order read for all the British troops to march out late on the evening of the 4th and attack General Washington, then encamped at Whitemarsh. On hearing this she returned to her chamber and lay down. Soon after, the officer knocked at her door, but she rose only at the third summons, having feigned herself asleep. Her mind was so agitated that she could neither eat nor sleep, supposing it in her power to save the lives of thousands of her fellow-countrymen, but not knowing how she was to convey the information to General Washington, not daring to confide it to her husband. The time, however, was short. She quickly determined to make her way as soon as possible to the American outposts, where she had a son who was an officer in the American army. She informed her family that as she was in want of flour, she would, go to Frankford for it. Her husband insisted she should take her servant maid with her, but to his surprise she positively refused. She got access to General Howe and solicited what he readily granted, --a pass through the British lines. Beyond the lines she was met by an American officer, Lieutenant-Col. Craig, of the Light Horse, who knew her. To him she disclosed her secret, after having obtained from him a solemn promise never to betray her individually, as her life might be at stake with the British. He conducted her to a house near at hand, directed something for her to eat, and hastened to headquarters, where he immediately acquainted General Washington with what he had heard. Washington made, of course, all preparations for baffling the meditated surprise. Lydia returned home with her flour, sat up alone to watch the movements of the British troops, and heard their footsteps; but when they returned in a few days after, did not dare to ask a question, though solicitous to learn the result. The next evening the adjutant general came in, and requested her to walk up to his room, as he wished to ask some questions. She followed him in terror, and when he locked the door and begged her, with an air of mystery, to be seated, she was sure she was either suspected or betrayed. He inquired earnestly whether any of her family was up the last night when he and the other officer met. She told him they all retired at eight o'clock. He observed, "I know you were asleep for I knocked at your door three times before you heard me. I am entirely at a loss to imagine who gave General Washington information of our intended attack, unless the walls of the house could speak. When we arrived near Whitemarsh, we found all there cannon mounted and the troops prepared to receive us; and we have marched back like a parcel of fools." [FINIS NOTE 14-6.] The proposition to retire the army for the winter gave rise to well-marked differences of opinion. Within army circles the only question was that of location. Whether it should fortify and remain where it was, or retire to the Perkiomen hills, or move south and occupy the vicinity of Wilmington, was canvassed by leading officers in the army, whose opinions were sought by the commander-in-chief. In political circles, and among a large and influential class of patriotic citizens of Pennsylvania, a different view prevailed. In their opinion, the exigency of the public service demanded a continuation of active operations upon the part of this army. Their hostility to the proposed cantonment of troops culminated in a remonstrance prepared by the General Assembly, and by that body presented to Congress, then in session at York. We recite the remonstrance here in order to illustrate the wisdom and force of character of the great and good man who, in serving the higher interests of his country, disregarded the remonstrance of those whose sensibilities were shocked by the calamities of war, and who, for a temporary respite from its ravages, would have sacrificed the army of hope by denying it that well-earned repose absolutely necessary to that season and period to preserve its existence. REMONSTRANCE OF COUNCIL AND ASSEMBLY TO CONGRESS, 1777 [Pennsylvania Archives, vol. vi. 1777-1778, p. 279.] "At a conference with the Supreme Executive Council and General Assembly of the State, held in the Assembly Room, Resolved, that a remonstrance be immediately drawn up and forwarded to Congress against the proposed cantonment of the army of the United States under command of His Excellency, General Washington, and that the following reasons be urged. "1st. That by the army's removal to the west side of the Schuylkill as far as Wilmington and its neighborhood, a great part of the State, particularly that on the east side, together with the State of New Jersey, 168 must be left in the power of the enemy subject to their ravages; the inhabitants be obliged either to fly to the neighboring States or submit to such terms as the enemy may proscribe." "2d. That the State Assembly at their last session had laid a tax of five shillings on the pound on all estates, real and personal. In order to call in and sink the moneys issued by this Government, and at this session had Resolved over and above said tax to raise the sum of sixty-two thousand dollars for support of war for the ensuing year. "Agreeably to resolve of Congress, both which taxes must infallible fail, provided the army go into cantonment at such distance as will prevent their covering the country from the depredations of the enemy, it being a melancholy truth that too many of our people are so disaffected already that nothing but the neighborhood of the army keeps them subject to Government, whilst the Whigs and those who have taken the most active, part in support of our cause will be discouraged and give up all as lost." FACSIMILE OF OATH OF ALLEGIENCE APPEARS HERE. "3d. By removal of our army it will be impossible to recruit the regiments of this State, as those who would be active and zealous in promoting that measure will be obliged to leave the State, whilst the Tories and disaffected will gain strength, and in many places, perhaps, declare openly for the enemy, by which means there will be a probability of their not only supplying their exhausted magazines, but greatly strengthening their army. "4th. The army removing at a distance from the enemy must give a fatal stab to the credit of the