Report of 38th Congress, 1865; Army of the Potomac, Part One Submitted for use in the USGenWeb Archives http://www.usgwarchives.net by Linda R ussell L ewis ******************************************************************* USGENWEB ARCHIVES NOTICE: These electronic pages may NOT be reproduced in any format for profit or presentation by any other organization or persons. Persons or organizations desiring to use this material, must obtain the written consent of the contributor, or the legal representative of the submitter, and contact the listed USGenWeb archivist with proof of this consent. ******************************************************************* ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the follow- ing report: GENERAL HOOKER. General Hooker was assigned to the command of the army of the Potomac on the 26th of January, 1863, succeeding General Burn- side. At that time that army was encamped on the north bank of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, Virginia, the Rappahannock river separating it from the army of the enemy under General Lee. The condition of the army of the Potomac at the time General Hooker assumed the command of it is well described by him in his testimony, together with the measures he took to render it more efficient. The statements of General Hooker are fully borne out by the testimony of other witnesses. He says : " It (the army of the Potomac) had recently returned from two unsuccessful efforts to cross the river and drive the enemy from his position; the first result- ing so disastrously as to render a second effort soon after, even with propitious weather, almost futile. Before the second effort ended, the winter rains set in, and all operations for a while were suspended; the army literally finding itself buried in mud, from which there was no hope of extrication before spring. ' " With this prospect before it, taken in connection with the gloom and des- pondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was in a for- lorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the army at this time, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its demoralization; and these in their tnrn had their effect upon the friends and relatives of the soldiers at home. At the time the army was turned over to me desertions were at the rate of about 200 a day. So anxious were parents, wives, brothers and sisters to relieve their kindred, that they filled the express trains to the army with packages of citizen clothing to assist them in escaping from service. At that time perhaps a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the government in the conduct of the war. The emancipation proclamation had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they never would have embarked in the war had they anticipated this action of the government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and out of the camps. " I may also state that at the moment I was placed in command I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates. These were scattered all over the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown. A copy of this return was furnished the commanding general of the army. * * * * * XLII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "My first object was to prevent desertion ; and when this was accomplished my whole attention was directed, to securing the return of absentees, and rendering those present -as comfortable and contented as circumstances would allow. I granted leaves of absence and furloughs to a limited extent, and in such manner as to enable all to be absent for a few days in the course of the winter. The disloyal officers were dismissed the service as soon as evidence of the fact was brought to my knowledge. The express trains were examined by the provost marshal, and all citizen clothing found was burned. " Important changes were introduced into the various staff departments, and especially in that of the inspector general, which was thoroughly-organized and filled with the most competent officers I could select in the army. Believing idleness to be the great evil of all armies, every effort was made to keep the troops employed; and whenever the weather would permit it they were en- gaged in field exercises. " The cavalry was consolidated and placed in a higher state of efficiency than had before been known in our service ; and whenever the state of the roads and the rivers would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to at- tack the enemy's pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession; my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men by successes, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adver- saries. In this we were eminently successful. The infantry grew in confi- dence, and the cavalry in all their encounters acquired a character in both ar- mies before unknown to that arm of the service. " Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to men- tion, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army had, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in an- cient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies. " During the time allowed us for preparation the army made rapid strides in discipline, instruction, and morale, and early in April was in a condition to in- spire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of ab- sentees. All were actuated by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the republic. " Early in April, though the roads were still heavy and impracticable for artillery and wagons, I believed that the army was in condition to march on the enemy; and as I had about 40,000 nine-months and two-years men, whose terms of service would soon expire, I felt it necessary to commence operations at the earliest practicable moment." The instructions given to General Hooker, and he says the only in- structions he received for his government, will be found in the fol- lowing extract from a letter from General Halleck under date of January 31, 1863: "In regard to the operations of your own army, you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them." General Hooker organized a campaign to start about the 13th of April, the cavalry under General Stoneman to proceed up the Rap- pahannock for some distance, then cross and sweep down behind General Lee's position and sever his communications with Richmond; the infantry then to cross below "Fredericksburg and attack or pursue Lee's army, as occasion might require. But shortly after the cavalry GENERAL HOOKER. XLIII started a heavy rain-storm set in, which rendered the river impassa- ble, and further operations were suspended until a more favorable opportunity should present itself. It may be well to notice, in connexion with this movement, that General Hooker speaks in his testimony of the enemy having ob- tained information from the reports of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with the accompanying testimony, of such crossings on the Rappahannock in the vicinity of Fredericksburg as were deemed by our officers to afford practical facilities for offensive operations, and had consequently taken measures to perfect their means of de- fence at the exposed points, thus rendering it the more difficult for our forces to operate successfully along that line. That General Hooker is laboring under a very erroneous impression will be seen at once by reference to the dates of the committee's report and the pro- posed movement by him. The movement was begun by the cavalry on the 13th of April. The committee submitted their reports to the Secretary of the Senate on the 6th of April, but one week before, and they were immediately sent to the government printer. The re- ports and accompanying testimony were not printed and distributed for some time after the committee concluded their labors. The ene- my, therefore, could have derived no information from them which could have affected the movement begun on the 13th of April. Towards the close of April General Hooker organized another movement, more comprehensive in its scope than the first, and differ- ent in its scene of operations. The cavalry portion was to perform about the same part which had been before assigned to it, viz., to strike and sever the communications of the rebel army with Rich- mond. . In regard to the infantry, the principal scene of operations was transferred from below to above the city of Fredericksburg, and it seems to have been expected that a fatal blow would be struck at the rebel army under General Lee. The 1st, 3d, and 6th corps were left in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, under the com- mand of General Sedgwick. The 5th, llth, and 12th corps were ordered to move up the river and cross the Kappahannock and Rap- idan and establish themselves in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. The movement was carried out with such secrecy and despatch that by the night of the 30th the position designated had been gained, with but little opposition from the enemy. This column General Hooker states did not exceed 36,000 men. Two divisions of the 2d corps, under General Couch, were held in readiness to take position at the United States ford so soon as the movement of the main column should render it practicable, and when the line had been established at Chancellorsville those divisions were directed to join the main column. During these operations, the left of the army, under general Sedg- wick, carried out the operations directed by the commanding general. The whole movement appears to have been conducted with little or no serious opposition from the enemy. Up to the morning of the 1st of May everything was favorable. On the 30th of April the 3d corps was ordered to join the right at Chancellorsville. On the 1st XLIV ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. of May a demonstration was made by the right of the army under the following order : [Circular.] "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, " Chancellorsville, May 1, 1863. " The 5th corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the river road by the most direct route; the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott and Golin runs. The movement to be masked by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at 2 o'clock. "The 12th corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle church, and masked from the view of the enemy by small advance parties, and the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock, to enable the llth corps to take its position. " One division of the 2d corps, with one battery, will take a position at Tod's tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direc- tion of the enemy. "The other divisions and battles of the corps will be massed out of the road near Chancellorsville; these dispositions to be made at once. " The 3d corps will be massed as fast as it arrives, about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States ford road, excepting one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's tavern. " General Pleasonton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville. "After the movement commences headquarters will be at Tabernacle church. "The llth corps, with its batteries, will be massed on the plank road, about on mile in rear of the 12th ; this movement to be completed at 2 o'clock. " By command of Major General Hooker. " WM. L. CANDLER, "Captain and Aide-de-Camp." At that time the right of the Union army had obtained a position at Chancellorsville, about 11 miles distant from the city of Fredericks- burg. The rebel army, under General Lee, had advanced from Fredericksburg to meet the movement of the Union army, and had taken position some three or four miles from Chancellorsville, and be- tween that place and Fredericksburg. A force of from 8,000 to 10,000 men, consisting of Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, had been left by General Lee at Fredericksburg to hold that position and the rebel lines below. The two principal armies were separated by broken ground, covered with dense and almost impenetrable forests, traversed by deep ravines running at right angles to the Rappahan- nock. The movement contemplated by the foregoing order was com- menced. As the heads of the columns emerged from the dense forest, the enemy were discovered advancing in line of battle. General Hooker states that being satisfied, from the nature of the ground, that he could not throw his troops through the forest fast enough to resist the rebel advance, he gave instructions for hia troops to return to the position they had just left, and there await the advance of the enemy. The enemy continued to advance, but were promptly and easily repulsed. The day closed without further active operations of importance on either side. GENERAL HOOKER. XLV Early in the morning of the next day, May 2, orders were given for the 1st corps, under General Reynolds, to join the right of the army, leaving with General Sedgwick, opposite Fredericksburg, the entire 6th corps, and one division of the 2d corps, under General Gib- bon. On the same morning General Hooker made an examination of his entire line at Chancellorsville, returning to his headquarters about nine o'clock. Not feeling satisfied with the dispositions made on the extreme right, held by the llth and 12th corps, the following instruc- tions were issued at half past nine a. m.: [Circular.] " HEADQUARTEBS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, " Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863—9.30 a. m. " I am directed by the major general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. " We have good reason to suppose that the enemy ia moving to our right. Please advance your pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach. " JAMES H. VAN ALEN, " Brigadier General and A. D. C. Major General SLOCUM and Major General HOWARD." About the time General Hooker returned to his headquarters from the examination of his lines, information was brought to him that a heavy column of the enemy were moving towards his right, evidently for the purpose of making a flank movement. The foregoing instruc- tions were promptly sent to the generals commanding the forces hold- ing the right of our line, and General Sickles, with two divisions of his corps, (the 3d,) was ordered to advance and follow up the move- ment of the enemy, which was concealed from view to a great extent by the woods in front of our line. General Sickles advanced with great