Area History: History of Schuylkill County, Pa: W. W. Munsell, 1881 History of Schuylkill County, PA: Chapter V - (Cont.) Contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by R. Steffey. Typing and editing by Jo Garzelloni and Carole Carr. USGENWEB NOTICE: Printing this file by non-commercial individuals and libraries is encouraged, as long as all notices and submitter information is included. Any other use, including copying files to other sites requires permission from the submitters PRIOR to uploading to any other sites. We encourage links to the state and county table of contents. ____________________________________________________________ HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, PA with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers. New York: W. W. Munsell & Co., 36 Vesey Street, 1881 Press of George Macnamara, 36 Vesey Street, N.Y. ____________________________________________________________ RIVALRY IN TRANSPORTATION. The Schuylkill Navigation Company transported only 222,693 tons of coal in 1847, the first year after the enlargement, which was attributed to a deficient equipment and an injudicious tariff of tolls, which repelled the line trade. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company was deeply impressed with the folly of continuing the war which had charac- terized the business of 1845 in the struggle with the Navigation Company, and it was anxious to enter into an amicable arrangement with the latter company, of mutual advantage, whereby harmonious relations might be established and perpetuated. Early in 1847 an attempt at negotiation between the two companies was made. Believing that the canal would be capable of carrying the in- creased production, the railroad company made no preparation to extend its business, and it conceded 400,000 tons of the coal tonnage for the ensuing year to the Navigation Company. The latter company rejected this offer with disdain, insisting upon _____________end page 56.______________ page 57 THE COAL TRADE IN 1849 _______________________________________________________________ 500,000 tons as its share of the trade. This not being acceded to, the negotiations were broken off, and each company made its own arrangements. It happened that both companies had all the tonnage they could carry, and their united facilities were not equal to the demand of the trade. The sequel was that of 1,583,374 tons of coal sent to market in 1847 by the two avenues, only 222,693 tons were sent by the Schuylkill canal. The stock of coal remaining over in the market on the 1st of April, 1848, was estimated at 275,000 tons; a burden under which the trade dragged heavily during the whole year. In connection with this circumstance the prostration of business diminished the consumption and checked the demand for coal. The result was a breakdown in prices and a great demoralization in the trade. The production in the Schuylkill region showed an increase of only 89,297 tons. An agreement entered into between the railroad and navigation companies for the government of the transportation of coal during 1849 had for its basis the principle that the toll and transpor- tation from Pottsville to Philadelphia. The transportation of one-third of the coal tonnage was conceded to the canal, which was estimated to 600,000 tons for this year-the amount actually transported being only 489,208 tons. The tolls for 1849 were adjusted so as to average $1.70 per ton by rail, and 75 cents per ton by canal. These rates were regarded as too high for the languishing condition of the trade-they did not admit of a compe- tition in the market on an equality with other regions. It was not apparent to the average understanding why the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company should charge $1.70 per ton for a service that cost no more than 65 cents, or why the Schuylkill Navigation Company should charge 75 cents per ton for a service that it performed without loss before the "enlargement" at 50 cents per ton. How, it was asked, about the great advantages over all other lines of the Reading railroad, with its admirable and uniformly descending grades, in favor of the trade? How about the great reduction in the cost of transportation that was to be accomplished by the improved, the enlarged, the magnificent Schuylkill navigation? The low prices at which coal was offered in 1849, by the dealers in Philadelphia, about the first of March-prices that would not net the operators the ruinous rates of the previous year-caused great excitement in Schuylkill county. A very large meeting of the operators was held at Pottsville on the ninth of March, at which a remarkable unanimity was exhibited and a stern resolution manifested to maintain the prices of coal at a remu- nerative rate, notwithstanding the sinister arts of the parasites who had fastened themselves upon the vitals of the trade. The co-operation of all the operators in the region was earnestly solicited in the adoption of such measures for their mutual protection as the exigency required. A committee appointed at a former meeting reported substantially that the people of Schuyl- kill county had been brought to the verge of bankruptcy by a bold and novel system that had been devised in the previous year, and had been again introduced at that time. Some speculative persons enter the eastern markets in advance of the producers, and by offering coal-which they had not yet bought-at prices below the cost of its production they secure all the orders for immediate delivery. The nature of mining requires that the daily product shall have an uninterrupted sale and removal from the mines. Having thus all the orders in their hands, these forestallers avail themselves of this peculiarity in the business, and the want of union for common protection against such a scheme, to alarm the small colliers, and thus to break down the market prices to suit their purposes. In this way a barrier was created between the producers of coal and the consumers, keeping them effectually apart. To put a stop to this unjust system the colliers of Schuylkill county were strongly urged to form an efficient organization without unnecessary delay. The principle was asserted that the only legitimate regulation of prices is the relation between supply and demand, with some reference, of course, to the cost of production. SUSPENSION AND STRIKE. It was then resolved, with the concurrence of the operators representing three-fourths of the tonnage of 1848, to suspend the shipment of coal to market from the 19th of March to the 7th of April, both inclusive, except to iron works. This suspension was subsequently continued from week to week until the 2nd of May, making all together seven weeks. On the 2nd of May, the day appointed for a resumption of work at the mines, the operators were confronted with an organized strike by the miners and laborers for an advance in wages. As usual upon such occasions this movement was attended with demon- strations of violence, the object being to compel their fellow laborers who were disposed to work to join their ranks. Where the men had made terms with their employers and had gone to work, they were driven from the works by large bodies of man armed with clubs and other weapons. The whole difficulty would have been promptly arranged had it not been for the interference of self- constituted leaders, styling themselves a central committee, who arrogated despotic power. The collieries were all in operation again by the 21st of May, but the demand for coal was very moder- ate, and in a few weeks there were symptoms of a drooping market. To prevent an overstock another suspension of work, for two weeks from the 23d of June, was determined upon. A lethargic feeling in the market continued to the end-no improvement took place, and prices were not maintained. During the period of the suspension of mining much salutary discussion was had in regard to the morbid condition of the trade, and the reckless disregard of sound business principles and judi- cious regulation and control, with which it had been suffered to drift along, to the inevitable ruin of all embarked in it. It was estimated _______________end page 57.________________ page 58 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. ________________________________________________________________ that the operators in the Schuylkill region had sunk in 1849 $250,000 on their current business alone, without considering interest on investment. GENERAL CONDITION OF TRADE TO 1850. The aggregate quantity of anthracite coal sent to market from the several coal fields in Pennsylvania during the first thirty years of the trade-from 1820 to 1850-was 25,230,421 tons; of which there was derived form the Schuylkill region 13,990,050 tons, or 55.45 per cent. The supply of the last ten years in- cluded in the above-from 1840 to 1850-included from the Schuyl- kill region 10,655,567 tons, or 54.63 per cent. It will be observed in the above statements that the state- ments that the supply from the Schuylkill region exceeded that of all the other regions combined, and this was the result, mainly, of individual enterprise in competition with large incorporated companies endowed with special privileges. But while the Schuyl- kill region greatly surpassed all others in production, the conclusion was not so satisfactory in regard to remuneration for capital invested and time and labor expended. There were weak points in the management of the business which had a very unfa- vorable influence upon it. The profits realized in favorable years were immediately invested-often with as much more capital or credit as could be secured-in making improvements on lands in which only a leasehold interest was held; instead of requiring the landowners to develop and improve their own properties. In this way all the risk was assumed by the tenants, of the condi- tion of the seams of coal when opened and of the value of the colliery when complete; while large sums of money were expended which were needed in the commercial routine of the business, and especially in marketing the coal without the aid of intermediary factors, who usually absorbed all the profit derived from its production. Another injurious element in the Schuylkill trade was the large number of small operators, many of whom were without sufficient capital to conduct their business properly, and were soon financi- ally embarrassed and caught in the toils of the "middlemen," to whom they sold their coal at reduced prices, under the vain hope that something would turn up opportunity in their behalf. They were in a great measure the cause of the ruinous prices that so frequently prevailed. Subsequently to the period now under review Mr. Cullen, then president of the Philadelphia and Reading Rail- road Company, was reported to have remarked that the mining of coal in the Schuylkill region would not become profitable until the small operators were broken up. The Schuylkill coal operators, however successful in attain- ing a large production generally, failed in an essential part of their business-the marketing and sale of their product. Without organization or unity for the conservation of their interests as producers and venders of coal, they rushed into the market in destructive competition with each other, over one hundred in number, as though their object was to break down the market, or to produce a larger tonnage than their neighbors, or perchance to raise money to pay their hands and life some promissory notes. It was only when their affairs became desperate, when a crisis was nearly impending, that a call was made to halt and a spasmod- ic effort made for self preservation. Under such management, or rather want of management, the periodical distress of the trade was inevitable. During the ten years ending with 1849 there were only four years of prosperity in the Schuylkill trade. On 10,655,567 tons of coal sent to market from the region during that period there was not probably, on an average, any profit realized by the operators. But if they derived no emolument from their business, other interests in the region, dependent upon the coal trade, flourished and prospered in an eminent degree. As an evidence of this, we need only state that the population of Schuylkill county was 29,072 in 1840, and in 1850 it had increased to 60,713 or over 200 per cent, in ten years. FLOODS IN 1850. In the spring of the year 1850 the Schuylkill coal trade wore a gloomy aspect. It was