Continental currency throughout this State. It in a melancholy truth that it is very difficult to purchase from many of our most able farmers the necessary provisions of our army, owing to their fear of the money; but this difficulty must be greatly increased when another market, without interruption, will open to them where they will receive at least a promise of hard money." [See NOTE 14-7.] "We have this day no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men in camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. Our whole strength in Continental troops amounts to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty. Since the fourth inst., our numbers fit for duty, from hardship and exposure, have decreased nearly two thousand men. Gentlemen reprobate the going into winter-quarters as much as if the soldiers were made of sticks and stones. "I can assure those gentlemen that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul I pity those miseries which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent." [NOTE 14-7.] To this remonstrance Washington replied on the 23d of December, 1777. After laying blame upon General Mifflin for neglect of duty as quartermaster-general, be says: "For want of a two days' supply of provisions, an opportunity scarcely ever offered of taking an advantage of the enemy that has not been either totally obstructed or greatly impeded. Men are confined to hospitals or in farmers' houses for want of shoes " [FINIS NOTE 14-7.] On the 11th of December the camp was broken up at Whitemarsh, and after a painful march over rough and frozen roads reached the Gulf Hills, crossing the Schuylkill River at Swedes' and Matson's Ford on improvised bridges. Here the advance division under General Potter, which moved south of Matson's Ford to cover the passage of the main army, unexpectedly came in contact with a strong detachment of the enemy under Cornwallis, out upon a foraging expedition. The presence of the enemy in this quarter and in such force was a surprise at the time. And occasioned delay, the counter-movement of troops and some apprehension upon the part of the commander-in-chief, which subsequently proved to be without cause. A camp was established for some days on the Gulf Hills, fourteen miles distant from Philadelphia. Where the army remained until the 18th, when it retired to Valley Forge, going into position with the right resting upon the base of Mount Joy, near the acute angle of the Valley Creek, the left flank resting upon and protected by the Schuylkill River, about one-half mile below Fatland Ford or Sullivan's bridge. Historians have uniformly signalized the arrival of the arm on this ground as coincident with the famous order of the commander-in-chief dated, "Headquarters on the Schuylkill, December 17,1777, congratulating his troops upon the close of the campaign, the results accomplished, the heroic conduct of officers and the endurance of men, counseling them to continue in 169 fortitude and patience, assuring his followers "that while in some instances he had unfortunately failed, that upon the whole, heaven had smiled upon their army and crowned them with success, that the end of their warfare was independence, liberty and peace, and that the hope of securing these blessings for themselves and their posterity demanded a continuance of the struggle at every hazard." This was the pleasing side of the picture, set in the gilded framework of war's seducing blandishments and panoplied with its field-day glories. But there was another, --the shoeless soldiers, the frozen ground, the cheerless hills, the lowering leaden sky that arched them over with gloom. These were the sorrowing and mute witnesses to the true scene of the arrival, and which the artist has thus far failed to place upon canvas. We are not, however, wanting for the pen picture. I give it in the language of Mr. George Washington Parke Curtis. "The brigades had gone into position upon the line of defense indicated by the skillful officer who drew it. The pitiless winter winds swept the hills and valley with unceasing fury as the December sun sank into banks of snow-clouds, presaging the coming storm. The poverty of supplies in food and raiment was bitterly and profanely bewailed by shivering, unpaid officers and half-naked men as they crowded around the comfortless campfire of the bivouac, when suddenly the appearance of the Horse Guard announced the approach of the commander-in-chief. "The officer commanding the detachment, choosing the most favorable ground paraded his men to pay their general the honors of a passing salute. As Washington rode slowly up lie was observed to be eyeing very earnestly something that attracted his attention on the frozen surface of the road. Having returned the salute with that native grace and dignified manner that won the admiration of the soldiers of the Revolution, the chief reined in his charger, and ordering the commanding officer of the detachment to his side, addressed him as follows: "How comes it, sir, that I have tracked the march of your troops by the blood-stains of their feet upon the frozen ground? Were there no shoes in the commissary's stores, that this sad spectacle is to be seen along the public highway?" The officer replied: "Your Excellency may rest assured that this sight is as painful to my feelings as it can be to yours, but there is no remedy within our reach. When shoes were issued the different regiments were served in turn; it was our misfortune to be among the last to be served, and the stores became exhausted before we could obtain even the smallest supply." The general was observed to be deeply affected by his officer's description of the soldier's privations and suffering. His compressed lips, the heaving of his manly chest betokened the powerful emotions that were struggling in his bosom, when, turning towards the troops, with a voice tremulous, yet kindly, he exclaimed, "Poor fellows!" Then, giving rein to his horse, he rode rapidly away. The purpose of the commander-in-chief in taking position at Valley Forge was to give the greatest measure of protection possible to the State, and to circumscribe the operations of General Howe within limits that would seriously affect his source of supply. To