Denton County, TX. - Military: The Bailey Brothers In The Civil War
************************************************************************
USGENWEB ARCHIVES NOTICE:  These electronic pages may NOT be reproduced
in any format for profit or presentation by any other organization or
persons.  Persons or organizations desiring to use this material, must
obtain the written consent of the contributor, or the legal
representative of the submitter, and contact the listed USGenWeb
archivist with proof of this consent.

The submitter has given permission to the USGenWeb Archives to store the
file permanently for free access.

   Contributed for use in USGenWeb Archives by:
   Ruby Prescott <rubyred1@flash.net>
   June 18, 2002
************************************************************************

                 THE BAILEY BROTHERS IN THE CIVIL WAR

William Bailey was born about 1810 in S.C. He moved to Miss. at an early age.
He and his wife, Mary Fletcher, had these children: William Edwin-B-in Kemper-
Scott Co. Miss. March 15, 1839. Ezekiel M.-B.- abt. 1841-Miss. , Robert N.  B.
-Abt. 1842-Ala., Lewis J. & Elizabeth-B. -March 24,1845-Leake County, Miss.
sometime after this; William’s wife died and he then married Sarah. They had:
Alexander-B. -abt. 1854, Henry-B. -abt. 1856, Nicholas-B. - abt. 1860.  I
cannot locate the family in the 1850 census but they were in Scott Co. in 1860
which leads me to believe they were also there in 1850, but were somehow missed
in the count.

It was a sad day for William, when on the 27th of July 1861 all four of his
older sons were mustered into the service of the Confederate States. Capt. T.B.
Graham had enrolled them on June 18, 1861. They went to Iuka, Tishomingo Co.,
Miss. All four had signed up for the duration of the war. Of course, like
everyone else, they thought the war wouldn’t last but a few months.

This Company of men were know as Capt. Graham’s Co., Mississippi Volunteers,
and as Capt. Graham’s Co. and Co. F., 20th Reg. Miss. Inf. Some of the men in
this unit had previously been in the state service. It was known for a short
time after being organized as Russell’s Regiment Mississippi Volunteers.

The 20th Infantry Regiment was organized during the late summer of 1861 with
men from Bolivar, Monroe, Noxubee, Adams, Scott, Carroll, and Newton counties.
The unit moved to Virginia, then Tennessee where it was captured on Feb. 16,
1862.

William Edwin was 22 years old at the time. Ezekiel M. was 20, Robert N. 19 and
Lewis J. was only 16. William ‘s heart was broken to see his 16 year old march
of to war with his older brothers. He had a great fear that he might never see
any of them again. Just five months later some of his fears came true at the
fall of Fort Donelson, during one of the coldest winters ever recorded.

Fort Donelson was built in the early winter of 1861 on a ledge just west of
Dover, Tenn.  Its purpose was to deny the Yankees the use of the Cumberland
River, and the batteries placed in the fort were well suited to the task. The
fort itself consisted of little more than a series of shallow earthen
entrenchments that extended in a semicircle around the batteries and just south
of Dover. Hickman creek, to the north, and Indian Creek, to the south, gave
additional protection to the flanks. The entire area was hilly and heavily
forested, with only a few poor roads running through it. The most important of
these was the Wynn’s Ferry Road, running Southwest from Dover.

Grant had just taken Fort Henry and he figured the boys at Fort Donelson would
be nervous, jittery, and maybe easy to capture, or at least drive them out of
middle and west Tennessee. He thought the best way would be to march overland
to Donelson.  Bad weather held him up a few days, but he finally got started on
February 11. He was nearly to the Fort by February 13. He had a total of
twenty-four infantry regiments, seven batteries of artillery, and several
mounted units Floyd had twenty seven regiments of infantry and additional
supporting troops. Grants forces were divided into two divisions: the 1st,
under John A. McClernand at the right, or eastern end of the line, and the 2nd,
under Charles F. Smith, on the left.

The infantry on both sides had a miserable day on the fourteenth. Grant had
received some reinforcements, Lew Wallace’s 3rd Division, which had come up the
Cumberland on transports behind Foote’s gunboats. There had been a blizzard the
previous night, and as the troops could not have campfires, they had been cold,
wet, and unhappy. A few wounded men froze to death.

Most Regiments had a special company composed of their best marksmen, and
during the investment of the fort they went out as individuals. They sought
cover behind rocks stumps, or in hollows. Some dug holes, others climbed into
trees. Once in a good spot, they stayed there all day, shooting at anything in
the enemy breastworks that moved.  It was dangerous to show a head and
impossible to start a campfire. Both sides contented themselves with hardtack.

Grants plan was to keep the Confederate infantrymen pinned within their lines
while the gunboats attacked the batteries at close range. Both he and Foote
thought that the boats would reduce the opposition at Donelson just as they had
at Henry. When the batteries were destroyed and the fleet controlled the river,
while Grant’s men blocked the exits, the Confederates would have to surrender.

Foote opened fire at about a mile’s range. His shells fell short and he moved
in closer. He finally came within ¼ mile and then only four hundred yards. All
the ironclads were taking hits, the decks were slippery with blood, the
surgeons were absorbed in tending the wounded, and the carpenters were busy
making repairs. Foote and the disabled boats began to float down the current.
Any victory won at Fort Donelson would have to be won by the army.

Grant was disappointed at Foote’s failure, but he did not panic. He knew that
the Confederates could not get reinforcements into the fort nor bring supplies
to the besieged men. He was willing to wait for starvation to bring him
victory.

Within the confines of the entrenchments, the infantry of Johnson had begun to
suffer heavily from the bombardment. The Texans of the 7th, poorly armed and
inexperienced, became so unnerved at the shell fragments which skipped through
their trenches that the 20th Mississippi, held in reserve since their morning
arrival, was sent by Johnson as a replacement. Dissatisfied with the state of
their cover, the Mississippians began to burrow downward like moles. Amid their
labors to build and bolster the height and thickness of their breastworks, the
20th Mississippi found it to their comfort and advantage to keep their feet dry
by bailing the accumulated water and melted snow out of the trench.

The Confederates decided not to wait. That night Floyd held a council of war
and all present agreed with his plan to attack the Union right wing and force a
breakout. The southerners spent the night of February 14 preparing for the
attack. Most of the troops left their rifle pits and massed over on the left.
They made every effort to keep silent, but heavy gun carriages just could not
be moved without making some noise. Yet, because of high winds from the tail of
the blizzard, the Yankees did not hear them.