universally conceded that unless some- thing was done to arrest the downward tendency of the trade the operators must sink under the difficulties with which they were contending. An appeal to the landowners and to the transporting companies for aid was in contemplation. A disastrous crisis was closely impending. The sheriff had already closed out some of the colliers, and others were "hanging on to the willows." This deplorable condition of affairs continued until the 19th of July, when by the interposition of Providence a great flood swept down the valleys of the Schuylkill and the Lehigh, which suspended navigation for a period, restricted the supply of coal and changed the whole aspect of the trade. Hope again lent its inspiration to the operators; and when on the 2nd of September a still greater flood descended than the first, rendering it cer- tain that the prices of coal must advance, they felt that their situation had been affirmed. The storm of the 18th and 19th of July, 1850, was of an extra- ordinary character for that season of the year, and it was parti- cularly severe in the valley of the Schuylkill. Property to a vast amount was destroyed. The boatmen suffered heavily by the loss of boats, the coal operators by the loss of coal and the in- undation of the mines. The damage to the Schuylkill canal was considerable. It was not until the 28th of August that the navi- gation was restored. Only five days after the movement of loaded boats had fairly commenced-on the 2nd of September-a second flood descended, which destroyed the Schuylkill navigation for the remainder of the year. The destructive force of the flood was tremendously aug- mented by the bursting of the Tumbling run reservoir, and, as a consequence, the breaking away of the numerous dams in the Schuylkill river. The reservoir covered twenty-eight acres of ground, was forty-two feet high at the breast of the embankment, and contained over 23,000,000 cubic feet of water. The effect of suddenly precipitating such ______________end page 58.______________ page 59 FLOODS IN 1850-TRANSPORTATION RIVALRY-INCREASED CONSUMPTION. _______________________________________________________________ an immense volume of water into an already swollen and angry flood, roaring and dashing through a narrow mountain gorge, is beyond imaging. It was the highest freshet, and the most de- structive to life and property, known from memory or tradition to have visited the Schuylkill. At some places the river rose twenty-five feet above its ordinary level, and covered the Read- ing railroad track at several points for the depth of three to five feet. In referring to this freshet the president of the Schuylkill Navigation Company says: "A flood with which nothing that has hertofore occurred in the valley of the Schuylkill within the memory of man can be compared. In the great elevation of the waters, in the destruction of property and life, and indeed in all it accompaniments, no living witnesses have seen its parallel. The most stable buildings were compelled to yield to the fury of the raging waters, and the very foundations of the mountains in many places were actually swept out." After the September freshet the prices of coal on board vess- els at Port Richmond advanced $1 per ton, which prices were main- tained until the close of the season. The cars and machinery of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company were taxed to their utmost capacity, day and night, to supply the urgent demand for coal after the September flood. The amount of coal transported by the company during 1850 was 1,351,507 tons, an increase of 253,745 tons over the tonnage of the preceding year. From the Schuylkill region, including the Lykens valley, there was an increase in the supply of 59,677 tons compared with that of 1849. RIVAL MARKETS AND TRANSPORTATION LINES. The antagonism in the New York and eastern markets of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, and the Pennsylvania Coal company, to the Schuylkill coal operators and dealers assumed a determined shape in 1851. It was alleged that a combination had been formed by those compa- nies to conduct their sales so as to command the whole market as far as possible, leaving the Schuylkill region to supply only so much coal as the combination might be unable to mine or trans- port. An effort was made to secure a mutual good understanding with these parties in reference to charges for transportation and to the quantity to be mined, but they were determined to lend no hand to effect an arrangement. The Schuylkill region had herto- fore supplied more than one-half of the anthracite coal consumed, and the parties interested in the mining and transportation of coal from that region were not willing to submit to or acquiesce in a policy by which they would be unable to maintain their accustomed position, and command their usual proportion of the trade. The managers of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company resolved to adjust their charges so as to meet the occa- sion and commnand a fair proportion of the trade. Before, howev- er, giving publicity to the course upon which they had deter- mined, arrangements were made with the parties occupying the wharves at Port Richmond to secure the large tonnage of the year. This covert movement excited the suspicion of the managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, who believed the canal was being deprived, by some underhanded measure, of its portion of the trade, and that the terns of the arrangement between the two companies were being violated. Instigated by these impressions, the managers, with great precipitancy, made such extrordinary reductions in the tolls on the canal that the whole trade was thrown into confusion. The results of these complications were unprecedentedly cheap transportation, a spirited demand for coal at low prices, a greatly augmented production and supply, and the introduction of anthracite coal into new markets. Over one half the supply was furnished, as previously, by the Schuylkill re- gion. The supply of anthracite from all the regions in 1851 was 4,428,919 tons, an increase of 1,151,554 tons over the supply of 1850. The increase in the supply from the Schuylkill was 535,656 tons over the supply of 1850. INCREASED CONSUMPTION. It was a cause for wonder and surprise that the heavy supply of coal in 1851 had almost disappeared by the opening of spring in 1852, and the market was seeking with avidity a fresh supply. The notable increase in the consumption of coal was due to the relief of the business depression, the resumption of operations at the iron works and other manufactories that had been totally or partially suspended for a long time; the impulse given to ocean steam navigation and the coasting trade; the expansion induced by low prices, facilitated by the extension of the rail- way system of the country into new markets; the increase in population, and the great scarcity and high price of wood. During the whole of 1852 the anthracite coal trade was prosper- ous. The operators received a fair return for capital invested and labor was liberally rewarded. A statistical chart, prepared by Benjamin Bannan, Charles W. Peale and Colonel J. Macomb Wetherell, for the World's Fair, held in New York in 1853, furnished the following statistics of the Schuylkill coal region: Number of collieries, 115; red ash, 58; white ash, 57; operators, 86; miles of underground railroads, 126 1/2; steam engines employed in the coal operations, 210; aggre- gate horse power, 7,071; number of miners and laborers employed at collieries, 9,792; miners' houses, out of towns, 2,756; capi- tal invested in collieries, $3,462,000; of which there was in- vested by individual operators about $2,6000,000; number of yards in depth of the deepest slope, 353; thickness in feet of the largest vein of coal, 80; of the smallest, 2. The coal lands worked in 1853 were owned by six corporations and about sixty individuals; about twenty-five of the owners resided in Schuyl- kill county; the remainder abroad. The entire coal production of 1853 was the result of individual enterprise. The coal royalty in the region averaged about thirty cents per ton. The income to the landowners in 1853 for rents was nearly $800,000. There were several obstructions to an even flow of the ________________end page 59.________________ page 60 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. _______________________________________________________________ coal trade in 1853. In the fall of 1852 a decline in prices of coal occurred and some loss was sustained by dealers on their stocks laid in before the decline. Mistrusting that the same condition would occur in 1853, they delayed making their pur- chases in the spring and influenced others to pursue a similar course, and as a consequence, the production fell off largely. Until after the first of June the trade moved sluggishly and prices ruled low. After that the demand for coal improved, and by the middle of July it became importunate and could not be satisfied. Frequent local strikes by the miners, who had become demoralized by the advance in wages previously paid, reduced the yield of the mines and proved the fact that the higher the wages the less the percentage of production. In the mean time the demand for coal for steamers, iron works and other manufacturing purposes became so great that coal, which sold at $1.80 at the mines in the spring, was run up to $2.50 and $3 before the close of the season. The consumption of coal had apparently overtaken the capability of the mines for production, and the supply was decidedly short, as was made quite apparent the following year. A PERIOD OF PROSPERITY. The year 1854 is remembered by those engaged in coal mining at that time as the "good year." It was indeed an extraordinary year in the history of the coal trade; extraordinary for the demand and high prices for coal, for the high rates of transpor- tation, the high prices of provisions, the high prices of labor, and the stringency of the money market. Every department of business connected with the production and transportation of coal was distinguished for its prosperity. The trade opened in the spring under the most auspicious cir- cumstances. Coal was in great request. The market was in a depleted condition. The rush and struggle for coal which soon ensued surpassed the expectations of the most sanguine. The operators were masters of the situation, and they would have been censurable, in view of losses in the past, had they not availed themselves of the rare opportunity to improve their fortunes. The demand continued pressing, almost without pause, until the close of avigation, prices reaching $3.50 per ton at the shipping ports in the coal region. The cost of the transportation of coal to tide water and the coastwise freights advanced in a proportional degree with the price of coal at the mines. Freight from Port Richmond to Boston advanced from $2 to $3.80 per ton. Labor, and every material entering into the cost of coal, advanced in price in as great or a greater degree than that product, as will be seen by the following quotations: 1853 1854 Flour per bbl $5.50 $9.50 Corn per bushel .70 1.15 Oats .42 .66 Potatoes .45 1.30 Pork per lb. .07 .10 1\2 Beef .08 .12 Lumber per M. 13.00 18.00 Iron advanced ninety and miners' wages from forty to fifty per cent. One of the most interesting events in 1854 was the presenta- tion at the Mansion House at Mount Carbon, on the 11th of Octo- ber, by gentlemen of Philadelphia interested in the coal deposits of Schuylkill county, of a tea service of silver to Enoch W. McGinnes as a token of their appreciation of his invaluable service to the region in the development he so successfully made at the Cartey shaft at St. Clair. Mr. McGinnes sunk the first perpendicular shaft in the Schuylkill region, and demonstrated the fact that the great white ash coal veins of the Mine hill and Broad mountain ranges ran under the red ash series of the Schuyl- kill basin. He established the face of the accessibility for practical working of the white ash coal measures throughout the entire basin. OPENING OF MAHANOY VALLEY. The extension of the Mine Hill and Schuylkill Haven Railroad to the Mahanoy region at Ashland was completed in September, 1854. This was the first practicable and effective railroad to penet- rate the great Mahanoy coal field. In anticipation of the app- roach of the railroad a number of collieries were in a state