Statewide County TN Archives Military Records.....Chapter XVII Civilwar 1st TN Cavalry (Union) ************************************************ Copyright. All rights reserved. http://www.usgwarchives.net/copyright.htm http://www.usgwarchives.net/tn/tnfiles.htm ************************************************ File contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by: Joy Fisher sdgenweb@yahoo.com April 13, 2007, 10:15 pm Chapter XVII CHAPTER XVII. BATTLE OF NASHVILLE—A GREAT UNION VICTORY—-THE GREAT CAVALRY BATTLE OF THE WEST—WILSON'S CAVALRY CAPTURING FORTS-HOOD'S ARMY WRECKED—THE DEEEAT AND ROUT—CAPTURING PRISONERS AND GUNS—THE PURSUIT. During this extreme cold weather the soldiers of both armies were trying to keep warm around the blazing camp-fires, while the men on the picket-lines stood shivering like a fellow with the ague. On the 12th there were some signs of a "thaw-out," consequently General Thomas ordered Wilson to move his cavalry from Edgefield to the south side of the river and take up a position on the right of his line. The earth was still covered with ice and it was with the greatest difficulty that Wilson was able to reach the position assigned him. This move, of Wilson thoroughly convinced General Thomas that he could not use his cavalry so long as the ice remained upon the ground; besides, the horses could not draw the artillery and wagons over the slippery surface. This caused another delay, and as we were unable to put up our tents on account of the frozen condition of the ground we passed several very uncomfortable nights on the cold, icy ground, with the sky for a roof and old Mother Earth for a bed. The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained the same, and with the exception of occasional picket-firing nothing of special importance occurred from the 1st to the 14th. The weather, which had entirely stopped all offensive operations, began to moderate, and by the 14th the ground had thawed out sufficiently to enable men and horses to stand up. General Thomas, believing that there would be a general "thaw-out," called a meeting of his corps commanders on the afternoon of the 14th and laid before them his plan of attack, and after a thorough discussion until all fully understood it, special field order No. 342 was issued. This order contained his plan of battle. The formation of the Union troops from left to right was as follows: General Steedman, commanding the District of the Etowah, formed the left; General Wood's Fourth and General Schofield's Twenty-third Corps, the center; General Smith's Sixteenth Corps and Wilson's cavalry, the right. Brigadier-General Miller, commanding the garrison of Nashville, and General Donaldson, with the quartermaster's troops, occupied the interior line. General Wilson formed his cavalry in the following order: Hatch's Fifth Division on the right of the Sixteenth Corps; Croxton's brigade of McCook's First Division to the right of Hatch. The other two brigades—Second and Third —and Eighteenth Indiana Battery, were in Kentucky after General Lyon, who had crossed the Cumberland River near Clarksville and was trying to reach the Louisville & Nashville Railroad at some point north of Nashville. General Johnson's Sixth Division was on Croxton's right—the right of his division extending to the Cumberland River. General Knipe's Seventh Division was formed on the Harding turnpike, inside of the works, and during the early part of the morning was held in reserve, to support either Hatch or Smith. Hood had placed a battery on the extreme left of his line, near Cumberland River. This battery was protected by light earthworks and supported by cavalry, and as Johnson advanced on the morning of the 15th it shelled him vigorously, but the fun was soon spoiled when Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Fitch, who commanded the gunboats, began enfilading this part of Hood's line. The tremendous discharges of his heavy guns could be heard above the rattling fire of the carbines and the light 3-inch Rodmans of Wilson's cavalry, and no doubt contributed largely to the demoralization of this part of Hood's line, which was held by Chalmer's division, supported by infantry. The effective force of General Wilson's corps on the morning of the 15th was twelve thousand, five hundred men and eighteen guns. It was a fine body of men, but very deficient in horses, many being wholly unfit for active service. Reveille was sounded at 4 a. m. on that chilly morning, and by 6 o'clock the men were in line ready to move. A heavy fog hung over the two armies during the morning. This and the unevenness of the ground completely concealed the movements of the Union army. The fog lifted about 9 o'clock, revealing to Hood and his