promptness, but did not reach the line of the enemy's move- ment until the main column had passed ; still, in time to capture a large number of its rear-guard. From those prisoners it was ascer- tained that this column of the enemy consisted of Jackson's corps, numbering about 25,000 men, and that their route was over a by-road through the forest, passing diagonally across the front of the Union line 'and approaching within two or three miles of the right of the llth corps, which occupied the extreme right of the army. About six o'clock in the afternoon a rattling fire of musketry was heard on the right, but nothing indicating a very serious engagement. Almost immediately, however, from some cause not fully evident from the testimony, the extreme right division of the llth corps was stampeded, and, flying along the line of the llth corps, threw that XLVI ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. whole corps into confusion and swept it from the field. Steps were at once taken to arrest the fugitives and prevent the panic being extended to the whole army. Berry's division of the 3d corps and a brigade of the 2d corps were directed to cover the rear of the llth corps, and, if possible, to retake and hold the position they had abandoned. This, however, they were unable to do, the enemy occu- pying it in great force before our troops could reach it. It will be remembered that some hours before General Sickles, with two divisions of his corps, had been ordered to advance for the purpose of operating against the column of the enemy under Jackson. The giving way of the right left General Sickles in a very exposed and critical position ; but, upon being informed of the condition of affairs, he at once took measures to withdraw his force, which was success- fully done, and without much loss. The enemy under Jackson con- tinued to advance after the panic-stricken troops, until checked by General Pleasonton, who had collected and brought into position some artillery for that purpose. Although a cavalry officer, he handled the artillery with exceeding great judgment and effectiveness. His skill, energy, daring, and promptness upoh this occasion contributed greatly to arrest the disaster which for a time threatened the whole army. His conduct upon this and many other occasions marks him as one of the ablest generals in our service, and as deserving of far higher con- sideration than, from some cause, he appears to have received. It was during this attack that the rebel General Jackson was mor- tally wounded. The enemy were repulsed with great loss, and active operations ceased for the night. While this action was taking place on the right, an attack was made by General Lee upon the positions of the 12th and 2d corps, which attack was promptly repulsed. In relation to the condition of affairs at the close of this action, General Hooker states : " This was the condition of affairs when night overtook us. General Berry, after going, perhaps, three-fourths of a mile, reported that the enemy was already in possession of ground commanding my position, and that he had been com- pelled to establish his line in thee valley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was communicated to me, I directed Generals Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line, which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, as I should not he able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy should renew his attack the next morning. " The bad conduct of the llth corps had cost me the key of my position, and had very much embarrassed me by contracting my sphere of action. The po- sition which had been held by the left of that corps was the most commanding one in the vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to enfilade the lines held by the 12th and 2d corps. He could drive from the plain, in front of the Chancellorsville house, all the artillery posted to command the junction of the plank road and the old pike; and he could drive from the plain all the force that might be upon it. To wrest this position from the enemy, after his batteries were established on it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it. * * * * " Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as prac- ticable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left [under General Sedgwick."] GENERAL HOOKER. XLVII While these operation is were being conducted by the right of the army, the left, under General Sedgwick, had been engaged in making- demonstrations before Fredericksburg and in its immediate vicinity ; but nothing of importance had taken place there up to the close of the day of May 2. After the close of operations on the right on that day, the following order was sent to General Sedgwick : "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, " Chancellorsville, Va; May 2, 1863—9 p. m. "The major general commanding directs that you cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chaneellorsville road, until you connect with him, and will attack and destroy any force yon may fall in with on the road. "You will leave all your trains behind except pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at delight. Yon will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between you and the major general commanding he expects to use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. "JAMES H. VAN ALEN, " Brigadier General and Aide-de-Camp. "Major General SEDGWICK." At midnight the following was also sent to General Sedgwick : "MAY 2, 1863—12 midnight. "Major General SEDGWICK: " From the statements brought by General Hooker's aid, it seems to be of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee's rear with crushing force. He will explain all to you. Give your advance to one who will do all that the urgency of the case requires. " DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, "Major General, Chief of Staff" General Hooker also testifies : " In order that there might be no failure about the movement, I also de- spatched General Warren to General Sedgwick, as that officer was familiar with the localities about Fredericksburg, and was informed of my own position, and could explain it to him. I pointed out to General Warren on the map where I wanted the 6th corps to go, and told him what time I desired it to be there. I also impressed upon him the necessity of a prompt compliance with my orders on the part of General Sedgwick." With General Gibbon to hold Fredericksburg with his division, General Sedgwick was left with his entire corps, amounting to from 22,000 to 25,000 men, to make the movement directed by General Hooker. The force of the enemy occupying the defences of Fred- ericksburg consisted of Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, amounting to perhaps 10,000 men. The main portion of the rebel army was confronting the force under General Hooker, some seven or eight miles above Fredericksburg. General Sedgwick commenced his movement, but it was conducted slowly, and with but little energy. No demonstration was made on the heights of Fredericksburg until after daylight of the morning of XLVin ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. the 3d of May, and the assault that resulted in carrying the heights was not made until 11 o'clock in the day. By that time the enemy, discovering the movement, had sent re-enforcements to Fredencks- burg, and were enabled to offer a pretty determined resistance to the assault. No advance was made beyond the heights until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The 6th corps then moved forward, meeting small bodies of the enemy, which were driven before them. On the 4th of May some slight encounters took place, and General Sedgwick took his force to Banks's ford, and that night recrossed the Rappa- hannock. From the testimony, which gives these transactions much more in detail than the committee deem necessary in their report, it will be seen that nearly all the witnesses concur in the opinion that the movement of General Sedgwick was not made with that energy and promptness which the peremptory character of his orders demanded and the importance of the emergency required ; that the movement directed by General Hooker was perfectly feasible, and if his orders had been promptly carried out by General Sedgwick, in all proba- bility a fatal blow would have been struck Lee's army. As it was, however, the movement was made without promptness and energy, was executed but partially, ard proved entirely ineffective for the purpose for which it was ordered. In reference to the operations on the right on the 3d of May, General Hooker says: " The attack was renewed by the enemy about 7 o'clock in the morning, and was bravely resisted, with the limited number of troops I could bring into action, until 11 o'clock, when orders were given for the army to establish itself on its new line. This it did in good order. The position I abandoned was one that I had held at disadvantage, and I kept the troops on it as long as I did only for the purpose of enabling me to hear of the approach of the force under General Sedgwick." The 3d corps, under General Sickles, received the brunt of this attack by the enemy. The corps fought most gallantly, losing very heavily. It was shortly after this attack commenced that General Hooker was injured by a cannon ball knocking against him a pillar of the house in which he was at the time. During the time he was incapacitated by this injury the command devolved upon General Couch as the senior officer. There seems to have been some con- fusion in relation to the conduct of affairs while General Hooker was disabled. The testimony fully proves that the want of energetic and prompt direction, while the action was in progress, prevented our forces from obtaining the advantage over the enemy which would otherwise have been gained. No further active operations were carried on by either the right of our army or that of the enemy after the attack on Sunday. On Tues- day a heavy rain-storm set in, which raised the water in the Rappa- hannock so as to endanger the pontoon bridges ; in fact, carrying away portions of them. The llth corps had become so demoralized as not to be regarded as very efficient. The 6th corps, under General Sedg- wick, had recrossed to the north side of the river. The cavalry, GENERAL HOOKER. XLIX under General Stoneman, had not been heard from. It was after- wards ascertained that he had failed almost entirely to accom- plish the object of his expedition, viz : the severing of Lee's commu- nications with Richmond. Under these circumstances, and in view of his instructions to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry General Hooker decided to recross the river and return to his old camp. The army recrossed, without opposition from the enemy, during the night of Tuesday and morning of Wednesday, the 5th and 6th of May. It would appear, from all the testimony, that there were three causes, perhaps four, which contributed much to render this campaign unsuccessful after it had been so successfully begun. Those cause? were, the stampede of the llth corps on the 1st of May, by which the enemy were enabled to obtain the possession of ground which com- manded the position of the Union army at Chancellorsville ; then the injury which General Hooker sustained on the morning of the 3d of May, by which the army was deprived of the direction which was so necessary at that time ; then the failure by General Sedgwick to carry out the orders he had received to fall upon the rear of Lee's forces early on the morning of the 3d; and the entire failure of the cavalry, under General Stoneman, to perform the part assigned to it the severing Lee's communications with Richmond. In connection with this Chancellorsville campaign, your committee have felt it their duty to investigate the report, so widely and indus- triously circulated in this and other countries, that General Hooker was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and incapacitated from exercising command'during the latter portion of the campaign The charge was one of so grave a character that your committee felt it should be fully investigated. It was either true or false. If true then, as soon as established by sufficient proof, the officer who could be so regardless of his position and the important interests committed to his charge should be instantly dismissed the service If false then those who had circulated so atrocious a slander against a faith- ful public servant, who was perilling his life in defence of his coun- try without full authority to support the accusation, should be ex- posed and held up to the scorn of all honorable men. Your committee have examined such officers of General Hooker's staff, and others who came before them, as from their position and opportunities would be presumed to have the most accurate know- upon the subject, and all, without exception, have testified that the charge was utterly unfounded. The examination upon this point would not have been pressed further but for one fact. There had appeared in the public press of England, and also in leading journals of this country, what purported to be a statement of some remarks made by Rev. Henry Ward Beecher on the 5th of July, 1863, at a breakfast given by the National Temperance League, in England. The New York Independent, generally recognized as Mr. Beecher's organ, in its issue of July 30, 1863. had copied that statement from an English paper, the Alliance, with editorial comments. The ex- tract is a follows: Part i--iv L ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "If it were fit he (Mr. Beecher) could point out several great misfortunes which had befallen the north on the field, owing entirely to the drunkenness of officers. The battle of Chancellorsville was lost from this cause; but he had heard it from almost direct authority that the general thus implicated, knowing his weakness, had been previously abstaining, but that having received a severe contusion he had been prescribed whiskey medicinally, and it was taking it for that purpose that the old appetite had been revived and had overcome him." Upon which the Independent proceeds to comment thus : " Mr. Beecher stated this as a private communication; but the case of in- temperance referred to is no secret here. That General Hooker was drunk, and thereby lost the battle of Chancellorsville, has been published wherever the English language is read; and it is due to the inculpated general that the ex- planation