At dawn when the woods were ringing with reveille and the numbed Union soldiers
were rising from their icy beds and shaking off the snow, the Confederates
struck. Pillow led the attack on the left, Buckner in the center. The general
direction was along Wynn’s Ferry Road. The 20th Mississippi serving with
Davidson’s brigade received orders to march at double time to the extreme left
of the line to be thrown in with Baldwin’s infantry. On the Forge Road, Baldwin
assembled his brigade with the 26th Mississippi in the lead, followed by the
26th Tennessee and with the 20th Mississippi trailing.

In the valley of Barn Hollow and to the east of the roadway lay a large open
field. Between the field and the road-about 10 yards from the latter-stood a
rail fence roughly parallel to the Forge road.  While the field offered no
protection for mounting an attack within range of the enemy musketry, Pillow
also knew he could not afford to expose his flank by leaving the enemy there
unopposed.  The newly assigned and idle rear regiment of Baldwin’s brigade-the
20th Mississippi- was handed the task. The leg of the fence coming at right
angles to the road and at the north end of the field gave the new regiment a
fine bulwark behind which to string out.

Colonel Isaac Pugh of McArthur’s brigade had long since discovered that the
biting cold of winter always brought on his most aggressive nature. His pickets
had also been involved in raising the alarm for the brigade. Almost on reflex
on the hearing of the news, Pugh had shoved two companies of skirmishers of the
41st Illinois forward on the road, the right side of which was his
responsibility.

Before Confederate eyes, patches of blue began to appear around the road
dividing the two Mississippi regiments. Penetration of this gap could
disastrously delay the assault. Instead of activating the third regiment of the
brigade, Pillow decided to utilize the 20th- already at hand and already in
formation. Speaking to its senior office, Major Brown, he outlined a rather
complex flank assault on the Union skirmishers. The Confederate line would
swivel until it was parallel to the road, catch the Yankees in their right
flank, and then remain in a position to cover the exposed gap. Pillow in turn
would be responsible for filling the hole behind the fence.

Meanwhile the gray-clad components of the 20th Mississippi had enthusiastically
leaped over the fence that had so conveniently allowed them to dress their
line. With the right flank company marking time, the 500 Mississippians began
one gigantic wheeling movement toward the west.  Major Brown considered this
less risky than moving his inexperienced recruits into position by echelon.

Pillow, in his saddle near the road, raised his field glasses and took in the
crisis. After a few seconds meditation he instructed the messengers to cancel
the previous orders and to return the 20th to its former position. To verify
the correctness of the interpretation of his wishes, he sent one of his on
aides with identical instructions to Major Brown.

Minutes later soldiers under Brown’s command were scampering over the fence and
stretching themselves in security at its base. Not all the regiment had
retired, however. Several companies of the left wing found it impossible to
extricate themselves immediately; now they were the subjects of the attentions
of the entire 41st Illinois.

Brown’s left wing wasted no time packing up and hustling north through the
level field. Behind the fence, the breathless returnees added nothing to the
moral of an already confused majority of the 20th Mississippi. They now had a
clear view of the smart and trim Union rows marching upon them through the
stubby vegetation of the field. Soon a volley coming their way reminded them
they were scared. First a few, then more, then everyone drifted back from the
fence. Officers spread to attempt to rally a line of defense on the southern
rim of the hollow.

As the Tennesseans were ominously threatening his left flank Pugh had wrested
the fence from the 20th Mississippi and he had thrown Wharton’s flanking
brigade off balance by seizing a clump of trees in their front. Suddenly the
tide was turning again. Some yards behind the fence Major Brown was bringing
his regiment under control. The right wing of the 41st in penetrating beyond
the woods encountered fresh legions of Southerners. These were not content with
blunting the attack but were pushing to the east and forming on the flank. On
Pugh’s left a detachment of Confederates directed themselves south on the
roadway, menacing his other flank. Seeing no reinforcements on the way, Pugh
deftly removed the 11th from the hotly contested field. It was the first
Federal retreat of Saturday, February 15.

Shouting encouragement to one another, the two regiments of Baldwin’s original
command took the initiative for the Confederate army. Preceded a short distance
by a thin line of skirmishers, the main body of the brigade swept through the
stabbing tickets and tread over the stubby ground until they had reached an
acceptable firing distance from the Union assemblage. Here they delivered their
first volley as a unit that day.

On the road, General Gideon Pillow felt the spark of new courage. One regiment
of the brigade, the 20th Mississippi, had already been demoralized and
withdrawn from the field of action. Another had formed only with the greatest
difficulty. Yet still, the brigade could throw itself boldly into the fray.
With such material, he exclaimed, how could his cause lose?

Colonel Wharton dug his spurs into his stallion and guided him behind the
fence. Within minutes, he was returning the smart salute of Major William Brown
of the 20th Mississippi. To Brown, Wharton explained the awkward position of
his brigade. The information he desired from the Major was if the 20th was
recovered enough to make a lodgment in the face of the Union firepower. The
sparse resources of his brigade, he admitted, were not equal to the task. Brown
responded that he could do no more than try. The two departed hoping for the
best.

The Mississippians decided to take no chances in their re-entry into the fray.
Whooping and hollering in unison they hurtled the fence and dashed pell-mell
through the clearing to a spot of advantage occupied by their dead and wounded.
Here they unleashed a volley upon the already hardpressed 9th Illinois.

The 9th Illinois continued to reap the blows of a human whirlwind. Now almost
the entire effort of Baldwin’s three regiments fell upon their heads. The
Confederates, under continual reminder, aimed their weapons low. Large caliber
smoothbore pieces firing buckshot and bullets cut the Illinois down in bundles.
As so often with novices, particularly on the top of slopes looking down, the
fire of the Yankees largely passed over the heads of the Mississippians and
Tennesseans. In spite of heavy losses and non-effective return, the 9th
Illinois clung tenaciously to their hillside.

Discovering everything to be going as well as could be expected in his
immediate location and with reinforcements from Heiman preparing to stride down
the hill to Buckner’s aid, Gideon Pillow stepped into the saddle in preparation
to riding behind the trenches back to the direction of the coordinated
divisions.