shivering soldiers a grand and magnificent military display, as the solid lines of blue moved forward in splendid order, with colors flying and bands playing. The house-tops in Nashville and the hills were covered with people, all eager to witness the display and battle, while from Montgomery and Overton hills Hood's troops could witness all of our movements; and to them no doubt it was an unexpected revelation. Hood, it seems, was totally unaware of any intention on the part of Thomas to attack his position and especially his left flank, for on advancing toward his position during the morning we came upon unfinished works. Steedman, on the left, was the first to move out and begin the attack. This heavy demonstration on Hood's right was not intended as a real attack, though it had that effect, and he was led to believe that this part of his line was to be attacked in force. As soon as Steedman had completed his movement, General Smith, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, moved out. Then the long, dark lines of Wilson's cavalry began moving forward on the extreme right and commenced the grand movement of the day. Croxton's brigade had been standing in line of battle during the morning just outside of the entrenchments near the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad and on the right of Hatch's division. It was about 10 a. m. when the order came to move. Croxton threw out a strong line of skirmishers and moved his brigade out between the Charlotte turnpike and the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad. The skirmishers moved forward, closely followed by the brigade, and soon the sharp firing in front warned us that the enemy's advance had been struck. The brigade continued to advance, and during the forenoon there was some very sharp skirmishing in Croxton's front. Just after crossing Richland Creek, the enemy opened fire on Croxton's brigade from a battery posted on the Charlotte turnpike. Croxton wheeled the Second Michigan to the right, and supporting it with the Eighth Iowa, moved toward the hill on which the enemy were posted, and after a few volleys from the revolving rifles of the Second Michigan, the enemy fell back. This move turned the enemy's position in front of Johnson's division on the Charlotte turnpike. Croxton received an order from Wilson directing him to remain and support Johnson's division, which was on his right, and who had not yet gotten into position owing to the roughness of the country and the long distance he had to move. During the time Hatch's division, which was just to our left, was driving the enemy along the Harding turnpike, and after crossing Richland Creek the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel Spaulding commanding, made a gallant saber charge, routing the enemy, capturing forty or fifty prisoners and General Chalmers' headquarters train, consisting of fourteen wagons, which contained his records, baggage and safe. In perhaps no battle of the war did cavalry and infantry move forward on the same line and join in the desperate work so eagerly and with so much vigor and unanimity. Often it was a race to see who would be the first to cross the "dreaded ditch," and if the ground was too rough to charge mounted, Wilson's troopers would dismount and with a yell charge the rifle-pits. This part of Hood's line was held by infantry and cavalry, and during the day some sharp fighting occurred on this part of the line. Wilson wheeled Hatch's division to the left and re-established his connection with the infantry. In making this move his right flank struck the enemy's line on the flank and rear, completely enveloping it. Stewart was in command of Hood's left, and during the morning he found that Thomas was working toward his left and beyond his works. He therefore set his troops to work early in the morning building works and extending his line farther to his left. Finding that his own troops could not man the lines, he called for reinforcements, and Hood sent him Johnson's division of Lee's corps. These works were west of the Hillsboro turnpike, and about 1 p. m. Hatch dismounted his men, assaulted and captured one of these advanced redoubts, containing four guns and some three hundred men. This was the first fort captured from Hood, and was accomplished with dismounted cavalry. Immediately after the capture of this fort, Hatch's division charged a second line and captured another four-gun battery, with its infantry support. The captured guns were wheeled around and used upon the retreating enemy. In the capture of this last fort, McMillan's brigade of McArthur's division, Sixteenth Corps, claimed a part of the honor, but as the guidons of Hatch's division were the first over the