furnished by Mr. Beecher should be made known." Accordingly, on the 18th of March, 1864, the chairman addressed a letter to Mr. Beecher in pursuance of the following order of the committee : " Ordered, That the chairman of this committee be instructed to address a letter to Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, informing him that the committee, in their examination concerning the battle of Chancellorsville, have not yet been able to obtain any testimony to substantiate the charge that General Hooker was under the influence of intoxicating liquor these; and inasmuch as lie (Mr. Beecher) is reported to have made that charge in his addresses last year in England, the committee desire him to give them his authority for the charge, and the names of reliable witnesses to substantiate the same." Not receiving any reply, on the 4th of April, 186i, the chairman again addressed a letter to Mr. Beecher, in pursuance of the follow- ing order of the committee : " Ordered, That inasmuch as no reply has been received from Reverend Henry Ward Beecher to the letter of the committee of the 18th ultimo, the chairman of this committee is hereby instructed to again address Mr. Beecher as before." To this second communication he received the following reply : " BROOKLYN, April 6, 1864. " DEAR SIR : I did not make any 'public' remarks about General Hooker while in England. At a breakfast of temperance men, strictly confidential, and pledged to make no report of proceedings, I alluded to Hooker's condition. My remarks were published in violation of confidence. " As to my evidence, it was such as to produce moral conviction, but not to establish the fact legally, that, during the last part of the battle of Chancel- lorsville, Hooker was under the influence of liquor. " I do not feel at liberty to mention my informant until I can see him and get his permission. " I am very truly yours, "H. W. BEECHER. " B. F. WADE, Esq." Your committee regret to state that, although Mr. Beecher's at- tention was twice called to the subject, and he was explicitly asked, each time, to give his authority with the names of reliable wit- nesses to substantiate the charge he had circulated, he has made no reply to them but the one above quoted. After the close of the Chancellorsville campaign, active operations GENERAL HOOKER. LI by the army of the Potomac were suspended for some time. Quite a large number of troops, whose time had expired, were mustered out of the service, and measures were adopted to reorganize the army so far as that was rendered necessary by the withdrawal of so many troops. Towards the close of May it became evident that General Lee was making preparations for some important movement. General Hooker soon satisfied himself that it was a movement in which the whole rebel army, under Lee, would take part ; and that he was probably contemplating a movement similar to the one which re- sulted in the battle of Antietam the year before. Comprehending its importance, and the necessity for prompt and energetic measures to meet it, ho submitted the following proposition to the consideration of the President in a letter dated Juno 5, 1863 : " In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of his excellency the President the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operation? can have an in- fluence on those of Lee's army. " Under the present system all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others ; at least such is my situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way of this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, hat only suggest, as I feel the necessity for concert as well as vigor of action. It is necessary for me to say this much, that my motives may not be misunderstood." This proposition was submitted by the President to General Hal- leck, who wrote General Hooker on that point: " Heintzelman and Dix are instructed to telegraph directly to you all move- ments which they may ascertain or make. Directions have also been given to forward military information which may be received from General Schenck's command. Any movements you may suggest in these commands will be ordered if practicable." General Hooker testified in regard to this : "This was the first intimation I received from any quarter that I held the relation to General Dix and to General Heintzelman communicated to me in the despatch of the general commanding the army. It was then I called on those officers for the strength of their commands, the positions of their troops, and the movements, if any, they were making. But, at the same time, no authority was given me over them, nor was any commander appointed." The testimony gives in detail the movements of the enemy and the movements .made by General Hooker to meet them. Your commit- tee do not deem it necessary, however, to do more than to state the general result of his operations, referring to two or three of the more important incidents connected with the movement. It being evident that General Lee had determined upon a movement into Maryland, and perhaps further north, the army of the Potomac abandoned its position in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, and moved by an interior line to the neighborhood of Washington, forcing Lee to pass along the Shenandoah valley line. As soon as information was received that the main body of Lee's army had crossed the Potomac, the army of the Potomac was crossed at Edwards's ferry, and assembled in the neighborhood of Frederick, Maryland. LII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. While these, operations were being carried on, General Pleasonton, in command of the cavalry, had an engagement with the cavalry of the enemy at Beverly ford, about the 8th of June, in which, though opposed by superior numbers, he succeeded in inflicting severe loss, and establishing a character for our cavalry which it has ever since maintained. He again met the enemy at Aldie, about the 20th of June, when our cavalry behaved with great gallantry and fully sus- tained their character for bravery and efficiency. These appear to have been the only engagements with the enemy of any importance during this period. On the 24th of June, General Hooker sent his chief of staff, Gen- •eral Butterfield, to Washington and Baltimore, with instructions to make certain representations to the President and General Halleck, and "to organize a column of 15,000, to move without delay to Frederick." On the 27th of June, General Butterfield reported that he had visited Washington, but failed to obtain any troops there. He then proceeded to Baltimore, and had an interview with General Schenck, who gave him full authority to take from his (General Schenck's) command whatever troops could be used for the purpose General Hooker had in view ; but that he had been able to organize a column of only about 2,500 strong, General Lockwood's brigade, which he had put on the road according to instructions. It will be seen, upon examination of the testimony and accompany- ing documents, that from the time there were indications of what might be the character and extent of the campaign upon which Lee was entering, General Hooker had urged upon the authorities at Washington the necessity of employing actively against the rebel army all the troops which could be used for that purpose. He urged that the best way to defend Washington and Baltimore was to defeat Lee's army, and that all efforts should be directed to that end. He was not able, however, to obtain any material addition to his own immediate army, and was not clothed with the authority he deemed accessary to enable him to perform the duty required of him. The immediate cause for General Hooker asking to be relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac was a difficulty be- tween him and General Halleck in relation to the disposition to be made of the force at Harper's Ferry. That force consisted of 10,000 men, under the commind of General French, and was embraced within the command of General Hooker. On the 27th of June he gave orders for the 12th corps to hold itself in readiness to march at 4 a. m. the next day, to be joined by a portion of General French's command: with this force it was intended to strike at the rebel com- munications across the Potomac, in order to cripple his supplies, "and also to intercept the commerce that Ewell had established in flour, grain, horses and horned cattle, which he was constantly send- ing to the rear." The day before, the 26th, General Hooker had telegraphed General Halleck as follows : GENERAL HOOKER. LIII "JUNE 26, 1863--7 p.m. "Major General HALLECK : "Is there any reason why Maryland heights should not be abandoned, after the public stores and property are remove?1 I propose to visit the place to-morrow, on my way to Frederick, to satisfy myself on that point. It must be borne in mind that I am here .with a force inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, and must have every available man to use in the field. "JOSEPH HOOKER, " Major General, Commanding." General Hooker testifies that ho proceeded the next day to Har- per's Ferry, made an examination of the place, and-.——' "After ascertaining that the public property could all be removed before 12 o'clock at night, I seated myself and was engaged in writing an order for its abandonment at daylight, when I received the following despatch from General Halleck : " WAR DEPARTMENT, Jvnc 27, 1863—10.30 a. m. "Major General HOOKER : * * * * * *.* !j:.^ " Maryland heights have always been regarded as, an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity. "H. W. HALLEGK, " General-in- Chief." To this General Hooker replied as fbllo-ws: "JUNE 27, 1863—1 p. m. "Major General HALLECK : "Have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10,000 men in condition here to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account; they cannot defend a ford on the river, and as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they re- main when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them; this is my opinion. All the public property could have been removed to- night, and the troops marched to where they would have been of some service • now they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return. " I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and his Excellency the President. "JOSEPH HOOKER, " Major General, Commanding." General Hooker testifies : "On finding that I was not allowed to manoeuvre my own army in the presence of the enemy, and conscious that I was standing in the way of the accomplish- ment of its mission, on the same day, the 27th of June, I sent General Halleck the following telegram: "JUNE 27, 1863—1 p. m. Major General HALLECK : "My original instructions were to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I hate now imposed on me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. ^ I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal, and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy. "JOSEPH HOOKER, " Major General, Commanding." LIV ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. General Hooker thereupon proceeded to Frederick, and directed the 12th corps to march to that place. On the following morning-, June 28, Colonel Hardie arrived with an order from General Halleck relieving General Hooker from command, and directing him to turn it over to General Meade : and with that ended his connexion with the army of the Potomac. In concluding their review of the operations of the army of the Potomac while under the command of General Hooker, your com- mittee would say that while all the testimony establishes the fact that the rank and file had great confidence in him as a leader, this feeling was not shared by many officers of high rank. Indeed, it would appear that tho impression prevailed that the general-in-chief was not friendly to him, and some of the witnesses state that that impression had its influence upon the feelings of the officers of the army. General Hooker states that at the time he receiver his ap- pointment as commander of the army of the Potomac, he had reliable information that General Halleck had opposed his appointment; and that the only request he made of the President at the time he assumed the command was that he (the President) should stand between him and General Halleck. General Sickles testifies that many officers in the army were decidedly hostile to General Hooker, and that that feeling was strengthened by the well-known fact that General Halleck was hostile to him; and that the partisans of General McClellan, then in high command, were hostile to General Hooker. General Birney testifies that there was among officers high in-rank a feeling against General Hooker. General Butterfield testifies that it was always the impression of General Hooker and officer? about headquarters that General Halleck was unfavorable to him, and that he believes that was the sole reason why General Hoofflr asked to be relieved from command. Other witnesses testify that many officers entertained a want of confidence in him after the battle of Chancellorsville. This would appear to have been brought to tlie attention of the President, for in a letter to General Hooker, dated May 14, 1863, he writes: " I must tell you I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true, and you should, therefore, first of all ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt." Upon the receipt of that letter, General Hooker, as lie states, called upon the President, and ascertained from whom he had derived that information. He- stated to the President that he did not desire to suspect any one wrongfully of a hostile feeling towards him, and asked the President to ascertain the feelings of his corps and division commanders, and for that purpose he would request those officers to call upon the President whenever they applied for leave to come to Washington. "What was the result of the President's investigation does not appear. He never in any way, so far as the testimony and records before your committee show, manifested any want of confi- dence in General Hooker, even after that officer had felt compelled GENERAL MEADE. LV to ask to be relieved from command by what he regarded as un- doubted evidence of hostility towards him on the part of General Halleck. In conclusion, your committee would observe that they consider it to have been extremely unfortunate that General Hooker was not permitted to have the use of such troops as he deemed necessary to