of preparation, a large number of houses had been erected, and a considerable population had centered at Ashland and vicinity during 1854. The first car of coal sent over the road was from the mines of Conner & Patterson, and was consigned to John Tuck- er, the president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Compa- ny. Neither the branch railroads nor the collieries were ready for business, and the regular shipments of coal did not commence until the following spring. The amount of coal sent to market from the Schuylkill region in 1855 was 3,513,860 tons, 417,958 more than in the preceding year. Judging by the amount of the production a superficial study of the trade of this year would indicate a satisfactory condition of prosperity. But a closer examination reveals the fact that the great volume of the business was the mistake and the misfortune of the trade; the operators were stimulated to make improvements and extensive preparations for an enlarged business, instead of nursing their resources and accumulating for a year or two. The consequence was overproduction, a plethoric market and low prices. Impressed with the folly of the recklessness of the past, and smarting under the losses sustained in their business, a determi- ned effort was resolved upon by a number of the leading Schuylkill operators to bring the coal business within the control of safe and rational principles. Early in February, 1856, a coal associ- ation was organized, with Samuel Sillyman, a man of sound judgment and large experience, as president. Meetings were held every Tues- day and Friday to deliberate upon the condition and prospects of the trade in the near future, to promote unity and steadfastness of action, and to devise measures for mutual protection and benefit. Among the most effective causes of a drooping market in the spring of 1856 was the opening of new sources of ________________end page 60._________________ page 61 COMPETITION IN CARRYING-JOHN TUCKER'S MANAGEMENT. _______________________________________________________________ supply. The new avenue to market from Scranton to New York had a malign influence on the trade; not so much by what could actually be accomplished by that route as by its high pretensions and boastful promises. With all these blatant pretensions the total amount of Scranton coal sent to competitive points in 1856 was only 85,668. The rates of transportation to tide water for the year were of vital importance to the Schuylkill coal operators, and not the promulgation of the new programme was looked for with great solicitude. The influx of coal from the Lackawanna region by a new avenue, and the candidature of the Lehigh Valley Railroad company for a proportion of coal tonnage to its new road, made it of great consequence that a conflict between the transporting companies should be avoided and an equitable adjustment of rates be established. The miners of coal who were without transporting facilities of their own had become deeply sensible of the disad- vantage they were laboring under in being forced into competition with large corporations possessing mining and transporting privi- leges, who could when so disposed sacrifice all profit in the mining to secure profit on the transportation of their product. MORE RIVALRY. About the first of May the president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, John Tucker, having discovered that the tolls to Port Richmond were equivalent to the prices of the New York companies in the New York market, but were fifteen cents too high for the eastern markets, concluded to make a drawback of fifteen cents to the latter points and not disturb the rates to other points; because if he did the Pennsylvania Coal Company assured him they would reduce their prices for coal. This ar- rangement it was supposed would remove all difficulty, and re- store animation to the Schuylkill trade. Frederick Frailey, the president of the Schuylkill Navigation company, was no sooner apprised of this measure than he, either misapprehending the object or suspecting a design to take advantage of the Navigation Company, immediately announced a reduction in the toll by canal to Philadelphia of fifteen cents per ton-from 80 to 65 cents. This surprising movement unsettled the whole trade. The Reading Company, in order to maintain its relative position with the canal in the New York market, was obliged to reduce the toll on the road fifteen cents per ton, and the New York companies re- duced the priced of coal in a corresponding degree. This reduc- tion, so far from being of any service to the trade, added to the evil it was already suffering from. It created an impression abroad that there might be another season of destructive competi- tion among the transporting companies; and dealers and consumers withheld their orders in anticipation of still lower rates. The reduction did not benefit the operators-the only parties really suffering-as it was deducted from the price of coal at tide water; and it proved an unnecessary sacrifice of profit on trans- portation, without increasing the consumption. The result of the year's business was a decline of nineteen cents per ton in the price of coal at the mines below the low rated of 1855. The amount of coal sent to market from the Schuylkill region in 1856 was 3,437,245 tons, a decrease of 76,615 tons compared with the supply of the preceding year. The supply from the Schuylkill region in the 1857 was 273,376 tons less than that of 1876, and it was the first year since 1832 that this region did not furnish over half the entire supply of anthracite coal from all the coal fields. The position then lost has not since been recovered, even with the accession of the Mahanoy region. The market at the opening of canal navigation in 1857 was sufficiently stocked to supply immediate wants, and the demand was consequently very sluggish, and so remained for several months. The depression in business generally caused an interrup- tion to the usual percentage of increase in the consumption of coal, and the capacity for production in the different regions was consequently greatly in excess of the requirements of the market. The large New York companies entered into a desperate struggle and rivalry for the market, initiating their proceedings by a reduction of about fifty cents per ton in the prices of coal, as compared with the prices of the preceding year. The trade progressed in a languishing way until September, when the ever-memorable monetary convulsion took place, paralyzing indus- try, destroying confidence and credit, bankrupting thousands of business men and producing a general contraction or collapse in business transactions. Many of the operators had reached that condition when an additional feather's weight would break them down, and they now succumbed. EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE CONTROL OF THE COAL TRADE. The Schuylkill coal operators early in 1857 entered into an arrangement with John Tucker, who had resigned the presidency of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, to assume the regulation of the Schuylkill coal trade. Mr. Tucker by his long acquaintance with the movements of the trade, the official inter- course he had held with the representatives of the different mining and transporting companies, and his ready tact, superior management and ability, was admirably qualified for the position. After due deliberation it was determined to give a plan submitted by Mr. Tucker a fair trial. Operators representing over three millions of tons subscribed to the new arrangement. Mr. Tucker became the head of the coal association and assumed the duty of controlling the supply of coal, so that it could not fall below a paying price to the producer. His utmost skill and energy were applied to this work, but he must have ascertained that it was more difficult to manage the Schuylkill coal trade than the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad. The effort to regulate the trade and make it prosperous was a failure. The time was inaus- picious and the trade incorrigible. After the financial crash in September every operator was left to his own devices. Sales were made at the best prices that could be obtained. The result of the year's business was a great disappointment. ______________end page 61._______________ page 62 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. ______________________________________________________________ On the 21st of January, 1858, the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company sold at auction in the city of New York 10,000 tons of Lackawanna coal, $1 per ton below the circular prices of the company at the close of the preceding year. What- ever the original object was in resorting to this unprecedented expedient, it became the usual practice of this company. The system of periodical sales of coal at public auction was inter- jected into the business as a permanent measure. This reprehen- sible practice has proved to the trade an incubus of the most blighting description. To obtain a monopoly in the market the profit on the carriage of the coal became the main object, to which the product of the mines was made entirely tributary. No other measure could be devised so well adapted to demoralize the trade and to depreciate the commercial value of the article sold. If the evil consequences of the practice were confined to the parties indulging in it, there would not be so much cause for complaint, but unfortunately they permeate the whole trade; the prices obtained becoming the standard of value. By these period- ical forced sales the mining interest as a specialty, its capital and the product of thousands of operatives have been disregarded and sacrificed-made a subservient auxiliary of a transporting company and of its stock jobbing operations. The low prices at which these sales of coal were made-always below the cost of production, adding the tolls-amounted virtually to a reduction in the rate of transportation on the company's coal, and to a monop- oly of the Scranton coal trade at Elizabeth. The other coal companies and individual operators in the Lackawanna region could not pay the prescribed toll on the railroad and deliver coal at Elizabethport in competition with the company without sustaining a heavy loss, and their only alternative, therefore, was to sell their coal to the company at any price they were offered. The Schuylkill operators viewed with great alarm the illegitimate methods pursued by the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company. In the exercise of its privilege to both mine and trans- port coal that company threatened destruction to individual enterprise in the Schuylkill region. Having no transporting facilities of their own, the Schuylkill operators were virtually excluded from the New York and Eastern markets unless large concessions were made in the charges for transportation by the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad company and the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Low tolls and freights were absolutely neces- sary in this crisis. It was the interest of those companies to support the region from whence they derived their tonnage. The navigation company made no abatement in the tolls, but allowed the whole burden to fall upon the poor boatmen, in an unprece- dented reduction in freights. Just enough was conceded by the Reading Railroad company to induce the producers to continue operations, taking care to exact from the trade a profit to base a dividend upon. This contracted and illiberal policy caused great dissatisfaction in the region in 1858 and 1859, and a strong effort was made to build a railroad direct to New York, as a radical remedy for the evils that encompassed the trade. The Reading Railroad Company succeeded in thwarting this project. The increase in the supply of coal in 1859 compared with the supply in 1855, from all the regions, was 1,136,909 tons, while during the same period the decrease from the Schuylkill region was 326,533 tons. A notable feature of the Schuylkill coal trade in 1858 was the upheaval of labor. Strikes for higher wages were frequent, and in some instances stubbornly prolonged. Wages were based upon the prices of coal and were undoubtedly reduced to a low stand- ard. The workingmen got all that the proceeds of their labor would bring in the market; while their employers were receiving nothing for the use of their capital. The attempt to exact more than