works, the honor and captured guns were credited to Hatch's brave men by McMillan's brigade. While these successful movements were going on, Wilson's cavalry had not yet reached Hood's true flank on account of the extension of Stewart's line to his left. Late in the afternoon Schofield's Twenty-third Corps was moved to the right of the Sixteenth Corps, so that Wilson could operate more freely upon Hood's left and rear. Shortly after reaching this position, Cooper's brigade of Couch's division, Twenty-third Corps, assaulted and captured a line of works near the Hillsboro turnpike. In this brigade were the Third and Sixth Tennessee Volunteers, our former companions while in Morgan's Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio. Croxton was ordered to move his brigade from the Charlotte turnpike across the country to the Hillsboro turnpike. In making this move Croxton's brigade skirmished most all the way, and shortly after crossing the Harding turnpike Croxton encountered a portion of Chalmers' division, which had been in Johnson's front but was now try-ins: to reach Hood's left. The First Tennessee was in the advance and was marching left in fronts and shortly after dark was fired upon by the enemy, who, by the flash of their guns, seemed to be either behind a stone wall or in rifle-pits. General Croxton immediately ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Dyer to dismount his regiment and dislodge the enemy. The order was promptly obeyed, and in a few minutes the regiment was over the fence and in line ready to move. At the command "forward," the men raised the yell and moved forward under a brisk fire, and in a few minutes reached the stone wall, and springing over succeeded in capturing a portion of the Fifth Mississippi Cavalry. The prisoners were sent to the rear, and moving to the opposite side, again the regiment opened a brisk fire on some troops that were posted in the woods a short distance in its front. In a short time the enemy's fire slackened and soon they fell back, and all became quiet again. The only casualties in the First Tennessee were two men wounded, as follows: Thomas Jones, Company G, and Wiley Milligan, Company I. Darkness having closed the operations for the day and shut out from view the contending forces, Croxton's brigade was ordered to bivouac near the Hillsboro turnpike. This was a hard day on us, as we had been in the saddle since early morning. The operation of Thomas's army on the first day of battle was a grand success and was rewarded by the capture of seventeen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prisoners, besides large quantities of small arms and equipments. Wilson's cavalry had fought during the day infantry and cavalry, had cleared their front, covered the extreme right of Thomas's infantry, and not only enveloped Hood's flank, but had taken it in reverse. Hood's flanks were much stronger than his center, and during the day Wilson's cavalry had completely turned his left and swept everything before them, and at night bivouacked near his line of retreat. During the night Hood withdrew his army and took up a new position south of the one he occupied on the morning of the 15th. This new line was much shorter, and extended from Overton's Hill on the Nashville & Decatur Railroad^ west across the Franklin and Granny White turnpikes, thence almost due south along a range of hills almost parallel with the Granny White turnpike, and reaching nearly to the Brentwood Hills. Hood kept his weary troops working all night digging rifle-pits and building forts, so by morning he had constructed a much stronger line than the one just abandoned. The Union army bivouacked on the cold ground, feeling assured of a complete victory the next day. The early part of the morning of the 16th was spent in reconnoitering the enemy's position. The ground on Hood's left was very, hilly, consequently Wilson moved his troops forward dismounted and by noon was east of the Granny White turnpike and had completely turned Hood's left. During these early movements there was some sharp fighting, but no ground was lost. Wilson's cavalry forced back the enemy, completely turning his left flank, and was now in possession of the hills through which the Granny White turnpike runs, completely cutting off Hood's line of retreat by this route in case of disaster. Stewart made several attempts during the forenoon to drive back Wilson's dismounted cavalry and retake the ground lost, but was unsuccessful and was repulsed without difficulty. Let us now turn to the Union left and see what was going on there. Generals Steedman and Wood had moved forward early in the morning and discovered the enemy thoroughly entrenched on Overton's Hill. At 3 p. m. the