Statewide County TN Archives Military Records.....Chapter XV 
Civilwar 1st TN Cavalry (Union)
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Chapter XV
CHAPTER XV.

HOOD CROSSES THE TENNESSEE—RACE WITH SCHOFIELD—HATCH ELOGS FORREST AT

CAMPBELLSVILLE—WILSON AT DUCK RIVER—NIGHT MARCH TO FRANKLIN-PREPARATIONS EOR
BATTLE.



    On the 29th of October, the advance of Hood's army drove back Croxton's

cavalry at Florence, Alabama, and in the afternoon of the same day attempted to

lay their pontoon bridge, but as the fire of the Union cavalry was so hot, the

further attempt was delayed until darkness set in. During the night the bridge

was completed and on the morning of the 30th, Johnson's division of Lee's corps

crossed over and threw up a line of works.



    Croxton, finding that the whole of Hood's army was in his front at Florence,

fell back behind Shoal Creek, picketing heavily on the road leading to Florence.

Early on the morning of November 5, the First Tennessee, under

Lieutenant-Colonel Dyer, was sent out to reconnoiter the enemy's position on the

road leading to Florence, and when about three miles from camp, the advance

guard of the regiment was met and driven back by a column of rebel infantry. We

learned afterwards that this was Johnson's division of Lee's corps.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dyer retired slowly, disputing every foot of ground, and on

reaching Shoal Creek the regiment moved to the north side and was formed in line

of battle to the left of the road.



    General Croxton heard the sharp firing of the First Tennessee, and on

reaching Shoal Creek we found the brigade and two 12-pound Howitzers in line of

battle along the north bank of the creek. The name of the battery I cannot now

recall, but think it was a United States battery.



    About 9:30 a. m., the enemy appeared on the opposite side of the creek, when

our guns opened a rapid fire on them. The Confederates responded with six guns,

and soon the air was full of flying missiles. The enemy's skirmishers repeatedly

advanced to the bank of the creek, but our fire was so rapid and destructive

that they were unable to cross, and were compelled to fall back and seek shelter

in the woods. Hood's men, already feeling good over their success in crossing

the Tennessee without serious opposition, now moved up in force, and attempted

to cross, but our fire was so hot they fell back. But the artillery on both

sides kept up the fire.



    Hood's men were so severely punished during the forenoon that they made no

further attempt to force a crossing in our front. The artillery on both sides

kept up a rapid and vigorous fire from commanding positions, while shot and

shell went flying thick and fast across the stream, the Union guns maintaining

the unequal contest with great courage.



    Johnson, believing that there was a large force in his front, and being

unable to effect a crossing on the main road, sent two brigades to a ford on our

left, near the mouth of Shoal Creek, where they crossed. This move forced

Croxton to abandon his position and fall back. The enemy had almost gained our

rear before he was discovered, consequently it was a hair-breadth escape all
around.



    When Croxton found that his left flank was turned, he ordered his brigade to

fall back to the road. The First Tennessee was on the left of the brigade and in

line along the north bank of the creek, with a thick growth of scrubby timber in

its rear. The Fourth Kentucky was to our right, and was fighting dismounted. The

Second Michigan and Eighth Iowa were still further to our right. When we began

to fall back, the enemy immediately plunged into the stream and followed close

upon our heels.



    On reaching the road, Croxton was compelled to halt the First Tennessee and

Fourth Kentucky for the purpose of checking the enemy long enough to let the

other two regiments and battery get to the road. The enemy soon emerged from the

woods we had just left and moved on the quick step toward our thin line of

battle. As they approached, the First Tennessee and Fourth Kentucky gave them a

volley, which for the moment staggered their line, and during this temporary

check Croxton ordered his brigade to retire.



    Just, as we reached the road our battery went dashing by, under "whip and

spur," the enemy not being over fifty yards away, but could do but little with

empty muskets in their hands.