their labor was worth at that time, by a combination and turnout, was necessarily a failure, and it recoiled upon those who essayed it, with suffering and loss. TRADE DURING THE FIRST FORTY YEARS. The supply of anthracite coal from all the regions during the first forty years of the trade-from 1820 to 1860-was 83,887,934 tons. Of this amount the Schuylkill region furnished 42,719,723 tons, or 50.93 per cent. In the decade ending with 1849 the Schu- ylkill region furnished 54.62 per cent. of the whole supply; in the decade ending with 1859 it furnished 49 per cent. Comparing the shipments from each region during the ten years ending with 1859 with the shipments of the ten preceding years, we find an increase from the Schuylkill region of 18,047,106, or 169.62 per cent.; from the Lehigh region of 7,359,920 tons, or 170 per cent; from the Wyoming region of 12,531,661 tons, or 285.72 per cent.; and from the Shamokin region of 1,185,402 tons, or 809 per cent. The aggregate increase from all the regions was 39,151,089 tons. The supremacy heretofore held by the Schuylkill coal trade was gradually departing. The tendency of the trade was alarming, and it invoked the profound solicitude of the intelligent operators, whose fortunes were involved in its prosperity or adversity. For a number of years investigations and interchange of opinions had been made in regard to the characteristics of coal mining in the Schuylkill region-the errors committed and the remedies best to be applied. Proud of their achievements as individual operators, in contrast with incorporated companies, yet there was a decided change of opinion manifested about this time (1860) in regard to the wisdom of the system upon which their mining operations had so far been conducted. The mistakes of the region were becoming manifest, and their consequences obvious to all. It was becoming more and more evident that associated capital was essential for the development and improvement of the region thenceforward. Since the trade first sprang into importance, very nearly all the money made in it was invested in improvements upon leasehold properties, of insufficient area for durable operations. In a paper read by P.W. Sheafer before the Pottsville Scientific Association in 1858, he says: ________________end page 62.________________ page 63 GRIEVANCES OF SCHUYLKILL COAL OPERATORS. _______________________________________________________________ "It is doubtless unfavorable to the profitable working of our coal beds that there is frequently both a want of capital and of the proper concentration of that which exists. Certainly no method of mining coal can be less economical than to fit out a number of separate operations upon comparatively small estates, with all the necessary engines and other improvements, instead of selecting a suitable point from which the coal of several adja- cent tracts could be worked by one large operation equipped in the best manner. This policy can only be carried out effectively by the union of the proprietors of adjacent tracts. Indeed the pursuit of the coal below the water level, requiring increased capital, has already tended to the concentration of the business of mining in fewer hands; and as the necessity of shafting to the lower coals becomes more apparent, the discussion, among those interested, of an enlightened system of harmonious action is more and more frequent." CONDITION OF SCHUYLKILL OPERATORS. The Schuylkill coal operators were scarcely ever without a grievance. Being subject to the arrangements of the transporting companies for the movement of their product, they were as a con- sequence peculiarly exposed to measures of a grievous tendency. They had no voice in the regulation or control of one of the most important elements of their business-transportation to market. The tolls imposed were inexorable and they were cunningly devised to stimulate production of tonnage without promoting the prosper- ity of the producer. In the Schuylkill, as in the Lackawanna and other regions, the coal mining interest was reduced to a subser- vient vassalage to the transporting interest. The operators, instead of being recognized by the carrying companies as patrons or customers, whom it was politic to cultivate, were regarded as machines to provide tonnage for their lines, which it was their interest to keep in good running order-that and nothing more. The coal operators might have asked with great propriety whether individual enterprise in coal mining, with hired transportation, could ever compete with the large companies possessing mining, trafficking and transporting privileges. The particular grievance with the Schuylkill operators in 1860 was that the rates of transportation did not place them on an equality with the producers from other regions in the New York and eastern markets. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, in the report of the managers, showed that the quantity of coal transported in 1860 was 1,878,156 tons, and the receipts for tolls on coal were $2,328,157.52. A comparison with the coal business of the road in 1859 shows an increase of 245,224 tons carried; an increase of $444,472.40 in receipts and an increase of $367,742.86 in profits. The net profit on the general busi- ness of the company, after deducting all expenses and the renewal fund, was $1,625,984.67. The dividend fund after deducting inter- est on the bonded debt was $894,863.67 as against $388,329.42 in 1859. The report makes a very favorable exhibit to the stock- holders, but at the same time it seems to justify the complaints of illiberal exactions in the charges imposed. In 1861, for the first time in the history of the trade, the supply of coal from the Wyoming region exceeded in quantity that from the Schuylkill, and this supremacy it has held ever since, except in 1865 and 1866. The entire supply of 1861 was 595,001 tons less than in the preceding year. The falling off in the Schuylkill region was 653,903 tons. The war excitement inter- fered seriously with the movement of the coal trade, and many of the collieries were crippled by the departure of numbers of miners and laborers, who had enlisted as volunteers in the army. The general depression in business that prevailed this year, and the prostration of the iron trade and other industrial pursuits of a peaceful character especially, induced a greatly diminished consumption. Competition, always excessive, was double intensi- fied, and prices of coal depressed almost beyond precedent. The general result of the year's business was consequently even less favorable than in 1860. The same disadvantages and inequality under which the Schuyl- kill trade struggled in 1860 were again imposed by the transport- ing companies in 1861. The loss in coal tonnage of the Philadel- phia and Reading Railroad was 417,324 tons, and of the Navigation Company 173,118 tons, compared with the tonnage of the previous year. The operators felt that they had become the pack horses to bear the burdens of the trade for the benefit of the carrying companies. They believed that ruin would inevitably overtake every one engaged in the trade unless some effective remedy was promptly applied. The extraordinary action of the Pennsylvania Coal Company in reducing the prices of coal in the spring of 1862, about fifty cents per ton below the opening rates of the preceding year, elicited a burst of indignation in all the coal regions. The promulgation of their circular paralyzed the trade. But the depression caused by that action proved to be the finale of the gloomy period in the history of the coal trade. DAWN OF BETTER TIMES. The increasing consumption of anthracite coal by the United States government for war purposes, and by manufacturers of war material, gave an impetus to the trade that was gradually improv- ing its condition, and would have been quicker and more decided in its effects had it not been for the folly of some of the producers. It required the intervention of Providence to admin- ister a quick and effective remedy for the ills of the trade, and this was applied on the 4th of June, 1862, by a flood of unexam- pled violence and destructiveness. The navigation of the Schuyl- kill was interrupted about three weeks, of the Lehigh until the 4th of October. One of the consequences of the freshet was a diminution of nearly a million of tons in the supply of coal for the year. Prices of coal, of transportation, and of labor rose rapidly. The price of coal on board vessels at Port Richmond advanced from $2.65 in April, to $5.75 before the end of the season, and averaged for the year $4.14, against $3.39 in 1861. After the June freshet the miners became exacting. Frequent acts of violence were committed and unlawful ________________end page 63.________________ page 64 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. ________________________________________________________________ demonstrations made by men on a strike. Before the close of the season numerous turnouts took place, and a number of collieries were forcibly stopped. The project of building a railroad direct to New York was re- vived in 1862. On the 15th of July books for subscription to the stock of the Schuylkill Haven and Lehigh Railroad company were opened at Philadelphia and a majority of the stock taken. On the 5th of August following the company was organized, engineers employed to locate the road, and a vigorous effort made to carry out the project. After the road had been put under construction the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad company succeeded in stop- ping it. The following railroads were leased by the Philadelphia and Reading and taken possession of at the periods named: Schuylkill Valley and Mill Creek railroads, Sept. 1st, 1861; Swatara, April 1st, 1862; Mount Carbon, May 16th, 1862; Mahanoy and Broad Moun- tain, July 1st, 1862; Union Canal, July 25th, 1862. The Mahanoy and Broad Mountain Railroad was completed late in May, 1862. The first car of coal passed over the road on the 30th of May, from the mines of Connor and Patterson, consigned to Charles E. Smith, president of the Reading Railroad, Philadel- phia. On the 4th of June occurred that memorable flood by which the road was so seriously damaged that three months were required to make the necessary repairs. The demand for coal throughout 1863 exceeded the most extra- vagant calculations made early in the season, and was greater than the producing and transporting companies could supply. Prices consequently ruled higher than ever known before. The season opened with a bare market. Notwithstanding there was an increase of 1,747,445 tons in production during the year, the consumption was so great that no stock in first hands was left over for sale in any of the great markets. The prices of coal on board vessels at Philadelphia in 1863 advanced from $5.38 per ton in January to $7.13 in December; averaging for the year $6.06, as against $4.14 in 1862. The cost of producing coal increased at a greater ratio than did its cost to consumers in the leading markets of the seaboard. The following comparison of the cost of the items named in Novem- ber, 1862, and November, 1863, is taken from the books of a large operator. Laborers per week, $6, $12; miners, $7.50, $18; powder per keg, $4, $4.75; whale oil per gallon, .90, $1.25; iron rails per ton, $45, $90; corn per bushel, .60, .90, oats per bushel, .45, .90; hay per ton, $12, $30; lumber per thousand feet, $12, $28; mules each, $150, $240; miners by contract per day, $2, $5. MOLLIE MAGUIRES. The high wages received by miners caused considerable dissat- isfaction among those engaged in other pursuits. The remunera- tion to skilled mechanics, to experienced accountants, to mining engineers, to learned professional men, was far below that of the uneducated miner. The anomaly was presented of muscle, applied six to eight hours per day, receiving better reward than brains, exercised from the rising to the setting of the sun. And yet those pampered miners demanded still more. The coal regions were rendered hideous by violence and outrages committed in the en- forcement of their importunate and unreasonable demands. The lives of the superintendents and agents of the operators were threatened in written notices, conspicuously posted, couched in execrable language and hideously embellished with drawings of pistols and coffins. Nor did they hesitate to use their pistols upon any slight pretext or occasion, with the feelings and in the spirit of hired