Grey-uniformed skirmishers, discouraged by the interlocking arms of the
deciduous trees, came filtering back to Brown’s brigade with the report that
the enemy could no longer be found or seen. North of the road Colonels Palmer
and Cook set out to see for themselves. With a small escort, they ventured into
the forest and soon in peering up the slope, they spotted a portion of Thayer’s
baggage. The return of the colonels after noon coincided with the retreat of
Forrest’s shaken vanguard.

Along Baldwin’s stilled battlefront General Bushrod Johnson had again vanished,
this time taking the 20th Mississippi under his wing. Baldwin, left with only
his two hardest fought regiments, was furious.

In the opening moments of the afternoon, Bushrod Johnson, with the recent
addition of the 20th Mississippi, renewed his frustrated attempts to outflank
Cruft’s brigade with Drake’s detachment.  The radical refusal of Cruft’s right
flank, however, led to a confused wandering of the semi-amorphous unit in which
they made little or no contact with the enemy Union battations.

After the first confused moments, with shots and shouts ringing out in the cold
air, McClernand’s brigade commanders got their units formed into line and began
to return the Confederates’ fire. Both sides slugged away for the better part
of the morning, spreading a lurid red over the snow, toppling limbs from trees
and sending up a continuous roar. The Yankees held.  About noon, officers from
various regiments rode up to the Union brigade commander on the right, with
news that their men were running out of ammunition. They asked where they could
get more, but he could only reply, "Take it from the dead and wounded." The men
that could not find ammunition, began to give way, holding up their empty
cartridge boxes as they re-treated to prove that they were not cowards. Seeing
them the Southerners gave a whoop and swept around the flank, the Yankees began
to retreat. The Confederates had control of the Forge Road; the road to the
southeast and Nashville was open to them.

The time had come to begin the retreat to the south. There can be no doubt that
had the                Confederates started out by noon they would have made it
safely to Nashville. The Union force probably would not have even mounted an
effective pursuit, since Grant was not on scene to direct it. He had left
before daybreak to consult with Foote and was in the middle of the Cumberland
River on the St. Louis. Pillow convinced himself that Grants whole army was
fleeing in rout for Fort Henry. He rode over to Buckner and accused him of
cowardice.  He ordered Buckner to attack. He then abandoned the thought of a
Confederate retreat to Nashville.

Lew Wallace decided to turn and fight. He placed the artillery across the road,
with the infantry on either side and in reserve. The Confederates hit the
roadblock at full speed and rebounded like a rubber ball. For the next ten
minutes they tried to break through, finally decided it was impossible, and
stopped to catch their breath. A lull settled over the field.

Just then, Grant rode up. He had ridden the entire length of his line, and was
satisfied with what he saw. Noticing the full knapsacks on the Confederate
dead, Grant immediately realized that Floyd and Pillow were trying to cut their
way out. He began walking his horse along the line, calling out to his men,
"Fill your cartridge boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to
escape and he must not be permitted to do so." It worked. The men cheered, set
to work, and quickly re-established the line on the right.

Grant then decided to launch an attack of his own. He was sure that Floyd must
have stripped his entrenchments to make the attack, so he rode over to Smith’s
headquarters and told that general to attack.

The position was a mean one, uphill and criss-crossed with felled trees. Smith,
in what Grant called "an incredibly short time," got his men into line and
began the movement. Smith him-self went to the front and center of the line to
keep his men from firing while they worked their way through the abatis. From
time to time, he turned in his saddle to make sure the alignment was kept. He
looked as if he were on review; one private remarked, "I was nearly scared to
death, but I saw the old man’s white mustache over his shoulder, and went on."
Confederate fire began to increase and men began to fall. Smith’s line
hesitated. The general put his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft,
and called out, "No flinching now, my lads! Here-this is the way!  Come on!"
Most of his men followed him, broke through the abatis, and scattered the
Confederates.

Grant now held an important section of the Southern entrenchments. Lew Wallace
and McClernand meanwhile had reorganized their men and launched their own
attacks, driving Pillow’s and Buckners men back into their entrenchments. The
Confederate attempt to break out had failed.

That night, as both sides gathered their wounded, Floyd and Pillow argued about
ways of extricating the army from its embarrassing position. Unable to reach an
agreement, at one A.M., they called a meeting of all the general officers and
regimental and brigade commanders. When most of the leaders assembled, Floyd
began to speak.  His scouts had just discovered that Grant had five regiments
of reinforcements coming to join his army. Floyd wanted to get out before they
arrived. He ordered his men to march by four a.m. The officers all left except
Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner. They remained in Dover at Pillow’s headquarters.
Buckner argued that Floyd’s orders were as unrealistic as Pillows actions had
been the preceding morning. The troops had fought all day and were exhausted.
There had been no regular issue of rations for days and the ammunition was
nearly expended. Grant had four times as many men and half of his were fresh.
It would be madness to try to fight their way through. If he persisted, Floyd
would lose three-quarters of his men, and Buckner said, "he did not think any
general had the right to make such a sacrifice of human life.” Pillow argued
that they ought to hold on and wait for transports to carry them across the
river; then they could make their escape by way of Clarksville, and “thus save
the army.” Buckner pointed out that Smith had already gained their
entrenchments & the Yankees would overrun them the next day.

Pillow stood up and declared, “Gentlemen, if we cannot cut our way out nor
fight on there is no alternative left us but capitulation, and I am determined
that I will never surrender the command nor will I ever surrender myself a
prisoner. Floyd chimed in, “ Nor will I; I cannot and will not surrender.”
Pillow added that he thought, “ there were no two persons in the Confederacy
whom the Yankees would prefer to capture than himself and General Floyd.” He
then ask Floyd if he could scurry off with him. Floyd replied. “It was a
question for every man to decide for himself.”

At this point Forrest entered the room, looked at the gloomy faces, and
demanded to know if they intended to surrender. Someone nodded. Forrest stomped
out of the room, assembled his officers, and announced, “Boys, the people are
talking about surrendering, and I am going out of this place before they do or
bust hell wide open. “ He got his troops together and marched them through the
icy streams and creeks to safety.  Most of the eastern end of the line was
unguarded.