enable him to carry out tlie plans he proposed to adopt for meeting and, if possible, destroying the rebel army. That those troops were disposable is clearly shown from the fact that his successor was im- mediately authorized to use them, together with other troops for which General Hooker had not asked. Nor can the committee doubt that had General Hooker been clothed with the power at once con- ferred upon his successor, and had been given the assistance which was so freely accorded to him, the result of the campaign might have been far more decisive than it was. Why the general-in-chief should have shown more desire to co-operate with and assist the one com- mander than the other, perhaps involves questions of motives and feelings which your committee refrain from commenting upon. GENERAL MEADE. The assigning General Meade to the command of the army of the Potomac, which he assumed on the 28th of June, 1863, seems to have been attended bv no immediate changes other than the trans- ferring to that army of the force at Harper's Ferry, under General French, which force had been refused to General Hooker by General Halleck ; the assigning General Couch and his force to his command, and the conferring upon him full powers for the organizing and offi- cering his army. The plans and views of General Hooker were fully made known to him by General Butterfield, who continued to act as chief of staff. General Warren states that " the troops continued to move on just the same as if the command had not been changed.'' The two armies were approaching each other so closely that it was apparent a collision could not long be avoided, and the most import- ant question undoubtedly was the selection of the field for the coming battle. General Pleasonton says that he several times informed Gen- eral Meade that, from the knowledge of the country he had acquired the previous year during the Antietam campaign, he was satisfied that there was but one place to fight the enemy, and that was Gettys- burg. With that view General Pleasonton, on the 29th of June, sent his strongest division of cavalry, under General Buford, to occupy Gettysburg, with instructions to hold that position to the last extremity until the army could be brought up there. General Meade, however, decided upon making a stand at another point for the purpose of receiving the attack of the enemy, and se- lected a position the general line of which was Pipe creek, the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at. Man- LVI ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. chester, and even down to somewhat late in the day of the 1st of July was engaged in making arrangements for occupying that posi- tion as soon as the movements of the enemy should indicate the time for doing so. To that end, on the morning of the 1st of July, a pre- liminary circular order was issued, directing his corps commanders to make the necessary preparations for carrying the order into effect as soon as circumstances should arise to render it necessary or advisa- ble in the opinion of the commanding general : and it was not until information reached General Meade, in the afternoon of July 1, that the cavalry, under General Buford, had come in contact with a large force of the enemy near Gettysburg, and that General Reynolds, who had gone to his assistance with the 1st and llth corps, had been killed, that the attention of General Meade seems to have been se- riously directed to the position at Gettysburg for meeting the enemy. He sent General Hancock there to report the condition of our troops. and the character of the ground. General Meade says that before he received the report of General Hancock he had decided, upon information received from officers from the scene of action; to con- centrate his army at Gettysburg, and it was done that night and the next day, and the battle was there fought. That circular order, with other orders and despatches of the same date, indicate the views of the commanding general and the circum- stances which led him to turn his attention to the position of Gettys- burg for the purpose of meeting the enemy. They are given here in full, as furnished by General Meade, and are as follows : [Circular.] " HEADQUARTERSS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, " Taneytown, July 1, 1863. " From information received the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz : the relief of Harrisburg and the prevention of the enemy's intended inva- sion of Philadelphia beyond the Susquehanna. " It is no longer hiss intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impediments, to withdraw the army from its present position and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester; the general direction being that of Pipe creek. " For this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and after crossing Pipe creek deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmettsburg will be withdrawn by way of Mechanicsville to Middle- burg, or, if a more direct route can be found, leaving Taneytown to their left, to withdraw direct to Middleburg. " General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and ' Two Taverns,' and withdraw them via Union Mills, deploying one to the right, and one to the left, after crossing Pipe creek, connecting on the left with General Reynolds, and communicating his right to General Sedgwick at Manchester, who will connect with him and form the right. "The time for falling back can only bo developed by circumstances; when- ever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling GENERAL MEADE. LVII back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once be communicated to these headquarters, and to all adjoining corps corn- manders. "The 2d corps, now at Taneytown, will bo held in reserve in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizelburg, to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it. In the event of these movements being necessary, the trains and. other impedimenta will all be sent to the rear of Westminster. Corps com- manders, with their officers commanding artillery and the divisions, should make themselves thoroughly familiar with the country indicated, all the roads and positions, so that no possible confusion can ensue, and that the movement, if made, be done with good order, precision and care, without loss, or any detri- ment, to the morale of the troops. " The commanders of corps are requested to communicate at once the nature of their present position, and their ability to hold them in case of any sudden attack at any point by the enemy. " This order is communicated that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position. "Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions. "The artillery reserve will, in the event of the general movement indicated, move to the rear of Frizelburg, and be placed in position, or sent to corps, as circumstances may require, under the general supervision of the chief of artillery. " The chief quartermaster will, in case of the general movement indicated, give directions for the orderly and proper position of the trains in rear of West- minster. All the trains will keep well to the right of the road in moving, and in case of any accident requiring a halt the team must be hauled out of the line and not delay the movements. " The trains ordered to Union bridge in these events will be sent to West- minster. "General headquarters will be, in case of this movement, at Frizelburg. " General Slocum as near Union Mills as the line will render best for him. "General Reynolds at or near the road from Taneytown to Frizelburg. " The chief of artillery will examine the line, and select positions for artillery. The cavalry will be held on the right and left flanks, after the movement is completed; previous to its completion lie will, as now directed, cover the front and exterior lines well out. " The commands must be prepared for a movement, and in tlie event of the enemy attacking us on the ground indicated herein, to follow up any repulse. " The chief signal officer will examine the line thoroughly, and at once, upon the announcement, extend telegraphic communications from each of the following points to general headquarters near Frizelburg, viz., Manchester, Union Mills, Middleburg, and the Tan ey town road. " All true Union people should be advised to harass and annoy the enemy in every way, to send in information, and taught how to do it, giving regi- ments by number of colors, number of guns, generals' names, &c. All their sup- plies brought to us will be paid for, and not fall into the enemy's hands. " Roads and ways to move to the right and left of general line should be studied and thoroughly understood. All movements of troops should be con- cealed, and our dispositions kept from the enemy. Their knowledge of these dispositions would be fatal to our success, and the greatest care must be taken to prevent such an occurrence. " By command of Major General Meade. " S. WILLIAMS, " Assistant Adjutant General." LVIII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 1, 1863. " COMMANDING OFFICER, First Corps: " The telegraphic intelligence received from General Conch, with the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg, or at a point somewhere on a line drawn be- tween Chambersburg and York, through Heidlersburg, and to the north of Gettysburg. " The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he liears something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position. " If the enemy is concentrated to the right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character for either an offensive or defensive position. The number of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artil- lery, and his cavalry from 6,000 to 8,000. Our numbers ought to equal it, and with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue. "The general having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does. "General Humphreys, who is at Emmettsburg with the 3d corps, the general considers an excellent adviser as to tlie nature of the country for defensive or offensive operations. If near enough lo call him to consultation with you, please do so, without interference with the responsibilities which devolve upon both. Yon have all the information which the general has received, and the general would like to have your views. "The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was re- ceived. "S. WILLIAMS, "Assistant Adjutant General." "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "July 1, 1863. "COMMANDING OFFICER, Sixth Corps: " I am directed by the commanding general to state that it would appear from reports just received that the enemy is moving in heavy force on Gettys- burg, (Ewell from Heidlersburg and Hill from Cashtown Pass,) and it is not improbable he will reach that place before the command under Major General Reynolds, (the 1st and llth corps,) now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and General Reynolds finds himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occu- pied to-night. Should circumstances render it necessary for the commanding general to fight the enemy to-day, the troops are posted as follows for the sup- port of Reynolds's command, viz: On his right, at 'Two Taverns,' the 12th GENERAL MEADE. LIX corps at Hanover, the 5th corps; the 2d corps is on the road between Taney- town and Gettysburg; the 3d corps i at Emmettsburg. "This information is conveyed to yon that you may have your corps^ in readiness to move in such direction as may be required at a moment's notice. "S. WILLIAMS, "Assistant Adjutant General." "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "July 1, 1863—1.10 p. m. "COMMANDING OFFICER, Second Corps: " The major general commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds'8 death, you assume the command of the corps there assembled, viz: the llth, 1st, and 3d at Emmetts- burg. If you think the ground and position there a suitable one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, lias gone out to sec General Reynolds. "Later—1.15 p. m. "Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of- Gettysburg. Keep your column ready-to move. "DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, "Major General, Chief of Staff. "HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, "July 1, 1863—3.20 p. m. " General PLEASONTON : " I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. " A tremendous battle has been raging since 9 1/2 a. m., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town. The enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person. " Brigadier General of Volunteers. "We need help now. " BUFORD." " 5.25. "GENERAL: " When I arrived here, aa hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken ; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which Will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the 3d corps not having yet reported, but I suppose that it is marching up; if so, his flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the mean time Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. General G. will see this despatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best to LX ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. be done. I think we can return; if not, we can fight here, as the ground ap- pears not unfavorable -with good troops. " I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him. " Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way. " Your obedient servant, "WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, " .Major General, Commanding Corps. " General Warren is here. General BUTTERFIELD, Chief-of-Staff." " HEADQUARTERS ARAIY OF THE POTOMAC, "July 1, 1863—7 p. m. " COMMANDING OFFICER, Fifth Corps : " The major general commanding directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if not already ordered to do so by General Slocum. The present prospect is that our general engagement must be there. Communicate with General SIocum, under whose direction yon were placed by the orders of this morning. The general had supposed that General SIocum would have ordered you up. "DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, "Major General', Chief-of-Staff." " HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Taneyown, July 1, 1863—7.30 p. m. " COMMANDING OFFICER, Sixth Corps : " The major general commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg ; that it is of the utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains, or