works were assaulted by Post's brigade, Beatty's division of Wood's Fourth Corps, supported by Streight's brigade, of the same corps, and Grosvenor's brigade of white troops, and Thompson's brigade of colored troops, all of Steedman's command. The assault was made with great courage, but the fire was so destructive that the two assaulting columns were repulsed with severe loss, Colonel Post being among the severely wounded. The two assaulting columns were re-formed at the foot of the hill for another charge. Smith, Schofield and Wilson now assaulted Hood's center and left with great vigor, sweeping everything before them. The shout of the victorious troops on the right was caught up by those of Wood and Steedman, and again they pushed forward upon the enemy on Overton's Hill, this time driving everything before them and capturing the works. The shout of victory was heard by Thomas's charging troops, which was taken up and responsive cheers heard from one end of the Union line to the other. Hood's lines were broken, and there being no reserves to restore order or save the day, his troops from one end of his line to the other threw away knapsacks and guns and rushed for the rear, which at that time was a long way off. Hood's troops rushed toward the Franklin turnpike in great confusion, and soon lost all semblance of organization and retreated in the wildest confusion. General Wilson's command was delayed in the pursuit, caused by the troops being so far from the led horses, as the men leading them made slow progress over the hills and dense forests. Croxton's brigade, which had been in reserve, was now moved to the right of Hammond's brigade of Knipe's division, and in making this move captured several prisoners. As soon as Wilson's men gained their horses the pursuit was begun, with the commands of Hatch, Knipe and Croxton on the Granny White turnpike and Johnson on ' the Hillsboro turnpike. Everything indicated a rout, and after moving a short distance the leading division—Hatch's —encountered Chalmers' division about dark, well posted behind a rail barricade across the turnpike. Hatch dismounted his division and charged the enemy, driving him from his position. General Rucker was wounded and captured, besides several prisoners and a Confederate flag. In this engagement the Twelfth Tennessee, Union, fought the Twelfth Tennessee, Confederate, and in the darkness and during the hand-to-hand fighting the Twelfth Tennessee, Union, succeeded in capturing General Rucker, who was in command of a Tennessee brigade, also his flag. The line of Hood's retreat revealed the fact that his army had retreated in great haste, as the turnpikes were thickly strewn with guns and accoutrements, while he made no effort to carry off his wounded or bury the dead. Hood's veteran army, which had been engaged in all the hard-fought battles in Tennessee and on the Georgia campaign— "one hundred days under fire"—was wrecked upon the field of Nashville. In perhaps no battle of the war was there such a small loss of life to the victors. The Union troops repeatedly assaulted the enemy's lines, and but one assault was unsuccessful, and that was made upon the strongest position held by Hood, on Overton's Hill on the Union left. And it is doubtful if that would have been a failure had not the gallant leader of the main column fallen at the critical moment, when the presence of a brave and determined leader is so important. The battle moved on vigorously from beginning to end, the cavalry and infantry vieing with each other in the effort to carry everything in their front, reflecting the highest type of generalship and the displaying of that true courage due Thomas and his brave soldiers. This was called the great cavalry battle of the west, and it is exceedingly doubtful if there was a single battle of the war where so much gallant and meritorious service was rendered by that arm of the service. The first fort captured at the opening of the battle was accomplished by Wilson's brave troops fighting as flat-footed infantry, and proving beyond a doubt that if General Hooker had been present at the battle of Nashville he could have seen the remains of several dead cavalrymen. This brave old hero was credited with the remark, "Who ever saw the body of a dead cavalryman?" or that he would pay twenty-five dollars for the "dead body of a cavalryman." The fruits of this battle were four thousand, five hundred prisoners, among whom were Major-General Ed Johnson and Brigadier-Generals H. R. Jackson, T. B. Smith and E. W. Rucker; all of the wounded left upon the field, fifty-four pieces of artillery, together with thousands of small arms and accoutrements and twenty-five battle-flags. The loss in killed and wounded on each