Statewide County TN Archives Military Records.....Chapter XVI 
Civilwar 1st TN Cavalry (Union)
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Chapter XVI
CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—HOOD ASSAULTS THE UNION LINES— REPULSED WITH GREAT

SLAUGHTER—HIS LOSS IN OFFICERS UNEQUALED IN THE WAR—DESPERATE FIGHTING —GENERAL

STANLEY WOUNDED—SCHOFIELD WITHDRAWS IN THE NIGHT—HE REACHES NASHVILLE.



    The building of earthworks was no new experience for Schofield's veterans,

and when the picks and shovels were passed along the line the dirt "fairly

flew," and soon a long line of rifle-pits was thrown up, and then the exhausted

troops lay down and "snatched" a few hours of sleep. Where the line of works

crossed the Franklin and Columbia turnpike the full width of the roadway was

left open to allow the wagons and artillery to pass through in double lines,

while a few rods in the rear a re-trenched line was built across the turnpike to

command the opening and its approach. An old cotton-gin near the line of works

was torn down and the timber used for head-logs.



    This hastily constructed line of works was held by the following troops from

right to left: Kimball's division, Fourth Corps; Rugers' and Reilly's division,

Twenty-third Corps. Opdycke's brigade of Elliott's division, Fourth Corps,

having covered the retreat from Spring Hill the previous night, was halted just

in the rear of the Union works on the Franklin and Columbia turnpike. This

splendid brigade was composed of seven regiments, and was ordered to fight where

its gallant commander thought it was needed the worst. Subsequent events proved

that this brigade was halted at the right place, and its heroic fighting no

doubt saved the day. Five batteries of artillery were also placed in the line.

Wood's division, Fourth Corps, crossed to the north side, and continued the line

on Reilly's left, and to act as a reserve to either flank. Then came Wilson's

cavalry, with Croxton's brigade of McCook's division next to Wood. Hatch's and

Johnson's divisions were still on the left of Croxton.



    But let us now follow the First Tennessee on the morning of the 30th. As

stated in the preceding chapter, Croxton's brigade was ordered to the south side

early in the morning, with orders to take an advanced position near Douglass

Church, on the Lewisburg turnpike. The First Tennessee and Second Michigan were

thrown well out to the front to watch the movements of the enemy. During the

morning everything was quiet save an occasional shot on the skirmish line.

Toward noon, the advance of Forrest's cavalry moved up and made an attack on

Croxton's two advanced regiments.



    The position of the two regiments was well chosen, there being a small

stream in front which the enemy must cross before reaching us, and on their

first advance they met with so hot a fire that they were forced to fall back.

They were quickly re-formed, and advanced again, but not a man crossed that

stream. Once more Forrest re-formed his broken lines, and, with a loud "rebel

yell," rode straight for our line, but the fire from the revolving rifles of the

Second Michigan and the breech-loading carbines of the First Tennessee was so

hot that Forrest made no further attempt to force us back, and all became quiet

again. Forrest was severely punished, and his loss must have been heavy, for at

each volley we could see men and horses go down—some never to rise again.



    At 1 p. m., Croxton ordered his two advanced regiments to fall back to the

line selected by him. This line was in the woods, and extended across the

Lewisburg turnpike, with the left resting on Harpeth River.



    Major D. W. Sanders, Adjutant-General of French's division, Stewart's corps,

in an article on the battle of Franklin, says: "Stewart's corps marched on a

dirt road east of the Columbia pike to De Graffenreid's, on the Lewisburg pike,

and completely turned the flank of the enemy's force, which were seen in line

from the Winstead Hills. As a consequence, the enemy withdrew his troops from

that position. * * * Stewart formed his line of battle one and a quarter miles

southeast of Franklin, with Buford's and Jackson's divisions of cavalry on his

right, extending east from the Lewisburg pike, with Looring, Walthlall and

French's division on the left, and moved from DeGraffenreid's to the woodland

south of McGavock's residence. When Stewart's line was formed, Buford and

Jackson drove Wilson's cavalry beyond McGavock's and east from the Lewisburg

pike across the Harpeth River."    *    *    *



    At 2 p. m., Croxton's brigade was attacked by both infantry and cavalry, and

after a brave resistance was forced to retire to the north side of the river.