After Forrest left, the comic opera at headquarters reached its climax. Floyd
started the last act. “General Buckner, “ he said, I place you in command; will
you permit me to draw out my brigade?’  “Yes, provided you do so before the
enemy act upon my communications, “Buckner replied.  Turning to Pillow, Floyd
said, “General Pillow, I turn over my command.”  Pillow exclaimed, “I pass it.”
Buckner grimly declared, “I assume it; bring on a bugler, pen, ink, and paper.”
While Buckner began his bitter duty, Floyd and Pillow dashed out and got down
to the river, where they were expecting a steamboat. Just before dawn, the
boats arrived.

On the riverbank was a scene of utter disorganization. Most of Floyd’s brigade
was drawn up to march up the gangplanks, Major Brown of the 20th Mississippi
(now reunited with McCausland’s brigade after service with Baldwin and
Johnson), had learned of the intention to embark on the steamers from one of
Buckner’s aides. Brown then went to Floyd to have these orders from an odd
source verified, which they were.

At the landing, various notions prevailed as to the order of march of the
evacuation. Floyd intended to have the regiments embark according to the rank
of their active commanding officer.  Others had heard that the order of march
from Bowling Green would be preserved. In any event, Major Brown assumed that
he was the junior major commanding a regiment, whereas in actuality a captain
was in charge of the 56th Virginia.

Meanwhile, rank and file, absent without leave, poured into Dover, intent upon
obtaining passage upon the boats. They turned into a rabble, pressing upon the
not-too orderly lines of the Virginians Floyd, nearly beside himself under the
pressure of events, called upon Brown and the 20th to form a ring of bayonets
around the wharf to keep those “unauthorized” from infiltrating aboard the
steamers.

Sometime after five o'clock both steamers were under way with the first load to
be ferried to the north side of the river. The 20th Mississippi, as the press
of the refugees had relaxed, stacked their arms and waited with anticipation
for the return of the ferries. They never did! Out of the 31officers & 469
enlisted men in the 20th Mississippi, 19 of these were killed & 60 wounded.

Buckner, who held to his old fashioned belief that a general’s responsibility
extended to going into captivity with his men, composed his note to Grant,
asking for terms of capitulation. Grant received it just before daylight. His
reply was terse: “No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be
accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.”

Buckner was shocked.  He wrote his reply to Grant. “The distribution of the
forces under my command incident to an unexpected change of commanders and the
overwhelming force under your command compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant
success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and
unchivalrous terms which you propose.” So Donelson was gone, and with it all of
western Kentucky and Tennessee.

Grant issue Special field order No. 10 directing:

All prisoners taken at the surrender of Ft. Donelson will be collected as
rapidly as practicable near the village of Dover, under their respective
company and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by
Brig. Gen. S.B. Buckner, and will receive two days’ rations preparatory to
embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets and
such private property as may be carried about their person and commissioned
officers will be allowed their sidearms.

Later that morning Grant rode into Buckner’s headquarters. The two commanders
made final practical arrangements- the prisoners went north on Yankee
transports, Buckner went with them.  There were 15,000 Confederates captured
that day. They were all sent North to the prison camps.  Seven thousand of the
men were sent to Camp Douglas, Ill. Three of them were the BAILEY brothers.
WILLIAM EDWIN, EZEKIEL M. & ROBERT N.

The steamboats left on Monday the 17th. The prisoners didn’t know their
destination. The weather was still very cold. They arrived at Alton, Ill., the
following Saturday, the 22nd. They were marched to boxcars, into which were
crowded fifty to a car. Eighteen hours later they emerged at Chicago.

It was Sunday, they had no fires and nothing to eat or drink, only a tin cup
full of hot coffee for each man. They were marched to Camp Douglas prison. Most
of the men were stricken with erysipelas.

At Camp Douglas, Ill., there was only one surgeon for a prisoner population of
over 7000. Some thought was being given to employing some civilian surgeons to
help with the treatment of the sick.

Among the first steps to be taken in caring for the prisoners was getting their
name enrolled.  To each mess, according to international law and the
regulations of the army, was to be issued the same food in quality and quantity
as was given to the enlisted soldiers of the forces of the United States. In
addition, those for whom the prescribed ration did not furnish sufficient
luxury or variety, were permitted to purchase from a licensed sutler other food
and necessary supplies, except intoxicants. The prisoners were allowed to have
money for these purchases, although large amounts sent or given to prisoners
were administered by the commanding officer. Visitors, except close and loyal
relatives of the sick, were not permitted. Finally, the prisoners were not
permitted to leave the confines of the camp.

Placing the prisoners in confinement, and establishing rules for the proper
discipline of the camps were not the only necessities to which the United
States had to attend.  The laws of war oblige the captor to feed the prisoners,
to clothe them, and to provide them with the necessary comforts of life. This
was a minimum requirement, and might be modified by conventions with the enemy
to supply specified kinds of food and clothing or to allow other privileges to
the captured. Since there was no arrangement with the forces of the seceding
states, Gen. Meigs early pointed out that the United States was only obliged to
give the prisoners one ration a day. In case they needed clothing, they might
be placed in a position to earn it by their own labor. The regulation ration
which the prisoners were to receive consisted of three-fourths of a pound of
bacon or one and one-quarter pounds of beef, one and one-third pounds white or
one and one-quarter pounds of corn-bread, one-tenth pound of coffee, one and
one half ounces of rice or hominy, one–sixth pound of sugar, a gill of vinegar,
one candle, a tablespoonful of salt, and beans, potatoes, and molasses in small
amounts. It cost ten to fifteen cents per prisoner a day. The prisoners were
required to do their own cooking.

Since these rations, which consisted mainly of meat, bread, and rice or hominy,
were considered too much for men leading a sedentary life, portions of the
issues were ordered withheld.

In addition to feeding the prisoners, it was necessary for the United States
Government to guard them against exposure due to their insufficient clothing.
Prisoners were allowed to receive gifts from friends but it was obvious that
this method would not suffice to keep any large proportion of them well clad.
Meigs instructed Hoffman to furnish them with “such clothing and bedding as may
be absolutely necessary for their health and comfort.” In the latter part of
January 1862, Hoffman was informed that defective clothing which had been
rejected as unfit army use, was to be issued to the prisoners of war. He was
also authorized to issue army blankets as they were needed. Hoffman decided
that blankets and clothing would both be needed, as he believed that it would
be necessary to discard the filthy clothing worn by prisoners when they arrived
at a camp.