    Croxton fell back a short distance and took up a new position near Sugar

Creek. In this engagement the First Tennessee sustained a very small loss, a

loss that the writer is unable to account for, as the regiment was in the

engagement from beginning to end. It was one of the many lucky escapes for the

regiment. Company B lost one man, Sergeant Robert A. Trent. He was reported as

"missing in action," and supposed to have been killed. Robert Adair, Company C,

was severely wounded. This brave and gallant soldier received his fourth wound

in this engagement, besides being hit with a spent ball on the retreat from

Cumberland Gap, in 1862. Just as the order was given to fall back, he was struck

in the left breast with a musket ball, which passed through his body, producing,

as we thought, a mortal wound. Almost at the same moment his horse was killed,

and both went down together. The Confederates were advancing, and were not fifty

yards away, when Sergeant James B. Clapp and the writer dismounted, picked up

their wounded comrade, who seemed more dead than alive, and placed him on the

horse behind his brother. We then hurriedly mounted our horses and all escaped

without further injury, amid a shower of lead. But, strange to say, this iron

soldier survived his wound and is at this date an honored citizen of Knox

county, but much shattered in health.



    During the night the enemy recrossed the stream, and Croxton's pickets

re-occupied the line at Shoal Creek.



    During our stay at this place the Presidential election of 1864 took place

amid these stirring events, and the boys in bine were given an opportunity of

expressing their choice between the opposing candidates. The Republicans had

renominated Abraham Lincoln for President and Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, for

Vice-President, while the Democrats selected as their candidate for President,

General Geo. B. McClellan, and for Vice-President, Geo. H. Pendleton. After the

votes had been counted and the result announced, there was great rejoicing in

camp over the result, as Abraham Lincoln had received almost the unanimous vote

of Croxton's brigade.



    Hood was compelled to wait until sufficient supplies could be collected to

warrant the opening of an active campaign. This delay was of the greatest

importance to Thomas, as it gave him more time to collect his scattered forces,

with which he was expected to drive Hood from Tennessee. Hood's field returns,

dated November 16, 1864, show an aggregate force present of forty-four thousand,

eight hundred and thirty-two. These returns do not include Forrest's cavalry, at

least nine thousand strong, which at that time was absent on a raid along the

Tennessee River, but rejoined Hood before he started on his campaign.



    Hood entered Tennessee with three corps of infantry and one of cavalry,

commanded respectively by Cheatham, Stewart, Lee and Forrest, and it is safe to

say that his army numbered at least fifty thousand men, while Thomas did not

have exceeding twenty-seven thousand men, of all arms, confronting Hood, until

Nashville was reached.



    General Edward Hatch, with the Fifth Division of Cavalry, was sent to Sugar

Creek to reinforce Croxton's brigade, and, being the ranking officer present,

assumed command of all the cavalry at that place.



    There was sharp picket fighting in our front. Our scouts having learned that

Hood's entire army was now on the north side, all the roads leading toward the

enemy's camp were blockaded with fallen timber, so as to delay him as much as

possible. Rafts were sent down the river to break his bridges, but we never knew

whether they were broken or not.



    On the 19th, Hatch moved the most of his division out toward Shoal Creek,

where he met Forrest, with a large force, moving along the west side. Coon's

brigade, of Hatch's division, crossed and attacked Forrest, but was forced to

re-cross the stream after some sharp fighting. This move developed the fact that

Hood's entire army was moving north.



    Hood believed that the most of Sherman's army was with him in Georgia, and

all that he would have to contend with would be hundred-day men, convalescent

troops and government employes. The great race began on the 20th, and after the

little "set-to" at Franklin, Hood became convinced that he must have been

mistaken and that if hundred-day men and convalescent troops could do such

fighting, it would be impossible to whip Thomas's veterans.



    On the 20th, Hatch concentrated his troops at Lexington, and the next day

moved to Lawrenceburg, Croxton's brigade acting as rear guard. Early on the

morning of the 23rd, the enemy drove in our pickets, but we held the town during

the day, repulsing all charges made by his dismounted cavalry. Late in the

afternoon they brought up their artillery and shelled us vigorously. General

Thomas sent Schofield to Pulaski, with orders to take command of all the troops

that were confronting1 Hood. The nearest infantry force to us was at Pulaski,

but as Hood was pursuing us on a road almost parallel to the one from Pulaski to

Columbia, the place was evacuated and the troops ordered to Columbia.



    Hood, knowing the country well, did not confine his marching columns to one

road. Lawrenceburg is sixteen miles west of Pulaski and thirty-three from

Columbia, and as the greater part of Hood's army seemed to be advancing on the

same road over which Hatch was moving, it was important that his army be delayed

as much as possible, to allow Schofield's troops and wagon-train to reach

Columbia first.