Croxton had scarcely reached the north bank when the pickets higher up the river

reported that the enemy's cavalry was crossing at different places. Forrest,

with the divisions of Buford and Jackson, had made one of his bold moves in

order that he might gain our rear and destroy the large train, which was already

in motion for. Nashville. Wilson immediately hurled Croxton's brigade and

Hatch's division upon him, realizing the great importance of keeping him on the

south side, and after some severe fighting he was driven across the river with

heavy loss.



    This was a bold and daring move, and if he had succeeded in gaining

Schofield's rear, it would have caused the withdrawal of a portion of

Schofield's troops to meet this movement of Forrest. But Wilson was equal to the

emergency and, realizing the importance of holding this part of the Union line,

threw his whole force along the north bank, and during the remainder of the day

kept Forrest on the south side of Harpeth River. During the afternoon there was

some sharp fighting along our front, but at no time was Forrest able to effect a

crossing. Wilson felt confident that he could now hold his position if Schofield

could only take care of himself against the combined attack of Hood's troops.



    While we were busy on this wing of our army, Hood was forming his troops in

line of battle for the desperate struggle that was about to take place. The

battle was fought in full view of each other, and at the same time each

commander, from his position, could witness the battle and the movements of his

men. Eighteen veteran brigades of infantry, with cavalry on the flanks, under

Cheatham and Stewart, were formed in line and stood ready to move when the order

came.



    It was a beautiful autumn afternoon, not a cloud obscured the sun, which

shone in full, rich splendor upon the plain with its gentle slopes, over which

they must pass to engage in the deadly fray, in the desperate effort to carry a

single line of works, by a most reckless and daring assault. Possibly no

battlefield of the war was so free from obstructions as the field of Franklin.

It is almost level, and on that afternoon presented the most imposing martial

display of the war.



    Behind the works lay Schofield's veterans, who had been pounding away all

the summer on the same men who now confronted them, but differently situated. By

a blunder of someone, two brigades of Wagner's division—Lane and Conrad—of the

Fourth Corps, were halted in an exposed position a short distance in front of

the Union line, astride the Franklin and Columbia turnpike. So when Hood's

troops rushed forward on their wild charge, these exposed troops delivered a

volley and then made for the works to avoid capture by Hood's men, who were

close upon their heels.



    It was about 4 p. m. when Hood ordered his troops to the assault. They

advanced with a quick step, with trailed arms, the bright barrels flashing in

the sunlight, with Cheatham on the left and Stewart on the right, their right

and left flanks composing the center. As Cheatham approached Wagner's line, his

men opened fire, which checked him for a few minutes only. As these two brigades

came swarming over the works, word was quickly passed along the line for the

Union troops to withhold their fire until they could pass the works.



    Already the black-throated monsters from Fort Grainger, on the north bank of

the river, were raking Stewart's line with an enfilading fire, cutting down his

troops like grain before the reaper. As the fleeing troops came swarming over

the works at the center, the men in the trenches became confused, and were

carried away by the excitement and confusion for at least three hundred yards.

This was the key to the position, and Hood had gained it without serious

fighting, and now held the main approach to the bridge, over which the Union

troops must retreat if defeated.



    This breach was on both sides of the turnpike, and through it Hood's troops

rushed, capturing two batteries, and with this advantage and his superior force,

it promised an easy victory and inspired his troops to greater activity. The

remainder of the Union line was held firmly, and the reserves, under General

Opdycke, and all the routed troops, were thrown into the breach at once, and

then there began one of the most desperate struggles of the war. Here the

fighting was hand to hand, and of the most desperate character. The fighting at

this point was for the possession of the works, and it was maintained with great

fury and stubbornness, in which men fought with clubbed muskets, and, with

bayonets baptized in blood, they drove Hood's veterans from the works and saved

the day.



    The Union troops, in this short but desperate struggle, recaptured all the

guns and soon changed the direction of their death-dealing missiles. They also

captured ten battle-flags and several hundred prisoners, showing that Hood must

have thrown a large force into this gap. General Pat Cleburne, one of the most

desperate fighters in Hood's army, fell a few rods in front of the works, near

the center. During the fearful struggle at the center, Hood was assaulting our

line from end to end, and the terrible discharges of the artillery and the

rapidity and destructiveness of the musketry fire was hardly equaled in the

history of modern warfare. The firing was so rapid that the smoke almost

obscured the field and shut out from view the assaulting columns as they rushed

madly into the very "jaws of death."