When the prisoners from Fort Donelson arrived, Hoffman found his expectations
justified. Reports from Camp Butler declared that they were the “hardest
looking set of men ever brought together.” Their uniforms were rags of all
colors, and they were equipped with strips of carpets for blankets. Such of
their clothing as was fit for use was adapted to a warmer climate than that of
the northern camps. Clothing was issued to the prisoners from the condemned
stock, and from supplies of materials not of the regulation color or cut.
Friends were allowed to send clothing to the destitute and some of the prison
commanders had a tendency to neglect issuing clothing in order to force the
prisoners’ friends to take action in their behalf. New clothing was issued even
to the eve of exchange, being stopped just before exchange was completed, since
such issues would be gifts to the Southern armies.

Aside from the daily roll calls and the police of their quarters, the duties of
the prisoners were few. For the most part, they enjoyed all of the liberties
consistent with their position. Their confinement was necessity, and visiting
was prohibited on the grounds of public policy. Disloyal visitors sometimes
lent aid to prisoners who planned to escape, and the restriction of visiting
was found to be conducive to better discipline. Mail from the prisoners and
letters coming into the prison camp were subjected to a censorship, and the
prisoners were limited to one page of personal matter in their letters.

Prison labor was used to make improvements in their camps. Generally, the
prisoners did not object to this work. Hoffman marveled that they did not even
complain of having to do things of such “doubtful propriety” as putting up the
fences that enabled their captors to hold them more securely.

Prisoners who worked were enable to overcome, to some extent, the mental
depression attendant upon their condition. The deprivation of liberty rested
heavily on men who were accustomed to a life without restrictions. The nerves
of the prisoners were constantly on edge, and they passed from periods of
excitement to ones of depression as the ever-current rumors of exchange varied
from hopeful to hopeless. To overcome the effects of confinement on the nervous
system and to pass away the time in prison, the prisoners played games,
gambled, and, in their nervous condition even fought. Two prisoners were
reported killed by their fellows at Camp Douglas. To relieve the depression
religious services were held in the prisons. It did not overcome the mental
depression of the prisoners. Many of them were sick or wounded when they were
taken captive, and others fell victims to the colder climate and the inevitable
exposure. Aside from the exposure and mental depression, much sickness resulted
from the physical conditions of the camps.  At Camp Douglas, President Bellows
of the United States Sanitary Commission found deplorable conditions. Declaring
that only some special providence, or some peculiar efficacy of the lake winds,
could prevent the camp from becoming a source of pestilence, he called upon
Hoffman to abandon the location before “the amount of standing water, of
unpoliced grounds, of foul sinks, of rotten bones and the emptying of camp
kettles,” resulted in disaster.

The post surgeon indorsed this report with the declaration that the hospital
was overcrowded and Hoffman recommended to Meigs a system of drainage for the
camp. Hoffman then ordered Tucker, successor to Colonel Mulligan as commandant
of the prison, to begin a system of police which should clean the camp,
although he explained to Meigs that the use of prison labor would considerably
reduce the estimated expense. Meigs, however, would authorize only minor
improvements for the camp, justifying his action by an appeal to humanity,
which required that the prisoners be given the treatment of enlisted men in the
United States Army, and by the further argument that, whatever the prisoners
received, it would be better than the rebels accorded to their prisoners.

Robert N. and Ezekiel M. Bailey both became so ill they were sent to the
hospital. Ezekiel died there on Feb. 25, 1962 from disease. Robert was admitted
with Pneumonia on the 28th of Feb. and released on March 13. In the meantime,
Ezekiel M. Bailey had been buried in the Confederate mounds in the Oakwood
Cemetery, Chicago, Ill.

On Aug. 1, 1862, both William Edwin Bailey and Robert N. Bailey were still on
the prisoners list at Camp Douglas. The captives were usually exchanged within
10 days. Perhaps due to Ezekiel's death and Robert being in the camp hospital,
William declined to leave at that time. They were finally sent to Vicksburg
aboard the Steamer Jno. II, on Sept. 2, 1862 to be exchanged. They were then
assigned to Tilghman’s and J. Adams’ Brigade, Department of Mississippi and
East Louisiana. For a time it served in the Vicksburg area, then transferred to
the Army of Tennessee. Placed in J. Adams’ and Lowry’s Brigade, the 20th was
involved in the Atlanta and Tennessee Campaigns and ended the war in North
Carolina. Only a remnant surrendered on April 26, 1865. Its commanders were
Colonels William N. Brown and D.R. Russell; Lt. Colonels D.H. Maury, Horace H.
Miller and Walter A. Rorer; and Majors William M. Chatfield, Thomas B. Graham
and C.K. Massey.

President Davis felt that the enemy had two principal objects in view, one to
get control of the Mississippi River, and the other to capture the capital of
the Confederate States. With this in mind, he appointed Maj. Gen. John C.
Pemberton as commander of the new Confederate Dept. of Mississippi and East
Louisiana, replacing Van Dorn, in Oct. 1862. His main duty was the defense of
Vicksburg on the Mississippi.

In Nov. Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnson was assigned to the major command in
the West, embracing western North Carolina, Tennessee, northern Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana. Johnson ‘s main task would be to
supervise Bragg in Tennessee and Pemberton at Vicksburg.

The new year of 1863, opened with the sound of artillery and small arms in
Tennessee, where the battle at Murfreesboro or Stone’s River remained to be
decided. In the east the Confederacy could pause a little, as Burnside’s
Federal army was held on the hills beyond Fredericksburg, and Lee’s taut host
lay between him and the southland. Elsewhere the Confederacy still saw the
prongs of possible eventual defeat striking for its vitals. Threats continued
on the Mississippi, where more assaults against Vicksburg would come soon,
along the coastline, from New Orleans, and from Tennessee. For the North the
defeat at Fredericksburg rankled, and there was criticism of the Army, of
generals, of Washington, Lincoln had already announced emancipation. For the
abolitionists, it was not enough; for others, it was far too much.

After many failed attempts, by the Union army, Grant was finally able to take
the Bluffs near Vicksburg. Thus began the siege in May of 1863. Grant shelled
the city night and day for six weeks.  The citizens were unable to get food and
medicine through. The people were starving; most of their homes were damaged or
destroyed. Many of them had moved to the caves nearby, for protection.