side was light when the numbers engaged are taken into consideration. General Thomas reported a loss in killed, wounded and missing of three thousand and sixty-one. The loss in Wilson's cavalry was three hundred and twenty-nine. It is said that Hood issued an order on the morning of the 16th for his army to retreat, but he could not withdraw under fire, so that afternoon his routed and disorganized army was seen flying southward from the battlefield. Let us now turn to the pursuit. After the defeat of Chalmers on the night of the 16th, Wilson deemed it unwise to continue the pursuit, as the night was very dark and the men and horses completely exhausted from the hard day's work. The cavalry bivouacked for the night as follows: Hatch, Croxton and Knipe on the Granny White turnpike, and Johnson on the Hillsboro turnpike. Early the next morning the pursuit was continued by the cavalry, followed by the infantry. At Brentwood, Crox-ton's brigade was ordered to take the Wilson turnpike, Johnson's division the Hillsboro turnpike, while Hatch and Knipe moved their divisions along the Franklin turnpike. Just a short distance beyond Brentwood, Knipe began skirmishing with Hood's rear guard, which was kept up until Hollow Tree Gap was reached. Here the rear guard of the routed army made a stand and offered battle. The position was handsomely carried by Knipe's division, supported by Hatch. The enemy was routed and fell back rapidly toward Franklin. In this spirited engagement the enemy lost by capture four hundred and thirteen officers and enlisted men and two flags. Croxton's brigade skirmished with the rear guard the most of the way to Franklin. Hood made a show of resistance at Franklin, but his flanks being turned he fell back toward Columbia. Croxton and Hatch moved to the left of Franklin, swimming Harpeth River at McGavock's Ford, and encamped for the night near Douglass Church, on the Lewisburg turnpike. In making this move the enemy was encountered only in small force, but we succeeded in capturing about one hundred and thirty prisoners. Johnson crossed below and Knipe in front of Franklin. Hood, finding his flanks turned, abandoned the place, which contained all of his wounded and a large quantity of rations. The little town of Franklin presented a sight that to be seen would never be forgotten. All public buildings, churches, school-houses, stores and even shops and private dwellings had been converted into hospitals, into which the wounded had been crowded after the desperate battle of November 30. A good many of our own wounded were among the sufferers in the crowded hospitals and no doubt many of the wounded of both armies died for want of proper attention. Wilson continued the pursuit south from Franklin with great energy, moving on all the roads, and continued to harass the flanks and rear of Hood's army. Johnson, who was moving on the Carter's Creek turnpike, turned Hood's right flank and dashed on in the direction of Spring Hill to strike the retreating army at that point. Croxton was moving on the Lewisburg turnpike, driving the enemy rapidly along that thoroughfare, while Hatch and Knipe pushed him along the Columbia turnpike. The flanking columns were ordered to push forward and if possible to pass around the flanks of Hood's rear guard, while the center column kept pressing the rear. A short distance south of Franklin, General Lee, who at that time was in command of Hood's rear guard, decided to make a stand in order that his exhausted troops might enjoy a night's rest. But Hatch and Knipe attacked Hood's rear with great energy, driving it back in confusion, capturing three guns. In this running fight General Lee was wounded, and under cover of darkness fled in disorder to Spring Hill. General Lee, in his official report of the Hood campaign, makes the following mention of the pursuit: "Early on the morning of the 17th our cavalry was driven in, in confusion, by the enemy, who at once commenced a most vigorous pursuit, his cavalry charging at every opportunity and in the most daring manner. It was apparent that they were determined to make the retreat a rout if possible. * * * I was compelled to withdraw rapidly toward Franklin, as the enemy was throwing a force in my rear from both the right and left of the pike, on roads coming into the pike near Franklin and five miles in my rear." Early on the morning of the 18th the pursuit was continued, although we were out of rations, with Croxton and Johnson on the flanks endeavoring to strike the enemy at or near Spring Hill, with Hatch and Knipe in the center. On reaching Spring Hill we found the enemy had left early in the morning for Columbia. This day's march was made through mud and slush and a cold, drizzling