turn them out of the road, that impede your progress. Your march will have to be a forced one, to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence. If any shorter road presents itself with- out difficulty in getting np, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these headquarters. " General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and Gen- eral Slocum from Littletown, and General Hancock's corps from here. The whole army is there (Gettysburg) or under way for that point. The general desires you to report here in person without delay the moment yon receive this. He is waiting to see yon here before going to the front. The trains will all go to Westminster and Union bridge as ordered. " DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, " Major General, Chief of Staff." On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, with a division of cavalry, was fiercely attacked by the enemy in the immediate vicinity of Gettysburg. He held his ground with great gallantry, and General Reynolds, upon hearing of the attack, immediately moved up to his support with the 1st and llth corps. The fighting on that day was on and near Seminary ridge, immediately west of the town of Gettysburg, and was conducted on our side entirely by the cavalry division of General Buford, and the 1st and llth corps of infantry. Quite early in the fight General Reynolds was killed, and the command devolved upon Genera] Howard, of the 11th corps. The fighting con- GENERAL MEADE. LXI tinued until about four o'clock in the afternoon, when our troops re- tired through the town and took up a position on Cemetery ridge. tad the fighting ceased for the day. General Sickles, with the 3d corps, which, with the 1st and llth, had constituted the command of General Reynolds, was at Emmetsburg, about ten miles distant. Upon hearing of the action at Gettysburg, General Sickles immediately put. his troops in motion, and they began to arrive at Gettysburg about five o'clock in the afternoon, and were at once placed in position by General Hancock, who had arrived and assumed command shortly after the position upon Cemetery ridge had been taken by General Howard. The 12th corps, under General Slocum, arrived at Gettys- burg about the same time. General Meade determined to concentrate his army at Gettysburg, and during the night of the 1st and morning of the 2d of July, the 2d, 5th, 12th, and most of the 6th corps were poved there, and placed in position upon Cemetery ridge, and other high ground connected therewith, as far as what is known as Round- trip mountain ; the line extending from Round-top mountain on the leftto Culp's hill on the right. The morning of the 2d of July was passed in strengthening the position of our army, and placing the troops in line to receive the attack of the enemy. Skirmishing began before noon, but the enemy did not make their attack in force until about half past three in the afternoon. The attack was directed mainly upon the 3d corps, under General Sickles, which was posted near the left of the line. It was very fierce, and the fighting continued until about seven o'clock, when the enemy retired. The 3d corps suffered severely in this day's en- gagement, and General Sickles received a wound resulting in the loss of a leg. . General Meade and others criticise General Sickles for the disposition he made of his troops before the fighting commenced ; claiming that by throwing forward his corps from the regular line he exposed himself to and invited the attack of the enemy. General Sickles in his testimony gives his reason for the course he pursued, and holds that the movement he made prevented a disastrous flank attack on our left, which was threatened, besides being advantageous in other respects. Some troops of the 2d and 5th corps were also engaged in support of the 3d corps. There is testimony to show that during the 2d of July General Meade contemplated abandoning his position at Gettysburg and re- tiring to some other position. As there is some controversy on that point, your committee will quote from the testimony of various wit- nesses upon the subject. General Butterfield, who was acting as chief of staff to General Meade, says : " General Meade then directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position. I stated to him that it would be necessary for me to know the exact position of the troops. "Question. What day of the fight was this? "Answer. This was on the morning of the 2d of July, before the battle of that day had commenced. I stated to General Meade that I could not prepare that order properly without first going over the field and ascertaining the position of each division and corps of the army with relation to the roads. LII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. General Meade replied that he could not wait for that; that he would show me where the troops were. He then took a pencil and a piece of paper and made a rough sketch, showing the positions of the different corps. I stated to him that the order was one requiring a great deal of care in its preparation; that it involved more than logistics, as we were in the presence of the enemy, and that while preparing it I must not be interrupted by anybody coming0 to me with despatches or orders. He said, ' Very well, you shall not be interrupted.' I told him I thought I could not prepare the order without a rnors accurate sketch, and I would have to send out to the corps commanders to give me a report of the positions of their troops in regard to the various roads ; that in the meanwhile I could be studying the maps. He said ' Very well do so' I then went up stairs, and after carefully studying the maps I prepared the order for the withdrawal of the army from the field of Gettysburg After finishing it I presented it to General Meade, and it met his approval. I then stated to him that it would be a great deal better if that order was to be executed, as it might involve great consequences if not properly executed, to submit it for careful examination to such general officers as were there present, with a view of giving them an opportunity of finding any fault with it then, so that no misunderstanding should arise from the manner in which it was worded or expressed. He said there was no objection to having that done I called General Gibbon, who was present, and, I think, General Williams and General Ingalls, and stated to them that I had been directed to prepare this order, and that 1 would be very much obliged to any of them if they would look it over and point, out any faults in it then, rather than after it was put into execution ; that I desired it scrutinized carefully, with a view of discovering anything in it which might be misunderstood. Some of these officers--I do not now remember which, I'm very sure General Gibbon was one; I think General Hancock was there, but whether he read it over or not I am not sure—some of these officers read it over, and said that they thought it was correctly prepared. The corps commanders were then sent for by General Meade to report to headquarters. The order which I had prepared was given to General Williams, and was copied by the clerks or was in process of being copied by them. As General Sickles rode up to headquarters, in pursuance of the request of General Meade, the battle broke out in front of General Sickles's corps, and there was no council held. General Sickles returned immediately, and every corps commander there rode immediately to his command. Without, my memoranda I cannot fix the hour of this occurrence, but it was during the 2d day of July." The testimony of General Williams, the adjutant general of General Meade, is as follows : "Question. Do you know anything about an order on the 2d of July to withdraw the army ? "Answer. The orders for the movements of the army under the present arrangement are generally prepared by the chief of staff, and the manuscripts of the orders are turned over to me to have copies prepared for those to whom they are to be distributed; and I am held responsible that the orders are cor- rectly copied, and that they arc delivered to the persons for whom they are intended. "I" regard to the order of the 2d of July, to the best of my recollection and belief, the chief of staff either handed to me or to my clerk an order looking to a contingency which possibly might happen of the army being compelled to assume a new position. To the best of my belief such an order was prepared and 1 presume it may have been signed by me, and possibly the copies may have been prepared for the corps and other commanders. Orders of such a character are usually made out in manifold, in order to save time. The particu- GENERAL MEADE LXIII lar order in question, however, was never distributed.; no vestige of it ia to he found among any of the records of my office; it must have been destroyed within a day or two after it was prepared. I have no reason to suppose, other than the fact that the order was given to me or my clerk by the chief of staff, that General Meade had any knowledge of it. It was not for me to look beyond the orders of the chief of staff. Whether or not a copy of that order was given to Major General Buttcrfield, wlio was then acting as chief of staff, I am unable to say, and I cannot certainly state whether the rough draught was ever handed hack to him. I only know that there is nothing in relation to that order to be found among the records in my charge. The order was never recorded or issued in any sense. I do not now remember the exact tenor of the order, but to the best of my belief it was an order which, if carried out, would have involved a retrograde movement of the army." General Gibbon says : " There is a matter connected with a report in regard to the retreat of the army from Gettysburg which I think it proper to mention in my testimony. It is this : Some time during the day of the 2d of July, but before this fight with General Sickles's corps had taken place, I was at General Meade's head- quarters, as I was frequently during the day. I consequently knew a great deal of the dispositions and orders given for the troops to come up. I had been urged frequently in the morning of that day, by General Meade, to hurry up to the field, and I heard of the other corps that were coming up. I therefore had but one idea in regard to General Meade's intention, which was to concentrate the whole army there for tlie purpose of fighting a battle. When, therefore, on coming out from the little' room in which he had his office, I met General Butterfield, hia chief of staff, and he asked me to read over with him and com- pare with a map he had there a draught of an order which he had, and I asked him what it was, when he told me that it was an order for the army to retreat, I was struck with a great deal of astonishment; and I recollect very well my exclamation: 'Great God! General Meade does not intend to leave this posi- tion?' General Butterfield did not say General Meade did intend to leave; he merely said something to the effect that it was necessary to be prepared in case it should be necessary to leave, or some remark of that kind. He then showed me the order, and either he read it over and I pointed out the places on the map, or I read it over and he pointed out the places to which each corps was to. go. When he got through I remarked that it was all correctly drawn up. " Until very recently I supposed that the order which General Butterfield showed me was an order in regard to the army falling back to a position which I heard General Meade had selected on Pipe-clay creek. But I am satisfied now that order must have been some different order from the one I had been thinking it was. Being firmly convinced, as I was at the time, that General Meade had no idea of falling back from the position there, it struck me as very remarkable that his chief of staff should be making such an order to retreat; and I still think so." General Sickles says that he received some intimation that it was in contemplation to fall back from Gettysburg, and that the question was to be submitted to the corps commanders ; that he was sent for to go to headquarters, but did not go until he received the second summons ; and that just as he arrived there the battle began, and lie returned to his corps without dismounting. General Howe says in his testimony : " I said to General Sedgwick, ' We ought to let our men have the best chance to rest that they can get right off; we are not likely to be called on to fight to- LXIV ARMY OF THE POTOMAC night; let us give the men a chance to get some coffee and rest all they can, for there will be something' done to-morrow undoubtedly.' He remarked to me, 'It is a little early yet; they are discussing whether we shall stay here, or move back to Westminster.' That is twenty-one or twenty-two miles. I said, ' It is some distance back there.' Said he, ' Can we move back ?' I replied, ' Yes, if it is necessary; we have just come over the road, and we know it; the men are worn; but if it is necessary the 6th corps can go back after resting two or three hours.' General Sedgwick gave me to understand that our army would prob- ably move back to Westminster. "Question. This was the night, after General Sickles was wounded ? "Answer. Yes, sir; this was the second day of the fight, the 2d of July. " Question. Who was in that council discussing the question of retreating ? " Answer. I do not know ; what I heard I had from General Sedgwick. He said, 'I think we are going to move back.' The impression he gave me was -that General Meade had the question under consideration. General Sedgwick said the question of falling back was then being considered, and the impression given to me was that we should move back to Westminster. Soon after, how- ever, it seemed to be decided that we were to remain there-" It will be seen that General Meade is very emphatic in his state- ment that he never gave or contemplated the giving any such order. He says : " I have understood that an idea has prevailed that I intended an order should be issued on the morning of the 2d of July, requiring the withdrawal of the army, or the retreat of the army from Gettysburg, which order was not issued owing simply to the attack of the enemy having prevented it. " In reply to that, I have only to say that I have no recollection of ever having directed such an order to be issued, or ever having contemplated the issuing of such an order, and that it does seem to me that to any intelligent mind who is made acquainted