On Friday, July 3rd, 1863, white flags of truce flew on Confederate earthworks
as Genls. Pemberton and Grant conferred under an oak tree for the surrender of
the fortress of Vicksburg. For over a year the Federals had operated against
the city. It had resisted all attempts by land and water, but now six weeks of
siege had done the job. Pemberton had no choice. No chance remained that Joseph
E. Johnston’s Confederate force could defeat Grant or relieve the city. Food,
while not exhausted, was very scarce, and it would only have lasted a few days
more. (Mule meat was declared quite palatable by some.) After some discussion,
the terms were settled upon, including paroling of prisoners. The formal
surrender would take place on July 4th.

On this Independence Day Vicksburg, Mississippi, was surrendered formally by
Confederates under Pemberton to Federals under Grant. About 29,000 Southern
soldiers laid down their arms and marched out of the sorely tried city. A quite
Union army observed their departure. Gen. Grant himself entered Vicksburg and
watched the Stars and Stripes replace the Confederate flag on the courthouse.
In the river, the naval vessels shrilled their whistles. The Mississippi River
was nearly open now, except for Port Hudson, still strongly besieged. However,
it was clear that the news of Vicksburg’s fall would undoubtedly cause the end
at Port Hudson also.

A resident of the City who had spent weeks living in a hillside cave said of
the surrender: “ I wept incessantly, meeting first one group of soldiers and
then another, many of them with tears streaming down their faces. The Bailey
brothers were among the 29,000 soldiers who laid down their arms and marched
away, to fight another day! They were in many more battles before the war was
over.

On Sunday, July 17th, 1864, President Davis replaced Gen. Joseph E. Johnston,
who was in command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, with Gen. John Bell
Hood. Hood was very impetuous but a fighter. Many felt that Johnston had been
too cautious. Hood took over on the 18th of July in Georgia. Near Peachtree
creek north of Atlanta, skirmishing at Buckhead presaged more severe action to
come.

On July the 19th, Shermans men, mainly the Army of the Cumberland under George
H. Thomas, pushed forward along Peach Creek, north of Atlanta. Hood prepared to
attack, particularly along Peach Creek. He hoped to mass superior force against
the army of the Cumberland while it was separated from the Army of the Ohio and
the Army of the Tennessee.

On Wednesday July 20th, the Federal Army of the Cumberland under George H.
Thomas crossed Peachtree Creek, heading toward the fortifications of Atlanta
from the north. Hood decided to attack, but there were delays of over three
hours, for which Hood blamed Gen. Hardee, perhaps unjustly. After some success
the fierce Southern assaults failed. Gen. Thomas and his men again steadfastly
held off the frantic Confederates, who charged for about two hours. Something
over 20,000 Federals were engaged, with about 1779 killed, wounded, and
missing. Nearly the same number of Confederates were in the charges with losses
totaling 4,796. Hood, who was not present, had failed in his first big test in
command. Unlike Johnston, Hood opened battle, but little had been accomplished.
Sherman’s Federals controlled almost half the perimeter of Atlanta and the only
open routes were to the south and southwest. Hood tried to make Hardee a
scapegoat                 both for the delays and because, he alleged, Hardee’s
men did not attack vigorously enough. The Battle of Peachtree Creek showed that
the fight for Atlanta would continue and that the only hope for the
Confederates probably lay in further efforts to make their lesser numbers
effective against a portion of the Federals. One of the wounded and captured of
this battle was LEWIS JASPER BAILEY. He was sent to the hospital at Forsyth. He
was paroled at Talladega, Ala., May 11, 1865. After Lewis was paroled, he went
back to Mississippi and married. He lived there until after 1880 and then moved
to the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma). Lewis lived in Love County, Oklahoma.
His wife Carrie died there in 1915. Lewis Jasper died in the Confederate Home
in Ardmore, Oklahoma on February 4th, 1925. Lewis and Carrie are both buried in
the City Cemetery in Marietta, Oklahoma-Love County.

By August 1864 the fighting was still heavy around Atlanta, Ga. Sherman had
begun his principal movement to cut off Atlanta completely. Troops marched
toward the south side of the Atlanta area, in the general direction of
Jonesborough.  By August 27th, Sherman’s army was ready. Much of it was in
position southwest of Atlanta on the Sandtown Road, ready to push farther south
and swing east toward Jonesborough to cut Hood’s last railroads into the city.
Hood and the Confederates had not been able to interfere with the preparations
to any extent.

By September the 1st, explosions and fires broke out at night around Atlanta’s
railroad depot and yards. Hood, beset by Sherman’s encircling force to the
south at Jonesborough and fearing a direct attack on the city, evacuated,
beginning in the late afternoon. Time did not remain to remove the extensive
munitions and other supplies, so they went up in flames along with a great deal
of railroad equipment. Like his predecessor, Johnston, Hood now was intent on
saving his army for a better day. However, without question, Hood had failed in
his major task, to fight and hold Atlanta. He withdrew to Lovejoy’s Station,
where the Army of Tennessee was reassembling after the retreat.

By the end of September, Hood, after conferring with Jefferson Davis, moved out
to try to sever Sherman’s lengthy supply line from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Hood
hoped to force Sherman to pull his army back to Tennessee.

By Sunday October 2nd, troops of the Army of Tennessee reached Sherman’s supply
line. Skirmishing ensured at Big Shanty and Kennesaw Water Tank, Ga., where
Hood’s men broke the Western & Atlantic Railroad and interrupted the Federal
link between Atlanta and Chattanooga.

Hood’s Army of Tennessee was squarely on the Chattanooga-Atlanta railroad in
Sherman’s rear and seized Big Shanty, Kennesaw Water Tank, and the nearby area,
breaking the track ever more.  Sherman, forced to take notice of Hood’s
operations, began sending troops back from Atlanta to cope with what had become
far more than nuisance raids. George H. Thomas arrived in Nashville, sent by
Sherman to command defensive forces against any possible invasion by Hood.

Hoods troops increased their grip on the Chattanooga-Atlanta railroad and
engaged in skirmishes at Acworth, Moon’s Station, and near Lost Mountain.
Sherman, however, leaving one corps in Atlanta, was on the way to rescue his
various beleaguered garrisons along the railroad. He set up his headquarters at
Kennesaw Mountain.

