74 S.W. 24
COLEMAN 
v. 
STATE.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 29, 1903.
        Appeal from Freestone County Court; H. B. Daviss, Judge.
        Charley Coleman was convicted of an aggravated assault, and he appeals. Reversed.
        Howard Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
        HENDERSON, J.
        Appellant was convicted of an aggravated assault, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $25.
        Appellant excepted to the action of the court refusing to permit him to prove that some time prior to 
the alleged offense the prosecutor had killed one of the yard dogs of appellant's mother, and that witness 
notified prosecuting witness McCray not to come through or upon her premises again. Appellant states 
that his purpose by this testimony was to show malice and ill will on the part of prosecuting witness 
toward defendant and his mother's family generally, as well as to show the wanton and reckless character 
of prosecuting witness. Appellant's line of defense was twofold: If prosecutor, when he fired the second 
shot, was wantonly firing at his mother's dog, he would have the right to protect the dog from such 
wanton assault, and, if he fired at prosecutor on this account, he would not be punishable; or if, when 
prosecutor fired the second shot in the direction of appellant and his mother, and appellant reasonably 
believed that one or both were in danger of life or serious bodily injury, then he would have the right to 
shoot in self-defense or defense of his mother. The proof offered that prosecutor had previously shot a 
dog belonging to appellant's mother, and that he had been forbidden to come on the premises, would be 
evidence tending to show that he was a trespasser on this occasion, and would tend to shed light on 
appellant's conduct from his standpoint, suggesting that he believed himself or his mother or her property 
was in danger at the time from a trespasser, who had been forbidden to come upon the premises; thus 
reinforcing his plea of self-defense or defense of property. Accordingly, we hold that this testimony should 
have been admitted.
        The court's charge gave appellant the full benefit of self-defense and of his theory of the case arising 
from the evidence, as we view the facts. No special requested charges were submitted, and, this being a 
misdemeanor case, before appellant can complain he must prepare and present such special charges, and 
then by bill of exceptions show that the court refused to give the same.
        For the error discussed, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.