with the great exertions I made to mass my army at Gettys- burg on the night of July 1, it must appear entirely incomprehensible that I should order it to retreat after collecting all my army there, before the enemy had done anything to require me to make a movement of any kind." Subsequently General Meade appeared and said : " I desire to add a little to my testimony, with the permission of the committee. "The chairman. Certainly; yon are at liberty to make such additional state- ments as yon please. " The witness. I wanted to say a few words to the committee, in extension of the remarks which I made the last time I was here, in reference to a charge which I expected then would be made against me, and which I understand has since been made against me, to the effect that I intended that an order should be issued, on the morning of July 2, withdrawing the army from the position it then occupied at Gettysburg, and retreating, before the enemy had done any- thing to require me to withdraw. "It is proper that I should say that the fact of such a charge having been made here, or such a report given here, has reached me through outside sources, but in such a way that I can hardly disbelieve that such a statement has been made; and that it was made by an officer who occupied a very high and confi- dential position on my staff, the chief of staff, Major General Butterfield. Now, indulging in the utmost charity towards General Butterfield, and believing that he is sincere in what he says, I want to explain how it is possible that such an extraordinary idea could have got into his head. " I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be made GENERAL MEADE. LXV known—-I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies, which the future should I, develop during the course of the day, might render it a matter of necessity I that the army should be withdrawn. I base this denial not only upon my own I assertion and my own veracity, but I shall also show to the committee, from documentary evidence, the despatches and orders issued by me at different periods during that day, that if I did intend any such operation I was at the same time doing things totally inconsistent with any such intention. "I shall also ask the committee to call before them certain other officers of my staff, whose position were as near and confidential to me as that of General Butterfield, who, if I had had any such intention, or had given any such orders as he said 1 gave, would have been parties to it, would have known it, and have made arrangements in consequence thereof; all of whom, I am perfectly confi- dent, will say they never heard of such thing. I refer to General Hunt, chief of artillery, and who had artillery occupying a space of from four to five miles, drawn out on the road, and who, if I had Intended to have withdrawn that army, should have been told to get his trains out of the way the very first thing, because the troops could not move until the artillery moved. I would also ask you to call upon General Ing-alls, my chief quartermaster, who had charge of the trains. Also General Warren, my chief engineer, who will tell you that he was_ with we the whole of that day, in constant intercourse and communication with me; and that instead of intending to withdraw my army I was talking about other matters. All these officers will corroborate what I say that I never mentioned any such purpose to any of them. "General Butterfield remained at Taneytown on the night of the 1st July and did not Join me on the field until about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning of the 2d, I having arrived there at one o'clock. Soon after he arrived I did direct him to familiarize himself with the topography of the ground; and directed him to send out staff officers to learn all the roads. As I have already mentioned in my previous testimony here, I had never before been at Gettysburg, and did not know how many roads ran from our position, or in what directions they ran My orders to General Butterfield were similar to this : • " General Bntterfield, neither I nor any man can tell what the results of this day's operations may be. It is our duty to be prepared for every contin- gency and 1 wish you to send out staff officers to learn all the roads that lead from this place , ascertain the positions of the corps ; where their trains are; prepare to familiarize yourself with these details, so that in the event of any contingency you can, without any order, be ready to meet it.' "It was in anticipation of possible contingencies, and not at all that I had made up my mind to do anything of that kind. "I would furthermore call the attention of the committee to the absurdity of such an idea. If I had directed the order to be issued, why was it not issued ? With General Butterfield's capacity it would not have taken him more than ten or fifteen minutes to prepare such an order. We were furnished with what you call manifold letter-writers; so that, after the frame-work of an order is pre- pared, ten or a dozen copies may be made at once. Why was not the order issued ; or it issued, why was it not executed ? There was no obstacle to my withdrawing that army if I had desired. The enemy presented none. There was not a moment from the time the first gun was fired at Gettysburg, until we knew the enemy had retired, that I could not have withdrawn my army; there- fore, it 1 had entertained such an idea, it seems to me extraordinary that I did not execute it. * * * * * * * " That General Butterfield may have misapprehended what I said to him, that he may himself have deemed a retreat necessary, and thought we would be compelled to retreat in the course of the day, and in the excess of zeal, and Part i——v LXVI ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. desire to do more than he was called upon to do, may have drawn up an order of that kind, I do not deny ; but I say he never showed me any such order, and it had not my sanction nor authority." General Hunt says in his testimony : " Question. Had you any knowledge of any order being- prepared, during the battle of Gettysburg, for tlie withdrawal of the army from the position it then occupied? "Answer. No, sir; I know of no such order, and no such intention. I pre- sume if any such intention had been entertained I should have known of it as soon as anybody, as the first thing to have been done was to get rid of the large reserve artillery and ammunition train under my charge, and which had been brought up on tlie morning of the 2d of July, under or by the direction of General Meade. " Question. You say you had no knowledge or intimation of any such thing daring the battle? " Answer. None at all. The only time I ever had a thought that such an idea might be entertained was on the night of the 2d of July. On that night I was down at the artillery reserve, refitting and reorganizing the batteries that had been cut up that day; I received a message from General Meade's head- quarters, (I do not now recollect whether it was from General Meade himself, or from General Butterfield,) stating that both General Tyler, who com- manded the reserve artillery, and myself were wanted at headquarters. I told General Tyier that it was impossible for me to go just then, but that if the question came up about falling back, to cast my vote against it. He remained for some time, and I went up with him, perhaps a half an hour afterwards. On arriving at headquarters I understood that the question had been spoken of as to what they should do, and there was no person at all in favor of leaving the ground we had taken; that was just as the conversation closed." General Sedgwick testifies as follows : " Question. Have you any knowledge of the preparation of any order for the withdrawal of the army at any time during the battle of Gettysburg, or the retreat of the army from the position it then held ? " Answer. I never heard of any such order until within the last four weeks; and when I first heard it, I denied most positively that any such order could have been given. I was the second in command there. I reported to General Meade at a critical time, and if he contemplated so important a move he would have informed me. Besides, his urging my corps forward shows that he in- tended to fight the battle there. General Meade undoubtedly was apprehensive that the enemy might turn his flank, and in that event he would have had to take up a new position; but I do not think he ever contemplated any retreat. "Question. Had it been the intention of the commanding general to retreat the army, was not the order to you to come up in direct conflict with any such in- tended movement? "Answer. Certainly it was. In the course of the night of the 1st and the morning of the 2d of July I received no less than three verbal messages from him to hurry up with all possible despatch." On the night of the 2d of July a council was held at General Meade's headquarters to determine upon the best action to be taken. General Meade testifies as follows, in reference to that council: "The questions discussed by this council were: First, whether it was neces- sary for us to assume any different position from what we then held; and, secondly, whether, if we continued to maintain the position we then held, our GENERAL MEADE. LXVII operations of the next day slionid be offensive or defensive. The opinion of the council was unanimous, which agreed fully with my own views that we should maintain our lines as they were then held, and that we should wait the movements of the enemy, and see if he made any further attack before we assumed the offensive." General Butterfield, in testimony, says : " That evening, after the enemy were repulsed, a council of corps commanders was held. I kept minutes of that council, which I sent to General Williams, who informs me that they have been lost. The general question put to the corps commanders present at that council was, whether our army should re- main on that field and continue tlie battle, or whether we should change to some other position. A vote of the corps commanders was taken in regard to that, and a majority were in favor of remaining on the field, and fighting it out. General Slocum gave the first opinion; his answer was, 'stay and fight it out.' I will not be positive as to what corps commanders differed with liirn, but the majority were for remaining on the line which the army then held and fighting it out. "Can you give the opinion of each corps commander? Because, perhaps, in justice to them, that ought to be known. "Answer. My impression is that those generals can tell how they voted. I am clear in my memory that General Slocum voted to stay and fight it out, and that General Sykes so voted; that General Newton entered into a long discussion to show that that position was a disadvantageous one; that he was not prepared to vote to leave it, but he wanted the council to understand that he had objections to it. General Birney, I think, voted to stay and fight it out, as did General Hancock also. I do not remember what General Sedgwick's vote was, nor do I remember how General Howard voted. I think he had a great deal to say upon the subject. The reason I do not remember the vote exactly is because I intrusted the matter to the memorandum which I sent General "Williams. After the council had finished, General Meade arose from the table, and remarked that, in his opinion, Gettysburg was no place to fight a battle; but it was settled to remain there, and the council dispersed." General Birney also testifies that the council, on the night of the 2d of July, was divided on the question of retiring to another position; bnt that a majority were in favor of remaining at Gettysburg and awaiting the attack of the enemy. On the 3d of July, no active operations took place until about noon, except on the extreme right, where the 12th corps drove the enemy from a position taken by them during the night, and which had been occupied by some of our troops that had been sent to t left during the fig-lit of the 2d. Not long after midday the enemy opened a furious cannonade upon our line from a large number of guns, estimated at from 125 to 150 pieces. The cannonade is de- scribed by witnesses as exceeding anything that had occurred in any previous battle of the war. . The cannonade and the assault that fol- lowed is thus described by General Hancock, who commanded that portion of the line against which it was directed : " About one or two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy commenced a terrific cannonade from, probably, 120 pieces of artillery, on the front of the line con- necting Cemetery hill with Bound-top, the left centre commanded by me. That line consisted of the 1st, 2d and 3d corps, of which I had the general command. I commanded that whole front General Gibbon commanded the 2d corps in my LXVIII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. absence, General Newton the 1st corps, and General Birney the 3d. That can- nonade continued for, probably, an hour and a half. The enemy then made an assault at the end of that time. It was a very formidable assault, and made, I should judge, with about 18,000 infantry. When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the centre of our line. But after marching straight out a little distance, they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Ceme- tery hill, which I have no doubt was their intention. They attacked with won- derful spirit—nothing could have been more spirited. The shuck of the assault fell upon the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps, and those were the troops, assisted by a small brigade of Vermont troops, together with the artillery of our line, which fired from Round-top to Cemetery hill at the enemy all the way as they advanced, whenever they had the opportunity—those were the troops that really met the assault. No donbt there were other troops that fired a little ; but these were the troops that really withstood the shock of the assault and repulsed it. The attack of the enemy was met by about six small brigades of our troops, and was finally repulsed after a terrific contest at very close quarters, in which our troops to.ok about thirty or forty colors, and some 4,000 or 5,000 prisoners, with great loss to the enemy in killed and wounded. The repulse was a most signal one, and that decided the battle, and was practically the end of the fight. I was wounded at the close of the assault, and that ended my operations with the enemy for that campaign." Other witnesses also testify to the terrific character of the cannon- ade, and the furious assault; and its signal and complete repulse. The enemy fell back in great confusion behind their artillery line, leaving it insufficiently supported. General Hancock states that while wounded, and just before being carried off the field, he dic- tated a note to General Meade, urging that the 5th and 6th corps should be at once ordered to advance and pursue the retreating enemy. His testimony is as follows : " I must say one tiling here: I think it was, probably, an unfortunate thing that I was wounded at the time I was, and equally unfortunate that General Gibbon was also wounded; because the absence of a prominent commander who knew the circumstances thoroughly at such a moment as that was a great dis- advantage. I think our lines should have advanced immediately, and L believe we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade told me before the fight that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the 5th and Gth corps on the enemy's flank. 