    The battle raged with unabated fury from 4 to about 8 p. m., and during the

desperate charges the flags of the enemy could be seen near the works by the

bright flashes of the artillery and small arms. The shouts of the charging

columns, mingled, with the groans of the wounded and dying, will never be

forgotten by those who stood shoulder to shoulder in the deadly struggle on that

beautiful November afternoon in 1864. Hood's troops assaulted the Union lines

with a recklessness never displayed before, and the great loss of officers and

men attest the great gallantry and sacrifice on the bloody field of Franklin,

and after all was lost they sullenly retired.



    From Schofield's headquarters he could witness the fighting of his entire

command, and at one time, when it seemed that Wilson's cavalry was about to be

routed and his left turned, he sent part of Wood's division to his support, but

before reaching him, Forrest was driven back, and he was unable to get in his

rear or turn his flank.



    Schofield makes the following mention of this engagement in his report: "A

short time before the infantry attack commenced, the enemy's cavalry forced a

crossing about three miles above Franklin, and drove back our cavalry, for a

time seriously threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the north bank

and moving toward Nashville. I sent General Wilson orders, which he had,

however, anticipated, to drive the enemy back at all hazards, and moved a

brigade of General Wood's division to support him if necessary. At the moment of

the first decisive repulse of the enemy's infantry, I received the most

gratifying intelligence that General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back

across the river. This rendered my immediate left and rear secure for the time

being."



    Firing was kept up all along the line until about 10 p. m., when all became

quiet, except an occasional shot from the skirmish line. Schofield could not be

driven, and Hood would not sound the retreat, and even after darkness had

settled over the field, he ordered Johnson's division of Lee's corps from his

reserves to assault the works held by Ruger's and Kimball's division. This

division made a determined effort to carry the works, but failed. Walthall's

division of Stewart's corps was confronted bv Casement's brigade, which was

armed with repeating rifles, and here the carnage was fearful.



    Hood's loss was frightful, and the next morning the battlefield presented a

horrible picture. Officers and men lay in heaps in front of the works, cold in

death, while wounded men, horses and broken guns attested the work of

destruction by the unerring aim of the western men. Hood's loss in officers was

exceedingly heavy, and from the best figures obtainable his loss was as follows:

Major-General P. R. Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals O. F. Strahl, John Adams, S. R.

Gist and H. B. Granberry. In addition to the five generals killed, who commanded

divisions and brigades, he lost six colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, three

majors and two captains, who commanded regiments. Line officers and enlisted men

killed, seventeen hundred and fifty. Officers wounded, one major-general, five

brigadier-generals, fifteen colonels, nine lieutenant-colonels, five majors and

two captains. Missing, two colonels, three majors and four captains. Captured,

one brigadier-general. Enlisted men wounded, thirty-eight hundred; missing,

seven hundred and two; making an agregate loss in Hood's army of six thousand,

two hundred and fifty two. Thirty-three stands of colors were also captured.



    The loss in Schofield's army was as follows: Killed, one hundred and

eighty-nine; wounded, one thousand and thirty-three; missing, eleven hundred and

four; making an aggregate loss of two thousand, three hundred and twenty-six.

The most of the missing were from the two exposed brigades of Wagner's division,

Fourth Corps. Among the wounded on the Union side was Major-General D. S.

Stanley, commanding the Fourth Corps. He was helping to rally the men near where

the breach was made, and during the fierce fighting at this point he received a

severe wound in the neck. General Stanley was Rosecrans' chief of cavalry in

1863, and as such led us through the Tullahoma campaign and on to Chickamauga,

but before the battle he was forced to relinquish the command of account of

sickness.



    The battle of Franklin, for the numbers engaged, was the grandest and

hardest fought battle of the Civil War. The cannon of Fort Grainger continued to

bellow out in tones not to be misunderstood, and as the shells went whistling

into the darkness beyond the Harpeth, they provoked no reply from the enemy.



    The casualties in the First Tennessee were as follows:



    Killed and Mortally Wounded—Company E, Corporal Joseph A. Beal, mortally

wounded and left on the field, date of death unknown; Company K, John T. Baxter;

Company L, Jacob Bacon.



    Wounded—Company A, Charles Dooley and Calloway Collins, severely wounded and

left on the field; Company D, John W. Legg; Company L, Corporal W. H. H. Bacon.



