56 S.W. 585
TUCKER 
v. 
WILLIAMS.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.
March 22, 1900.
        Appeal from district court, Freestone county; L. B. Cobb, Judge.
        Bill by Douglas Tucker against Andrew Williams and others. From a judgment in favor of defendant 
Williams sustaining a demurrer, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
        Bell & Williford and John Young Gooch, for appellant. Boyd, Compton & Anderson, for appellee.
        PLEASANTS, J.
        Appellant brought this suit in the district court of Freestone county against appellee and the clerk of 
the county court and the sheriff of Freestone county to have a judgment of said county court declared a 
nullity, and to enjoin and restrain the enforcement of said judgment. A temporary injunction was granted, 
and writ issued. The petition alleged that Andrew Williams, appellee, on April 1, 1898, filed a suit in the 
justice court of Freestone county, Tex., against appellant, Douglas Tucker, for the possession of a bull 
yearling, alleging its value to be $15; that said Tucker pleaded a general denial, and filed a cross suit for 
$15 damages for the wrongful suing out of a writ of sequestrating in said suit; that on May 6, 1898, the 
case was tried on these issues, and judgment was rendered in the said justice court in favor of said Tucker 
for the bull, or for $15, its value, if not delivered to him, and costs of suit; that on May 16, 1898, said 
Williams filed an appeal bond, and the justice forwarded a transcript and the papers to the county court of 
said county; that said cause was tried de novo in said county court on July 12, 1899, and judgment was 
rendered in favor of said Williams for said bull, or for $15, its value, and for all costs of the justice and 
county courts. The petition further alleged that the amount in controversy in said justice court was less 
than $20, in plaintiff's cause of action, and that the amount in controversy in defendant's cause of action 
was less than $20, and that the judgment of the said justice court was for less than $20, the amount 
stated in each being $15, and that, therefore, the judgment of the justice court was final and no appeal 
could be had, and that the county court judgment was void, because said court had no jurisdiction to 
render it; that the said question of the want of jurisdiction was presented in the county court by motion to 
dismiss and in arrest of judgment, and overruled; that plaintiff is without remedy except by injunction; 
that he had paid all the costs for which he was primarily liable; that execution was about to be issued and 
levied upon his property under said void judgment for costs amounting to $30 or $40, and that he would 
be irreparably injured. The appellee filed general and special exceptions to the petition, and specially 
answered, admitting the allegations of the petition to be true as to the statement of the pleadings and 
result of the trials of the suit in the justice and county
Page 586
courts, but claimed that the amount in controversy in said suit, as shown by the petition, was $30. Upon a 
trial of this cause in the district court, appellee's general demurrer to the petition was sustained, and the 
injunction dissolved, and the cause dismissed, at cost of appellant.
        The only question presented for our consideration is whether or not the district court erred in holding 
that the amount in controversy in the original suit exceeded $20, and that, therefore, the county court 
had jurisdiction, on appeal from the justice court, to render the judgment sought to be enjoined. We think 
the rule announced by our supreme court in the case of Crosby v. Crosby, 49 S. W. 359, conclusively 
answers this question in favor of the appellant. In that case Chief Justice Gaines, in construing the statute 
which gives the right of appeal from the county court to the courts of civil appeals in all cases in which the 
amount in controversy exceeds $100, uses this language: "Where there is a cross action in the nature of a 
counterclaim or plea in reconvention, there are two cases which are triable together; and we understand 
the rule to be that, in order to give an appellate court jurisdiction over the matter, where such jurisdiction 
depends upon the amount in controversy, either the plaintiff's demand or that of the defendant must, of 
itself, reach the jurisdictional sum." It cannot be said that the amount claimed by the appellant in the 
justice court was $30, because of the fact that he denied the title of appellee to the yearling in 
controversy, which was valued at $15, and, in addition thereto, claimed damages against appellee in the 
sum of $15 for wrongfully suing out a writ of sequestration. The suit for the yearling was brought by 
appellee, and the affirmative claim asserted by him was for the recovery of said yearling, or its alleged 
value, the sum of $15. This was the only amount in controversy, so far as appellee's suit was concerned. 
The plea in reconvention of appellant was for $15 damages, and this was the whole amount of the 
affirmative claim asserted by him and in controversy in his suit against the appellee. While the two cases 
are triable together, the amounts involved in both cannot be added together in order to give the right of 
appeal to either party. The fact that the yearling in controversy was sequestered, and that appellant, in 
the justice court, obtained a judgment for same, or its value in the sum of $15, in no way affects the 
character of the two causes of action, nor the amount in controversy in either.
        Appellee makes no issue in his brief as to the jurisdiction of the district court to grant a writ of 
injunction in this suit if the judgment sought to be enjoined is void for want of jurisdiction in the court 
rendering same, but he has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the district court has 
no jurisdiction to enjoin the issuance of an execution and the enforcement of a judgment of the county 
court. In support of this motion appellee cites the case of Lincoln v. Andrews (Tex. Civ. App.) 51 S. W. 
278. In that case no question was raised as to the validity of the judgment of the county court, and the 
rule there announced that a district court is without power to enjoin a sale under a levy of execution 
issued upon a judgment of a county court is not applicable to the facts of this case. The county court was 
without jurisdiction to render the judgment sought to be enjoined in this suit, and said judgment is, 
therefore, void. The amount in controversy being insufficient to give the appellant the right of appeal, his 
only remedy is by injunction. The district court being a court of general equity jurisdiction, and, under our 
judicial system, the great reservoir of equity power, that power, in the absence of a remedy at law, can be 
always exercised to protect the rights of the citizen, regardless of the pecuniary value of the right sought 
to be enforced or defended, subject only to the limitation that in the exercise of its equity powers said 
court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of other courts as fixed by the constitution and law. Anderson 
Co. v. Kennedy, 58 Tex. 616; Alexander v. Holt, 59 Tex. 205; Jennings v. Shiner (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 
276; Railway Co. v. Ware, 74 Tex. 47, 11 S. W. 918. The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to 
the petition in this case, and, the facts stated in said petition being admitted by appellee to be true, the 
judgment of said court is reversed, and this cause is remanded, with instructions to the court below to 
enter an order perpetuating the injunction. Reversed and remanded.