1, therefore, when I was wounded and lying down in my ambulance and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the 5th and 6th corps I believed he would win a great victory. I asked him afterwards, when I returned to the army, what he had done in the premises. He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night, except that some of the Pennsylvania reserves went out and met Hood's division, it was under- stood, of the enemy, and actually overthrew .it—assisted, no doubt, in some measure by their knowledge of their failure in the assault. There were only two divisions of the enemy on our extreme left, opposite Round-top, and there was a gap in their line of one mile that their assault had left. And I believe if our whole line had advanced with spirit, it is not unlikely that we would have taken all their artillery at that point. I think that was a fault; that we should have pushed the enemy there, for we do not often catch them in tliat position. And the rule is, and it is natural, that when you repulse or defeat an enemy, GENERAL MEADE. LXIX you should pursue him; and I believe it is a rare thing that one party beats -another and does not pnrsue him. And I think that on that occasion it only required an order and prompt execution." Other witnesses concur in the opinion that if a prompt and vigorous advance had been made immediately after the repulse of the enemy, it would have resulted in a great victory, and the loss of the most, if not the whole, of the line of artillery from which the enemy had opened previous to their assault. Orders were given to General Sykes and General Sedgwick to advance with the 5th corps, but the movement was made so slowly that nothing practically resulted from it, except the capture of some prisoners on.the left. At the conclusion of the battle on Friday, our troops were in good condition, in the best of spirits, and anxious to be led against the enemy. The three days of the battle liad been for the most of them comparatively days of rest, and though we lost heavily, our loss had not been so great as that of the enemy, while the morale of our troops was far better. General Howe speaks of the battle as the most •orderly fight he had ever been in ; that the position did the work for us ; that, there was no manoeuvring, no combinations on our part, no great generalship displayed, for none was needed ; and at, the close of the fight our men were not much jaded or fatigued, but had plenty of fight in them, and were comparatively fresh. The considerations which seemed to influence the general in com- mand and the corps commanders, in relation to the pursuit of the enemy after their final repulse, are these : General Meade says that even on the 5th of July he was not satisfied that the enemy was in full retreat for the Potomac, or what his further movements would be, and was not aware of the injury he had inflicted upon the enemy in the battle that had just taken place. General Warren says, '' there was a tone among most of the prominent officers that we had quite saved the country for a time, and that we had done enough ; that we might jeopard all we had won by trying to do too much." All the witnesses but General Meade state that it was very appar- ent, on the morning of the 4th of July, that the enemy were in full re- treat, and Generals Pleasonton, Warren, Birney, and others state that they counselled an immediate pursuit. General Birney says that he asked and obtained permission to make an attack that morn- ing on the enemy as they were crossing a point uear him on the pike to Hagerstown ; but just as he had commenced the movement to at- tack, a staff officer rode up with a written order from General Meade not to attack, but to let the enemy go, which was done. General Pleasonton states that when he urged General Meade to order an im- mediate advance of the army after the enemy, he replied that "he was not sure they might not make another attack on him, and to satisfy himself, he wanted to know first, that they were in retreat, •and for that reason I was to send the cavalry out to ascertain." He •states that General Gregg, 22 miles on the Chambersburg road, re- ported at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, "that the road was strewn with wounded and stragglers, ambulances and caissons, and that there was great demoralization and confusion." This was imme- diately reported to General Meade, but no pursuit was ordered. LXX ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. But little was done on the 4th of July. General Warren says : " On the morning of the 4th General Meade ordered demonstrations in front of our line, but they were very feebly made. And when the officers met together that evening to report the state of things in their front, there was so little definitely known as to the position and designs of the enemy, that after some consultation they determined, I believe, to try and find out something before they did move." That night a council of war was held. Its. deliberations and results are thus described by General Butterfield, from memoranda taken at the time : " I have here the minutes I .kept of the council of the 4th of July. That council was held at the headquarters of General Neal; he gave up his head- quarters to General Meade. The council was opened by General Meade ex- plaining his instructions, and asking the corps commanders for their advice as to what course he should pursue. " Question. Can you state what General Meade said his instructions were ? " Answer. I think he said his instructions were to cover Washington and Baltimore. He said he had no knowledge of General Foster's movements. There was a rumor that General Foster was coming up from Washington with re-enforcements. General Meade said he desired the earnest assistance and advice of every corps commander. The corps commanders commenced giving their opinions, beginning with General Slocum and followed by General Sedg- wick and General Howard. Their advice, according to my memorandum, was as follows: "General Slocum would move on an interior line as far as Emmettsburg,. and then, if the enemy had not gone from Gettysburg, hold on there and push out a force at once with a view of preventing the enemy from crossing the- Potomac. " General Sedgwick would wait at Gettysburg until certain that the enemy were moving away. " General Howard would like to remain at Gettysburg and ascertain what the enemy were doing, but thought it would do no harm to send a corps to Emmettsburg. " General Meade then determined to change the manner of procedure in the council, and the following questions were written by his instructions ; a portion of these questions are in his handwriting and a portion in mine : " The first question was, ' Shall this army remain here ?' (.That is, at Get- tysburg.) "Second. 'If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?' "Third. 'Do yon deem it expedient to move towards Williamsport, through Emmettsburg ?' " Fourth. ' Shall we pursue the enemy, if he is retreating on his direct line of retreat ?' "To the first question General Newton answered 'No;' to the second question, ' No ;' and to the third question, ' Yes.' " General Slocum answered to the first question ' No ;' the second question was involved in that answer; to the third question, ' Yes ;' to the fourth ques- tion, ' To pursue on the direct line of retreat with cavalry, moving with the infantry to cut him off.' " General Sedgwick to the first question answered, ' Would remain here (at Gettysburg) until positive information concerning their movement;' to the second question, 'No;' to the third question, 'Yes;' to the fourth question,. ' Only cavalry.' GENERAL MEADE. LXXI " General Howard to the first question did not exactly say yes, and did not exactly, say no, bnt would commence a movement to-morrow; to the second question, 'No;' to the third question, 'Yea;' to he fourth question,'By a show ot force.' . " General Sykes to the first question, as to remaining at Gettysburg, answered, ' Until _we know where the enemy is gone;' to the second question, 'No; to the third question he made no answer, his answer to the first question involving that; to the fourth question he answered, • He would pursue with cavalry only.' " General Birney to the first question answered, ' Yes, until we see •' to the second question, ' No ;' to the fourth question, ' He thinks not.' " General Pleasonton to the first question answered ' No;' to the. second question, 'No;' to the third question, 'Move by that route;' to the fourth question, ' Would pursue with infantry and cavalry.' " General Hays answered to the first question, ' Yes, until we find out where the enemy are and what they are doing;' to the second question, ' No ;' to the third question, 'Yes, if we move;' to the fourth question. 'No, only with cavalry.' ' • " General Warren as to the first question, whether we should remain there, answered, 'Yes, until we see what they are doing;' to the second question, about assuming the offensive, ' Not if the enemy remains.' " Those arc the questions to the corps commanders and their answers. The summary which I made for General Meade in the council of the answers to the first question, whether we should remain at Gettysburg, was : "Those in favor—Birney,' Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren. " Opposed—Newton, Pleasonton, and Slocum. " Doubtful—Howard." On the 5th of July the 6th corps commenced to follow the enemy, and on the 6th and 7th the rest of the army moved, going to Fred- erick rather than directly after the enemy, on account of some appre- hensions of the difficulty of following the enemy through the moun- tain passes, which were reported to be strongly fortified. General Howe states that his division had the lead of the 6th corps, after passing ^Boonsboro', but he was directed to move carefully, and not to come in contact with the enemy, as a general engagement, was not desired. He states that when near Fnnkstown General Buford re- ported to him that his cavalry held a strong position some distance to the front, which, in his opinion, the enemy should not be allowed to occupy, but that he was pretty hardly engaged there; his ammuni- tion was nearly out, and that lie was expected to go further to the right; and asked General Howe to send forward a brigade and hold the position. General Howe applied to General Sedgwick for per- mission to relieve General Buford, but received in reply the answer, "No; we do not want to bring on a general engagement.'' General Buford considered the position of such importance that General Howe applied the second time for permission to occupy it, representing that General Buford would soon be compelled to abandon it, as his ammunition was giving out. To this application he received the re- ply that he might occupy the position if General Buford left it. Gen- eral Buford did leave it, and General Howe occupied and held the position. General Pleasonton states that on the morning of the 12th of July the cavalry in front of General Slocum's command drove the LXXII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. enemy from an important position, and could have held it, but ( eral Slocum ordered it to halt, for fear of bringing on a genera. gagement, and the enenry afterwards brought a strong force t and held the point. In reference to the movement of our army after the battle of Gel burg, General Warren testifies : "We commenced the pursuit with the Gth corps on the 5th of July, an the Gth a large portion of tlie army moved towards Emmettsburg, and all that left followed the nest day. On July 7 the headquarters were at Frederick July 8 headquarters were at Middletown, and nearly all the army was cor trated in tlie neighborhood of that place and South mountain. On Ju headquarters were at South Mountain house, and the advance of the arm Boonsboro' and Rohrersville. On July 10 the headquarters were move Antietam creek; the left of the line crossed the creek, and the right of the moved up near Funkstown. On the llth of July the engineers put a new br over the Antietam creek; the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jon crossroads, while the right remained nearly stationary. In my opinion we shi have fought the enemy the next morning, July 12." No attack was ordered, but the question was submitted to a coin of the corps commanders on tlie night of the 12th of Julv. General Meade says : " I represented to those generals, so far as I knew it, the situation of afft I told them that I had reason to believe, from all I could ascertain, that Gen Lee's position was a very strong one. and that he was prepared to give bal and defend it if attacked; that it was not in my power, from a want of knc edge of the ground, and from not having had time to make reconnoiasances indicate any precise mode of attack, or any precise point of attack; that, nei theless, I was in favor of moving forward and attacking the enemy, and tak the consequences ; but that I left it to their judgment, and would not do it unl it met with their approval." Generals Howard, Pleasonton, and Wadsworth were in favor attacking the enemy at once. General Warren, who was not then command of a corps, says : "I do not think I ever saw the princi corps commanders so unanimous in favor of not fighting as on tt occasion." The opinion of the .council being strongly against attac ing the enemy at that time, the 13th of July was passed in recc noitring the enemy's position. But