assassins. Their fellow workmen who were well disposed were forced to acquiesce, at the peril of their lives, in this reign of terror. To prevent the anthracite coal regions from sinking into a state of barbarity-to prevent the center of a great industry from becoming a pandemonium for outlaws-and to secure to the government a supply of coal for war purposes, it became necessary to occupy the coal fields with national troops. The rioters were controlled by a number or imported professional agitators, whose business it was to sow dissension, to cultivate discontent, and to organize conspiracies. The coal regions also became the harbor of another class of immigrants. These were confirmed and hardened criminals, the scum of foreign lands. Desperate and unscrupulous, they were the terror of every neighborhood, and exercised a fearful domination over their fellow workmen. These were the Mollie Maguires, the men to waylay and murder superintendents, to burn coal breakers, and to commit every description of outrage. PERIOD OF GREATEST EXPANSION. The year 1864 was a period of overflowing and bountiful prosperity. It was notable for the high standard of values of all staple commodities, and in the anthracite coal trade for the wonderful expansion in all its branches-with high prices for coal, high prices for labor, high rates for transportation, and a great appreciation in value of every material entering into the cost of the production of coal. It was also notable in the coal regions for the aggravated nature of the aggressions of labor against capital, and for the turbulence, violence and flagrant outrages committed with impunity by numbers of workmen employed at the mines. Such was the contemptuous disregard of the re- straints of law and civilization, and such was the subdued meek- ness of capital in its relation to labor, that a true and faith- ful narrative of the events of that and subsequent periods will scarcely be credited after the lapse of not many years. The year was notable for the large fortunes suddenly acquired by the sale of collieries, as well as by the profits in mining; by the extensive sales of coal lands; and by the organization of numerous coal corporation. The exceptional times of 1864 afford- ed a number of coal operators an opportunity to retire from the business, with a competency who had been on the brink of bank- ruptcy. Of these a few were wise enough to embark in safer enterprises. Many more returned to their first love, and were ______________end page 64._______________ page 65 THE FLUSH TIMES OF 1864-OBSTRUCTIVE EMPLOYES. _______________________________________________________________ scorched in the flames of their own carbon. Some invested in oil, and their hard earned gains soon slipped smoothly away. Very few were left after a few years who had anything substantial remain- ing of the good times of 1864. The expansion of 1864 greatly hastened a revolution then under progress. The arrogance and demoralization of labor final- ly deprived capital of the control of its investments. The oper- ators having lost control of the business, and capital being repelled by lawlessness, the danger was that the coal regions would lapse into a wilderness again. The transporting companies, to prevent these evil consequences and to preserve their coal tonnage, were compelled to intervene and assume control of the coal producing interest. In this way the Schuylkill region was rescued from dilapidation by the Philadelphia and Reading Rail- road Company. This event was not consummated until some years after the period under consideration, but is alleged that the events of 1864 precipitated the revolution. Very extensive sales were made of coal lands in 1864 at prices ruling much higher than ever before, though some of the estates then sold commanded better prices subsequently, when the pulse of the capitalist beat in its normal condition. The pur- chase and sale of coal lands and collieries in 1864 were followed by a furor for acts of incorporation. In the Schuylkill, Mahanoy and Shamokin regions alone about fifty coal companies were organ- ized in that year. Many of them were organized for speculative purposes alone, and they had but an ephemeral existence. Others, with substantial assets and healthy organizations, embarked in the business of mining and selling coal under favorable auspices, followed by considerable success. The price of anthracite coal on board vessels at Port Richmond in 1864 ranged from $7.25 per ton in January to $11 in August, declining to $8.50 in December. About the middle of September the trade became dull, with receding prices. Shipments fell off heavily, and prices declined $2 per ton in one month. In August coal retailed in New York at $13 to $14 for 2,000 pounds. The commencement of the year was distinguished by a fresh installment of trouble in Cass township, at the mines of the Forest Improvement Company, which had commenced in 1863. On the 16th of February Generals Couch and Sigel visited the region to make inquiry into the state of affairs, which resulted in the beginning of April in stationing a portion of the 10th regiment of new Jersey in Cass township, which restored order in that district. BOATMEN'S GRIEVANCES AND TURNOUT OF RAILROAD EMPLOYES. A difficulty occurred between the boatmen and the Schuylkill Navigation Company, growing out of the fact that the fluctuations in the freights had heretofore been an obstacle in making con- tracts for the delivery of coal by canal. The navigation company proposed to enter into contracts with the boatmen to carry coal at fixed rates of freight during the year, or at least for stated periods of time, which would enable dealers to make contracts for the delivery of coal by canal at fixed sums, the company collect- ing the freights, who would account to the boatmen. The boatmen, however, regarded the project with great hostility, and became very much excited upon the subject. They contended that it would be giving all their privileges as individuals to the navigation company, and they declared that a combination had been formed between the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company and the Schuylkill Navigation Company, by which their interests were made identical. The rivalry between them ceased, they alleged, be- cause the business was sufficient for both-the necessity for competition had passed away. The only obstacle to excessive charges for freight, they believed, consisted in the fact that the boatmen of the Schuylkill canal, being owners of the boats, could, upon the payment of the tolls, as limited by the charter of the navigation company, carry the coal at such rates as they deemed proper, and thereby enter into competition with both the canal and the railroad company. The boatmen's idea of entering into competition with the Phil- adelphia and Reading Railroad Company-"that voracious and devour- ing monopoly"-for the conservation of the coal trade was magnani- mous, it was chivalrous. But even then it was too late. The fiat had gone forth-although not fully revealed-that for weal or for woe the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad company was des- tined to own and control the Schuylkill coal trade, from the minutest filaments of the roots to the topmost branches of the tree. The obstacles attempted to be interposed by the boatmen to the plans of that ambitious and powerful company were never felt, and the boatmen, before many years, were dependent upon that company for employment, protection and support. There was a time when the boatmen exercised considerable influence upon the coal trade. They were not so conservative then. They exacted the last dollar from the trade that it would bear. The most annoying branch of the business at that time was the freighting of boats on the canal. But it is not generous to visit the sins of the fathers upon even the second generation, and this second genera- tion had been subjected to such a crucial ordeal in past years as to merit public sympathy. In the first week of July, 1864, a turnout of the engineers and brakemen on the lateral railroads suspended the coal trade in the Schuylkill region. In consequence of the interruption to the supply of coal for government use the Reading railroad and its branches were seized for the military service of the United States, and a new set of hands sent on from Washington to work the lateral railroads. After two weeks demonstration of their strength-with parade and flourish of banners, accompanied with music of drums and fife-the old hands resumed their positions without having obtained the object of the strike. PATRIOTIC OPERATORS. The great central fair for the Sanitary commission held in Philadelphia in 1864 afforded an opportunity to ________________end page 65._________________ page 66 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. ________________________________________________________________ the liberal minded citizens of this country to show their patri- otism, benevolence, and charity. To Colonel Henry L. Cake, of the St. Nicholas Colliery, in the Mahanoy region, belongs the honor of having originated and set the example of making contri- butions in coal to this great charity. No sooner was it known that he had set apart Saturday, May 14th, as his contribution of a day's production of coal from his colliery for the benefit of the fair than he was notified that the freight and toll would be remitted for its passage over the Reading Railroad and the Little Schuylkill Railroad, so that the good cause would receive the whole proceeds of the sale of the coal. The coal-forty cars, containing 210 tons-was sold at the Corn Exchange rooms in Phila- delphia on Monday, the 16th of May. The proceeds amounted to $1,605.20. The largest contribution made was by Davis Pearson & Company, being half the proceeds of the sale of 101 cars of coal, amounting to $1,830.61. In addition to the above we find the following reported from the Schuylkill region. The total amount contributed from the anthracite regions was $62,003.46. The employes of the following houses contributed the sums mentioned: St Nicholas Colliery, $200; Wheeler, Miller & Co., $124.53; J.& E. Sillyman, $125; Hammet, Vandusen & Co., $305; George W. Snyd- er, $314.75; William Milnes, Jr., & Co., $511.50; J.M. Freck & Co., $154.85; T. Garretson & Co., $248.69. There were donated by T. Garretson & Co. 41 cars of coal; J. & E. Sillyman added $200 to the gifts of their employes mentioned above. FLUCTUATIONS IN TRADE. That the inflated prices of all commodities in 1864 should recede as the rebellion faded away was natural, and a transition state of trade generally was revealed in 1865. The immediate effect of the restoration of peace was a partial paralysis of the iron trade, and of the manufacture of cotton and woolen fabrics; and a long list of supplies for the army and navy received a check to their manufacture. This was followed by a stagnation in the coal trade, and a decline in prices to a point below the cost of production. The demand from the government almost ceased, and from manufacturers it was very much diminished, at a reduction in prices of over $2 per ton. To meet this great change, a new basis of operations was necessary. A reduction in expenses was essential. Labor was the principal element in the cost of pro- ducing coal, and the wages of labor were out of proportion to the value of its productions. A reduction was proposed of twen- ty-five to thirty-three per cent. in wages, which was resisted. A partial suspension of work at the collieries followed. Not until after two months times were the terms of the reduction gen- erally accepted. The depression in the trade continued until about the 1st of August, when business began to revive, the demand for coal impro- ved and prices advanced. The turnout in the Lackawanna region, which caused a total cessation of mining for about ten weeks, alarmed consumers during its progress, and stimulated the demand to a degree that overtaxed the productive and transporting capac- ity of other regions and again ran up the price of coal and labor. The loss in the supply of coal, compared with that of the year 1864, which was over a million of tons on the 1st of August, was reduced at the end of the year to 625,896 tons. So rapid was the advance in wages that by the 1st of October they had risen $5 a week to laborers, and about 55 cents a wagon for cutting coal by the cargo at Philadelphia opened at $8.38 in January, declined to $6.03 in