    Alexander H. Stephens, in his history of the United States, makes the

following mention of the battle of Franklin: "In this battle Hood gained a

signal victory, though at considerable loss."



    When the last of Schofield's troops had been withdrawn from the south side,

the bridges were fired by Wood's division, Fourth Corps, and as the flames arose

from the burning bridges the enemy opened a heavy fire from his artillery. From

our position east of town we could see the light of the burning bridges and hear

the roar of the cannon, as the sound floated out on the cold, frosty morning air.



    The First Tennessee moved from its position, with the remainder of Wilson's

cavalry, at 4:30 a. m., December 1, and covered the retreat of Schofield to

Nashville. Forrest followed and skirmished with the rear guard to Brentwood,

Near this place, Stewart's brigade of Hatch's division had a sharp engagement

with Buford's division. From Brentwood, Johnson's division and Croxton's brigade

were moved east to the Nolensville turnpike, and then, turning north, moved on

toward Nashville. Late in the afternoon we were halted two miles from Nashville

and ordered to build a temporary line of works across the turnpike.



    After completing the works, our horses were sent to the rear and a fresh

supply of ammunition issued to the men. During the night the enemy moved up near

our position, but made no attack, though there was considerable picket firing

during the night in our front. Early the next morning we moved into Nashville,

and were placed in rifle-pits on the left of Thomas's line, between the

Murfreesboro turnpike and Cumberland River.



    On the 3rd, Wilson's cavalry was relieved by Steed-man's troops and ordered

to the north side of the river, to continue the line on the left and to watch

Thomas's long line of communication with Louisville. All the crossings for some

distance above and below Nashville were kept guarded by the cavalry. Croxton's

brigade went into camp nearly opposite the works on the south side, and remained

in that position until the nth. During this time there was great activity going

on in Wilson's camps, as every effort was being made to put this arm of the

service in an efficient condition for the next move.



    All broken-down horses were turned in, and the government corrals and the

adjacent country searched for horses. By these means, Wilson almost doubled the

strength of his cavalry. Horses were newly shod and extra shoes fitted ready for

an emergency. Clothing was issued to the men and the old ones and their

inhabitants consigned to the flames. Thomas intended to move out and attack Hood

as soon as his cavalry could be mounted and his troops concentrated. When

Schofield's troops reached Nashville they were placed in the lines that were

already built in the following order: Twenty-third Corps on the left and

adjoining Steedman, the Fourth Corps in the center, and the Sixteenth Corps,

from the Army of the Tennessee, on the right. This splendid corps of hardy

Western men under General A. J. Smith was by Sherman's orders sent to Thomas

from Missouri and reached Nashville on the 1st day of December.



    Notwithstanding Hood's great defeat at Franklin on the 30th he moved his

army on toward Nashville, and on the 3rd day of December drove in Thomas's

outposts and placed his army in position in front of the city. The line selected

by him was on the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's Creek, extending

westwardly from the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad across the Nolensville,

Franklin and Granny White turnpikes, crossing the spurs of Montgomery Hill;

thence deflecting southwest along the high groud east from the Hillsboro

turnpike, and thence westwardly across this turnpike to a high hill immediately

west of the Hillsboro turnpike to Sugar Tree Creek.



    In addition to this line, he built numerous detached works still southwest,

extending across Richland Creek and the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad and

west of the Harding turnpike. These were the works first struck by Wilson's

cavalry on the morning of the 15th, as will be stated further on. This line was

well chosen and was a position of great strength. Into this line of works Hood

placed his troops in the following order: Cheatham on the right, Lee in the

center and Stewart on the left, with Forrest's cavalry on his flanks. From the

most reliable figures obtainable it is safe to say that Hood had at least

forty-two thousand men in the trenches at Nashville.



    On the 5th, Hood detached Bate's division of Cheatham's corps and part of

Forrest's cavalry and sent them to destroy the railroad and to capture

Murfreesboro. Three block-houses were captured and the bridges burned, but no

serious harm was inflicted upon the track. On the 6th, Bate was reinforced by

two additional brigades of infantry and the next morning approached

Murfreesboro. Rousseau was holding the place with eight thousand men and as Bate

declined to make a direct attack, Milroy was ordered to move out and engage him.

After some sharp righting, Bate was routed and driven from the field with

considerable loss. Bate's troops were recalled, but Forrest continued to operate

between Nashville and Murfreesboro.