General Meade says that t day was rainy and misty, and not much information was obtaine General Meade, however, ordered an attack to be made at daylig of the 14th ; but when the army moved forward it was ascertain' that the whole rebel army had crossed the night of the 13th, and hi escaped. General Meade says : " It is proper I should say that an examination of the enemy's lines, and the defences which he had made, brings me clearly to the opinion that an attai under the circumstances in which I had proposed to make it would have result! disastrously to our arms. * * * * * Ai my opinion is now that General Lee evacuated that position, not from anywa: of ammunition, or the fear that he would be dislodged by any active operatiol on my part, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent by Harper LXXII ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. enemy from an important position, and could have held it, but Gen- eral Slocum ordered it to halt, for fear of bringing on a general en- gagement, and the enemy afterwards brought a strong force there and held the point. In reference to the movement of our army after the battle of Gettys- burg, General Warren testifies : "We commenced the pursuit with the 6th corps on the 5th of July, and on the 6th a large portion of the army moved towards Emmettsburg, and all that was left followed the next day. On July 7 the headquarters were at Frederick; on July 8 headquarters were at Middletown, and nearly all the army was concen- trated in the neighborhood of that place and South mountain. On July 9 headquarters were at South Mountain house, and the advance of the army at Boonsboro' and Rohrersville. On July 10 the headquarters were moved to Antietam creek; the left of the line crossed the creek, and the right of the line moved up near Funkstown. On the llth of July the engineers put a new bridge over the Antietam creek; the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jones's crossroads, while the right remained nearly stationary. In my opinion we should have fought the enemy the nest morning, July 12." No attack was ordered, but the question was submitted to a council of the corps commanders on the night of the 12th of July. General Meade says : " I represented to those generals, so far as I knew it, the situation of affairs. I told them that I had reason to believe, from all I could ascertain, that General Lee's position was a very strong one, and that he was prepared to give battle, and defend it if attacked; that it was not in my power, from a want of knowl- edge of the ground, and from not having had time to make reconnoissanees, to indicate any precise mode of attack, or any precise point of attack; that, never- theless, I was in favor of moving forward and attacking the enemy, and taking the consequences ; but that I left it to their judgment, and would not do it unless it met with their approval." Generals Howard, Pleasonton, and Wadsworth were in favor of attacking the enemy at once. General Warren, who was not then in command of a corps, says : "I do not think I ever saw the principal corps commanders so unanimous in favor of not fighting as on that occasion." The opinion of the .council being strongly against attack- ing the enemy at that time, the 13th of July was passed in recon- noitring the enemy's position. But Gene/al Meade says that the day was rainy and misty, and not much information was obtained. General Meade, however, ordered an attack to be made at daylight of the 14th ; but when the army moved forward it. was ascertained that the whole rebel arm}- had crossed the night of the 13th, and had escaped. General Meade says : "It is proper I should say that an examination of the enemy's lines, and of the defences which he had made, brings me clearly to the opinion that an attack under the circumstances in which I had proposed to make it would have resulted disastrously to our arms. * * * * * And my opinion is now that General Lee evacuated that position, not from any want of ammunition, or the fear that ho would be dislodged by any active operations on my part, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent by Harper's LXXIV ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. mined to fall back, which he did until he finally reached the position of Centreville and Bull Run, destroying- the bridge across the Rappa- hannock and abandoning the railroad communications to the enemy. As soon aa our army stopped. General Lee began himself to fall back, destroying the railroad, and retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. There seems to be no doubt that the enemy might have been advan- tageously met at any one of several points between the Rappahannock and Bull Run; but no fighting of importance occurred, except at Bristow station, where the 2d corps, then under the command of General Warren, met the enemy and repulsed them with heavy loss. General Warren says that he thinks General Meade supposed that the enemy intended to fight him when he made his advance, and therefore General Meade desired to select the best position for that purpose; that General Meade had no idea that Lee would go off without attacking him. General Warren also says that General Meade was very much misinformed as to what was going on; and that some of his officers failed him inspirit. By this retreat and the destruction of our lines of communication with the Rappahannock, the remainder of the fall season was lest for active operations. After the enemy had retired our army again advanced as far as Warrenton, arriving there the latter part of October. A. delay of some days occurred for the purpose of repairing the railroad as far as that point; and then, about the 8th of November, the army again crossed the Rappahannock. The most of the witnesses express the opinion that had the army then moved promptly beyond the Rappa- hannock, it must have resulted most disastrously to the rebel army. The enemy had gone into winter quarters ; their forces were scattered over a distance of some forty miles ; the movement of our army-took them completely by surprise, and a prompt advance would have di- vided their army. But a delay again took place, in order to rebuild the railroad from Warrenton to the Rappahannock, and no general advance was made until nearly the close of November. On the 26th of November OUT army again advanced, but the move- ment was delayed in crossing the Rapidan, in consequence of tho pre- cipitous character of the banks at some of the places selected for crossing, and also because the pontoon bridges were found to be too short to span the river ; and after the crossing was accomplished, which was done with little or no opposition from the enemy, there was a failure to concentrate at Robertson's tavern as directed by Gen- eral Meade, the force under General French failing to reach there at the time indicated. This led to another delay, until his forces should come up. The army then advanced until it arrived before the enemy's position on Mine run. Our forces, at that time, were greatly superior to those of the en- emy. General Howe states that while our army was before the enemy at Mine run, General Meade himself estimated his own forces at 68,000 fighting men, while he did not consider the force of the enemy as exceeding 45,000 men. General Warren says that he urged that if an attack was to be made on that line, it should be made at once, though he was of opin- GENERAL MEADE. LXXV ion that the better plan was to turn the enemy's left and get beyond their works. But a day was spent in reconnoitring' and examining the position of the enemy. An attack was ordered from both the left and right of our line the next morning ; that on the left to be com- menced by General Warren at 8 o'clock, that on the right by Gen- eral Sedgwick an hour later. General Warren states that upon examin- ing the position of the enemy by daylight on the morning appointed for the attack, he found it had been so strengthened during the pre- vious night that he deemed it inadvisable to attack, and took the re- sponsibility himself of suspending the attack until he could commu- nicate with General Meade; that General Meade, upon receiving the in- formation, rode out to the left of our line, and after full consultation with him (General Warren) General Meade said "that he thought it was best for us that we had not attacked : that the enemy he had no doubt was fully prepared for us." Preparations had in the mean time been made for the attack on out- right. General Howe says that during the night our troops took up a secure position, unobserved by the enemy, in some woods, where they could look right into the enemy's camp ; that the troops were in good spirits and eager for the attack; that the artillery opened at the time appointed, but had fired only a few shots when an order came to suspend the attack, in consequence, as he understood, of the failure to make the attack on our left. General Birney, in the centre, had moved with his division to the attack, had crossed the stream and penetrated beyond the first line of the enemy's works, when an aid rode up and directed him to fall back, stating that he had attacked by mistake. General Birney ac- cordingly fell back to his former position. No further demonstrations were made, and the following day our army retired without opposition to its former line upon the Rappa- hannock, and active operations, so far as the main army was concerned, then ceased for the winter. It will thus be seen that no attack was made by the Army of the Potomac upon the rebel army, under Lee, from the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, under General Hooker, until Lieutenant General Grant assumed the active control of that army and commenced the campaign which has so lately resulted in the capture of the rebel • capital and the annihilation of Lee's army, followed by the entire destruction of the rebel military power. The battle of Gettysburg, though important in its results, was purely a defensive battle on our part, and was not followed by such active measures as in the opinion of the majority of the witnesses were necessary and practicable to enable us to reap the full fruits of the victory there gained. General Warren, who attributes the failure of the army of the Potomac, while under General Meade's command, to achieve and great and practical success over the 'enemy rather to the failure of the officers under him than to anything on the part of General Meade, gave the following testimony in "March, 1864: " Question. Is it not your opinion that we have lost a great many opportuni- ties by hesitating and waiting at the decisive points ? LXXVI ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "Answer. Yes, sir; I will enumerate the points where, during the last year, I think we have lost opportunities. " I think we should have advanced on the evening of the 3d of July, after the enemy were repulsed at Gettysburg, with all the force we had on our left. "I think we should have attacked the enemy at Williamsport on the morning of the 12th of July; I think we were as ready then as we ever were, and the enemy was not ready at all. " Then we lost another opportunity at Manassas gap, on the 23d of July, while the enemy were retreating. " Then again we lost another opportunity when the enemy attacked us on the 14th of October, at Bristow. Perhaps not at that point exactly, but during that movement, we missed an opportunity that wo should be very glad to have again. " Then again we lost a good opportunity after we recrossed the Rappahannock on the 8th of November. " And another opportunity was lost in not making the junction we should have had at Robertson's tavern on the 27th of November. "Nearly all these delays and failures are due, not so much to General Meade, as to his plans and expectations not being carried out. "Question. And you think that, on the occasions you have enumerated, with promptness and energy of action serious injury might have been inflicted upon the enemy ? "Answer. Yes, sir; almost amounting to his destruction." Your committee could not forbear asking the witnesses before them, if the army, after all these indecisive advances and retrograde movements, still retained confidence in its commanding general. Various answers were returned to this inquiry, all, however, tending to establish the fact that much discouragement had been felt by the army at these ineffective operations, and that but for the highly intelli- gent character of the rank and file it could never have retained even its then effective condition. General Pleasonton states that the cavalry under his command did not retain confidence in the mili- tary ability of General Meade. General Birney states the same about his corps, stating that while General Meade was rather liked as a man, he was not regarded as a man of resolution, or one who is willing to assume that responsibility required by the position he occupies. General Howe states that, in his opinion, the rank and file of the army do not regard General Meade as possessed of that zeal, activity, and energy necessary to carry on an offensive warfare generally, but he admits that the most of the corps commanders would probably say that General Meade was eminently qualified for the command he now holds. That opinion General Howe qualifies, however, by stating that so far as he has observed, the most of the principal officers of the army of the Potomac, including its commanding general, are governed by the same sympathies, feelings, and considerations which were infused into the army by its commander during the Peninsular campaign. General Birney says that many of the principal officers believed that General McClellan was the only general who should command this army ; although there is not as much of that feeling now as formerly. General Doubleday bluntly says: '' There has always been a great deal of favoritism in the army of the Potomac. No man who is an anti-slavery man or an anti-McClellan man can expect de- GENERAL MEADE. LXXVII cent treatment in that army as at present constituted." General Warren states that after the battle of Gettysburg the army was de- prived of many of its best corps commanders, General Reynolds having been killed, Generals Sickles and Hancock wounded, and General Meade made commander of the army; that since that time the corps commanders have not been all equal to their position, and consequently the army had been less effective in its operations. Respectfully submitted. B. F. WADE, Chairman. (to be continued)