    The weather, which up to this time had been warm and pleasant, now changed,

and rain, sleet and snow fell, making our marches and bivouacs unpleasant. Hood

was a "hard pusher" as well as a "bold fighter," and hoped by a rapid march to

get in Schofield's rear before his troops could reach Duck River, and this was

only prevented by a hard night's march. If Hood had won in the race for

Columbia, the Union army would have been entirely at his mercy, and the capture

of Nashville assured. Hatch withdrew his troops from Lawrenceburg and moved back

toward Columbia, with Croxton's brigade covering his rear.



    During the day there were several brisk encounters as the enemy kept

pressing our rear guard, but at no time were they able to "produce a panic."

Thus the day wore away— fighting and falling back. There is one thing that can

be truthfully said about Hood. He was the only Confederate general who could

make his infantry keep up with his cavalry on the march. We almost invariably

found Forrest well supported by infantry.



    On the 25th, as Hatch was approaching Campbellsville, Forrest forced a

battle on him, and for his "impudence" he was thoroughly and soundly whipped,

and without further molestation Hatch moved his troops to Columbia, where our

little army once more faced about to confront the foe. Columbia is a beautiful

place, surrounded by rich and fertile fields and situated upon the south bank of

Duck River, which at this place flows almost west, with numerous fords above and

below town.



    A heavy line of works was thrown up in front of Columbia, with a view of

checking the enemy and to hold the place. It was Thomas's intention to meet*

Hood and offer battle at this place, but his force was so small that he

abandoned the idea and gave instructions to Schofield to delay Hood as long as

possible without endangering his command.



    The cavalry was ordered to the north side of the river and distributed above

and below Columbia for the purpose of guarding the fords and watching

Schofield's flanks. Croxton's brigade and a portion of Hatch's division held the

fords above Columbia, the latter extending his line as far east as the crossing

of the Lewisburg and Franklin turnpike. When Hood approached Columbia and found

Schofield in possession, he deployed his troops and moved up toward the Union

works, but made no attack.



    At this place, Croxton's brigade was assigned temporarily to the Sixth

Division of Cavalry, commanded by General R. W. Johnson, and remained in his

division until Nashville was reached. In Johnson's report for the month of

November, we find the following: "Brigadier-General Croxton, with his fine

brigade of the First Cavalry Division, was also placed under my command. Of the

operations of General Croxton's brigade during the short time he was under my

command, I shall not attempt particularly to speak, though I desire to observe

that upon all occasions both General Croxton and the officers and soldiers of

his command conducted themselves in a manner becoming the high reputation which

both he and they deservedly enjoy."



    On the 26th, there was heavy artillery firing and some very sharp

skirmishing in front of Columbia, but no general attack was made. In the

meantime, Schofield sent part of his troops to the north side, with orders to

entrench, but as this side of the river is much lower, this position was

completely commanded by the hills on the south bank. The 27th was comparatively

quiet at Columbia, and that quietness there meant great activity on some other

part of our line.



    While we were holding the fords and crossings along Duck River, east of

Columbia, General James H. Wilson, our new chief of cavalry, reached us. He was

relieved from the command of the Third Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the

Potomac, for the purpose of taking command of General Sherman's cavalry. The

cavalry was too much scattered and entirely too busy to receive him in the

manner that his rank demanded, but he set a noble example to his troops by

remaining at the front and sharing the hardships and dangers with his men.



    All the afternoon of the 27th we could see troops marching east along the

opposite side of the river. This information was immediately sent to Schofield

at Columbia. Hood left two divisions of Lee's corps and all of his artillery in

front of Columbia, and with the remainder of his army moved to his right, with a

view of turning Schofield's position.



    On the morning of the 28th, Forrest made several attempts to cross at

different fords between Columbia and the Lewisburg turnpike, but was

unsuccessful. Later in the day he massed his troops at Huey's Mill, about seven

miles east of Columbia, drove back the pickets and began crossing. General

Wilson at once notified Schofield of the enemy's movement, and suggested the

immediate evacuation of Columbia, as he believed that Hood, once across, could

beat him to Franklin—-and subsequent events proved that Schofield had delayed

the withdrawal of his troops one day too long. Croxton's brigade was some

distance below where Forrest crossed, and as it was in great danger of being

outflanked and captured, Wilson ordered Croxton to fall back.



    Hood laid his pontoons at Davis' Ford, five miles east of Columbia, late in

the afternoon of the 28th, and early the next morning his army began crossing.

