289 S.W. 196
CHURCHWELL et ux. 
v. 
PURE OIL PIPE LINE CO.
(No. 438.)
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.
December 2, 1926.
Page 197
        Appeal from District Court, Freestone County; A. M. Blackman, Judge.
        Suit by W. C. Churchwell and wife against the Pure Oil Pipe Line Company. Judgment for defendant, 
and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
        Williford & Geppert, of Teague, for appellants.
        Vinson, Elkins, Sweeton & Weems, of Houston, for appellee.
        STANFORD, J.
        Suit by appellant and wife against appellee for the loss and damage to household goods, and for 
exposure and resultant sickness to appellant's wife, by reason of a house in which appellants resided as 
tenants of appellee being inundated and washed away by an overflow of a nearby creek. The case was 
tried before the court without a jury, and judgment rendered for appellee, defendant below. Appellants 
alleged, in substance, that appellant W. C. Churchwell was in the employ of appellee as a crude oil 
engineer, and that one of the considerations of his employment was that appellee was to furnish a 
dwelling house for appellants to occupy; that appellee did construct such house near Wolf creek; that it 
was the duty of appellee to construct said house in a safe place; that the appellee, by its engineers, could 
have discovered the dangers of overflow, etc. Appellee denied that it agreed to furnish appellants a house 
in which to live as a part of the consideration for his employment, pleaded caveat emptor, and that said 
overflow was an event that could not have been foreseen.
        There is only one question involved in this appeal, to wit, Is there evidence in the record to support 
the judgment of the trial court? If so, then this court is not at liberty to disturb such judgment. The record 
discloses that appellee purchased a small piece of bottom land, some 500 feet away from Wolf creek, and 
erected on said land some storage tanks, a pump station, and three small residences; that appellant 
Churchwell, who was in the service of appellee, requested to be permitted to occupy one of said cottages, 
and that he went and inspected same and selected the one he desired and moved into it, and paid $5 per 
month rent, that is, $5 per month was taken by appellee out of the monthly checks for labor; that during 
a very heavy rain said Wolf creek overflowed and the house in which appellants resided floated away, but 
water did not get into any of the other houses. The evidence is sufficient to show that there was nothing 
about the property in question or its location to indicate that it might or that it had ever overflowed. There 
is no evidence that appellee had any notice that said creek would or had ever before overflowed the 
premises in question. In fact, the evidence is sufficient to show that the rain causing said overflow was an 
unprecedented rain, and there is no evidence that said property ever before or since overflowed. We think 
the evidence ample to show that said house was not furnished appellant as a part of the consideration for 
his work, but was rented to him, and at the time of the injury appellant W. C. Churchwell was paying a 
stipulated rental of $5 per month, and that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between appellee 
and appellant W. C. Churchwell, and that there was no warranty on the part of appellee or any of its 
agents that the premises were safe for the purposes for which they were rented; that there was no fraud 
or deceit practiced by appellee upon appellants; that appellee did not know the rented premises were 
subject to overflow, and did not conceal from or misrepresent to appellants any fact with reference to said 
premises. The evidence clearly showing the above facts, we think the court was correct in rendering 
judgment for appellee. American Exchange Nat. Bank of Dallas v. Swope & Mangold, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 
101 S. W. 872; Perez v. Raybaud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S. W. 177, 7 L. R. A. 620; Dice's Adm'r v. Zweigart's 
Adm'r, 161 Ky. 646, 171 S. W. 195, L. R. A. 1916F, 1155; C. R. Miller & Bro. v. Nigro et al. (Tex. Civ. 
App.) 230 S. W. 511.
        But appellants contend that appellee is liable to them because by the use of ordinary care it could 
have known of the dangerous location of the premises. We cannot assent to this proposition. The rule in 
this state and most of the other states seems to be that where there is no agreement by the landlord to 
repair the demised premises, and he is not guilty of any fraud or concealment by failing to disclose hidden 
defects of which he has knowledge, the tenant takes the risk of their safety, and the landlord is not liable 
to him or to any person entering under his title or by his invitation for injuries sustained by reason of their 
unsafe condition. Fraser v. Kruger et al. (C. C. A.) 298 F. 693, and cases cited; Perez v. Raybaud, 76 Tex. 
191, 13 S. W. 177, 7 L. R. A. 620; Blackwell v. Speer (Tex. Civ. App.) 98 S. W. 903; C. R. Miller & Bro. v. 
Nigro et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 511; Shew v. Hartnett, 121 Wash. 1, 208 P. 60.
Page 198
        We overrule appellants' assignments of error and all propositions thereunder and affirm the 
judgment of the trial court.