July, and advanced to $8.93 in October, averaging for the year $7.86, as against $8.39 in 1864. The supply of coal from all the regions in 1866 was 12,432,835 tons-an excess of the extraordinary amount of 2,945,097 tons over the supply of the previous year. Of this excess 923,918 tons were from the Schuylkill region. Notwith- standing the large production, the Schuylkill operators, in consequence of the high rates of transportation and the great shrinkage in the price of coal, did not find their business profitable. At the auction sales in New York the prices of coal declined between January and December over $400 per ton, and at Port Richmond the decline was during the same period $3 per ton. The usual consequences of an oversupply affected the market after the first of September. The operators were unable during this year to reduce the cost of coal in proportion to its shrinkage in value. The high prices of all the necessaries of life made it impossible to reduce the wages of common labor, and the miners offered a resistance, combined and powerful, to any reduction. The reduction in the price of coal, having been greater than on any other article, bore heavily on the operators. The downward tendency of the prices of coal continued through 1867. Sales at Port Richmond averaged for the year $4.37 per ton, as against $5.80 in 1866. The auction sales in New York averaged for stove coal $2 less per ton than in the previous year. The market for Schuylkill coal at competitive points was reduced to a supply of what other regions could not furnish, unless furnished at a loss which reduced the trade to a deplorable condition. The effect of the adverse condition of the trade was a loss of coal tonnage during the year of 592,645 tons by the transporting companies from the Schuylkill region. The gloomy prospects of the Schuylkill trade in 1867 caused great concern and apprehension among the operators early in the season and a renewal of interest in a new, direct and independent outlet to the New York and eastern markets. The "Manufacturers and Consumers'Anthracite Railroad Company" was chartered in March, 1866. A powerful effort was made in its behalf, but failed of pro- curing the necessary support. The occurrence of a turnout in the Schuylkill region, begin- ning about the 1st of July, 1868, and ending about the 1st of September-the object being the establishment of the eight hours system of labor-saved the trade of that year from disaster by curtailing the supply of coal during the suspension about 600,000 tons. At the New York auction sales the price for stove coal was _____________end page 66._______________ page 67 THE WORKINGMEN'S COMBINATION. ________________________________________________________________ $5.05 in July, and in October it was $9.05, receding in December to $6.50. The speculative and extravagant price for stove coal manipulated at the auction sales of Scranton coal taxed consumers heavily and proved detrimental to the permanent interests of the producers. It created an excitement in the trade, and induced the operatives at the mines to demand prices for work that could not be afforded for any length of time, and which once granted could not be easily reduced to a fair basis after the prices of coal had receded. The men claimed participation in every rise and exemption in every fall. The strike for the eight hours system of labor-which meant eight hours' work for ten hours' pay, and amounted to twenty per cent. advance in wages-was conducted with mob demonstrations, by raiding through the region, driving men from their work, and stopping collieries. The movement was a failure, the ten hours system prevailing, but an advance in the price of coal having resulted from the suspension of work, a corresponding advance in wages was paid. WORKINGMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The organization of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association on the 23d of July, 1868, followed very closely the violent demon- stration made on the eight hour question, and the conception of such a combination was no doubt due to the excitement growing out of that event; it was then made apparent to the designing men who manipulated the whole affair that a union of the working classes could be formed, through which great power, influence, and pecu- niary profit could be made to accrue to themselves by arraying labor against capital. The title assumed by the association was a misnomer and a deception to begin with; the true object being not benevolence, but a purpose to establish and maintain a high standard of wages, to get control of the property and the manage- ment of the mines and to give effective force and aggrandizement to their proposed aggressive movements against the coal opera- tors. Had their object been to extend beneficial aid to their members who were sick, disabled, or unfortunate, it would have been a very exemplary charity, worthy of commendation; but we believe the only contributions made by it in support of the members were during the strikes precipitated by the leaders, when small sums were doled out in order to prolong the contest. The power lodged in the officers was in its exercise deleterious and oppressive to the laboring classes, a blight upon their industry, a tax upon their earnings, a hindrance to their comfort and welfare, and a fruitful source of poverty, privation, and dis- tress. The aggressiveness of this association against the rights of the proprietors of the collieries was practiced unceasingly; one exaction after another was imposed; the control of the mining department of the business was usurped by the "committee men," and their constant interference and frequent interruption of the works entailed a great loss to the operators. They were unable to sustain themselves against the successive strikes of the min- ers instigated by the leaders of the association, and in two years many of them were virtually driven out of the business. The Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company was compelled by the destructive tendency of the acts of the miners to engage in the business of mining, in order that the production of coal might continue to meet the requirements of the market. The threatened disaster toward which the Schuylkill coal trade was gravitating was thus averted, and the mad conspirators, too powerful for the individual operators, were held in check by that powerful corporation. A stubborn and prolonged contest ensued, culminating in the strike of 1875, which terminated in the com- plete defeat and overthrow of the Workingmen's Benevolent Associ- ation. The year 1869 was notable for the excitement and agitation that prevailed throughout the anthracite coal regions, induced by the aggressive movements of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association or Miners' Union. This state of things caused prolonged interru- ptions in mining, threatening a short supply of anthracite. The measures introduced by these leaders were a suspension of mining for three weeks, with the ostensible object of depleting the mar- ket of the stocks of coal lying over, and the establishment of the "basis system," by which wages were to be regulated by the prices of coal. In attempting to adjust the basis a difficulty was encountered between the men and their employers, the miners demanding more for their work as a starting point, than the prices of coal would warrant, in the opinion of the operators. On the 29th of April, 1869, the executive committee of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association ordered a general suspension of work, to take place on the 10th of May. The design was to suspend through all the regions and to continue three weeks, but the men in the Lackawanna region did not join the movement, the effect of which was to prolong the suspension. On the 9th of June, the general council of the association ordered that on and after June 16th "all districts and branches which can agree with their employers as to basis and conditions of resumption do resume work." The result of the suspension was a removal of the excess of coal in the market compared with the supply of the previous year, with a deficiency of 105,809 tons. The curtail- ment amounted to 818,541 tons, of which 469,363 tons were from the Schuylkill region. If the average value of this coal at the shipping ports in the region was $2.70 per ton, the loss to the Schuylkill region was $1,267,280. The Schuylkill operators, not knowing the practical operation of the basis system, agreed to try it as an experiment, providing that there should be no "illegitimate interference with the working of the collieries." The conditions of resumption having been agreed upon by the parties, and an assurance having been given on the question of interference that no such right was claimed by the miners' association, work was resumed in the Schuylkill region. The basis accepted by the operators was proposed to them by the leaders of the Miners' Union, and it met with considerable opposition from many ______________end page 67._______________ page 68 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY ________________________________________________________________ operators; but as all other efforts to control the trade had failed, and it might be the means of preventing the chronic strikes which had operated so disastrously, it was concluded to try the experiment. Thus, virtually, the operators surrendered the control of their business by accepting the participation in its management of the men in their employment. The three large companies in the Lackawanna region persisted to the last in refusing to confer with their men on the question of a basis. In their opinion the only question involved in the issue was whether their property should be controlled and the policy of the compa- nies determined by the owners, or whether they should be commit- ted to the care and direction of an irresponsible organization. The Miners' Association failed after a four-months strike, ex- tending from the middle of May to the middle of September, to establish the basis system in that region, but they compelled the companies, by the action of the other regions, to make large advances in wages. The effect of these interruptions to the trade was to run up the price of coal to consumers, without benefiting the producers. Under the operation of the basis system, the interference with the working of the collieries continued through the local committees, who dictated who should be employed and who discharged. ANTHRACITE BOARD OF TRADE. The anthracite board of trade of the Schuylkill coal region was organized on the 19th of November, 1869, with William Ken- drick as president. It represented 4,437,000 tons of coal, and acted thereafter in all negotiations with the workmen. Upon the resignation of Charles E. Smith, Esq., on the 28th of April, 1869, as president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, Franklin B. Gowen was elected as his successor. The election of Mr. Gowen met with the hearty approbation of the Schuylkill operators, and we believe of every person connected with the Schuylkill coal trade. From his knowledge of the coal business, his enlarged and liberal views of men and things, his eminent ability and great business capacity, the most exalted anticipations were indulged in as to the characteristics and success of his administration. A strong hope was inspired-which was not disappointed-that under his administration the producing interest of the Schuylkill coal region would receive that consid- eration and fostering support which had been withheld from it for many years. From the commencement of the anthracite coal trade to the 1st of January, 1870, the quantity of anthracite coal sent to market from all the regions was 190,058,685 tons, of which from the Schuylkill region, 82,030,232 tons; the Shamokin region, 6,584,523; the Lehigh region, 36,564,177; the Wyoming region, 64,879,753; total, 190,058,685. A comparison of the quantity of anthracite coal furnished by the different regions in the decade ending with the year 1859, and the decade ending with the year 1869, shows that the Schuyl- kill region furnished 12 per cent. less of the whole supply in the latter decade, than it did in the former, although its ton- nage was augmented 36 per cent. When we consider the disadvan- tages of the Schuylkill coal trade during the ten years prior to 1870, the formidable and somewhat adventurous and speculative