By November 30, 1864, leading units of the retreating Federals of Schofield’s
force under Jacob Cox arrived in Franklin, Tennessee, about dawn. They formed a
defensive line south of the town and the Harpeth River. Schofield wished to
hold Franklin until he could repair the bridges and get his trains across. Hood
moved rapidly toward Franklin on the main pike. A skirmish at Thompson’s
Station south of the town and other Federal delaying moves slowed the
Confederate advance.  About 4 p.m. Hood debauched from the Winstead Hills in a
massive frontal attack against the well-posted Federals on the southern edge of
Franklin. Gallantly the Confederates pressed ahead, carrying forward works of
the enemy, though suffering heavily. After a near break, the Federals rallied
on the interior lines. Some of the bloodiest and most tragic fighting of the
war occurred in front of the Carter House and up and down the lines of
Franklin, but to no avail for Hood. The battle lasted well into the night.

For the Confederates the toil included six generals; the famous and capable Pat
Cleburne, S.R. Gist, H.B. Granbury, John Adams, O.F. Strahl, all killed
outright, and John C. Carter, mortally wounded. The Confederates had between
20,000 and 27,000 men in action, and lost 1750 killed, 3800 wounded, and 702
missing for 6,252. Schofield’s Federals numbered between 22,000 and 27,000
engaged and they suffered many fewer casualties: 189 killed, 1033 wounded, and
1104 missing for 2,326. For Schofield’s valiant defenders, Gen. Jacob D. Cox,
commanding the 23rd Corps and really in command of the field, deserves much
credit.

During the night, Schofield pulled his battered units north across the Harpeth
and headed toward Nashville. The Confederates had failed to break the Union
lines and suffered ghastly casualties they could not afford, but they did
proceed on to Nashville.

By Dec. 1st, 1864 the Federal troops of John M. Schofield had successfully
withdrawn from Franklin, Tenn., and were now taking their places in the
Nashville defense lines of Gen. George H. Thomas. The Federals formed a rough
semicircle south of the Tennessee capital, with both flanks resting on the
Cumberland River. John Bell Hood’s weary Army of Tennessee moved upon Nashville
with little pause to take care of the casualties or to reorganize after the
woeful toll exacted at Franklin on Nov. 30. Already he was too late, for the
Union had staunchly entrenched on the hills of the city. Hood faced two
alternatives: to lie in front of the city in partial siege and await attack, or
to bypass Nashville, which would leave Thomas in his rear. Some minor scraps
included one at Owen’s Cross Roads.

Sherman was still on his march across Georgia. He was more than halfway from
Atlanta to Savannah, proceeded with little difficulty as they approached
Millen, Ga., site of a prison camp for northern soldiers.  Federals were
reported heading toward notorious Andersonville, far to the south, to free the
prisoners there.

Advance units of Hood’s Army of Tennessee approached the Federal lines at
Nashville, establishing their own positions this day and on Dec. 3rd Cavalry
carried out operations against blockhouses and outer positions of Thomas’
Federal defenders, with some skirmishing. Washington ordered Thomas to attack
Hood soon. With both sides dug in at Nashville, that front appeared to be at a
standstill for a while.

On Dec. the 6th, Gen. Grant issued new orders to Gen. Thomas at Nashville,
“Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for remount of your cavalry.  There is
great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River.” Thomas
obediently said he would attack at once, although it would be hazardous without
cavalry.  Grant told Stanton if Thomas did not attack promptly, he should be
removed. By the 10th the bad weather continued at Nashville, making any
movement hazardous. Grant again urged Thomas to attack Hood and Thomas replied
that he would as soon as the weather improved.

On the 12th of Dec. Thomas informed Halleck in Washington that he had his
troops ready to attack Hood as soon as the sleet had melted, for it was now
almost impossible to move on the ice-covered ground. Hood and Thomas waited out
the ice storm. Thomas still promised to move when the weather abated, but Grant
now ordered Maj. Gen. John A Logan to proceed to Nashville to supersede Thomas.
Logan was not to take over if Thomas had moved. Grant then headed for
Washington, intending to go on to Nashville himself.

On Dec. 14th, Gen. Thomas told Washington that the ice had melted and he would
attack Hood south of Nashville the next day.

On Thursday Dec. 15th, George H. Thomas; Army of the Cumberland came out from
the works of Nashville in the heavy fog and struck John Bell Hood’s Army of
Tennessee a devastating blow. A holding demonstration was made by Thomas’ left
against the Confederate right while the main Federal force; totaling 35,000
attacked the thin Confederate left. They carried redoubts and then successfully
assaulted Montgomery Hill and drove the enemy from the main defensive line to a
position about a mile to the rear along the Brentwood Hills. Hood had been
beaten back but still held the main road to Franklin and remained an effective
force.  He claimed his lines had been overextended and that the new positions
were taken to shorten the line. Both sides made troop readjustments during the
night. There was some thought among Federals that Hood would withdraw, but it
was soon clear that the Southern line was solidly posted.  Thomas had
skillfully handled his troops and had moved surely. When the message of the
day’s outcome reached Washington before midnight, Grant canceled his plans to
go farther than Washington. Logan, who had been sent to supersede Thomas, had
not yet arrived in Nashville. On the morning of the 16th the President wired
his congratulations and urged Thomas to continue.

On Dec. 16 at 6 A.M. in rain and snow, Union troops on the left pressed back
the Confederate right on the Franklin Pike to the main entrenchments, but S.D.
Lee’s corps held.  Federals completed aligning for battle south of Nashville
and the movement against the enemy’s left continued along the Granny White
Pike. On Hood’s left, the Union cavalry had gained his rear and the whole flank
was threatened and encircled. Then, late in the afternoon, came the main
assault, after a punishing artillery bombardment. Up the hills, they went in
the face of rigorous fire. The Federals were successful everywhere, capturing
many prisoners and much artillery. The Southern left at Shy’s Hill gave way and
then the center fell back, leaving the right to cover the withdrawal.  The
Confederates were, as Thomas said, “Hopelessly broken, and they “fled in
confusion.” Federals pursued for several miles until after dark, but Hood’s
rear guard fended them off. Hood said his Army of Tennessee resisted all
assaults until mid-afternoon, when part of the line to the left of center gave
way and “In a few moments our entire line was broken...”

