48 S.W. 178 FRANKLIN v. STATE. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. December 14, 1898. Appeal from district court, Freestone county; L. B. Cobb, Judge. Jim Franklin was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Reversed. Boyd, Compton & Anderson, for appellant. Mann Trice, for the State. DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of 15 years; hence this appeal. But one bill of exceptions appears in the record, and this was reserved to the refusal of the court to give a requested instruction upon the law of manslaughter. Under the evidence adduced for the state, the jury were justified in finding appellant guilty of murder in second degree. The testimony upon which appellant relied as a basis for the requested charge on manslaughter is found mainly in the evidence detailed by himself, with some supporting testimony from other witnesses. Defendant's testimony is to the effect that, during the month of May (prior to this homicide in September), he caught deceased in adulterous intercourse with a woman on the roadside. This "leaked out" in the community, and the deceased became offended on account of it. Later on, a petition was gotten up to remove deceased as a school trustee, and deceased accused appellant of having instigated it. This brought up further trouble between the parties. However, after talking the matter over, appellant says that they became reconciled; at least, such was his conclusion. In regard to the matters stated, deceased had made threats against appellant; and, on the day of the homicide, he had been warned by a friend of these threats, who suggested to him that he had better be on his guard. Appellant and deceased had a conversation in Fairfield, on the day of and preceding the homicide. They lived in the same neighborhood, and traveled the same road in returning home. The deceased and Ab Daniels left town in advance of appellant. He overtook them, and deceased began to abuse him, and said he ought to be killed, and rode in front of defendant, who was in a buggy or wagon, driving a mule. Deceased was riding a mule, and Ab Daniels was on horseback. In regard to the further occurrences between the parties, appellant testified: "I reasoned with him, and told him I had not done anything, and I thought that he was satisfied. He rode outside the road, and we went a short distance, when deceased again rode in front of me, and stopped me, and abused me. After again reasoning with him, we went on, and met Jack Jones. Jack asked me if I was `taking them in.' I said, `Yes.' Deceased said, `You are a liar,' and got down, and took hold of my line, and stopped me. Finally I persuaded him to let me go. He stopped me again near the bridge, just beyond Mr. Cain's; and again, just beyond Jack Jones' house, deceased caught my line, and stopped me, and said that I was the most hellish nigger he ever saw, and that I was the biggest liar he ever saw; that I ought to be killed; that he intended to whip me; that he paid $750 for one nigger, and that he would pay it again; that I had lied about that petition, and about that girl. I then began to get scared, sure Page 179 enough. Finally I got loose from him, and drove on a short distance, and met Billy Lemmons. And deceased and Daniels stopped to talk with him, and I drove on to John Jones' gate, and got out, and went to his house, and bought his pistol. Deceased and Daniels passed. Some twenty minutes later, I drove on to the cane mill, and Oce Jones called me by. I stopped, and talked to Oce Jones and Henry Jones. I did not speak to either Ab Daniels, Dick Tatum, or Scruggs while there. I had a talk with Oce Jones about the election of a county chairman of the Republican party. Scruggs came back for his coat, and the deceased and Daniels went on, and were out of sight over the hill when I started. Scruggs and I left the cane mill about the same time. When I drove over the hill, I found deceased and Daniels stopped. Deceased was off his mule. He accused me of having a pistol. I denied it. Deceased said, `You have got a pistol, and you have got to use it.' Scruggs said to deceased, `I will have nothing to do with this matter, but you all ought to let Franklin alone.' We then started off down the road. Daniels and Scruggs dropped back. I drove away with deceased after me. He got ahead of me in a short distance, and stopped me again, just opposite Mr. Ledbetter's tank. When Tatum got out of the road, I put whip to my mule, and kept it in a trot and loping down the road. I thought that I would get away from deceased. Deceased ran his mule, and kept up with me; rode along on my right side, until we got a short distance below a small tank below Lindsey's, when deceased rode in front of me, and turned my mule out to the left side of the road, and ran it up against the fence. My mule's head was to the east. Deceased turned his mule clear around, and had his right side to me. There were several poles lying near my mule's head. Deceased, when he stopped me, and turned round, said, `I'll burst your brains out;' then said, `No, I'll shoot your heart out, ' and put his hand back towards his hip pocket. I had raised up in my buggy, and, as he put his hand back, I shot him. I shot rather over the dashboard. Deceased was in front of me when I fired the first shot, and had his eyes right in mine. My mule's head was rather southeast, and his mule's head rather northwest, when I first shot. Deceased's mule then began to pitch, and I shot him again. I shot three times. Had a self-action pistol, and pulled the trigger as fast as I could. The last shot the pistol just went off. I was not trying to shoot him then. Deceased fell off his mule towards me, and fell near the wagon rut on the east side of the road. I pulled my mule back, and drove around him on the west side." Other witnesses testified to the fact that the buggy or wagon tracks drove out of the road at the place of the homicide. There is also other evidence, both for the state and defendant, of a quarrel between defendant and deceased at the time they met Lemmons or Jones. That is an uncontradicted fact. We believe that, under this state of case, a charge on manslaughter should have been given. While this evidence may not be true, and the court may have regarded it as false, yet it suggests the issue of manslaughter. If the deceased stopped the defendant, and in the manner stated by him, on the occasions testified by him, on the public highway, and followed him up to the point of the homicide, in the manner indicated, and rode in front of him, and blocked his passage in the manner and by the conduct, as testified by appellant, under all the circumstances, it occurs to us that it was a cause upon which could be predicated sudden passion, such as to render appellant's mind incapable of cool reflection. At least, this should have been submitted to the jury. It is clear that the deceased had no authority to stop defendant traveling along the public highway in the manner indicated. It was in violation of his rights as a citizen. It was in violation of the laws of the state; and, if the testimony is true, the deceased was guilty, perhaps, of false imprisonment; and this, connected with the rough manner in which it was done, was calculated to arouse his passions to such an extent as to demand, under our statute, a charge upon manslaughter. The court not only failed to charge on manslaughter, but refused to give appellant's requested instruction, and to this refusal he only reserved his bill of exceptions. For the error of the court in failing to charge the law of manslaughter, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.