    Governor Harris and R. L. Caruthers accompanied Hood's army on this "wild

campaign," expecting that Nashville would be captured and Caruthers, who, it is

said, had been elected Governor to succeed Harris, would be inducted into

office, amid the boom of cannon. This distinguished citizen was doomed to

disappointment, as a loyal son of Tennessee was occupying that honorable

position, and no doubt it was a sad disappointment to be "so near and yet so

far" from this coveted prize and position of honor.



    General Thomas had hoped to be ready to attack Hood sooner than he did, but

was delayed in procuring horses for his artillery and remounts for his cavalry.

Grant was dissatisfied at what seemed to him a useless delay, and urged him to

attack at once, but "Old Pap," as the boys called him, knew more about the

situation than he did. The weather, which previous to the arrival of the troops

had been good, became, shortly after reaching Nashville, exceedingly cold for

that latitude. About the 8th, a driving storm of rain and sleet set in. This

continued for about twenty-four hours, freezing as it fell, making it utterly

impossible for the cavalry to move and exceedingly difficult for the infantry to

move about in the performance of camp duty, so slippery was the surface. It was

a war with the elements, as well as the enemy, and it is very doubtful if Thomas

could have won a victory under the circumstances. But our grand "old hero," who

had never lost a battle, had the entire confidence of his troops, and his true

character seemed to shine brighter on this occasion than ever before. He won the

first Union victory in the West, at Mill Springs. At Murfreesboro, on that

terrible December day when all seemed lost, he set a noble example, and was

designated "the lion-hearted hero, calm amid the fury of battle." At bloody

Chickamauga, when the Union army was being swept from the field, he turned at

bay and was ever afterwards called "The Rock of Chickamauga." Later on, to the

same commander, while at Chattanooga, he said, "We will hold the town till we

starve."



    General Thomas was a Southern man, but the government did not have a more

loyal or faithful soldier in its ranks than this grand old hero. To show that he

was faithful and true to the Union and its flag, and free from all petty

desires, he yielded a ready acquiescence in the selection of General Sherman to

command the Military Division of the Mississippi, his junior in years,

experience and commission, and at no time his superior as a commander. He

executed all the orders of his superior faithfully and co-operated with him in

all plans and movements of his army. He was no army pet, consequently was never

on favored duty of any kind, and possibly no commander ever had so few leaves of

absence. The fame of General Thomas is so well known that comment is

unnecessary. He was always at the front.



    Sherman having severed his connection with the forces in Tennessee, Thomas

received all of his orders direct from Grant. Thomas was in command of all the

troops operating in the Departments of the Cumberland and Ohio, and to him was

committed the task of driving Hood's army from Tennessee. The same army that had

confronted Sherman in Georgia was now before Thomas at Nashville. The audacity

and boldness of Hood's movement was calculated to depress the spirits of his

men, for if defeated, there was no army close enough to come to their rescue.

Beside all of this, Thomas's army was badly scattered, and when once collected

the officers and men were strangers to each other, save the uniform and the old

flag. In Hood's ranks were thousands of Tennesseans who were glad to press their

native soil once more, and when he marched south, hundreds continued to press

the soil of their native State while his broken and shattered army moved south.



Additional Comments:
Extracted from:



HISTORY OF THE FIRST REGIMENT OF

Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry



IN THE GREAT WAR OF THE REBELLION,

WITH THE ARMIES OF THE OHIO AND CUMBERLAND,

UNDER GENERALS MORGAN, ROSECRANS,

THOMAS, STANLEY AND WILSON.



1862-1865.



BY



W. R. CARTER, COMPANY C.



ILLUSTRATED.



KNOXVILLE, TENN.:



GAUT-OGDEN CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS.

1902.



Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1896, by

W. R. CARTER,

in the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C.





TO THE SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE FIRST TENNESSEE CAVALRY; TO THE MEMORY OF OUR

DECEASED COMRADES AND THEIR KINDRED; TO THE MARTYRED PATRIOTS OF EAST TENNESSEE

WHO DIED ON THE GALLOWS AND IN PRISON, AND TO THE LOYAL AND PATRIOTIC PEOPLE WHO

SYMPATHIZED WITH THEM, THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, IN FRATERNITY,

CHARITY AND LOYALTY, BY THE AUTHOR.



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