rain. This was a quiet day, and late in the afternoon the command was halted some four miles south of Spring Hill, where it bivouacked for the night. Before leaving camp on the morning of the 19th, rations were issued to the troops, after which the whole column resumed the pursuit through a storm of rain and snow. Hood fell back during the night and by morning was on the south side of Rutherford's Creek. After crossing the stream he destroyed the railroad bridge, and on reaching Rutherford's Creek we found his rear guard strongly posted behind works on the south bank, completely covering the crossings. On approaching Rutherford's Creek we found this bold and rapid stream very much swollen by the heavy rains of the past twenty-four hours. This rise made it impossible for the cavalry to cross, and as we were without a pontoon bridge, a short halt was made. The deep, swift current of Rutherford's Creek formed almost as good a rear guard as Hood's discouraged troops. The rains had ruined the roads; in fact, it was almost impossible for the troops to move except along the turnpikes, the dirt roads being nothing more than quagmires. During the day several attempts were made to cross the stream, but all of them failed. Wood's Fourth Corps reached us on the afternoon of the 19th. This was a very dreary and disagreeable day, as a cold and drizzling rain continued to fall during the day. Late in the afternoon Hatch made a floating bridge from material obtained from the partially destroyed railroad bridge, and taking his men over dismounted, succeeded in driving back the enemy from the south bank. During the night the pontoons arrived and on the morning of the 21st were thrown across Rutherford's Creek at or near where the Columbia turnpike crosses, Wilson's cavalry pushed on toward Columbia, but was able to capture but few prisoners, as Hood had taken advantage of the swollen stream to slip out of the way of his pursuers. At Rutherford's Creek the divisions of Johnson and Knipe were turned back and sent to Nashville for the purpose of being remounted. On reaching Columbia the advance of Wilson's cavalry had a light skirmish at the crossing with the rear of Hood's army. There was considerable cannonading during the day by both armies^ but toward night the firing ceased and all became quiet. Duck River was very much swollen by the recent rains. For the next two days the cavalry remained in camp, awaiting the arrival of the pontoons. The weather, which had been exceedingly gloomy and wet for the past few days, now changed to bitter cold, greatly retarding the work of laying the bridge in front of Columbia. The sudden freeze caused the river to fall rapidly, necessitating frequent alterations and changes of the bridge. Hood from the very start managed to keep his wagons well toward his front, thereby saving them from capture. At this place Hood ran some of his guns into Duck River to prevent capture. Not quite a month before, Hood's army was headed north and was full of hope, expecting to brush away the little army that confronted them, capture Nashville and march on to Louisville. But after the reception given his army at Franklin and Nashville, he changed his mind, about-faced and, like the soldier who went to Lee for a furlough, continued the march. As the story may not be familiar to the reader, I will relate it. One day a soldier went to General R. E. Lee for a furlough. The general said to him, "Take the position of a soldier," which he promptly did. Lee then gave the command, "About-face, forward march!" And as the soldier was not halted he continued the march to his home. Additional Comments: Extracted from: HISTORY OF THE FIRST REGIMENT OF Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry IN THE GREAT WAR OF THE REBELLION, WITH THE ARMIES OF THE OHIO AND CUMBERLAND, UNDER GENERALS MORGAN, ROSECRANS, THOMAS, STANLEY AND WILSON. 1862-1865. BY W. R. CARTER, COMPANY C. ILLUSTRATED. KNOXVILLE, TENN.: GAUT-OGDEN CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS. 1902. Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1896, by W. R. CARTER, in the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C. TO THE SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE FIRST TENNESSEE CAVALRY; TO THE MEMORY OF OUR DECEASED COMRADES AND THEIR KINDRED; TO THE MARTYRED PATRIOTS OF EAST TENNESSEE WHO DIED ON THE GALLOWS AND IN PRISON, AND TO THE LOYAL AND PATRIOTIC PEOPLE WHO SYMPATHIZED WITH THEM, THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, IN FRATERNITY, CHARITY AND LOYALTY, BY THE AUTHOR. File at: http://files.usgwarchives.net/tn/statewide/military/civilwar/other/u1sttncav333nmt.txt This file has been created by a form at http://www.genrecords.net/tnfiles/ File size: 28.3 Kb