competition encountered in the market, the oppressive and illib- eral policy of the transporting companies and the baleful influ- ence of the so-called Workingmen's Benevolent Association, it is surprising that its position in the trade was so well sustained. The year 1870 was one of the most unfortunate years in the Schuylkill coal trade since the break-down in 1857. Mining operations were suspended from the first of April to the first of August, while negotiating for a basis of wages. The miners claimed the wages of 1869, based upon $3 per ton for coal at Port Carbon, as a minimum. The operators declared that experience had proven conclusively that the basis of $3 per ton was entirely too high to permit Schuylkill coal to compete with the large compa- nies in the Lackawanna region. Mr. Gowen, at the request of both parties, settled the difficulty under the terms of what became known as the "Gowen compromise," which was the $3 basis, but sliding down as well as up with the change in the price of coal. The price averaged for the year $2.45 at Port Carbon, and the wages fell below the rates offered by the operators in February. The loss in production, compared with that of the previous year, was 782,578 tons. LEASE OF THE SCHUYLKILL NAVIGATION. Upon the 12th of July, 1870, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company leased the Schuylkill navigation. On the 7th of November, 1870, the committees representing the Anthracite Board of Trade and the Workingmen's Benevolent Associ- ation met in Pottsville to arrange the terms of a basis for wages in 1871. An agreement was signed and ratified, based upon $2.50 per ton as the price of coal at Port Carbon. It was a judicious arrangement, which had it been adhered to, would have operated beneficially to all interests involved; but it was repudiated subsequently by the leaders of the Miners' Union, in order that the association might join in the strike of their fellow members in the Lackawanna region. A general suspension was ordered by the general council of the association, to commence on the 10th of January, and on the 25th of January the delegates of the associa- tion in Schuylkill county resolved to adhere to the $3 basis. This course was in violation of good faith, and it satisfied the public that the leaders were unworthy of confidence. Great opprobrium was brought upon the association and its officers. The union could be no longer regarded as a protection to labor, but as an engine for its oppression. Its iniquities became known of all men, and the necessity for its suppression, as an enemy to the business interests and prosperity of the coal regions, became generally acknowledged. The suspension of work continued for four months, the region being kept in a state of agitation and excitement in the mean- _______________end page 68.________________ page 69 READING COAL COMPANY-WAGES AND PRODUCTION. _______________________________________________________________ while. All other efforts to make an arrangement having failed, the difficulty was referred to a board of arbitration, with Judge William Elwell as umpire. On the question of interference with the working of the mines the umpire rendered a decision adverse to the claims of the miners, and on the question of wages a scale of wages was adopted based upon $2.75 per ton for coal at Port Carbon. PHILADELPHIA AND READING COAL AND IRON COMPANY. The average price at Port Carbon for the eight months of the year after the adoption of the $2.75 per ton basis was $2.61 per ton. In 1870 the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company was organized as an auxiliary of the railroad company. The new company purchased during the year seventy thousand acres of coal lands in Schuylkill county. "The result of this action has been to secure-and attach to the company's railroad-a body of coal land capable of supplying all the coal tonnage that can possibly be transported over the road for centuries." The amount of coal sent to market in 1872 was 19,371,953 tons, an excess of 3,579,475 over the supply of the previous year. From the Schuylkill region the supply was 5,355,341 tons, 81,130 more than in the previous year. There was no interruption to the production in 1872 by strikes. The basis of wages was arranged on the 6th of January and adhered to throughout the year. The arrangement was based upon $2.50 per ton at Port Carbon, and the wages were not to go below that with a decline in the price of coal except in April and May, and then not below the rates based on $2.25 per ton. The arrangement operated unfavorably to the operators. The average price for the year was $2.14 per ton, or 46 cents per ton less than in 1871, while the wages were higher than in that year, with a $2.75 basis. The "basis" adopted for 1872 amounted virtually to a surrender of their business inter- ests by the operators, to a formidable and antagonistic labor combination. The consequence was that they crippled themselves, while they invigorated their enemies. So reduced did many of them become that the Reading Railroad Company, to enable them to continue their production and supply the railroad with tonnage, found it expedient to advance money on mortgage to them. "Our first intention," said Mr. Gowen, "was never to mine a ton of coal. The idea was that the ownership of these lands would be sufficient to attach the tonnage to us, and that we could get individuals to mine the coal at a rent. That was the policy inaugurated by the company, and to develop it they expend- ed eight or nine hundred thousand dollars, simply in loans to individuals to enable them to get into business. We built col- lieries, rented them to individuals and advanced money on mort- gage; and had it not been for the terrible demoralization of labor in the coal regions, resulting in strikes, individuals would have been able to do all that we wanted. But we had, during the time I speak of, a succession or strikes which entir- ely destroyed individual enterprise. There was no man who had the capital to stand up against them; six months out of a year they were idle, and we saw that we had to take the bull by the horns and go into the business of mining ourselves. There was nothing else for us to do. We tried honestly and sincerely for nearly eighteen months to develop these lands and work them by individual enterprise; nay, more than that, when we found that would not do, in several instances we opened the collieries and associated men of know experience with us as partners in mining, and let them have the business; but that was also unsuccessful, and we had to take hold of the coal trade as we took hold of the railroad-establish ourselves in it as a large corporation, with fixed rules." In no previous year was the anthracite coal trade so judicio- usly and systematically governed as in 1873. Indeed it may be said that never before had the trade been governed in union and harmony, and with the co-operation and accord of the great repre- sentative interests in all regions. The trade, heretofore so capricious and ungovernable, was subjected to complete discipline and control. Under the title of the "Associated Coal Companies" an organization was formed, composed of the large mining and transporting companies, for the purpose of proportioning the sup- ply of coal at competitive points to the demand, and to regulate the prices of coal during the year so as to secure remuneration to the producers. The plan was to establish prices at the opening of the spring trade in March at the lowest rates on board vessels at the shipping ports, and to raise the prices ten cents per ton every month until the close of the year. By virtue of this arran- gement the coal trade remained prosperous throughout the year, with prices fully maintained, notwithstanding the monetary panic, the opposition of the coal brokers and the clamor of the press against the "combination." The question of wages in the Schuylkill region for the year 1873 was arranged on a basis of $2.50 per ton at Port Carbon as a minimum. It operated well, because the Associated Coal Companies prevented coal from receding below the basis price. The price of coal averaged for the year $2.58 per ton, or forty-four cents per ton more than in the preceding year. The production of coal in the Schuylkill region was 314,081 tons in excess of that of the previous year. In 1873 the consolidation of coals at Port Richmond for ship- ment known as the "pool" was put into operation. By this system- which was a commingling of coals from different collieries to save expense in handling and vending-the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company undertook, at a greatly reduced cost, the shipping and selling of the coal of the producers. In the same year the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company embarked in the retail coal business in the city of Philadelphia, having built yards and depositories of great capacity. The following were the essential features of the programme of the Associated Coal Companies for the government of the anthra- cite coal trade to competitive points ________________end page 69._________________ page 70. HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. ________________________________________________________________ in 1874: Tonnage to competitive points for ten months from February 1st to November 30th inclusive to be 10,000,000 tons, and to be distributed among the six interests in the same propor- tion as that adopted in February, 1873, for the business of that years, viz.: To the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 2,585,000 tons; Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 1,598,000; Cen- tral Railroad of New Jersey, 1,615,000; Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, 1,837,000; Delaware Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, 1,380,000; Pennsylvania Coal Company, 985,000. It was recommended that prices should open in March, 1874, at an average of fifteen cents per ton above the opening prices of 1873, and thereafter advance as follows: say in April five cents, May ten cents, and July, August, September, October and November each fifteen cents per ton. The great depression in all manufacturing industries in 1874, and especially of the iron trade, diminished the consumption of coal for manufacturing purposes and caused considerable stagna- tion in the coal trade. Of the 662 furnaces in existence in 1873 only 410 were in blast on the 1st of January, 1874, and only 382 at the close of the year, showing the great prostration of that interest. The coal trade moved very sluggishly from the start, and the Associated Coal Companies soon found it necessary to curtail the allotment of tonnage to competitive points. Instead of 10,000,000 tons there were only 8,248,928 sent to competitive points. In the mean time the programme was carried out in regard to advancing prices. In the Schuylkill region, the basis of wages for 1873 was continued. The average price at Port Carbon for the year was $2.60. REDUCTION OF WAGES AND THE "LONG STRIKE." The supply of anthracite coal in 1874 from all the regions fell off 774,333 tons from that of 1873; of this decrease 327,382 tons was from the Schuylkill region. A general reduction of wages was determined upon in all anth- racite regions in 1875 by virtue of imperative necessity. The shrinkage in value of nearly all commodities since the crisis of 1873 had produced a corresponding reduction in the wages of labor; coal could not be made an exception to the general rule to enable the producers to pay war prices to their operatives; the time for short hours and $5 a day had passed away, and the miners like other men were required to be industrious and frugal. A reduction of ten per cent. in wages had already been made and accepted in the Lackawanna region. The coal operators in the Schuylkill region, after careful study of the situation-the market being overstocked with coal., one half the furnaces in the country being out of blast, and manufacturers of all kinds run- ning half or quarter time if at all-concluded that to reduce the price of coal, as was demanded to start the furnaces and manufac- tories, there must be a corresponding reduction in wages. Ac- cordingly the following scale of wages for the year 1875 was decided upon as an ultimatum: Outside wages-first class, $1.50 per day; second class, $1.35; all inside work to be on a basis system-basis $2.50 per ton at Port Carbon; inside labor and miners' wages to be reduced