Wilson fell back to Rally Hill, where he held the enemy in check during the

evening, but was unable to concentrate his scattered troops until Hurt's Cross

Roads was reached. From Rally Hill, a turnpike runs northwest to Spring Hill,

and along this road Hood led his army in person the next day. With Schofield's

small force at Columbia, it looked like he might as well try to dam up Duck

River with a fish net as to check Hood's army. The road over which his army was

to retreat was badly blockaded with wagons, but a greater obstacle than this was

in his way just then. The most of Hood's army was across Duck River as soon as

Schofield was, and stood ready to march toward Spring Hill on a shorter route.

With all these obstacles in the way, it will be seen that Schofield's situation

at Columbia was extremely perilous, and he was led to believe himself that he

had delayed the evacuation of Columbia at least one day too long. All

communication between Schofield and Wilson was cut off. Croxton's brigade

reached the Lewisburg turnpike at Rally Hill about dark, and was immediately

formed in line of battle across the road to check the enemy until all the

scattered troops could close up. Wilson held his position at Rally Hill, on the

Lewisburg turnpike, until after dark on the 28th, and then fell back and

bivouacked near Hurt's Cross Roads.



    During the night, Buford joined Forrest, and early the next morning he moved

against Wilson with all of his cavalry. But Wilson made a brave and determined

resistance, putting Croxton's brigade in the rear, with orders to contest every

foot of ground. Wilson began to fall back along the Lewisburg turnpike, and just

after passing Hurt's Cross Roads, Forrest made a fierce attack on our rear

guard. Croxton dismounted the First Tennessee and Second Michigan, and ordered

them to build a line of barricades across the turnpike, but before the last rail

and log were laid on, Forrest drove in the skirmishers and charged upon our

works. As his men approached our line, the two regiments opened such a rapid

fire upon his troops that they broke and fled to the rear, leaving several dead

and wounded in our front. We mounted and fell back, still pursued by Forrest,

but after this he was very shy of barricades. The only casualties in the First

Tennessee were: Private Harvey Sandidge, of Company L, wounded, and B. Taylor,

of Company G, missing—supposed to be killed.



    As Wilson approached Mount Carmel, his leading brigade—Coon's—was attacked

in front by a portion of Forrest's cavalry, who had gained his front by hard

marching, but was repulsed and driven off with severe loss. About 10 a. m.,

Croxton's brigade reached Mount Carmel and passed inside our lines. At this

place the turnpike leading from Spring Hill to Murfreesboro crosses the

Lewisburg turnpike. Croxton's veteran brigade had gallantly covered the retreat

to this place, and during that time there was hard and almost continued

skirmishing, as the enemy kept pressing forward with great energy, and made

several attempts to push around and strike our column in flank.



    Forrest left the most of his troops at Mount Carmel, to hold Wilson, and

with the remainder moved to the left toward Spring Hill, ten miles west on the

Franklin and Columbia turnpike, where he attempted the destruction of our large

wagon-train. Hood was moving rapidly along the Rally Hill turnpike, toward

Spring Hill, with Cleburne's division of Cheatham's corps in advance. Wilson's

cavalry had been driven back to Mount Carmel. Schofield was still at Columbia,

but when he learned that Hood, with the most of his army, was moving toward his

rear, he at once ordered Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, to Spring Hill.



    All the wagons had been sent back to Spring Hill, and Stanley arrived there

just in time to save them; as Forrest had moved with the remainder of his

cavalry and driven in a small force of cavalry that was holding Spring Hill.

Cheatham heard Stanley's cannon and hurried forward Cleburne's division,

followed by the remainder of his corps. Cleburne dashed upon Stanley's men like

a mad man, but was repulsed with severe loss. There was desperate fighting all

the afternoon, but Stanley held the place and saved our wagons.



    Toward night the fighting ceased, and Hood's army lay in line of battle near

the turnpike. The day closed with the Union army badly scattered. Part of the

Twenty-third Corps was still at Columbia, with a portion of the Fourth Corps in

supporting distance; the remainder of the two corps was at Spring Hill with

Stanley; the cavalry under Wilson was on Stanley's left, near Mount Carmel. All

of Hood's army was with him at Spring Hill except his artillery and the two

divisions of Lee's corps, which were still at Columbia. Hood was no doubt

puzzled and hardly knew what to make of the heavy firing he heard at Columbia.



    General Cox, with his division, left Columbia at dark and by hard marching

reached Spring Hill near midnight. As Cox's weary troops were marching along

near Spring Hill, the camp-fires of Hood's army were dimly burning only a short

distance away. As the Union troops were marching by, Hood was notified of the

fact, and he sent one division to check the movement, but as the night was dark

and the commander not being familiar with the ground over which he was to move,

the enterprise failed.