this end his line was admirably drawn. On the West Side of the Schuylkill he extended his right flank to Wilmington, at which point he stationed General Smallwood with his brigade of infantry, covering the long interval with Morgan's rifle corps and the squadron of cavalry under Major Harry Lee. On the east of the river he occupied the country as far as Whitemarsh, placing General Armstrong with a brigade of Pennsylvania militia so as to cover the principal roads converging at that point; the cavalry under Major Jameson and Captain McLane guarded the highways in the direction of Barren and Chestnut Hills; and to still further prevent the incursions of the enemy northward from Philadelphia, he directed General Pulaski, who was in command of the brigade of cavalry, to go into camp at Trenton, N. J. The line of defense from the west shore of the Schuylkill River to the base of Mount Joy, at the angle of Valley Creek, occupied commanding ground, and the earthworks and fortifications erected under the direction of General Duportail were extensive in character and skillfully constructed. The interior line of works and abatis were semicircular in term, crossing from north to south, with one star and two square forts, from which the army could have successfully covered a retreat westward, had such a movement become necessary. The interior lines, with the remains of the two square forts, are still discernible, and constitute the only landmarks which the crumbling hand of time has left to guide the pilgrim over these hills. Fortunately for the living of today, we are not without reliable data by which we may indicate with accuracy the position of the fourteen brigades of Continental troops encamped within the fortified lines, representing a maximum of seventeen thousand men but reduced by sickness and the paucity of supplies to the pitiable number of five thousand and twelve effectives. The extreme right of the line, commanding the approaches from the southwest, was held by Brigadier General Charles Scott, of Virginia, upon whose left Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne, commanding the Pennsylvania line, was placed; then in succession from right to left came the brigades of General Enoch Poor, of Massachusetts, General John Glover, of Massachusetts, General Ebenezer Larned, General John Patterson, of Massachusetts, General George Weedon, of Virginia, who connected with General 170 Peter Muhlenberg, of Pennsylvania, holding the extreme left of the line, resting on the Schuylkill at a point near where the village of Port Kennedy is now located. The second or supporting line of troops was encamped immediately in front of the interior line of earthworks, still discernible. Brigadier-General William Woodford, of Virginia, held the right, covering the corps of Major-General Henry Knox's artillery, located a short distance to his left and rear; to the left of Woodford, successively, the brigades of General William Maxwell, of New Jersey, General Thomas Conway, of Irish birth, General Jedediah Huntingdon, of Connecticut, connecting with the brigade of General James Varnum, of Massachusetts; on the extreme left, covering the bridge over the Schuylkill River, built by General Sullivan, Brigadier-General Lochlau McIntosh, of Scottish birth, Georgian by adoption, with the remaining brigade, was encamped: in the rear, of the second line of entrenchment's a short distance east of the Potts' mansion, occupied by the commander-in-chief; near by and to the left of McIntosh, Washington's body-guard, commanded by major Gibbs, of Rhode island, was encamped; still farther to the west, and of the opposite side of the Valley Creek, the artificers of the army were quartered in huts, with large log buildings for work-shops. PICTURE OF POTTS' MANSION APPEARS HERE The bake-house, used for the double purpose of furnishing food for the army and as a place for holding court-martial, was located within a few yards of these work-shops. By the 20th of December the army was in position as indicated, and the order to construct huts for the winter was issued. Its execution followed with dispatch and great exactness. Soldiers became axe men from necessity; before them the forest fell, and hundreds of log houses grew as by magic. The dimensions of each hut were fourteen by sixteen feet, with chimney, fireplace, and door, facing upon company streets, drawn in strict conformity with the rules of military encampments. Quarters for field and staff officers were erected in rear of the line of troops, while still farther to the rear, upon the sloping hills; shelter was sought for the trains of the army. History and tradition alike confirm the fact that the hills were made bare of timber in completing the shelter necessary for men and animals, and the wood necessary for fuel during the long winter was hauled by men a distance of one or more miles from the camp. Major-Generals Lafayette, De Kalb and Stirling established their headquarters for the winter with the army, and were alternately assigned to important field and detached duty during the winter. Major-General Charles Lee, at the time prisoner of war, was subsequently exchanged for General Prescott, and returned to this camp, together with Major-General Thomas Mifflin, of Pennsylvania, who had been absent some months. The following staff officers established their headquarters near the Potts mansion: Major-General Nathaniel Greene, of Rhode Island, Quartermaster-general of the army; Major-General Baron Steuben, inspector-general; Brigadier-General Duportail, chief engineer; Colonel Timothy Pickering, adjutant-general; and Colonel Alexander Hamilton, aide-de-camp. Time and space forbid what would otherwise be a pleasing task of calling from the long roll of honor the names of subordinate officers, who were conspicuously associated with those near the person of the commander-in chief and supported him in his trials and embarrassments while in occupation of Valley Forge. Long before the works for defense were completed, or the huts that were to shelter the army were finished, the bitter cry of hunger, from thousands of brave and heroic men, reached the cars and heart of Washington. He appealed in vain to the government for supplies. END Chapter XIV-Part I