ten per cent. below the rates of 1874; contract work to be reduced twenty per cent.; one per cent. on inside work to be paid in addition to the basis rate for every three cents advance in the price of coal above $2.50 per ton; and one per cent., to be deducted from the basis rate for every three cents decline in the price of coal below $2.50 per ton at Port Carbon. No maximum and no minimum. The wages in 1874 were: for miners, $13 per week; inside labor, $11 per week; outside labor, $10 per week, when the price of coal was $2.50 per ton at Port Carbon and to rise one cent to every three cents advance in the price of coal above $2.50 per ton. These terms were submitted to a committee of the Miners and Laborers' Benevolent Association on the 1st of January, 1875. After some dis- cussion they were rejected, and an order issued by the officers of the association that work at the mines should be stopped immed- iately. Thus was inaugurated the celebrated "long strike" of 1875. The conflict of labor against capital, which had been prosecuted so aggressively through the agency of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association ever since its organization, reached a decisive issue this year, after a six months; struggle of the most determined character that had yet taken place, culminating in the overthrow of the miners' combinations and the permanent rescue of the prop- erty of the proprietors of the collieries from the arbitrary cont- rol of an irresponsible trade union; as well as the emancipation of the workingmen themselves from the power of the political and professional agitators who had so long controlled them. In this prolonged and bitter contest the workingmen-or those who assumed to act for them-resorted to their usual methods during strikes, of intimidation, violence, outrage, incendiarism and assassi- nation. A reign of terror prevailed, unchecked for a period, throughout the anthracite coal fields. The pernicious combination of the miners had fastened itself like an incubus upon the coal- producing interest, and the individual operators were too weak to cast it off; but the strikers now had to contend with the Philad- elphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company as well. At the end of the strike, in the middle of June, there was a deficiency in the supple of coal, compared with that of the previous year to the corresponding period, of 2,400,000 tons, nearly all of which was made up by the end of the year. The decrease from the Schuylkill region, however, was 689,011 tons. The prices were maintained, with monthly advances, by the Board of Control of the Associated Coal Companies. The prices in November, compared with those of November, 1874, show a reduction of fifty cents per ton on lump, steamer and broken sizes, twenty-five cents on egg and thirty-five cents on stove. The wages of the men working on the sliding scale varied from two to six per cent. above the basis of $2.50 per ton for coal at Port Carbon. Mining operations were brought to a close in the Schuylkill region in 1875 on the first of December, the ________________end page 70.__________________ page 71 THE COAL TRADE IN 1877, 1878 AND 1879. ______________________________________________________________ market being fully supplied, and the wharves at Port Richmond and all other depositories overflowing with coal. Before the trade of 1876 could begin to move a large depletion of the stocks on hand was absolutely necessary. Consequently, there was very little coal mined until the following April, and in two months afterward such stagnation prevailed that suspensions were ordered every alternate week by the Coal Exchange, and the Board of Control of the Associated Coal Companies reduced the monthly allotments. The peculiar condition of the coal trade this year, arising from the underconsumption of coal, caused by the general prostration of industrial interests, seemed to indicate the necessity for a regulating and controlling power in the manage- ment to a greater degree than had ever existed before, and it was with unconcealed apprehension that the coal operators received the intelligence of the dissolution of the organization called the Associated Coal Companies, on the 22nd of August. Following the disruption of the association was the sacrifice of half a million of tons of coal at public auction, at prices that would not pay the freight to deliver it, and about $2.50 below the August circular rates. New schedules of prices were announced, based on an approximation to this great reduction; transportation was lowered correspondingly, and the wages of the operatives were reduced fifteen twenty-five per cent. to meet the changed circum- stances. Operators worked their collieries experimentally, to solve the problem whether the loss would be greater to work or to stand idle. FREE COMPETITION VS. ASSOCIATION. The average price received for coal during 1877 on board ves- sels at Philadelphia was $2.41 per ton, or about $1 per ton less than the lowest prices previously known, and about the value of the coal in the coal region. The only compensation to be expect- ed from these low rates was the extension given to the consump- tion of anthracite coal, by its entrance into new markets and by the stimulus it afforded manufacturing industries. The amount of anthracite sent to market this year was 20,828,179 tons, an excess of 2,327,168 tons over the supply of the previous year. The amount sent from the Schuylkill and Shamokin regions was 8,195,042 tons, 1,973,108 more than in the previous year. The coal tonnage of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, including 152,742 tons of bituminous coal was 7,255,317 tons, an excess of 1,660,111 over that of the previous year. These fig- ures represent a heavy trade, and they likewise represent a heavy loss to the producer. So dissatisfied were the producers with the result of "free competition" in 1877 that another combination was formed on the 16th of January, 1878, for the government of the trade of that year. The immediate effect was to advance prices of coal fifty cents per ton. A large curtailment of prod- uction was determined upon during the winter months, which was effected by suspension of work at the collieries. The following percentages of the coal tonnage were allotted to the several interests: Philadelphia and Reading, 28.625; Lehigh Valley, 19.75; New Jersey Central, 12.905; Delaware, Lackawanna and Western, 12.75; Delaware and Hudson, 12.48; Pennsylvania Rail- road, 7.625; Pennsylvania Coal Company, 5.865. The trade was very dull, and the association of coal companies was unable to secure for coal a sufficiently increased price to compensate for the great restriction of production found necessary, and conse- quently the anticipations formed of profits to result from the combination were not realized. The operation of restricting the production of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, and its effect upon the business of that company and the railroad company, is exhibited the following table: _________________________________________________________________ COAL TONNAGE ----------------------------------------------------------------- RAILROAD MINED BY COAL AND IRON CO. MONTH TONS CWT. TONS CWT ------------------------------------------------------------------- Dec., 1877....... 647,727 03 361,829 06 Jan., 1878....... 231,323 11 96,935 03 Feb., " ....... 173,462 01 65,680 18 Mar., " ....... 229,260 00 89,324 06 April, " ....... 408,620 09 180,983 03 May, " ....... 513,614 04 240,057 06 June, " ....... 754,653 15 333,193 06 July, " ....... 440,722 04 191,880 03 Aug., " ....... 683,076 15 341,129 03 Sept., " ....... 327,539 15 139,736 11 Oct., " ....... 695,332 10 299,268 02 Nov., " ....... 803,807 17 378,590 14 ---------- --- ----------- --- 5,909,140 04 2,727,608 01 __________________________________________________________________ CHART ABOVE IS CONTINUED BELOW...FOLLOW LINES ACROSS BY DATE __________________________________________________________________ COST OF COAL NET PROFIT AND LOSS OF MINED BY COAL OF BOTH COMPANIES. AND IRON CO. MONTH AT BREAKER PROFIT. LOSS. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dec., 1877 ..... $0.95 1 - 10 $400,488.23 Jan., " ..... 2.38 $107,652.9 Feb., " ..... 3.12 9 - 10 236,174.82 Mar., " ..... 2.16 4 - 10 87,638.98 April, " ..... 1.26 7 - 10 197,955.31 May, " ..... 1.14 484,165.83 June, " ..... 1.07 5 - 10 688,588.15 July, " ..... 1.36 7 - 10 211,695.28 Aug., " ..... 1.10 8 - 10 588,660.14 Sept., " ..... 1.49 5 - 10 7,522.43 Oct., " ..... 1.10 5 - 10 688,281.10 Nov., " ..... .91 8 - 10 956,283.03 -------- -------- ----------- --------- $1.23 7 - 10 $4,213,117.07 $438,989.14 _________________________________________________________________ The above table indicated that in open competition for the market, with the admitted excellence and great variety of Schuyl- kill coal, and no restriction imposed upon production, the Phila- delphia and Reading Railroad Company had no cause to fear any of its competitors in the coal trade. But it does not follow that the restrictions imposed upon production in 1878 were not neces- sary and beneficial to the trade generally. The benefits result- ing from the "combination" were the actual consumption of all surplus coal and the ability to secure fair prices in the future, which it was impossible to obtain so long as the large production kept the market overstocked. The amount of anthracite coal sent to market in 1878 was 17,605,262 tons, a decrease of 3,222,917 from the supply of 1877. The amount of coal sent to market from the Schuylkill, Mahanoy and Shamokin regions in 1878 was 6,282,226 tons, a decrease of 1,912,816 from the supply of the preceding year. The decrease in the coal tonnage of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company in 1878 compared with that of 1877 was 1,346,177 tons. The restriction of production in 1878 made room for and ren- dered profitable the extraordinary production of 1879. In the latter year the trade was much improved, the demand active at low prices, and the consumption largely increased; but the supply of coal was excessive, and the result of the year's operations afforded another example of the irrepressible tendency of the producing interest to over production. In 1879 the Schuylkill region produced 8,960,329 tons, 2,678,103 more than in 1878; the Lehigh region 4,595,567 tons, an increase of 1,358,118 over 1878; and the Wyoming region 12,586,293 _______________end page 71.________________ page 72 HISTORY OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY. _______________________________________________________________ tons, 4,500,706 above the production of 1878; total 26,142,189 tons, an increase of 8,536,927 over 1878. The coal tonnage of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in 1879 was 8,147,580 tons, an excess of 2,238,440 tons over that of 1878. The aggregate amount of anthracite coal sent to market from the year 1820-the beginning of the trade-to the 1st of January, 1880, was 384,023,046 tons. Of this amount 155,693,353 tons were from the Schuylkill region; 7,415,446 from the Lehigh region, and 156,903,247 from the Wyoming region. In this statement the Schuylkill region is credited with all the coal sent to market and reported from the Southern or Schuylkill coal field (except the eastern end of the basin, which has its outlet by the Lehigh), from the Mahanoy district, and from Columbia and North- umberland counties; the Lehigh region is credited with all the coal sent to market and reported from the eastern end of the Southern coal-field and from the detached basins in the middle coal field; the Wyoming region is credited with all the coal sent to market and reported from the Northern coal field. The amount of anthracite coal produced and not reported was at least 20,000,000 tons, making the aggregate production 404,012,246 tons. According to the estimate of Professor P.W. Sheafer we still have, after allowing sixty-six per cent. for waste, 8,786,858,666 tons to send to market. By the year 1900 we will reach our probable maximum annual production of 50,000,000 tons, and will finally exhaust the supply in 186 years. At the rate of production in 1879 the Northern coal field is being rapidly exhausted: the Middle coal field will cease extensive mining in about twenty years; and the source of supply beyond that period will be largely from the Southern coal field in the deep basins of Schuylkill county. ___________