Thomas had some 50,000 to55, 000 Federals on the field and suffered 387 killed,
2562 wounded, and missing for 3,061. Confederate figures are far less certain;
Hood probably had well under 30,000 men, of which about 4500 were captured.
Killed and wounded were possibly 1500. Of the 4500 captured, among them were
WILLIAM EDWIN AND ROBERT N. BAILEY.

William and Robert Bailey were sent to Military Prison in Louisville, Ky. and
from there, they were transferred to Camp Douglas, Ill arriving Dec. 20, 1864.
They applied for Oath of Allegiance in Jan. 1865. Confederate soldiers who did
this was know as, “GALVANIZED YANKEES’”.

William stated that he was loyal to the Union, and had enlisted in the
Confederate States through false representation. He was captured In Nashville
and desired to take the Oath to the United States and become a loyal citizen.
He took an appointment as Fifth Sergeant March 31, 1865 and was mustered into
service on April 3rd, 1865 serving at this rank until his discharge on Nov. 3,
1866. While serving with the 6th Reg. U.S. Inf. Co. K., in the winter of 1865
near Cottonwood Springs, Nebraska, he incurred frozen feet from exposure. Later
that same winter, he sustained a rupture while he was near Elk Horn Nebraska.
He took rheumatism from the exposure and was disabled from this in later life.

Robert N. Bailey also took the Oath and went into the 6th Reg’t U.S. Vols.,
Infantry, Co. K. He went in as a Pvt. and remained at this rank. He and William
were sent to the Western frontier together. Robert served as company cook,
teamster, and was on detached duty when it was called for as scout and guard
for wagon trains, etc. Robert was 22 years old when he was captured Dec. 16th.
He was 5 feet 6 ½ inches tall had black hair and black eyes. William was
captured on Dec. 15th and was 25 years old at the time. He was 5 feet and 11
inches tall and had dark complexion, hazel eyes and black hair. He served as
escort to surveying parties at Fort Kerney, Elkhorn and other places. He was
discharged on Nov. 3, 1866 and went back home to Mississippi and lived for one
year before he married.

On October 24, 1867 in Newton Co. Mississippi, William took for his wife,
Lucinda Josephine Wharton, whose parents were Jesse Wharton and Martha Acton
Wharton. Ned Bailey married William and Lucinda, a preacher of the C.P. Church
They then moved to Texas with both sets of parents. It appears that Lewis
stayed in Mississippi. He married Carrie last name unknown about 1875 in
Mississippi. They moved to Indian Territory about 1884/85. The Bailey and
Wharton families settled in Dallas County at first. Robert N. Bailey married
Margaret Wiggins in Dallas on December 10, 1868. J.S. Strother, J.P, married
them. Later each branch of the family moved to different places. Robert and
their father moved to Kaufman Co. Robert moved back to Dallas. I don’t know
when he died. William Edwin and Lucinda stayed in Dallas County until about
1875 and then moved to Freestone County. They only stayed there about one year
and then moved to Navarro County. They stayed there until 1883 then moved back
to Dallas.  The Bailey family then moved to Denton County around 1892 and lived
there until William Edwin’s untimely death on April 4th 1899.

            MISSISSIPPI 20th INFANTRY REGIMENT

Organized in the spring of 1861. Mustered into Confederate service for the war
in June of 1861.  Surrendered at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. Exchanged
in April 1862. The ill and injured stayed longer.  Consolidated with the 6th,
15th, and 23rd Infantry Regiments and designated as the 15th Infantry Regiment
Consolidated at Smithfield, North Carolina on April 9, 1865.  First Commander:
Daniel R. Russell (Colonel)

Field Officers:

William N. Brown (Major, Lt. Colonel, Colonel)

William M. Chatfield (Major)

Thomas B. Graham (Major)

Conrad K. Massey (Major)

Horace H. Miller (Lt. Colonel)

Walter A. Rorer (Major, Lt. Colonel)

Assignments: Army of the Kanawha (Sept.-Oct. 1861)

Floyd’s Brigade, Dept. of Northern Virginia (Oct. 1861-Jan. 1862)

Floyd’s Div, Central Army of Ky., Dept. # 2 (Jan-Feb. 1862)

McCausland’s Brigade, Floyd’s Div., Fort Donelson, Dept. # 2 ( Feb. 1862)

3rd Sub-district, Dist. of the Mississippi, Dept. # 2 (July-Aug. 1862)

Baldwin’s Brigade, Tilghman’s Div., Last Corps, Dept. of Miss. and East
Louisiana (Oct-1862-Jan.1863)

Tilghman’s Brigade, Loring’s Div., Army of North Miss., Dept. of Miss & East
Louisiana (Jan-Feb.1863) Tilghman’s Brigade, Loring’s Div., 2nd Military Dist.,
Dept. of Miss. & East La. (March-April 1863)

4th Military Dist., Dept. of Miss. and East Louisiana (April-May 1863)

Tilghman’s Brigade, Loring’s Div., Dept. of Miss and East Louisiana (May 1863)

Tilghman’s -Reynolds’-Adams’ Brigade, Loring’s Div. Dept., of the West (May-
July 1863)

Adams’ Brigade, Loring’s Div., Dept. of Miss. and East Louisiana (July 1863-
Jan. 1864)

Adams’ Brigade, Loring’s Div. Dept. of Ala., Miss, and East La. (Jan-May 1864)

Adams’ Brigade, Loring’s Div., Army of Miss. (May-July 1864)

Adams’ Brigade, Loring’s Div., 3rd Corps, Army of Tennessee (July 1864-April
1865)

Battles:

Fort Donelson (Feb. 12-16, 1862)

Fort Pemberton (March 11, 13, 16, and April 2,& 4, 1863)

Vicksburg Campaign (May-July 1863)

Champion Hill (May 16, 1863)

Jackson Siege (July 1863)Meridian Campaign (Feb.-March 1864)

Atlanta Campaign (May-Sept.,  1864)

Jonesboro (Aug. 31-Sept. 1, 1864)

Franklin(Nov. 30, 1864)

Nashville (Dec., 15-16, 1864)

Carolinas Campaign (Feb.-April 1865)

Bentonville (March 19-21, 1865)