    There was some light skirmishing during the night, but by daylight

Schofield's army had passed the "danger line" and was now in front instead of

the rear. It was evident that someone had blundered, and the responsibility must

be shifted upon some subordinate. General Pat Cleburne, one of Hood's bravest

and most trusted division commanders, was severely criticised, and even

Cheatham, one of his corps commanders, did not escape censure. Cleburne,

smarting under the reprimand of his commander, rushed into the battle the next

day and laid down his life upon the bloody field of Franklin. Hood was present

upon the field during the fighting around Spring Hill, and could see that all of

his orders were properly and faithfully executed and that perhaps no one erred

but himself.



    The heavy wagon-train was pushed out of Spring Hill during the night,

followed by Schofield's troops, the last leaving at daylight on the 30th.

Wilson's cavalry still held the Lewisburg turnpike, and during the night reached

Franklin. The only works at Franklin at this time was Fort Grainger, a small

fort built a year before, on a high elevation on the north bank of Harpeth

River, for the purpose of protecting the railroad bridge and track, which runs

almost parallel with the river some distance south. The guns of this fort

completely commanded the town and the entire battlefield, and during the

engagement on the afternoon of the 30th enfiladed Stewart's line and did fearful

execution to his troops as they moved forward to the assault.



    It was about noon when the advance of Hood's army approached Franklin. Hood

halted his weary troops some little distance out for a short rest and to allow

his columns to close up. All morning there was great activity among those who

were in charge of our large wagon-train. There were two bridges over which they

were crossing, and the shouts of the teamsters, the rattle and rumbling of the

wagons, could be heard some distance, and occasionally some thoughtless fellow

would get excited and let out a big word that was in direct violation of the

Third Commandment.



    As the troops came up they were assigned positions in the line. Wilson's

cavalry was placed on the left of the Union line, with Croxton's brigade on the

right. The Lewisburg turnpike, as it approaches Franklin, runs parallel with the

Franklin and Columbia turnpike until it reaches the Harpeth River, then it turns

almost due west and runs almost parallel with the river to where it crosses the

Nashville & Decatur Railroad. The ground south of Franklin, between the

Lewisburg turnpike and the railroad, was at the time of the battle covered with

timber, which furnished some protection for Stewart's infantry and Forrest's

cavalry. Hood evidently intended to move a portion of his army along this route

for the purpose of turning Schofield's left, but in this attempt he "struck a

snag." Stewart's corps and Forrest's cavalry, when formed for the attack, held

this part of Hood's line, and in the grand move met with stubborn resistance

from the two advance regiments of Croxton's brigade.



    Schofield, with his advance, reached Franklin about daylight, and by noon

his entire command had reached the town. Schofield selected a position on a

slight elevation a short distance in front of Franklin, and early in the morning

picks and shovels were distributed and his weary troops began throwing up a

single line of works, which completely encircled the town in front, with each

end extending to the river. The Harpeth River at this place makes a big bend

northward, while the Union line curved outward, and in this bend the little town

of Franklin, which was about to become historic, and its people to witness one

of the most desperate struggles of the war, is located. Franklin is on the south

side of the river, and was entirely within the Union lines.



Additional Comments:
Extracted from:



HISTORY OF THE FIRST REGIMENT OF

Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry



IN THE GREAT WAR OF THE REBELLION,

WITH THE ARMIES OF THE OHIO AND CUMBERLAND,

UNDER GENERALS MORGAN, ROSECRANS,

THOMAS, STANLEY AND WILSON.



1862-1865.



BY



W. R. CARTER, COMPANY C.



ILLUSTRATED.



KNOXVILLE, TENN.:



GAUT-OGDEN CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS.

1902.



Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1896, by

W. R. CARTER,

in the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C.





TO THE SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE FIRST TENNESSEE CAVALRY; TO THE MEMORY OF OUR

DECEASED COMRADES AND THEIR KINDRED; TO THE MARTYRED PATRIOTS OF EAST TENNESSEE

WHO DIED ON THE GALLOWS AND IN PRISON, AND TO THE LOYAL AND PATRIOTIC PEOPLE WHO

SYMPATHIZED WITH THEM, THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, IN FRATERNITY,

CHARITY AND LOYALTY, BY THE AUTHOR.



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